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'The Dramas of 'Bhāsa

BY

JYOTISCHANDRA GHATAK, M.A.

Book I

The Age of Bhāsa

The thirteen dramas of the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series which have been published by MM. T. Ganapati Śāstri and have been ascribed to Bhāsa have created quite a sensation in the literary as well as in the historical world. The dramas are :—

1. Svapna-vāsava-dattam	...	(3 Acts).
2. Pratijñā-Yaugandharāyaṇam	...	(6 „).
3. Pañcarātram	...	(3 „).
4. Avi-mārakam	...	(6 „).
5. Bāla-caritam	...	(5 „).
6. Madhyama-vyāyoga	...	(1 Act).
7. Dūta-vākyaṃ	...	(1 „).
8. Dūta-ghaṭōtkacam	...	(1 „).
9. Karṇa-bhāram	...	(1 „).
10. Ūru-bhaṅgam	...	(1 „).
11. Abhiśeka-nāṭakam	...	(6 Acts).
12. Cārudattam	...	(4 „).
13. Pratimā-nāṭakam	...	(7 „).

Now, there have been two schools, to speak broadly, as regards their view about the antiquity of these works ; one school holding that the author was the well-known Bhāsa mentioned honourably by both Kālidāsa and Bāṇabhaṭṭa, while the other maintaining that the author of these works is not Bhāsa at all ; he must be an unknown Bhāsa, a Pseudo-Bhāsa, who flourished after

Kālidāsa and Bāṇa, very probably in the latter part of the 7th century or in the 8th century A.D.

Now, those scholars who believe that the author of these works is Bhāsa and the true Bhāsa alluded to by Kālidāsa and Bāṇabhaṭṭa, fall broadly into four classes :—

(1) One group holding that this Bhāsa was anterior even to Kautilya and flourished before the 4th century B. C.

(2) The second maintaining, that the poet came after Kautilya but before Patañjali, that is he flourished between 4th century B.C., and 2nd century B.C.

(3) The third believing, that the poet came after Patañjali but before Aśvaghoṣa that is to say, flourishing between 2nd century B.C. and 2nd century or 3rd century A.D.

(4) The fourth saying, that the poet came after Aśvaghoṣa but before Kālidāsa that is to say flourishing between 2nd or 3rd century A.D. and 5th or 6th century A.D.

To the Pseudo-Bhāsa school belong Mr. Barnett (L.D.), Bhaṭṭa Nāthasvāmi and others (*vide* J. R. A. S., 1921, p. 587; Indian Antiquary, 1916, p. 189); (Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, London Institute, 1920.)

To the 1st subdivision of the True-Bhāsa school belong Mr. T. Ganapati Śāstri, Hiralal Amritlal Shah and many others. (*Vide* Introductions to Svapna and Pratimā; Indian Antiquary, 1916, pp. 112-15, pp. 125-29).

To the 4th subdivision, belong Lesny and others. (*Vide* Z.D.M.G., 1918, pp. 203 f.).

Now let us first weigh the arguments of the Pseudo-Bhāsa school on the one hand and the True-Bhāsa on the other.

The Pseudo-Bhāsa school fortifies itself chiefly on the following grounds—

(1) That, of the fourteen verses ascribed to Bhāsa by different writers and anthologists, not one blessed verse occurs in the thirteen dramas already discovered.

The verses are :—

- (1) “कठिनहृदये सुखं क्रोधं सुख-प्रतिघातकं
लिखति दिवसं यातं यातं यमः किल मानिनि ।
वयसि तरुणे नैतद्युक्तं चले च समागमे
भवति कलहो यावत् तावद्धरं सुभगे रतम् ॥”

(Subhāṣitāvalī, 1619)

The same verse is given in Subhāṣitaratna-bhāṇḍa-
gāra, p. 321, Sl. 51, as follows :—

- “कठिनहृदये सुखं भ्रान्तिं व्यलोककथाश्रितां
पिशुनवचनेदुःखं नेतुं न युक्तमिमं जनं ।
किमिदमथवा सत्यं सुगुप्ते त्वया हि विनिश्चितं
यदभिरुचितं तन्मे कृत्वा प्रिये सुखमाप्स्यताम् ॥”
- (2) ‘कपोले मार्जारौ पय इति करालेदि शशिनः
तरुच्छिद्रप्रोतान् विसमिति करौ संकलयति ।
रतान्ते तल्पस्थान् हरति वनिताप्यंशुकमिति
प्रभामत्तसन्द्रो जगदिदमहो विप्रवयति ॥’

(Śārṅgadhara, V. 3640 ; Subhāṣitāvalī 1994. Acc. to
Saduktimuktāvalī this is a verse of Rājaśekhara.)

- (3) कृतकृतकैर्मायासख्ये (शाठ्ये) स्वयारम्यतिवञ्चिता (तिवर्त्तितं)
निधृतनिधृतैः कार्यालापैर्मयाप्युपलक्षितं ।
भवतु विदितं नेष्टाहं ते वृथा परिखिद्यसे
अ(ह्य)हमसहना त्वं निःस्नेहः समेन समं गतम् ॥

(Subhā-1828 Śārṅga-3580)

- (4) तीक्ष्णं रविस्तपति नौच इवाचिराद्यः
शृङ्गं तरुस्थजति मित्रमिवाकृतघ्नः ।
तोयं प्रसीदति मुनेरिवचित्तमन्तः (धर्मचिन्ता) (Śārṅga)
कामी दरिद्र इव शोषमुपैति पङ्कः ॥

(Subhā-1821, Śārṅga-3907, Sadukti—).

- (5) दुःखात्ते मयि दुःखिता या हृष्टे प्रहृष्टा तथा
 दीने दैन्यसुपैति रोषपरुषे वथं वचो भाषते ।
 कालं वेत्ति कथाः करोति निपुणा मत्संस्तवे रक्षति
 भार्या मन्त्रिवरः सखा परिजनः सैका बहुलं गता ॥

(Subhā-1353)

- (6) बाला च सा विदितपञ्चशरप्रपञ्चा
 तन्वी च सा स्तनभरोपचिताङ्गयष्टिः ।
 लज्जां समुद्वहति सा सुरतावसाने
 हा कापि सा किमिव किं कथयामि तस्याः ॥

(Subhā-1286).

- (7) सञ्चितपद्मकपाटं नयनद्वारं स्वरूपतडनेन । (?)
 उदघाट्य सा प्रविष्टा, हृदयगृहं मे नृपतनूजा ॥ .

(सप्रदत्ताख्यनाटके) Acc. to Abhinavagupta in Dhvanyā-
 loka-locana. (Nirṇaya-Sāgar Ed., p. 152l 1.-2).

- (8) अस्या ललाटे रचिता सखीभि-
 र्बिभाव्यते चन्दनपत्रलेखा ।
 आपाण्डुरक्षामकपोलभित्ता
 वनङ्गवाण-व्रण-पट्टिकेव ॥

(Śārṅga-3292) (कस्यापि-acc. to सुभाषितावली)

- (9) दयिताबाहुपाशस्य कुतोऽयमपरोविधिः ।
 जीवयत्यर्पितः कण्ठे मारयत्यपवर्जितः ॥

(Śārṅga-3330) ('कलङ्ककस्य' acc. to सुभाषितावली)
 ('काशीरस्य श्यामलस्य' acc. to सद्भक्तिकर्षावत)

- (10) दम्बे मनोभवतरो बालाकुक्षकुम्भसंस्मृतोरुतैः ।
 त्रिवलीकृतालबाला जाता रोमावली वल्ली ॥

(Sadukti-2, 383).

- (11) प्रत्यासन्नविवाहमङ्गलविधौ देवार्चनव्यस्तया (व्यथया)
 दृष्टाये परिणेतुरेव लिखितां गङ्गाधरस्याकृतिं ।
 अस्मादक्षितरोषलज्जितरसे (धिया) गीर्ध्या कथञ्चिच्चिरात्
 वृद्धस्त्रीवचनात् प्रिये विनिश्चितः युष्माञ्जलिः पातु वः ॥

(Sadukti)

- (12) विरञ्चिन्नितावक्रौपम्यं विभर्त्ति निशापति
गलितविभवस्यान्नेवाद्य द्युतिर्मृष्टया रवेः ।
अभिनववधूरोषस्त्रादुः करीषतनूनपा
दसरलजनाश्लेषक्रूरस्तुषारसमीरणः ॥

(Sadukti)

- (13) पेया सुराः प्रियतमानुच्छमीक्षणीयं
ग्राह्यः स्वमावललितो विकटस्त्रवेष्टः ।
येनेदमीदृशमदृश्यत मोक्षकर्म-(वर्क)
दीर्घायुरस्तु भगवान् स पिनाकपाणिः ॥

(Ascribed to Bhāsa by Sōmadeva in his *Yasastilaka* ; but found to occur in *Mattavilāsa Prahāsana* of *Mahendravikrama*). (This shows the hazy and unreliable character of the references of writers as to the authorship of old verses).

- (14) यद्यपि विबुधैः सिन्धोरस्तः कथञ्चिदुपाजितं
तदपि सकलं चारुस्त्रीणां मुखेषु विलोक्यते ।
सुरसुमनसः श्वासामोदे (शशौ) च कपोलयो
रमृतमधरे तिर्यग्भूते विषं च विलोचने ॥

(Ascribed to Bhāsa in *यशस्तिलक*)

(2) That, of these fourteen verses, one distinctly refers to 'Svapnavāsavadatta' Nāṭaka, the referer being Abhinavagupta who, in his commentary *Dhvanyāloka-lōcana* says :—

यथा स्वप्नवासवदत्ताख्यनाटके—

“संचितपद्मकपाटं नयनद्वारं स्वरूपतडनेन ।

उद्भास्य सा प्रविष्टा हृदयगृहं मे नृपतनूजा ॥”

and that this verse should have occurred in the *Svapnanāṭaka* of the Trivandrum series. But it does not.

(3) That it is a striking fact that none of these dramas gives the name of the author.

(4) That at the close of the drama "Svapna-nāṭaka" "इति स्वप्ननाटकमवसितम्" is given, and that in no reading the full name 'Svapnavāsavadattam' is given.

(5) That even accepting that 'Svapna-nāṭaka' is no other than 'Svapnavāsavadatta' nāṭaka, it requires to be proved that all these thirteen dramas come from the same pen, there being no positive evidence for it.

(6) That the Svapnavāsavadatta referred to by Sarvānanda in his Tīkāsarvasva (a gloss on Amara Kōśa) must be an entirely different work, since that one has got for its plot Vāsavadattā's marriage with Udayana while the present one has got Padmāvatī's marriage with him as the plot.

(7) That the verse "संचितपद्मकपाटं" cannot be called an omission from 'Svapna,' since even according to MM. T. Gaṇapati Śāstri, such a verse cannot properly find a place in the Trivandrum drama.

(8) That the very name 'Svapnavāsavadatta' does not at all fit the Trivandrum drama, since the event from which a drama derives its name, must have an importance or in other words, it should give effect to further development of the plot ; but it does not do so here. In Abhijñāna Śakuntalam, the ring which is the Abhijñāna (*i.e.*, the object of recognition) is the central point of the plot of the 4th, 5th and 6th Acts and of the 7th Act to a little extent. It is introduced in the very first Act where it serves the purpose of the King being recognised by the maidens. Thus, Kālidāsa is fully justified in giving the name Abhijñāna Śakuntalam to his play. The name Mudrārākṣasa too, depends upon the pervading importance of the seal. The name 'Vikramōrbaśīya' means, according to some interpreters, "the work on Urbaśī, having valour as its important feature." It is justifiable because Pururavas's valour releases Urbaśī from prison. Also his valour is the cause of Indra's

allowing Urbaśī's union with Pururavas. In *Mṛicchakaṭika*, the event of a Claycart, has for its sequence Cārudatta's accusation, which resulted in speedy destruction of Pālaka through the hands of Cārudatta's friend Āryaka and his party and thus brought prosperity to Cārudatta. In *Trivandrum Svapnanāṭaka*, the *Svapna* has no appreciable connection with the main plot. So that, judging from the standpoint of the significance of the name in the development of the drama, the true drama may be said to have no real value of the title.

(9) That 'Daridra Cārudatta,' drama referred to by Abhinavagupta cannot be the same as 'Cārudatta' as we have in *Trivandrum* collection.

(10) That the technique of the *Trivandrum* group is strikingly similar to that of a seventh century play called 'Mattavilāsa' and that therefore, both must have hailed from the same or approximately the same period.

(11) That there is very probably a sly reference to Tēr-Māran Rājasimha I (C. 675 A.D.), a 7th century King, in seven out of thirteen dramas in their final verses.

Now, before examining the cogency of these issues, let us accept for argument's sake, that the *Trivandrum Bhāsa* is a false *Bhāsa*, by starting an enquiry on the basis of व्यतिरेकमुख प्रमाण or the Negative Method.

So, accepting this *Bhāsa* to be a false *Bhāsa*, we are constrained to acknowledge the existence of two 'Svapna Vāsavadatta' dramas. Now, with regard to such a forced conception, we have to say only this, that such a thing as two dramas having identical titles, affords no parallel in the history of Sanskrit literature. The latter poet, would, at least, modify and improve the title,* in case he is unable to invent a new one, but he would, in no case, employ the same used title. Besides, we would be further constrained to admit that such expressions as "अथैन मे भादा इदो," etc., must have been borrowed by our poet

from Bhāmaha and not by Bhāmaha from the poet. It is an well-known and thoroughly established fact, that treatises on Rhetorics quote from poets and authors ; but poets or authors never borrow expressions from Rhetoricians.

A hypothesis is said to be valid even as a working one, so long as the truth contained in it, does not collide with any well-established law or fact. Judged from such a standpoint, our hypothesis that the Trivandrum Bhāsa is a Pseudo-Bhāsa, comes to be invalidated, at least in so much as it clashes with these fairly well-established truths.

Now, let us answer the aforesaid eleven issues one after another —

(1) Not one even of the fourteen verses which have been ascribed to Bhāsa, is found to occur in any of these thirteen works. To this we offer a three-edged answer. *Firstly*—all the references to different poets as are made by anthologists or other writers, are not found to be correct. This has been quite a familiar experience of those who have taken any pains to trace the various verses to their real authors under the guidance of the anthologists. So, we need not multiply examples for this. (*Vide* यशस्तिलक ascribes to भास “सुरापेया,” etc., which verse is found in मत्तविलास.) *Secondly*—the same verse is ascribed to different authors by different anthologists. For example, “लिम्पतोव तमोद्भानि” is ascribed to Vikramāditya by Vallabha-deva (in his Subhāṣitāvalī); to both Vikramāditya and Menṭha, by the compiler of Śārṅgadhar-paddhati, to Daṇḍin by some, to Śūdraka by others, to Bhāsa by some others. *Thirdly*—all the works of Bhāsa, have not yet been brought to light. Tradition ascribes to Bhāsa the authorship of some twenty-three dramas. Paṇḍit Śrīnibāsa Śāstrī is credited with possessing in his library such dramas of Bhāsa as ;—(1) Kiraṇāvalī (2) Mukutataḍita,

(3) Udātta-rāghava, etc. The pandit's younger brother Pandit Nārāyaṇ Śīstri speaks to the same effect. (*Vide* Priyadarśikā, Śrī-vāṇivilās-Sanskrit Series No. 3, p. xxiii, lines 11-14). Whether Bhāsa was the author of twenty-three or twenty-six (as another tradition runs) dramas we are not concerned with. We are satisfied with this much of information, by way of tradition, that Bhāsa's dramas were many in number and certainly exceeded a score. The dramas built up a 'Cakra' (wheel) as we know from Rājaśekhara's Sūktimuktāvalī.

(2) Of these fourteen verses, one, *viz.*, 'संचितपद्मकपाटं...' etc., is definitely and unambiguously referred to the drama Svapnavāsavadatta by Abhinavagupta, a tenth-century commentator (*vide* p. 152, Dhvanyāloka-lōcana, Nirṇayasāgara Edition). But this verse unfortunately does not occur in the Trivandrum Svapnavāsavadatta.

To this our answer is, that writers and commentators do not always trace the authorship correctly. Look to the anthologies, and see how often the compilers work on mere hearsay or tradition. Look also to the fact that various readings are found for the same text. It is interesting to note in this connexion the tradition expressed by Mammata Bhaṭṭa in his Kāvyaaprakāśa while explaining काव्यं यशसेऽर्जुने, etc. He says there, 'श्रीहर्षादेर्धावकादीनामिव धनम्.' Many of Mammata's commentators, *e.g.*, Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa in his Uddōṭa, Vaidyanāth in his Prabhā, Maheśvar in his Ādarśa, and Jayarām in his Tilaka, have said 'धावकादीनामिव धनम्.'

But to compare the different readings is very interesting.

We have a second reading 'वाणादीनामिव धनम्'—

a third ... 'भासकादीनामिव धनम्'—

a fourth ... 'मयूरादीनामिव धनम्'—

How instructive !

(3) The third charge is that none of the 13 Dramas, names the author. The answer is easy to see. In all the Trivandrum dramas, in the prologue, we do not get any description of the Kāvya or any mention of the author, thus pointing to the antiquity of the dramas. As there is no mention of the author in the proper place, there is none also at the end.

(4) That 'Svapnavāsavadatta'—this full name we do not get anywhere is true, but that the drama Svapna-nāṭaka is the same, is not far to seek. In one reading we get Svapna-nāṭaka, in another we get Vāsavadatta, the full name evidently comes to be 'Svapnavāsavadatta.'

(5) That all the dramas emanate from the same pen would be evident from a careful comparison of the phraseology, language, diction, technique and various other peculiarities of style and imagery. The unique peculiarity of Sūtradhāra's reciting Maṅgala verses, the phrase 'नान्द्रन्ते ततः प्रविशति सूत्रधारः' are common to all, "एवमर्थमिच्छान् विज्ञापयामि। अये किन्तु खलु मयि विज्ञापन-व्यये शब्द इव श्रूयते। अङ्ग पश्यामि।" is found in all except Pratijñā, Cārudatta, Avimāraṇa, Pratimā, and Karnaabhāra. Again the sloka:—

“इमां सागरपर्यन्तां हिमवद्विम्यकुण्डलां ।

महीमिकातपत्राङ्गां राजसिंहः प्रशास्तु नः ॥

is found both in Svapna and Bālacarita. 'भवन्त्वरजसो गावो,' etc., also. The practice of suggesting names of the principal dramatis personæ, in the benedictory 'verse, is alike in Pratijñā, Pañcarātra, Pratimā, and Svapna. 'किं वक्ष्यतीति हृदयं परिशुद्धित' मे' occurs both in the 6th Act of Svapna and in the 4th Act of Abhiṣeka. The word 'स्थापना-' instead of 'प्रस्तावना-' at the end of prologue, is also a common feature. Besides, there are certain choice expressions which occur in common in many of the works. The same sloka 'लिम्पतोव तमोऽङ्गानि' occurring

in both the works, *viz.*, Cārudatta and Bālacarita, not only shows that the author is the same but also proves the authorship of such a verse once for all. Note in this connexion the significant occurrence of identical passages in *Kumāra Sambhavam*, Canto 7, slokas 57 to 62, and *Raghu*, Canto 7, verses 6 to 11. Also note

“सूत्रधारः । अलमतिविस्तरेण । अद्याहं...उत्सवे सवहुमानमाङ्ग्य
...आवर्जितानि सकलसामाजिकानां-मनांसि इति मे निश्चयः ।”

“ओहर्षो निपुणः कविः परिषदप्येषा गुणग्राहिणी
लोके हारि च वत्सराजचरितं नाट्ये च दक्षा वयम् ।”

etc.. ...समुदितः सर्वो गुणानां गणः” ।

These lines are identical in Ratnāvalī, Priyadarsikā and Nāgānanda. Only for ‘वसन्तोत्सवे’ in Ratnāvalī and Priyadarsikā we have ‘इन्द्रोत्सवे’ in Nāgānanda.

Again, note the use of ‘लंकातोरण-मालिन्ना-तरलिणो’ in Karpūramañjarī, Act I, verse 17, and the very same expression in विद्वशालभञ्जिका, Act I, V. 29, and also वाग्मन्ति चित्ताणिला and चेताणिलो णच्चदि in those two verses. Also note the employment of identical lines as—‘ब्रह्मादयो ब्रह्महिताय तद्वा परःसहस्राः शरदस्तपांसि’ in महावीरचरित, Act I, 42, and उत्तररामचरित, Act I, V. 15.)

Again, “दधति कुहरभाजामत्र भल्लूकयूनां, अनुरसितगुरुणि ख्यानमम्बूक्तानि, etc..” occurs in Mahāvīra, Act V, verse 11, and Uttararāmacarita, Act II, V. 21.

Again we have the common saying—

• “भगवतः कालप्रियनाथस्य यात्राप्रसङ्गे ...”

in all the three works, Uttararāma, Mahāvīra and Mālātī-Mādhava.

We don’t wish to multiply instances. We have already corroborated our statement by quite sufficient number of citations.

(6) As regards Sarvānanda’s reference to Svapnavāsa-vadatta in his gloss on Amarakosa, the said passage

affords no real difficulty. Pandit T. Ganapati Śāstri suggests a better reading which is possible. But we think, the reading as it is, is all right. It draws our attention simply to the two different kinds of marriage of Udayana as based upon two different motives. Indeed, our Tr. poet always says that Udayana's first wife was Vāsavadattā and his second wife was Padmāvatī. The first marriage was performed, prompted by true love—by the charming influence of Eros. On this point all Vāsavadattā narrations are unanimous. The second marriage was performed, being actuated by a motive of furthering his kingdom, and becoming a one-parasoled lord of the earth as the Siddha predicted.

(7) It is quite clear that 'संचितपद्मकपाटं....,' etc., can never fit in our Svapna nātaka (*vide* Svapna, Introd., p. xxiii, f). It appears probable that the quotation is from some drama relating to Vāsavadattā, *e.g.*, 'Tāpasa-vatsarāja,' but carelessly relegated to Svapnavāsavadatta, because the name 'Vāsavadattā' which is prominent in the mind of the commentator, is present bodily in the title Svapna-vāsavadatta. Such careless references abound everywhere in Sanskrit literature.

(8) As to the thoughtless and idle attack that the title Svapnavāsavadatta does not appear to have much significance in this drama, we have got the following reply. Look at the page 57 (5th Act), 1st line (1st Edition), or at the page 107 1st line (Annotated edition).

There we get,

‘राजा (स्वप्नायते) हा वासवदत्ते !’

Beginning from there read up to (p. 59, line 8, 1st Ed., or p. 112, line 5, Annotated Edition).

“यदि तावदयं स्वप्नः धन्यमप्रतिमोचनम् ।

अथायं विभ्रमो वा स्याद् विभ्रमो ह्यसु मे चिरम् ॥”

The King is evidently dreaming of Vāsavadattā, sighing the heavy breath of a penitent lover—and panting

after Vāsavadattā, in the hollowness of a shallow dream. But alas! by strange coincidence of events, Vāsavadattā happened to be present there in person, sharing a corner of the bed upon which Padmāvatī lay asleep.

She witnessess with her own ear the real grief-prompted bewailings of her husband for her sake. Just imagine her delight. The king in his dream says that he would propitiate the queen Vāsavadattā as she is suffering separation from him. He actually extends his arms to catch hold of her feet probably in half dream. Just at this juncture the queen actually quits the place. The king now plays a somnambulist. He rises up in hot haste to catch hold of the queen but is checked by being hurt on a side of the door. The blow brings the King to wakefulness. The buffoon is asked about the whereabouts of the queen. He says the queen is dead. The King cannot bear to hear this saying, he brings his comrade to task by telling him not to play the same trick with him any more. The dream had for him all the air and charm of reality. It was so vivid that he refused to accept it as a mere dream, and he vociferates forth :—

शय्यायामवसुप्तं मां बोधयित्वा सखे गता !

दग्धेति ब्रुवता पूर्वं वञ्चितोऽस्मि रुमण्वता ॥”

At this the jester said :—

तत्रहोदिं चिन्तयन्तेन सा सिविणि दिग्धा भवे । [तत्रभवतीं चिन्तयता
सा स्वप्ने दृष्टा भवेत्]

See now the majestic and at the same time highly artistic significance of the title and look at the fathomless depth where these expressions land us and at its pervading influence over the plot of the whole drama. What more can the King wish now but ejaculate forth :—

“यदि तावदयं स्वप्नो धन्यमप्रतिबोधनम् ।

अथायं विभ्रमो वा स्याद् विभ्रमो ह्यसु मे चिरम् ॥”

How grand is the application of the term *Scapna* with reference to *Vāsavadattā*! Indeed, we cannot conceive of a happier choice of the title, of a more artistic and magnificent application of the term, constituting, as it does, the very backbone of the whole drama—the very pivot upon which the whole plot oscillates.

(9) Daridra Cārudatta and Cārudatta are certainly not identical titles. But it is quite probable that Daridra Cārudatta being a big title was shortened into simply Cārudatta; just as 'Svapnavāsavadatta' is shortened into 'Svapnanāṭaka,' and 'Pratijñā-yaugandharāyaṇa' is curtailed into 'Pratijñā' simply. Besides, we know how some writers use interchangeable titles quite freely. (cf. Abhinavagupta calls 'Ratnāvalī, of Śrīharsa by the name of 'Vatsarāja-carita').

Indeed, some works have actually got double names e.g., 'Bhaṭṭikāvyaṃ' is also called 'Rāmakāvyaṃ,' 'Pracaṇḍa-Pāṇḍava' is also called 'Bālabhārata.' Mahānāṭaka' is also called Hanumannāṭaka, etc.

(10) That the technique of Mattavilāsa and that of the Trivandrum group of dramas are much similar, does not prove that they hail from the same period. Rājaśekhara in his Karpūramāñjarī has attempted a revival of Bharata's technique. But to argue that they both come from the same period, must be idle. 'Pārvatī-pariṇaya' of Bāṇa bears a close resemblance to Karpūramāñjarī. Are we therefore justified to maintain that both must be contemporaneous? Similar is the case of resemblance between the technique of Mattavilāsa and that of Trivandrum dramas.

(11) Mr. Barnett thinks that in the use of the word 'Rājasimha' at the end of many of the works, there must be some sly reference to a seventh century King Rājasimha T. (C. 675 A.D.). In only seven, out of

thirteen, we get Rājasimha; in others just in similar contexts either simply 'Rāja' or 'Narapati' is used. This clearly shows that there is no reference to any proper name. It simply means, 'the lion of a king,' i.e., a powerful king. Epigraphy has revealed to us volumes of texts where the poets or court-bards are over-fluent in their praise of kings and patrons, to the extent of comparing the beams shooting forth like a current from the nails of the feet of their patrons, to the holy stream of the Ganges! (*Vide* Epigr. Indica, Vol. I, p. 86, 1-7) (Valabhi grant of Dhruvasena III) (*cf.* "गुह्यसेनस्तस्यसुत-स्तपदानखमयख-सन्तान-विसृत-जाह्नवी-जलोन्न-प्रक्षालिताशिष-कलमषः")

So far by way of refuting the grounds of the Pseudo-Bhāsa school. Now, we would proceed by adducing cogent reasons for our belonging to the true-Bhāsa school.

(1) Firstly, we get in Harṣacarita—a few qualificatory terms as regards the nature and merit of Bhāsa's dramas. Now judging in the light of these highly pregnant adjuncts, we can at once fix this Trivandrum poet to be the Bhāsa alluded to by Kālidāsa who enjoyed so high renown. Bāṇa says—

A
B

सूत्रधारकृतारम्भे नाट्यैर्बहुभूमिकैः ।

C
सपताकै र्यशो लेभे भासो देवकुलैरिव ॥”

(A) Nothing can be truer to our Tr. poet than the three adjectives given here. His dramas all begin with the Sūtradhāra entering the stage and uttering the Maṅgala verses. This is not the case with Śūdraka's or Kālidāsa's dramas. There the Maṅgala verses are recited from the green room and then the Sūtradhāra enters and introduces the play.

(B) 'Bhūmikā' means 'dramatis personæ.' Now, no other drama possesses such an overflowing abundance of

dramatis personæ. In 'Svapna' for example, we get at least 16 such persons. In Pratijñā 16, in Pañcarātra 19, in Avimāraka 21, in Abhiṣeka 17, in Cārudatta 12, in Pratimā some 21, the climax being reached in Bāla-carita where no less than 37 persons appear.

(C) All his dramas have got well-defined and thoroughly pronounced Pataākās (पताका). What 'Pataākā's are, is quite well known to the literary public; still we shall dwell briefly upon them.

- (i) "यत्प्रार्थे चिन्तितेऽन्यस्मिन् तस्मिन्नेऽन्यः प्रयुज्यते ।
आगन्तुकेन भावेन पताकास्थानकन्तु तत् ॥" (साहित्यदर्पणम्
ch. 6, V. 299.)
- (ii) 'यत्प्रान्यस्मिन् युज्यमाने तस्मिन्नेऽन्यः प्रयुज्यते ।
आगन्तुकेन भावेन पताकास्थानकन्तु तत् ॥" (भरतनाट्यशास्त्रम्
ch. 19, V. 29.)
- (iii) "प्रस्तुतागन्तुभावस्य वस्तुतोऽन्योक्तिसूचकं ।
पताकास्थानकं तुल्यसंविधानविशेषणम् ॥" (दशरूपकम्, Pr. 1,
v. 14):

'Pataākā' or (Pro-episode), is thus the indicating of some other thing with some other attributes by sly punning in a passage which gives a ready or first-hand meaning. Such indicating is generally of a future event. Hence Dhanika says on 1.14 Daśarūpaka—

'प्राकरणीकस्य भाविनः अर्थस्य सूचकरूपं पताकावद्भवतीतिपताका-
स्थानम् ।

(cf. 'उदयनवेन्दु'...etc., in Svapna, 1st Act, and also some first verses.

(2) Secondly, we get in Sūktimuktāvalī of Rājasekhara

"भासनाटकचक्रेऽपि केकैः क्षिप्ते परोक्षितुं ।

स्वप्नवासवदत्तस्य दाहकोऽभून्न पावकः ॥"

Vide also the Commentary of Jonarāja on the Prithvirāja passage दीप्तानि वज्रेरपि मानसानि भासस्य काव्यं खलु विष्णुधर्मान्, etc. Again in Gaudavahō of Vākpati, V. 809, Bhāsa is described as 'Jalanamitte' (the friend of fire). If we

weave together these two sayings, we at once find that the reputed Bhāsa was a 'friend of fire.' This is so, not simply because of the Lāvaṇaka conflagration being introduced into the plot of Vāsavadatta, but because of the poet's excess of zeal for introducing fire scenes, or talks or imageries about fire :—

- Cf.* :—(1) लावणके हुतवहेन etc. (Act 5, V. 1, Svapna).
 (2) इदञ्चसुखमाधुर्यं (Act 6, V. 13, Svapna).
 (3) प्रदीप्तोऽग्निर्भाति (Svapna, Act I, V. 16).
 (4) काष्ठादग्निर्जायते (Pratijñā I, 18).
 (5) Pratijñā. Act 2, V. 11.
 (6) Pratijñā :—p. 47, शून्यमिदमग्निगृहम्.
 (7) Do. „ 67, V. 12.
 (8 to 20) Pancarātra, Act I, verses 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.
 (21) Avimāraka—Act 4, V. 4.
 (22) Do. Act 4, V. 5, अग्निचूर्णं.
 (23) Do. p. 59, Act 4 (last sentence).
 (24) Do. Act 4, V. 7.
 (25) Do. Act 4, V. 8.
 (26) Do. Act 4, V. 15.
 (27) Do. Act 6, p. 105, नारदः ।—तवायं पुत्रः अग्नेरुत्पन्नः
 (28) Bālacarita, Act 4, V. 3, विषदहनशिखाभिः—
 (29) Do. Act 4, V. 4.
 (30) Do. Act 2, V. 24.
 (31) Do. Act 4, V. 9.
 (32) Do. Act 4, V. 10.
 (33) Madhyama—Act I, V. 6, हुत-हुतवह-दीप्त...
 (34) Do. Act I, V. 15, राक्षसान्नी
 (35) Do. Act I, V. 51, यथाङ्गतीनां प्रभवो हुताशः—
 (36) Dūtavākya—Act I, V. 14, कोपशिखिना
 (37) Do. Act I, V. 32.

- (38) Dūtaghaṭotkācam—Act I, V. 6.
 (39) Do. V. 24, वैराग्निः.
 (40) Do. V. 25, प्रज्वालित.
 (41) Do. V. 22.
 (42) Do. V. 30.
 (43) Do. V. 47.
 (44) Do. p. 65, पुत्रशोकोत्थितो अग्निः.
 (45) Karṇabhāram, p. 76, V. 10, रोषानलो.
 (46) Do. V. 23.
 (47) Ūrubhangam, p. 88, Act I.
 (48) Do. V. 6, वैरवह्निः.
 (49) Do. p. 99, V. 34.
 (50) Do. V. 43, वह्नित्वमागतः.
 (51) Do. V. 56, सदहन इव मेरुः.
 (52) Abhiṣeka—Act I, V. 13, संवर्ताग्निः.
 (53) Do. Act 3, भस्मीकरोति.
 (54) Do. Act 4, V. 5, हुताशनं प्रवेष्टुं.
 (55) Do. Act 6, p. 69, last line—अग्निप्रवेशाय.
 (56) Do. Act 6, p. 70, V. 24, ज्वलनमिह.
 (57) Do. Act 6, V. 25, पावकं प्राप्य.
 (58) Do. Act 6, V. 26, ज्वलतो हव्यवाहनात्.
 (59) Do. p. 72, 1st line, भगवान् हुताशनः.
 (60) Pratimā:—Act I, V. 21.
 (61) Do. Act 5, V. 20, दग्धः.
 (62) Do, Act 6, V. 5, शोकाग्निः.
 (63) Do. Act 7, V. 7, व्यसनदग्धम्.

(3) Thirdly, we get in Jayadeva's Prasanna Rāghava's prologue:—

“यस्याक्षोरश्चिकुरनिकरः कर्णपूरो मयूरो
 भासो हासः कविकुलगुरुः कालिदासो विलासः ।
 हर्षो हर्षो हृदयवसतिः पञ्चबाणस्तु बाणः
 केषां नैषा कथय कविताकामिनी कौतुकाय ॥”

Here the poet Jayadeva clearly characterises Bhāsa's poetry as 'हास' or 'laugh.' This laugh is no doubt synonymous with 'spontaneously flowing clear current of humour' which, for its innocent character may well be compared to 'laugh' which is 'white,' 'lucid' and 'luminous' according to the rhetoricians. This reference to congenial wit of Bhāsa, rigidly establishes the identity of our Trivandrum poet with the reputed Bhāsa. Of Bhāsa's limpid and congenial humour, we have only a large number of instances in the Trivandrum dramas. We would quote one bright example :—

“गुणानां वा विशालानां सत्काराणां च नित्यशः ।
कर्त्तारः सुलभाः लोके विज्ञातारस्तु दुर्लभाः ॥”

(Svapna, Act 4, V. 9).

Now, that the Trivandrum poet has been found to be the true Bhāsa of Kālidāsa's reference, let us proceed to discuss his age.

In this connexion five verses, *viz.* :—(1) लिम्पतीव (2) यासां वलिः (3) शरच्चन्द्रांशुगौरेण (4) नवं शरावं and (5) मार्जारः प्रवने would be found to be very important and instructive. Now, the verse लिम्पतीव has been curiously ascribed to (a) Vikramāditya by Vallabhadeva, (b) to Vikramāditya and Menṭha, by the author of Śārṅgadharapaddhati, (c) to Daṇḍin by some, (d) to Sūdraka by others and (e) to Bhāsa by some others.

Now, Daṇḍin can never be the author of this verse. This is true for two reasons :—

Firstly, his book Kāvyaḍarśa is a work of Rhetorics and as such, is more apt to quote verses from other poets than compose verses by himself. Secondly, only the half of the verse is quoted in Kāvyaḍarśa, 2. 226, and his manner of saying leaves no doubt in our mind as to its being a quotation.

Of इतोदमपि भूयिष्ठमुत्प्रेक्षाक्षणावितं ... also
‘केषाञ्चिदुपमाभ्रान्तिरिव श्रुत्येव जायते ।

This latter is more conclusive. As to the Vikrama or Vikrama-Menṭha authorship, we have to say that the difference of tradition speaks already against it. Besides, the Vikrama-Menṭha of legend and tradition, appears to be the Harṣavikramāditya and Bhartrīmenṭha as narrated in Rājatarāṅgiṇī where the two personages are also connected in time, being described as contemporaries. Now, this part of Rājatarāṅgiṇī does not give a strict chronology ; but the facts are more or less correct. So we will have to adjust the approximate age of the two poets in the light of critical history,—the evidence of coins and inscriptions and the records of Chinese travellers and the like. According to Rājatarāṅgiṇī this Harṣa of Ujjayinī, Maṭrigupta and poet Bhartrīmenṭha were contemporaries. Maṭrigupta was followed by Pravarasena II, the latter being the son of Tōramāṇa. Now this 'Tōramāṇa' is a historical person.

From the Eran Stone Boar Inscription of Tōramāṇa (Corpus I. I, Vol. 3, No. 36) we learn that Tōramāṇa was contemporary of Mātriviṣṇu and Dhanyaviṣṇu. Now these two brothers set up a flag staff to God Janārdana and the inscription upon the Varāha temple tells us that its *date was 484-85 A. D.* when Budhagupta, the Gupta emperor, reigned. Thus Tōramāṇa's date is approximately 500 A. D. Thus Pravarasena II's date may be about 525-550 A. D. The evidence of coins, places Tōramāṇa at about 514-544 A.D. (*vide* plate V, No. 12 Silver Coin, in 'A Literary and Historical Atlas of Asia' and also p. 110 *loc. cit.* where a brief survey of coinages of Asia is given by J. Allan). Pravarasena II founded Pravarapur which is modern Srinagar. When Hiuen Tsang visited Kashmir in the year 632 A.D. he found the capital to be quite a new town. So that Pravarasena must have lived about 550 A.D. Thus from three independent sources of evidence we can fairly settle the age of Bhartrī-Menṭha—Vikrama who immediately

preceded Pravarasena. We would not, therefore, be much wrong if we fix the date approximately at 475-500 A.D.

Now Mricchakaṭika is, according to the opinion of a large body of veteran scholars, a production of the 1st century A. D. or 1st century B. C. Some hold that the date of Mriccha is about 3rd century A. D. In any case, the author of Mriccha must have preceded Vikrama-Meṇṭha (who hails from 475-500 A. D.). In a contest between an earlier and a later poet, as regards the authorship of any verse which occurs in both, the verdict must be in favour of the earlier one.

Thus the real contest as to the authorship of the verse लिम्पतीव, etc., now rests between Bhāsa and Sūdraka. In this fight we must give the laurel to Bhāsa. The grounds for our so doing would be given in the course of this controversy.

- (1) If we look at the verse लिम्पतीव in the two books—Mricchakaṭika and Bālacarita in their own contexts, it would at once appear that Bhāsa is the real author of the verse.

In Bālacarita, the verse occurs like a plant in its own row in a garden, while the Mricchakaṭika verse appears like one forcibly rooted out from its mother soil and transplanted in a new one to suit anyhow the fresh environment. One is like a bright flower growing in the healthy companionship of sister flowers in an unmolested cluster, while the other has the appearance of a culled one meant for the adornment of the flower-vase. The two are thus widely different things, and can be easily distinguished even by the smell.

See, how our Trivandrum poet goes on :—

“वसुदेवः । अहो बलबांशान्धकारः । सम्प्रति हि—

लिम्पतीव तमोऽङ्गानि वर्धतीवाऽञ्जनं नभः...

अहो तमसः प्रभुत्वम् ।

अप्रकाशा इव दिशो वनीभूता इव द्रुमाः ।

सुनिविष्टस्य लोकस्य कृतो रूपविपर्ययः ॥

नाहं गन्तुं समर्थः । अये दीपिकालोकः !

आ—तमसा संवृते लोके मम मार्गमपश्यतः ।

अपेक्षमणहेतोस्तु कुमारेण प्रभा कृता ॥ एष मार्गः ।

अये इयं भगवती यमुना कालवर्षसंपूर्णा सन्निहिता ।...

How majestic !

Now, look at the Mricchakaṭika verse in its own context:—

“विटः ।—अहो बलवानन्धकारः । तथाहि—

‘आलोकविशाला मे सहसा तिमिरप्रवेशविच्छिन्ना—

उन्मीलितापि दृष्टिर्निमीलितान्धकारेण ॥

अपिच । लिम्पतोव.....

शकारः । भावे भावे अस्मेशामि वशन्तशेषिभम् ।”

That our Trivandrum poet is a master hand at depicting darkness, would be still more obvious from a perusal of the following:—

“इह हि,—

नगरपरिचितोऽहं रक्षिणो ज्ञातसारा-

स्तिमिर-गहन-भोमं वर्त्तते चार्धरात्रम् ।

असिरपि सुसङ्गायो निश्चितस्यान्तरात्मा

किमिह बहुविचारेः को मया दुष्करोऽर्थः ॥

अहो—अर्धरात्रस्य प्रतिभयता । संप्रतिहि—

गर्भस्था इव मोहमभ्युपगता सर्वाः प्रजाः निद्रया-

प्रासादाः सुखसुप्त-नीरवजनाः ध्यानं प्रविष्टा इव ।

प्रयस्ता इव संचितेन तमसा स्पर्शानुमेया नगा (cf. रत्नावली here)

अन्तर्धानमिषीपयाति सकलं प्रच्छन्नरूपं जगत् ॥

अथैव खलु वर्तते काशरात्रिः ।

तिमिरमिव वहन्ति मार्गनद्यः

पुलिननिभाः प्रतिभान्ति हर्म्यमालाः ।

तमसि दशदिशो निमग्नरूपाः

प्रवतरणीय इवायमन्धकारः ॥'

(Avimāraka, Act 3, verses 2-4, p. 43).

(Also compare Cārudatta, 1. 19. in this connexion.)

The Trivandrum poet is so madly fond of the term लिम्पति that according to him even wind can do लेपन

cf. "लिम्पन्ति रुक्मपवना सिकताग्निचूर्णेः ।"

Avimāraka, p. 59.

Also compare Cārudatta 1. 19 and Avimāraka, Act 3, verses 2-4, p. 43, in this connexion.

(2) Besides this, it is also an well-established fact that 'when a poet uses the same verse in his different works he must undoubtedly be the author of the verse.' A borrowed verse, no one would use twice. Shame would descend upon the borrower if he wants to use it again and again, only because he is not the legitimate owner of such goods. We have already shown by abundant quotations how only the true author can use the same verse in his different works.

Again there is another verse 'यासां वलिर्भवति' etc., which is quoted by Vāmana in his Kāvya-lāṅkāra-Vṛitti. This verse occurs both in Mriccha (Act 1. 9) and Cārudatta (Act 1. 2). Now, who is the real author? The decision would not be very difficult. This verse occurs, with some variations, in both the works. Now Vāmana's quoted verse is verbatim identical with that of Bhāsa (with only one word's variation, viz., for विभक्तपुष्प of Bhāsa we have विसृजपुष्पः); while it differs from the Mricch verse in various

words and phrases. Mriccha has 'सपदि' for वामन's and भास's 'भवति.' Mriccha has संप्रति for पूर्व in भास. Mriccha has विरुद्धवाङ्मुरासु for बलिरुद्धवाङ्मुरासु of both Bhāsa and Vāmana. Only विलुप्तपूर्व of Mriccha is retained by Vāmana. The irresistible conclusion is that Vāmana quotes from भास; but Mriccha's one phrase stuck to his memory as a usurper.

Again, the verse 'मार्जारः क्रमणे.....' of Mriccha would be found to be an undoubted improvement upon its predecessor 'मार्जारः झवने—' of Bhāsa, on artificial and laborious lines. Thus 'मार्जारः झवने—' has been changed into 'मार्जारः क्रमणे'; 'वृकोपसरणे' into 'मृगः प्रसरणे'; 'श्वेनो गृह्णालोकने' into 'श्वेनो ग्रहालुञ्चने'; 'निद्रा सुप्तमनुष्यवोर्ध्वतुलने संसर्पणे पन्नगः' into 'सुप्तासुप्तमनुष्यवोर्ध्वतुलने श्वा सर्पणे पन्नगः'—.

The author of Mriccha sees that up to the end of the 2nd foot, animals are mentioned; so he omitting निद्रा substitutes 'श्वा' a dog (as able to compare the strength of sleeping and non-sleeping beings).

'माया वर्णशरीरभेदकरणे' of Bhāsa has been changed into 'माया रूप-शरीर-वेश-रचने'. 'संकटेषु च तिमिर' has been changed into 'संकटेषु दुडुमः...'. The word 'दुडुमः' is very probably a देशी (vernacular) word of that period. None of the Sanskrit lexicons now extant gives the word. 'दुडुम' is explained as 'अश्वतर' or mule in the notes by Mr. H. H. Sarmā, but the source of extraction is not given. For वायुःस्थले of Cārudatta we get वाजीस्थले. The very mentality of the author of Mriccha shows him to be the borrower. He is not satisfied with this verse but composes another of the very same nature to clear out his mental tenesmus. In this verse the वृक of भास comes in as 'वृका इव च गृहणे. 'पन्नगः' has been already mentioned in verse 20, and

again 'भुजगः' is mentioned in the next verse. This would at once show the quite obvious imperfection of the Mricchakatika author. No writer of any true merit would indulge in such an anomaly and clumsiness of thought. Besides, there is the Rhetorical defect of 'समाप्तपुनरात्तता.' This is a deficiency which every poet, of some stability, steers clear of.

In this way we see that Bhāsa must have flourished before the author of Mriccha; *i. e.*, to say before 1st century A. D. at the lowest reckoning.

There is another verse 'नवं शरावं-' etc., which is quoted by Kauṭilya and is found in Bhāsa's Pratijñā 4. 3. Now, who is the borrower in this case? The manner in which Kauṭilya quotes, *viz.*, by saying 'अपीह श्लोकौ भवतः'—shows that he quotes from some authority, probably the author of some ritual or code, some Dharma-śāstra or the like, Quotation from a poet's work is not at all likely. Our poet also cannot be the borrower from any treatise on Arthaśāstra. If he borrowed at all, he and Kauṭilya must have done so from some common source. Vāmana quoted the verse in 5.2.28. 9. p. 74 (Jivānanda Ed.). Now a rhetorician is concerned with poets. He has no business to point out blemishes of style or figure of speech or grammar in a treatise on Arthaśāstra. This clearly establishes that Vāmana must have quoted from Bhāsa, that passage occurring in no other kāvya in so far as our present knowledge goes. This fact suggests the probability of our Tr. poet being the author of the verse. But this cannot be asserted with certainty.

But there are fortunately other items of information which enable us to fix the date of the poet with pretty fair certainty—

(1) The term यवनिका occurs manywhere in these dramas (p. 75, Svapna). This shows that the author must.

have come after the great Greek intercourse of India in the 4th and 3rd centuries B. C.

(2) The verse 'शरच्चन्द्रांशुगौरिण' is quoted by वामन and occurs nowhere but in our poet's work. This suggests that Vāmana is very frequently and profusely quoting from Bhāsa, so that 'नवं शरावं,' in all probability, he must have quoted from Bhāsa.

(3) Kālidāsa in his Mālavikā mentions Bhāsa, Saumilla and Kaviputra; and he next says that they are 'Purāṇa' poets. Now the word 'पुराण' always means very old, old by some centuries. This fact also would point to the possibility of Bhāsa's flourishing in the centuries before Christ.

(4) Bhāsa's being called a 'Muni' also shows his remote antiquity. Jōnarāja, a 15th century commentator of Prithvīrājacarita of Jayānaka of the 12th Century, calls Bhāsa a 'muni' and narrates the story how 'Fire' did not burn his Vaiṣṇava works.

(5) Jōnarāja even compares Bhāsa (भास) with Vyāsa (व्यास) and puts their names side by side. This also points to Bhāsa's antiquity.

(6) Rājasekhara's verse 'भासो रामिलसोमिलौ वररुचिः,' etc., appears to preserve the order of chronology, at least with regard to the authors whose ages are more or less perfectly known. So it would not be impertinent to extend the same principle to the whole verse. In the light of this fact (that the said verse very probably affords us an accurate chronological order of the poets) we may not only adjust the relative antiquity of the said poets but also see the hoary antiquity of our Trivandrum poet.

(7) Bhāmaha, who is an old rhetorician, obviously quotes the Prākṛit passage of Pratijñā—'अणेन मे भादा हदो, अणेन मम पिदा अनेन मम सुदो' in a sanskritized versified form.

That Bhāmaha preceded Kālidāsa would be evident from the latter's reply to the former's charge,

“अयुक्तिमत् यथा दूता जलभृश्वारुतादयः”

in his Meghadūta verse “कामार्त्ता हि प्रकृतिक्रपणाचेतनाचेतनेषु” (पूर्वमेव 5).

That Bhāsa preceded Aśvaghoṣa would be evident from the following facts:—

(8) ‘काष्ठादग्निर्जायते मथ्यमानात्
भूमिस्तोयं खन्यमाना ददाति ।

.....
.....

Pratijñā 1-18.

‘काष्ठं हि मथ्यन् लभते हुताशं
भूमिं खनन् विन्दति चापि तोयं ।’

.....
.....

etc., Buddha carita, verse 60,
13th canto.

A comparison of these two verses can never fail to strike a scholar as to who was the original author. The easy and graceful flow which characterizes Bhāsa's verse would at once enable one to know *who was the improver and who the author*.

(9) In the 5th Act of Pratimā, Vārhaspatya Artha śāstra is alluded to but not Kauṭilya's. This clearly shows that either Bhāsa was a contemporary of Kauṭilya or came shortly after him.

(10) Daśarūpaka, Bharata's Nāṭya śāstra, Sāhitya darpaṇa—each of these books—speaks of initial *stage management by three persons* (a) the sūtradhāra, (b) the sthāpaka and (c) the pāripārśvika. In Kālidāsa and later dramatists we find this done by two; and the maṅgala slokas are recited from the green room. But in Bhāsa's works, although the sthāpaka does not appear still the

sūtradhāra recites the maṅgala slokas—a relic of old stage conventionality. Thus we find that *Bhāsa's technique marks the transitional stage in the Indian stage management*, it being the connecting link between the old custom of three personages appearing on the stage and doing different parts on the one hand and the total abolition of a sthāpaka by making sūtradhāra introduce the drama (sthāpaka's business), the maṅgala slokas being recited from the green room, on the other. (*Vide* Bharata ch, 5.98, vs. 149-54.)

This also points to the antiquity of Bhāsa.

(11) A comparison of the different Prākṛita forms would also show that not only our poet is prior to Aśvaghoṣa but that he very probably belongs to the 3rd or 2nd century B. C.

(1) 'Gacchiya' (Bhāsa) is more archaic than 'Gadua' of (Kālidāsa and others).

(2) 'Karia' is more archaic than 'Kadua';

(3) The Bhāsa form पहरिसिदो for Sanskrit प्रधर्षित (p. 13, Pratijñā) shows the change of 'dha' into 'ha' in participial forms, which is quite unknown to Aśvaghoṣa and is very rare in later poets.

(4) 'Āhābai' for Sanskrit 'Ādhābati' (Pratijñā, p. 40) 'dha' changed into 'ha' in such verb forms, is not found in Aśvaghoṣa and is rare in later poets.

Both (3) and (4) show that they were very near to Aśoka Inscription period. Compare the strikingly instructive and parallel examples in Asoka 6th pillar (a) 'तथाच विदहमि' (for Sanskrit 'तथाच विदधमि') (b) Sāranāth pillar;—1.9.—last word तुफाकं आहाले for (Sanskrit आधारः) (c) निगोहकुभा (Sanskrit न्यग्रोध गुहा).

It is also instructive to find that the root 'dhā' is changed into 'hā' in Pāli also; so that in Bhāsa's Prākṛit we get some bright specimens of a Pen-Asokan

period Prākṛit—a proof of antiquity of at least 2nd century B.C. As regards such forms as 'ayya' for 'ajja' (in Kālidāsa and others), Mr. Barnett's comparison of the Tr. texts and Calcutta texts, is instructive (*vide* J. R. A.S., 1921, p. 589).

(5) 'आम'—an old Pāli form.

(6) 'अम्हाअम्' for genitive plural is not seen in Kālidāsa.

Thus from the study of the very peculiar Prākṛit forms we come to the conclusion that Bhāsa flourished either in 3rd or 2nd Century B.C.

(12) The custom alluded to in Pratinā, p. 25, that 'अवगुण्ठन' (veil) was used by ladies and also that the veil could be done away with in times of sacrifice, marriage, calamity and forest life, shows that certain amount of restriction to free rejection of veil obtained in that period. This fact answers very well to the social condition of India in the 4th, 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. (*vide* Kautilya's Arthaśāstra, and consider Aśoka's ' Ōrōdhanamhi' and ' Ithījhaka—Mahāmātā').

(13) The use of the word 'visrama' ('rest') in Bhāsa instead of 'visrāmā' as in Kālidāsa and later poets, shows its antiquity. (Svapna, p. 14.)

(14) The word Mahābrāhmaṇa is used so often but always in an innocent sense, is a proof of Bhāsa's antiquity.

(15) Abimāraka, Act 1, p. 72, speaks of नग्ना अमणिका—(naked female recluse). This probably points to the Jaina nuns, or the female 'Nirgranthas' or 'निगण्ठ's' as we hear in Aśoka Inscriptions, 7th pillar.

This also shows that very probably Bhāsa belonged to the 3rd century B. C. or 2nd century B.C.

(16) As to the occurrence of a large number of un-Pāṇinian forms ("अपाणिनिय प्रयोग") in Bhāsa, we reply that it does not necessarily imply priority of Bhāsa to

Pāṇini. *Vide* Kālidāsa's un-Pāṇinian forms (1) द्वियम्बकं संयमिनं ददर्श, (2) प्रभञ्शयां यो नहुषं चकार, etc.

(17) Both the forms 'चेक्रोयते' and 'चेक्रोद्यताम्' occur in Bhāsa. Evidently upon these uses Bharata has his caustic and edged remark.

Cf. चेक्रोयते प्रभृतिभिर्विस्तृतैश्च शब्दैः

युक्ता न भान्ति ललिता भरतप्रयोगाः ।

यज्ञक्रियैव शरवर्मधरैर्घृताक्तै

वेष्ट्या द्विजैरिव कमण्डलुदण्डहस्तैः ॥”

(Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra, Ch. 16, V. 117,
p. 178, Nirṇaya Sāgara Press Edn.)

This shows that Bhāsa flourished long before Bharata.

(18) Bhāsa furnishes us at least two important details about (a) sculpture and (b) painting. (a) 'Pratimā' nāṭaka is based on the custom of carving out statues to dead kings in a building erected for the purpose. (b) Dūtavākya, Act I, pp. 9-18, gives a graphic narration of realistic painting. The earliest known example of painting in India is that of the Jōgimārā Cave, 3rd century B.C. (Bloch, Archæol. Survey of Ind., 1903-4, pp. 128-30). So that the date 2nd century B.C. for our poet, as fixed by us, would not clash with known facts.

(b) The earliest portrait statue seems to belong to the 2nd century B.C. This also fits well with our fixed date of the poet.

(19) *Amarāvati* and *Bharahāt* relic shrines contain sculptured carving of the Jātaka stories. At *Bharahāt* the titles of several of the Jātakas, are found inscribed. Thus we see that these birth-stories of Buddhist religious history, were known in the 3rd century B.C.

Now, these Jātaka figures bear some striking similarity with Bhāsa's characters—(1) Yakṣiṇi as a female evil spirit is given in the Jātaka as well as in Bhāsa's

Svapna, p. 59. (2) Sentences at the beginning of a story, *e.g.*, "There was King Brahmadatta of Kampillya, etc.," Svapna, pp. 54-5,—is familiar to the Jātakas.

(20) Pradyōta's ambassador addresses his master Udayana's son-in-law as 'Āryyaputra' and 'ayyaputto' (Svapna, pp. 67, 69). In Asoka's Siddhāpur Insc., Āryyaputra=Prince, Kumāra. (It should be noted that otherwise 'Āryyaputra' as a form of address is always used by the wife to call her husband.)

(21) Bhāsa mentions 'Mānaviṃya dharmasāstra.' But this cannot bring down the poet's date. Mānaviṃya dharmasāstra (not the present Manusmṛhitā) cannot be later than 329 B.C.

(*Vide* Indian Antiq., 1916, p. 128, Mr. Shāhu's article.)

Book II

Bhāsa's Kāvyaś

(A) THEIR PLOTS

(1) *Svapna vāsavadattā*.—The Buddhist Jātaka Stories are as old as the 6th or 7th century B. C., and perhaps older still. In Jātaka 4. 375, we hear of Udena, King of Vacchas or Vainsas of Kōsambi. Once, in a fit of drunken rage at a picnic, because his womenfolk left him, when he was sleeping, to listen to Piṇḍōla, a Buddhist Saint, he had Piṇḍōla tortured by having a nest of brown ants tied to him. These stories about Udayana, even in the Jātaka books, show the antiquity of the historical King. In Svapna-Vāsava we learn that Vāsavadattā was the daughter of King Mahāsena of 'Avantī' (Ujjaini). Kathāsaritsāgara says that Vāsavadattā was the daughter of Candamahāsena. But Ratnāvalī, Priyadarśikā and Meghadūta say that the father was Pradyota, King of Avanti. Now, Buddhist tradition confirms this. Vāsavadattā is placed in the hands of Padmāvatī. She lives under the name of Avantikā with her, until Padmā is married to Udayana, when both enjoy the consortship of the King. Darśaka is the king of Magadha in our Svapna, Padmāvatī being his sister. There is no mention of Padmāvatī's father Pradyōta. Udayana had already married Vāsavadattā before and he would never marry any other lady, be it Padmāvatī or any one else. This fact Yaugandharāyaṇa the minister; knew. But the minister wanted to recover his master's territories from the enemy's hands and thus, according to the saying of Siddha, wanted to marry his master to Padmā, since she was believed to be the *would-be-queen* of a one-parasoled king.

But knowing the mentality of the king,—his reluctance to marry any other lady—the Minister laid a plot with Vāsavadattā, and they all spread the report that Vāsavadattā had been burnt to death in Lāvaṇaka conflagration. Great was the grief of the King for the so-deceased Queen. After he had married Padmāvatī, Avantikā, who was kept as a trust by the minister (in the disguise of a of a Brahmin) was known to be the real Vāsavadattā. And the King enjoyed the companionship of both the Queens.

Ratnāvalī and Priyadarsikā are much indebted to our poet not only for the development of their plots, but also for certain ideas being taken bodily.

Compare. “पञ्चेषुर्मदनो यदा कथमयं व्रतः शरः पातितः”

(Śvapna, 4. 1.)

with “बाणाः पञ्च मनोभवस्य नियतास्तेषामसंख्यो जनः”

(Ratnā, Verse 48, Act 3.)

In Pratijñā we find the identification of Mahāsena and Pradyōta—the King of Ujjaini. So that there is no cause for suspecting its plot to be posterior to that of Kathāsarit's prototype, *viz.*, Guṇādhyā's Brihatkathā.

(2) *Pratijñā*.—Pradyōta, the King of Ujjaini wants to marry his daughter to Udayana the King of Vatsa. But failing to secure his consent he managed to make him captive by enticing him to an elephant-hunting. He was appointed the music-master of his daughter. In a short time love grew between them and one day the pair eloped. Bharata-rōhaka, the minister of Pradyōta, poured forth words of abuse against Udayana when Yaugandharāyaṇa interposed.

E.g., “महासेनस्य दुहितरं शिष्यां प्रतिगृह्य अदत्तापनयनं कृतं, युक्तेयं भोस्तस्करवृत्तिः !” To this Yaugandharāyaṇa retorts ; “मा भवानेवं । विवाहः खल्वेषः स्वामिनः ।” At last अङ्गारवती

the mother of वासवदत्ता was about to commit suicide by a fall from the palace, when she was checked by Mahāsena saying,—

“आत्रधर्मेण उद्दिष्टो दुहितुर्विवाहः । किमिदानीं सन्तप्यसे ।
तच्चित्रफलकस्थयोर्वत्सराज-वासवदत्तयोर्विवाहोऽनुष्ठोयताम् । इति ।”

‘A-virtue-of-necessity’ or ‘Grapes-are-sour’ fable is illustrated once more.

But the union of the couple should have been accompanied by their joining Yaugandharāyaṇa the faithful minister. But that is not. This is an obvious imperfection of the drama from the comedy standpoint; but is a great device of dramatic vigour when judged from the tragedy standpoint.

(3) *Pañcarātra*.—The play takes its name from the period of five nights referred to in the plot, which is briefly as follows:—

After wandering for twelve years in the forest the Pāṇḍavas were living incognito in the thirteenth year. Drōṇa, the family preceptor of the Kurus, knew the reluctance of दुर्योधन (Duryyodhana) and others to give a bit of land even, to the Pāṇḍavas. Hence he apprehended a fratricidal war. To avoid such a calamity he was looking for an opportune moment to unite the brothers. At the instance of Drōṇa, he (Duryyodhana) performed a sacrifice. At the end of the sacrifice he performed his अवभृथ bath and wanted to render ‘गुरुदक्षिणा’ (Gurudakṣiṇā). Drōṇa cleverly demanded half of the kingdom for the Pāṇḍavas. Duryyodhana assented to it on the condition that Drōṇa would bring within five nights the news of the whereabouts of the Pāṇḍavas. Drōṇa found out Bhīma from the news of the Kīcakas being slain in secret in the capital of Virāṭ. Bhīma induced the Kauravas to carry off the cattle of Virāṭa under the pretext of ministering him for his absenting himself from the

sacrifice of Duryyodhana. Thus he located the Pāṇḍavas. And half the kingdom was given to the Pāṇḍavas.

This version of five days' search and restoring half the dominions is not according to the Mahābhārata.

The further peculiarity of its plot is that Abhimanyu joined the Kauravas in the Kaurava-Vairāṭa fight, and that the division of the kingdom was half and half.

(4) *Avi-māraka*.—The king of Sāuvīra, Viṣṇusena, became caṇḍāla for a year, along with his family by the curse of Dirghatapas. He lived in Kuntibhōja town incognito. While thus living he killed an Asura named Avi, and became known as *Avi-māraka*. One day he rescued his maternal uncle's daughter Kurangī from the clutches of an infuriated elephant. On hearing this, the father of Kurangī, Kuntibhōja, had motive of marrying her to Avi-māraka. But he could not do so, as Avi-māraka was of a very low caste (अन्यज). But Kurangī and Avi met, grew in mutual amour, and the love reached climax. Through Dhātri's contrivance Avi-māraka once entered Kurangī's chamber. Then coming out and finding no help out of the difficulty, resolved to die by throwing himself down from a hill. At that time a Vidyādhara met him, and gave him a ring out of mercy, by whose power he could secretly enjoy the companionship of Kurangī every night with a buffoon of his as his comrade. Kuntibhōja on finding him there became perplexed, and thought of marrying her to Jayavarman, another nephew of his on the sister's side. But Nārada intervened and married the couple publicly with celebration.

This drama shows that the marriage of maternal and paternal brothers and sisters, obtained in those days. In the Mahābhārata Arjuna is seen to marry his maternal uncle's daughter. In any case, the plot is an evidence in favour of the antiquity of the drama. It shows Manu's Dharma Śāstra did not hold a sway then. The

Kathāsarit tells the same tale in a somewhat different manner. There is some similarity of the plot. Sudarśanā, was the mother of Avimāraka, Queen of Kāśīrāja. Nalinikā, Māgadhikā, Vilāsinī, were handmaids of Kuṅṅgī. Vasumitrā and Harinikā were handmaids of Kuntibhōja's queen. Kāuñjāyana was the minister of Kuntibhōja.

(5) *Bālacaritam*.—In it is described the well-known Devakī-Vāsudeva story, and the Kṛiṣṇa-Kaṁsa story. Here Ugrasena, is the father of Kaṁsa and Dāmodara and Saṁkarṣaṇa are the names for Kṛiṣṇa and Valadeva. With the epic it has in common the wrestlers Cāṇūra, and Muṣṭika. *Kātyāyanī*, stands for Yōgamāyā. Śaṁkha, Cakra, Śārṅga and Kaumodakī are presiding gods and goddesses.

Here, Vāsudeva is seen to start for Nanda's house with Kṛiṣṇa, the baby: crosses the Jumna, but does not enter Nanda's house; on the other hand, waits under a banyan tree. Just at that time Nanda was passing by that way with his dead baby daughter. Vāsudeva then requested Nanda to take the male child saying that that was his *seventh son*; six previous sons being killed by Kaṁsa. In the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas we get *Kṛiṣṇa as the 8th child*. When Vāsudeva returned to his home with the dead daughter of Nanda, the baby revived. The daughter was brought to the scaffold ground in due time, by Kaṁsa, the king, when the baby, *Kātyāyanī* exclaimed—

“शुभं निशुभं महिषं च हत्वा कृत्वासुरान् पाहत्यनुपपन्नं, चष्ट
प्रसूता वसुदेववंशे कात्यायनी कंसकुलक्षयाय ।”

In the 3rd Act:—Old Gōpālaka narrates Kṛiṣṇa's Līlā before Dāmaka, briefly. On the 11th day Kṛiṣṇa killed Pūtanā; on the 30th day Śakaṭāsura and Yamalārjuna were released and he became known as Dāmōdara.

Kāliya-damana story is briefly related here. The early life is full of वीररस instead of 'द्वैतरस' or 'रासरस' as in भागवत and other books.

Kātyāyana's helpmates were Kuṇḍōdara, Sūla, Nīla and Manōjaba.

(6) *Madhyama-Vyāyoga*.—This is a vyāyoga ("सत्यस्त्रीजनसंयुतः"). It should consist of a very few female dramatis personæ. It should be one-Acted. War should not take place because of females. Vritti should be Kauśikī. These characteristics are all present in this vyāyoga.

By using the word "Madhyama" Ghaṭōtkaca demanded the middle son of a Brāhmaṇa. Bhīmasena's attention being invited by the word 'Madhyama,' he went there and rescued the Brahmaṇa boy. Hence the name Madhyama-vyāyoga. Bhīmasena had a fight with Ghaṭōtkaca (quite a departure from the epic) then the latter brought Bhīmasena to his mother Hiḍimbā, when she recognised him, and told her son to greet him as father.

(7) *Dūta-Pākyam*.—This is an one-Acted Drama. This is woven from the Mahābhārata story of Kṛiṣṇa acting as an ambassador of the Pāṇḍavas. Kañcukī intimated the arrival of Kṛiṣṇa to Duryyodhana saying 'Purusottama is come.' Just then Duryyodhana was holding his ministerial council. He corrected Kañcukīya's language telling him to name Kṛiṣṇa as Kaṁsasabhritya Dāmōdara. As an evil omen Duryyodhana fell from his seat at the advent of Vāsudeva Kṛiṣṇa. When Vāsudeva was seated in Duryyodhana's council hall, he found there a picture of Draupadī's 'Keśākaraṣaṇa. He at once uttered "अपनीयतां एष चित्रपटः।" Kañcukīya was obeying this when he was interrupted by Duryyōdhana. Vāsudeva then demanded the

division of the paternal property (दायादं तद्विभज्यताम्). Duryyodhana pointed to Pāṇḍu's remaining free from intercourse with females as there was a curse from a sage and refused any division of property; saying, "तदा प्रभृत्येव स (पाण्डुः) दारनिष्ठः पराम्भजानां पितृतां कथं ब्रजेत्।" Vāsudeva also, then pointed out that विचित्रवीर्य Vicitravīrya got Pthisis Pulmonalis and that Dhṛitarāṣṭra was born on Ambikā through the agency of Vyāsa and that therefore he also, on the same ground as Duryyodhana held out, could not claim paternal property. Then Duryyōdhana tried to use force, when Vāsudeva took his visvarūpa, (विश्वरूप) (i.e., universe-wide figure) and the former found him everywhere in every possible shape and size. Sudarśana, the discus of Vāsudeva, was called in by the latter into action and there came Sudarśana, Kaumōdaki (कौमोदकी) (mallet) Pāñcajanya and all other weapons in the train. Duryyōdhana's fear and bewilderment were highest. Then Vāsudeva again cooled down. Just then Dhṛitarāṣṭra came in on the scene, and fell at the feet of Vāsudeva, to atone for the fault of his sons. The Lord Vāsudeva complied to his request. The extension of the plot and its description are really charming.

8. *Dūta-Ghaṭōtkacam*.—Abhimanyu was killed by the Dhārtarāṣṭras cruelly and in an illegal manner. Then Gāndhārī, Dhṛitarāṣṭra and Duḥśalā, all repudiated the conduct of the Kāuravas. Ghaṭōtkaca was sent as an ambassador by the Pāṇḍavas to the Kāurava camp, when Duryyōdhana and brothers insulted him by calling Kṛiṣṇa a *no-king*, etc. Ghaṭōtkaca gets irate, shows his defiant and heroic attitude when Dhṛitarāṣṭra intermeddles and quiets him down. This is a new conception of our poet to send Ghāṭa as an ambassador. Very charming is the manner in which the poet manages Ghaṭōtkaca's ways.

9. *Karṇa-Bhāraṇ*.—It describes how Karṇa gave both his Kavaca (कवच) and Kuṇḍala (कुण्डल) to Indra in the guise of a Brāhmin, by way of gift. Karṇa gives his life-history to Śalya on that occasion. The Vajramukha worm's boring the thigh of his teacher, how the curse came upon him from his teacher,—everything he narrated. His charitable spirit shines the most in the verse put into his mouth by the dramatist, *e.g.* :—

“अङ्गेः सहैव जनिः (१) मम देहरक्षा
 देवासुरैरपि न भेद्यमिदं महास्त्रे ।
 देयं तथापि कवचं सह कुण्डलाभ्यां
 प्रोत्था मया भगवतीरुवितं यदि स्यात् ॥”

10. *Urubhaṅgam*.—The plot is simply nothing but breaking the thigh of Duryyōdhana by Bhīmasena in the mallet-fight. There is nothing peculiar in the plot. Aśvatthāman has a caustic comment upon Duryyōdhana's thigh-break, *e.g.* :

“भोः कुरुराज !

संयुगे पाण्डुपुत्रेण गदापात-कच-ग्रहे ।
 सममूरुद्वयेनाद्य दर्पीऽपि भवती हतः ॥”

11. *Abhiṣekanāṭakam*.—Based on the Rāmāyaṇa. In it, the events of the Kiskindhyā and Sundarakāṇḍa and Lankākāṇḍa are very briefly shown and narrated. In the first Act, we get Vālibadha; in the second, we have Hanūmat's going to Sītā and narrating Rāma's sayings to her. In the third Act, Hanūmat goes to Rāvaṇa, and Rāvaṇa forsakes and cuts off all connexion with Vibhīṣaṇa. In the fourth, Vibhīṣaṇa takes shelter under Rāmacandra. In the fifth Meghnāda or Indrajit is killed. Rāvaṇa faints down at the news of his death. Very charming is

the language in which the poet puts the lamentation of Rāvaṇa.

Of. “देवाः सेन्द्रा जिता येन दैत्याश्चापि पराङ्मुखा ।

इन्द्रजित् सोऽपि समरे मानुषेण निहन्यते ॥”

again,

“हा वत्स ! सर्वजगतां ज्वरकृत् ! कृतास्त्र !

हा वत्स ! वासवजिदानतवैरिचक्र !

हा वत्स ! वीर ! गुरुवत्सल ! युद्धशौण्ड !

हा वत्स ! मामिह विहाय गतोऽसि कस्मात् ॥”

In the 6th Act Rāvaṇa himself is killed. Then comes *Sitā's Trial* for her supposed infidelity. She enters fire (“प्राविशत् पद्मवनं यथैव हंसी”) to demonstrate her purity, and comes out quite unharmed.

“एषा कनकमालेव ज्वलनाद् वर्षितप्रभा ।

पावना पावकं प्राप्य निर्विकारमुपागता ॥”

* Then there follows singing of the celestial beings—the Gandharvas and others. This portion of the singing of Lord Nārāyaṇa's praise is exceedingly charming.

“नमो भगवते नारायणाय त्रैलोक्यकारणाय । ब्रह्मा ते हृदयं । मग्नेयं हि जले वराहवपुषा.....,” etc.

Again it ends with Rāma's asking boon from god Agni in the shape of Bharat-vākya.

In this drama, the peculiarity—*viz.*, its departure from the Rāmāyaṇa—is this, that there is a conversation between Lakshmī and Rāmacandra even before Sitā's being kidnapped by Rāvaṇa.

12. *Cārūdattam*.—The author of *Mṛicchakaṭika* has developed his theme on the basis of this drama of the Trivandrum poet. Around the nucleus of this plot was woven the charming fabric by Śūdraka. The first acts of the two plays differ very little except that Vasanta-senā

is pursued by two persons in this drama, while she is pursued by three in *Mṛiccha*; viz., Viṭa, Ceṭa, and Śākāra. The characters of Māthura, Dyūtakāra and Dardūraka of the *Mṛiccha*, are not found in the second Act of our *Cārudatta*. The shampooer (संवाहक) turns out a Paribrājaka in our drama but in *Mṛiccha*, he becomes a Śākya Śramaṇa (*vide*, p. 44) “अज्ज एव कदाह निव्वेदेण पव्वजेयं ।”

In the third Act, the plot is the same in both the plays. In the 4th, when Vasantasenā has overheard the conversation between Madanikā, and Sajjalaka, Vidūṣaka steps in to carry out his mission; and Sajjalaka appears before Vasantasenā only after Vidūṣaka is gone. This is not so in *Mṛiccha*. No reference to the story of Āryaka and Pālaka, is found anywhere in *Cārudatta*. The ideas which are expressed very concisely in *Cārudatta* have been dragged to an extensive length in *Mṛiccha*. The description of the mansion of Vasantasenā by Vidūṣaka is so short in *Cārudatta*. Cf. “अहो गणिआवाडस्स सखिरोअदा...” etc.

It has been magnified enormously in *Mṛiccha*. Our ‘Ceṭa’ is ‘Karnapūraka’ in *Mṛiccha*. Our ‘Sajjalaka’ is ‘Sarvilaka’ in it, and our ‘Brāhmaṇī’ is ‘Vadhu’ in *Mṛiccha*.

The development of the plot of *Mṛicchakatika* from the plot of *Cārudatta*, has been nicely depicted by Pandit Gaṇapati Śāstrī in his introduction to *Svapnavāsavadatta*. We would not reiterate it. (*Vide* Introduction, *Svapna*, xxxix to xlii.)

13. *Pratimā*.—The drama is so named from the importance attached to ‘*pratimā*’ or statue in it.

First Act :—Sītā’s playful adornment of her body with bark-garment. Rāma’s going to the forest with Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa.

Second Act :—The mental state of Daśaratha afflicted by his separation from Rāma.

Third Act :—Bharata's knowing the death of his father by seeing the latter's statue erected amidst the statues of departed forefathers in the statue-house. Bharata's meeting his mother and others.

This is a quite unique conception on the part of our poet, highly euphemistic and dramatic.

Fourth Act :—Bharata's return to the capital accompanied by Sumantra after obtaining Rāma's permission to coronate the latter's sandals.

Fifth Act :—Abduction of Sītā by Rāvaṇa in the guise of a mendicant. Golden deer illusion. Jaṭāyu's resistance offered to Rāvaṇa.

Sixth Act :—Killing of Jaṭāyu; on hearing the abduction of Sītā, Bharata's resolve to go to Lankā to help Rāma.

Seventh Act :—Rāvaṇa killed. Rāma's return with Sītā to the hermitage. Bharata's receipt of the news and going out to meet them accompanied by his mother, step-mothers, ministers and followers. Rāma's acceptance of the kingdom from Bharata and his coronation in the hermitage.

In this drama certain developments of the plot are our poet's own, *e.g.*, (1) Bharata's obtaining news of Sītā's abduction, (2) Rāma's coronation in the hermitage, etc.

Such departures from the original, lend more dramatic beauty to the works of the dramatists. Thus in the Uttaracarita the meeting of the hero and the heroine in the forest, and their subsequent happy reunion at the end of the Aśvamedha sacrifice, are the dramatist's own. So in Śakuntalam is the curse of Durvāsas not mentioned in the Mahābhārata.

(B) POETICS OF BHĀSA'S DRAMAS.

(*The excellence or otherwise of the language, imagery, diction, pathos, figures of speech and above all the creation of "Rasa."*)

(1) *Riti* (रिति).—The style of the dramas is *Vaidarbhi*; sometimes while describing fights, etc., "Gauḍi" is also found in a shining look.

(2) *Language and figures of speech*.—His language is very simple, sometimes even ludicrously so. His verbal flow is unimpeded and limpid like the torrent from a mountain-spring. His utterances are mostly quite elegant but are not highly rhetorically polished. Excess of rhetorical figures generally encumbers the real meaning of the passages and is counted as a great drawback in Drama. Our poet is very free from the blemish of super-abundance of figures of speech. The figures that are very simple and quite commonplace have been used by our poet—*viz.* :—(1) *Upamā*, (2) *Dr̥ṣṭānta*, (3) *Arthāntaranyāsa*, (4) *Rūpaka*, (5) *Nidarśanā* and such like simple things of common parlance. These figures even, he has drawn without the least effort. (In this respect we may perhaps place our poet even on a higher level than that of Kālidāsa.) If गद्य is कवीनां निकषम् then Bhāsa's Saraswatī must be called pure gold when put to the test. In short, his linguistic excellence can laconically be expressed by the five words :

(a) प्रसन्न, (b) उदार, (c) गम्भीर, (d) सरल and (e) मधुर.

(3) *Characterisation*.—Very nice. He never enters into details, but with one or two broad strokes conjures up a very individualistic personality. Only such characters have been chosen as are marked by the genuine worth of their character. Their movements in life both mental and physical have been so artistically

delineated as to draw the minds of the audience thoroughly into them.

(4) '*Rasa*'.—Our poet is master hand at the creation of '*Rasa*.' It is '*Rasa*' which is desired by the literateur, the most. It is '*Rasa*' that captivates the mind of the cultured most easily and most thoroughly. This our poet has exhibited, without showing any effort, and by not denuding the materials of their natural colour and timbre.

(C) INDEBTEDNESS OF KĀLIDĀSA, ŚUDRAKA AND OTHER POETS TO BHĀSA.

This has been so well done by Pandit Gaṇapati Śāstri in his introductions to Svapna and Pratimā that we would not do the same here at length. But we would only point out a few more which are of great interest in tracing the development of the dramas.

(1) ऋक्षेपमात्रोदिते सूर्ये, p. 8, Pratijñā, developed into युगमात्रोदिते सूर्ये in Śakuntalam.

(2) कन्यायाः वरसम्पत्तिः पितुः प्रयत्नः ।

भाग्येषु शेषमायत्तं दृष्टपूर्वं न चान्यथा ॥ Pratijñā, p. 26.

Cf. Śakuntalam—"भाग्यायत्तमतः परं न खलु तद्वाच्यं वधू-
वन्धुभिः ।"

(3) वाणाः पञ्च मनोभवस्य, etc., of Ratnāvalī has been developed from a Bhāsa passage which we have already pointed out.

(4) The description of darkness in Ratnāvalī (cf. पालीयं चम्पकानां, etc.), (verse 53) is founded on the passages describing darkness in Bhāsa's dramas. We have already referred to those Bhāsa passages before (Avimāraka, p. 43).

(5) 'Mūdaka mallaka' idea is very probably taken by Kālidāsa in his Śakuntalam, Act 2, from Pratijñā (*vide loc. cit.*, pp. 39-40).

(D) PROSODY OF BHĀSA.

Our poet has a great command over vṛttas (or metres). He uses a very large variety of metres. In this respect he is just fitly placed between Vālmiki and Vyāsa on the one hand and Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa, Bhāravi and Bhavabhūti on the other. To take a concrete example, we find in his Svapna :

	No.
(1) Āryyā metre (आर्या)	5
(2) Ślōka metre (श्लोक)	26
(3) Śārdulavikrīḍita (19 syllables) (शार्दूलविक्रीडित)	6
(4) Vasantatilakā (14 syllables) (वसन्ततिलका)	9
(5) Puṣpitāgrā (uneven metre called अर्द्धसमवृत्त) (12 and 13 syllables) (पुष्पिताग्रा)	2
(6) Vaiśvadevī (वैश्वदेवी) (12 syllables) ...	1
(7) Śālinī (शालिनी) (11 syllables) ...	3
(8) Śikharinī (शिखरिणी) (17 syllables) ...	2
(9) Upajāti (उपजाति) (11 syllables) ...	1
(10) Upendra-Vajrā (11 syllables) (उपेन्द्रवज्रा)	1
(11) Harinī (हरिणी) (17 syllables) ...	1
	<hr/> 57 verses.

(E) SOCIAL AND POLITICAL GLIMPSES FROM HIS KAVYAS
(INDICATING THE HIGHWATER LEVEL OF CIVILIZATION
AND CULTURE IN THOSE DAYS).

(1) • *Avarodha prathā* existed. *Avagunṭhana* (veiling system) (excepting four occasions) obtained. (*Vide* above.)

(2) *Astronomical knowledge* was great (*vide* Udaya-jñāna (observatory) alluded to in Svapna, p. 54).

(3) *Sculpture as a developed Art*.—Existence of statue-houses (*vide* Pratimā).

(4) *Belief in black art, magic, incantations and charms.*—Cf. (1) Vali, (2) Sambara, and (3) Mahākāla (the three chief president gods for black art and charm), are mentioned (p. 46, Avimāraka). Compare in this connexion, the same gods mentioned in the same context by *Kautilya* (कौटिल्य) in his *Arthaśāstra* *Aupaniṣadika* chapters (औपनिषदिक अध्याय).

(5) *Widows were avoided on auspicious occasions* (*vide* p. 27, Svapna).

(b) *Existence of* (a) *Rājagṛiha* (the town) (Svapna-nāṭaka), (b) *Venuvana* (so famous in Buddhistic literature), (c) *Nāgavana* (famous in Buddhistic literature) (*vide* *Pratijñā*, p. 3), (d) *Pāṭaliputra* (Cārudatta, p. 39), (e) *Kāmpillya* (Svapna, p. 54).

(6) *Naked Sramanas' existence* (p. 72. 85, Avimāraka).

(7) *Belief in Ardhanārīśvara* god-head, very predominant (*vide* Avimāraka, p. 32).

(8) *Generation of fire* (kindling of fire) *by rubbing pieces of Araṇi wood together*. This also shows the antiquity of Bhāsa. Cf. 'काष्ठादग्निर्जायतेमथ्यमानात्,' etc.

Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus

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INTRODUCTION

Speculations on grammar naturally presuppose the existence of language; and the relation in which the study of a language stands to that of its grammatical system is one of interdependence. Based as it is on the strictly scientific method of generalisation and particularisation on the one hand, and that of agreement and difference on the other, Sanskrit grammar may be viewed as throwing much light upon problems of philology. Moreover, the rules of Sanskrit grammar, as they unfold the laws that regulate the growth, formation and correctness of recognised linguistic forms, are in themselves short formulæ of the science of language. Again, the rules, such as परः सन्निकर्षः संहिता (Pāṇ. 1. 4. 109), अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः (Pāṇ. 6. 1. 101), which virtually show the tendency of two vowels having close proximity and homogeneity to lengthening, are as much phonological as grammatical. There was, moreover, a period in the development of the Sanskrit language when, in the absence of such technical devices of grammar, Samāsa had to be determined by different modulations of voice. The division of स्वरः into उदात्तः, अनुदात्तः, and स्वरितः, the transformations of sounds as are illustrated by the rules of संप्रसारणम्, and the principles of euphonic combinations, are indications how intimately grammar is related to phonology. Again, what frequently engross our attention in connection with the investigation of-

language, and the methodology of grammar, are the problems of Semantics which, as a cognate science, deal with the psychological aspects of language. 'The science of meaning,' though of comparatively modern growth in the domain of western philological research, had already developed into a scientific branch of study at the hands of the Nairuktas or etymologists.¹ The antecedency of ideas to words,² the relation between the sign and the object signified,³ the derivability of words from roots, the method of naming objects, and the principle of meaning-change, are facts that were scientifically dealt with by the Nairuktas and grammarians. The etymological explanations of words, as they occur in the Brāhmaṇa and Nirukta literature, give an indication that studies in the science of meaning were not only considered essential for the proper understanding of the Vedic texts, but formed an important part of Sanskrit learning. Though an independent branch of study mainly devoted to the psychological side of language, the study of the Nirukta, as Yāska maintains, is materially akin to that of grammar,⁴ since the former serves as the complement to the latter. The speculations on grammar being thus organically related to those of Philology and Semantics as such, and as the path traversed by them being almost the same, we propose to sketch in the Introduction to the 'Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar' some general outlines of Hindu Philology and Semantics.

¹ अर्थगत्यर्थः शब्दप्रयोगः । अर्थे संप्रत्याग्रयिष्यामीति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते ।—Māhābhāṣya, ed. Kielhorn, Vol. II, p. 15.

सर्वोद्दि शब्दोऽर्थप्रत्ययनार्थं प्रयुज्यते—Tantra-vār., under 1.3.8.

² औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः etc.—Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, 1.1.5.

नित्योच्चर्थवामर्थैरभिसंबन्धः—Mahābhāṣya, ed. Kielhorn, Vol. I, p. 7.

³ नामान्याख्यातज्ञानोति शाकटायनो नैरुक्तसमयश्च—Yāska's Nirukta, 1.12. (Bom. ed., p. 99).

⁴ तदिदं विद्यास्थानं व्याकरणस्य कार्त्तव्यं स्वार्थसाधकं च ।—Yās. Nir., Bom. ed., Vol. I, p. 115.

The early monuments of Sanskrit literature bear ample evidence to the fact that studies in the science of language, as in various other departments of culture, had engaged the keen attention of the Indian thinkers at a very early period; and the amount of success they attained in this particular branch of study cannot be overestimated. Whatever may be the views of scholars regarding the antiquity of the Sanskrit language, we can reasonably assume that the power of speech (Vāk), often personified as a goddess 'वाग्देवी,' was not unknown to the Vedic seers who seem to have been lavish in their laudation of Vāk. On the assumption of a hypothetical parent-tongue one may dispute the claim of Sanskrit to be regarded as the oldest of all tongues, but there is no reason to doubt that it is the oldest of all *living* languages, and that scientific speculation on language first originated in India.

Sanskrit, though no longer a spoken tongue, has got such a vast stock of words on the one hand, and such comprehensive systems of grammar and phonology on the other, that a comparative study of this language along with Greek and Latin laid down the foundation of the science of 'Comparative Philology' in the western world. 'The discovery of Sanskrit,' says Sir R. G. Bhandarkar,¹ 'and the Indian grammatical systems at the close of the last century led to a total revolution in the philological ideas of Europeans.' It is gratifying to find that early Indian speculators on language, though their linguistic survey was confined to one tongue, had succeeded in making accurate observations on language and giving them a strictly scientific character. It is not an exaggeration to say that the references to Vāk, found in the earlier and later Vedic

¹ 'Wilson Philological Lectures,' p. 5.

literature, in passages like the following, "Devas created speech which is spoken by all animals,"¹ "there are as many words as there are manifestations of all-pervading Brahma,"² "speech was invented for the performance of sacrifice,"³ "speech was originally undivided into parts,"⁴ "speech is the rope, names the knots,"⁵ "speech is eternal,"⁶ "the fourth form of speech is current among men,"⁷ "the world originated from Vāk (logos),"⁸ "the word 'Kāka' is an instance of the imitation of sounds,"⁹ "the use of words represents the easiest way of expressing ideas and naming objects,"¹⁰ and "all words are derivable from roots,"¹¹—are almost scientifically correct and represent, so to speak the earliest speculations on language ever made in any part of the world.

No literary records have possibly been preserved either in Babylonia or Greece that are older than the Vedic literature, and contain traces of more accurate observations on language than those to be found in the early Vedic literature. Here and there we find many passages in Sanskrit which have practically a philological bearing and serve to give us more valuable knowledge of the linguistic science than the works of early Greek thinkers. But what we actually lack there

¹ 'देवीं वाचमजनयन्तः देवास्तां विश्वरूपाः पशवो वदन्ति.'—Rigveda, 6.7.5.

² सहस्रं यावत् ब्रह्मविष्टितं तावती वाक्.—Rigveda, 10. 10. 2. 8.

³ इयत्तिंवाचं जनयन् यजज्ये.—Rigveda, 4. 2. 11. 5.

यज्ञेन वाचः पदवीयमायन्तामन्वविन्दन् विसुप्रविष्टाम्.—Rig., 10. 71. 3.

वशिष्टासः पितवत् वाचमकृत etc.—Rigveda, 10. 5. 6. 14.

⁴ वाग्वै पराच्यव्याकृतावदत्तेदेवा इन्द्रमनुवन्.—Tait. Sam. VI, 4. 7.

⁵ वाक्तन्निर्गमानि दामानि.—Ait. Aranyaka, 2. 1. 6. B. Ind., p. 63.

⁶ वाचा विरूपन्त्यया.—Rigveda, 8. 8. 66.

⁷ "तुरीयं वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति."—Rigveda, 2. 3. 22. 5.

⁸ वागेव विश्वामुवनानि जज्ञे.—Quoted by Pūnyarāja under Vākyapadīya. Kārikā, 121, p. 45, Ben. ed. [ed., p. 316.]

⁹ काकइति शब्दानुक्रुतिरुद्दिदेशकुनिषु बहुलम्.—Yās. Nirukta, VII. IV. I. Bom.

¹⁰ अथोयसाश्चशब्देनसञ्चारणं व्यवहारार्थंलोके.—Nirukta, 1. 1. 2, p. 44, Bom. ed.

¹¹ नामान्वाख्यातजानौति.—Nirukta, 1. 12, Bom. ed., p. 99.

is a systematic study of language on a comparative method. As regards the question of time or priority, we know of no European thinker who, far from being anterior to the Vedic seers of respectable antiquity, might even be placed before Yāska whose work is a conspicuous sign of the scientific development of Sanskrit Philology. This being the actual state of things, we can hardly make out what led Prof. Sayce¹ to assert in bold terms that it was not in India but in Babylonia and Greece that the first attempt had been made to solve the problems of language. The contribution made by Sanskrit literature to the philosophy of language is really valuable, and, in the words of Sir R. G. Bhandarkar,² 'India may justly claim to be the original home of scientific philology.' It will suffice here to say that the Sanskrit passages which speak of 'fourfold' division of speech,³ 'Vāk⁴ as string, and names as knots,' and of 'speech⁵ as the materialisation of internal consciousness,' are, in no way, posterior to the linguistic speculations of Heracleitus and Democritus. Yāska, who flourished at least a century earlier than Plato, and who was undoubtedly preceded by good many etymologists, and grammarians, had already divided speech into four parts, had strictly adhered to the doctrine of derivability of words from roots,⁶ and distinguished verbal roots from prefixes and suffixes. Though the works of earlier etymologists who founded their schools like the grammarians have been lost, and we have access only to one of

¹ Intro. to the Science of Language by Prof. Sayce, Vol. I, pp. 3 and 5.

² Wilson Philological Lectures, p. 4.

³ चत्वारिवाक् परिमितापदानि. —Rigveda, 2. 3. 22. 5.

⁴ Ait. Aran., 2. 1. 6.

⁵ सूत्रमर्थेनाप्रविभक्ततत्त्वमिमां वाचमभिस्यन्दमानाम्—Sṛuti quoted by Panyarāja. Vāk. Karika, I.—यच्च धीरा मनसा वाचमकत.—Rigveda, X, 71. 2.

⁶ चत्वारि पदजातानि नामास्त्रयातीपसर्गेनिपाताश्च.—Nir., 1. 1. p. 23.

them, yet we do not fail to notice the scientific accuracy of Indian speculations on language. Examples may be multiplied to show that speculations with regard to the science of language had their origin in India in that remote period of the Vedic literature when the 'Pada-pātha' texts, on a purely grammatical line, had been arranged by Śākalya and numerous treatises on Phonology (Prātisākhya), Etymology (Nirukta) and grammar had come into existence with the supreme necessity of facilitating the Vedic studies. It was, of course, at the hands of Pāṇini, Patanjali and Bhartrihari in a later period that studies in the science of language, specially in the philosophy of grammar, seem to have received a systematic development.

Much has been done by European scholars in the domain of linguistic researches; they have based their speculations on a comparative method and carefully systematised the materials gathered from a study of the conspicuous languages of the so-called Indo-European family. Their achievement, judged by the scientific standard, is indeed great. But, to speak the truth, very little has been spoken of the Indian logico-grammarians whose observations on the philosophy of language are calculated to be of no less scientific value. We shall not be far from truth if we say that Indian linguists have not really been given the prominence which they rightly deserve in consideration of the antiquity of their speculations and the cogency of their arguments. It is quite manifest from what we have already said that Indian speculations on language might be placed at the head of all linguistic dissertations of the world. In the following pages an attempt will be made to find out the materials upon which the structure of 'Hindu Philology' is to be built.

PART I

Philosophy of Language

VĀK—ITS ORIGIN AND ETERNAL CHARACTER

In the first part of this thesis we propose to deal with the Philosophy of the Sanskrit Language and set forth the general features of the tongue from both physical and psychological standpoints. The short space at our disposal will not, however, permit us to give here a comprehensive analysis of all the texts that have either a direct or indirect bearing upon the problems of language. The dominant idea we have kept in view is to show that speculations on languages are not entirely the product of intellectual activity of the west, and the fruitful result of scientific studies of languages, as undertaken by the present generation of scholars, but India has reason to be proud of having largely contributed in a much earlier age to the general knowledge of the linguistic science in its manifold aspects.

The sacred language of the Indo-Aryans (subsequently known by the popular appellation **संस्कृत**)
Divine origin. is spoken of in the Rig Veda as a 'Divine speech' created by the gods for the use of all animals in their respective fashions. Whether speech was given to man as a divine gift or acquired by him through imitation, belief regarding its divine origin steadily gained ground, even in later times, and we find Dandin¹ and Bhartrihari² eulogising 'Sanskrit as a 'Divine tongue.' The mysticism underlying the phenomenon of speech

¹ संस्कृतं नाम देवी वाक्—Kāvyaṭṭarāṣa, 1. 33.

² देवोवाक्यवकीर्णयम्—Vāk.pad., 1. 156 (Ben. ed.).

does not usually excite our wonder. Scarcely it becomes a burden of thought as to how we learn to speak or how the manifestation of internal ideas takes place through the medium of audible sound. But when we consider the magnitude of what has been said on the origin of speech by Indian thinkers, we are almost forced to appreciate the width of vision with which they sought to trace the ultimate origin of Vāk as well as the depth and importance of the subject itself. The germs of speech seem to have been implanted to human nature by some divine agency ; men do not create speech but serve only to manifest it by the exercise of their vocal organs. The power of articulating sound, as a divine or natural gift granted to men, serves to distinguish men from other animals. Moreover, the designation 'गोर्वाणवाणो,' as often applied to Sanskrit, purports to show the sacredness of Sanskrit as being the language of gods. The credit of developing a highly efficient means of communication as speech (Vāk) might therefore be ascribed to gods from whom men got it. It may be further held that the world of speech (वाक्मय-जगत्) represents the audible manifestation of that unseen power which permeates the entire existence. To bring in the idea of God for explaining the origin of language is not altogether obsolete, for we hear of a group of scholars in Steinthal's linguistic discourses who advanced arguments in support of the 'Divine Origin' of language. Vāk is again said to have originated for the performance of sacrifice. The first and foremost thing necessary for the performance of sacrifice was the recitation of mantras, and as it was through the medium of speech (as opposed to gesture) that the priests had to offer their prayers to gods, the importance of Vāk was early conceived by the Vedic seers. Pranava, as a symbol of or virtually identical with Brahma, is spoken of as the

ultimate source of Vāk (ॐकारमेवेदं सर्वम्).¹ To this primordial sound is attributed the origin of the entire world of speech. It is mysterious how all words are capable of being reduced to such a single syllable as *pranava*, and it necessarily requires a good deal of meditation to realise a phenomenon like this.

Rightly or wrongly, most of the Hindu teachers have spoken of their traditionally sacred tongue as 'Nitya'² (eternal), or more properly, 'Pravāhanitya'³ (current from time immemorial). In the *Rig Veda* we first meet with the expression 'वाचाविरूपनित्यया' which assigns eternality to Vāk. When Brahman is held to be identical with words,⁴ as we have already alluded to, it is no wonder that Vāk should merit the same attributes as are popularly assigned to Brahman. This view, however inconsistent with the accepted theory, was not without its effects. The entire school of *Mīmāṃsā*⁵ philosophy is based upon the doctrine of eternity of sound. To maintain the non-human origin of the Vedas, the *Mīmāṃsakas* had no other alternative than to strongly advocate the eternal character of sound. The non-eternal view of Vāk, as is held by *Audambarāyaṇa*,⁶ found absolutely no support at the hands of etymologists and

¹ 'सर्वावाचोवेदमनुप्रविष्टाः' and 'स (प्रणवः) हि सर्वशब्दार्थप्रकृतिः'—Vākpad. Kārika. 1. 10.

² 'वाग्वैशायतौ'—Chhāṇ. Upan, 3. 12, Bom. ed.

³ 'नित्याश्शब्दाः'—Mahābhāṣhya. Vol. 1, p. 18 (Keil. ed.).

⁴ 'सिद्धं नित्यशब्दत्वात्'—Vār. Mahā, Vol. 1, p. 257.

⁵ 'कार्यशब्दिकानामपि मते प्रवाहनिवृत्तयार्थस्यापि...नित्यत्वम्.—Kaiyata on "सिद्धे-शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे ।

प्रवाहं नित्यया शब्दात् सदैव प्रतीतेः—Punyarāja on Vāk. ka., 3. 2,

⁶ 'ब्रह्मदं शब्दनिर्माणं शब्दशक्तिनिवृत्तम्'—Punyarāja on Vākya padīya-karikā, 1.

⁷ 'नित्यस्तु स्यात् दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात्.—Mīm. Sūtra, 1. 1. 18.

तस्मात् वेदप्रमाणाथ नित्यत्वमिह साध्यते.—Sloka-vāṇ. on Mīm. Sūtra, 1. 1. 6.

⁸ 'इन्द्रियनित्यं वचनं औदुम्बरायणः'—Yāska Nir. 1.

grammarians. The Mīmāṃsakas, therefore, were not alone to lend support to such a view, since the grammarians, though in a different way, seem to have established the same truth by formulating the doctrine of 'Sphoṭa.' We can justify our remark by showing that the author of the Mahābhāṣya¹ has often applied to words such attributes as कूटस्थः, नित्यः, अविचाली, अविकारी, etc., which are all expressive of 'eternity.' What is really meant by holding language to be current from eternity is that its origin can hardly be definitely traced back to any particular period of the history of mankind, and that speech seems to be almost coëval with man. There is hardly any justification to believe the existence of such a human society in which men might be supposed to have been living in a state of absolute muteness. We may compare language to a living organism having both growth and decay; we may adhere to the doctrine of Evolution for affording us some clue as to the articulation of sound from gibberish of lower animals; and we may look upon language either as instinctive faculty or mechanical art acquired by men under pressure, but in all cases it will ever remain an enigmatic problem to ascertain the true origin of language. Gestures, onomatopoeia and interjectional cries may, as some philologists have pointed out, serve to explain the origin of a few words, but greater bulk of words, we must remember, would remain entirely inexplicable so far as their origin is concerned. As onomatopoeia is found to be applicable only to a very limited number of words, such as 'Kokila,' 'Kāka,' 'Dundubhi,' etc., we find it difficult to look upon the so-called 'Bow-wow' theory of Prof. Max Müller as throwing much light upon the origin of language.

¹ नित्याश्च शब्दाः नित्येषु च शब्देषु कूटस्थैरविचालिभिर्वर्गेभिरवितत्यमनपाश्रीपजनविकारिभिः.- Mahābhāṣya, Vol., I. p. 18.

Though he seems to have been conscious of the part played by the imitation of natural sound in the formation of language, Yāska holds that all words do not speak of the same origin¹; and maintains, on the contrary, that words referred to above are also capable of being derived in a different way.² The inefficiency and insufficiency of gestures,³ etc., as modes of expressions, have also been particularly observed by Yāska, since he states that in giving names to objects, words or articulate sounds are resorted to to the exclusion of physical movements on the scientific ground of their being most precise and comprehensive.

Language, whether existing from eternity or simply a conventional product of human efforts, is, according to the author of the Vākyapadiya, without beginning.⁴ In the form of subtle sound ('नादः'), Vāk resides in the innermost part of human body and reveals itself through the instrumentality of vocal organs. 'There are, as we know, permanent word-records in the sub-conscious strata of the human mind.'⁵ They are manifested and not brought into existence by the act of uttering. That is to say, the production and disappearance or destruction of sound mean respectively manifestation and absence of operations on the part of vocal organs. This is, so to speak, the argument whereby the Mīmāṃsakas sought to refute the non-eternal view of words, as held by the Naiyāyikas (व्योमगुणेष्वनित्येषु ध्वनिषु—Śabdakhaṇḍa, Tattva-cintāmaṇi, p. 464, Bib. Ind. ed.). As regards the essence

¹ 'न शब्दाकृतिविद्यते इत्यौपमन्यवः ।—Nir. III. 17, p. 316.

² काक उपकालयितव्यो भवति ।—Nir. III. 17, p. 316 (Bom. Ed.).

³ अक्षौयस्त्वाच्च शब्देन संज्ञाकरणम् ।—Durga has अभिमतया अपि व्याप्तिसकः पाणिनिद्वारा-
चिन्तितो वादयः ।—Nir., p. 49.

⁴ नित्यत्वे कृतकत्वे वा तेषामादिर्न विद्यते ।—Vāk. 1. 28, p. 15.

⁵ Dr. Lakshman Sarup's Nirukta.

of Vāk, both Bhartṛhari¹ and Puṇyarāja hold that it is internal consciousness which finds expression through the medium of words, that is, in the use of words are reflected the mental ideas of the speaker. Vāk is, therefore, a means for the purpose of clothing thoughts. The subtle or psychological form of Vāk is held to be imperishable and consequently eternal. Here we find what is really meant by the Vedic text 'वाचा विरूपनित्या' and Manu's assertion 'अनादिनिधनानित्या वागुत्पृष्टा स्वयम्भुवा.' The internal wind, to be more clear, gets material shape while passing through the vocal organs and is neither subject to production nor destruction in the true sense of the terms.

By word the Hindu grammarians meant sound which comes from within (तस्मात् ध्वनिः शब्दः). This sound which forms the outer garment of our inner thoughts becomes cognisable when it is usually capable of being expressed by letters (क्षतवर्णपरिग्रहा). All sounds do not, however, constitute language; sounds (apart from those that are produced by the beat of drum and the like) expressive of sense² come under the cognisance of linguistic studies as such. Later on will follow the discussion as to how sound and sense are inseparably associated with each other. The Chāndogya³ Upaniṣad clearly states that the internal wind known as Vyāna, which represents a conjunction of Prāṇa (inhalation) and Apāna (exhalation), is the same as Vāk; and it is on

¹ अथिदमात्तः ज्ञानं सूक्ष्मवागात्मनास्थितम् । व्यक्तये स्वस्य रूपस्य शब्दत्वेन निवर्तते । — Vākya-pādiya-kar., 1. 113.

प्रत्यक् चैतन्यस्यान्तःसन्निविष्टस्य परकीयनाय शक्तिरभिधन्यत इति । — Puṇyarāja. Vāk. Kar., I.

एतावता ज्ञानस्य शब्दत्वमिति बोध्यम्. — Com. on Manjushā. Kala, Vol. I, p. 190.

² प्रतीतपदार्थं को लोके ध्वनिः शब्द इत्युच्यते । — Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 1.

³ यः प्राणपानयोः सन्धिः स व्यानो यो व्यानः सा वाक् तस्मादप्राणपानान्वाचमानाभिव्यङ्ग्यते । — Chh. Up., 1. 3. Bom. ed., p. 32.

this account that at the time of speaking one is to refrain from both inhaling and exhaling. The same view regarding Vāk is also to be found in the Mahābhārata (प्राणायामान्तरे देवो वाग्वे निखं हि तिष्ठति). Commenting on 'प्राणोवावप्येष्टस्यैष्टस्य,' etc., Ch. Up., 5.1, Śaṅkara observes that in point of time Prāṇa or vital force is older than Vāk, that is, in an embryo the vital force comes earlier than the faculty of speech which depends on the growth of sense-organs. That Prāṇa is superior to Vāk is shown by the fact that the dumb, though devoid of the power of speech, are not found unfit to live. Man does not, however, bring the faculty of speech into existence but only attempts to manifest the sounds that lie in undeveloped forms in some innermost part of his body. In tracing the ultimate origin of Vāk, the Śikṣās¹ also speak of internal wind as the creative factor. The soul, after ascertaining by intelligence the object to be communicated to others, engages mind to give expression to it, that is, to vocalise the thought rising within. Mind so appointed acts upon the internal physical fire which, again, moves the internal wind. Coming in touch with vocal organs, this internal wind assumes the form of words. This view with slight modifications is to be found in many Sanskrit works. To a Tāntrika, Vāk represents the audible potentiality of Śakti; every sound forms in itself the distinct manifestation of Nāda, and letters whereby sounds assume forms are called मातृकावर्णः. It is further stated that the operation of Nāda is continually going on, and that in every act of inhaling and exhaling we are unconsciously making two indistinct sounds, namely, हं and सः. In the Vākyapadīya Bhartṛhari² has shown

¹ आत्मा बुद्ध्या समेत्यर्थान् मनो युङ्क्ते विवक्षया । मनः कथाप्रमाहन्ति स प्रेरयति मातृकम् — Pāṇiniya Śikṣa. Nirṇay., ed. 6.

² स्थानेनभिहतो वायुः शब्दत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।—Vākpad. 1. 109.

how internal wind reveals itself in the form of words; and has spoken of consciousness¹ and atoms² as life-giving constituents of words. To sum up what has been said in connection with the origin of language, we should say that there is almost no contention as regards the transformation of internal wind into the audible form of Vāk, and that this mystical process, though constantly at work, is almost imperceptible. As fire, says Bhartṛhari,³ lies dormant in Araṇi, so the germs of Vāk are latent in consciousness; and every act of uttering sound is only to manifest what is unmanifest (अव्यक्त).

Nāgeśa⁴ has attempted to explain the origin of Vāk with reference to Cosmogony. After the annihilation of the cosmic world, he maintains, when the Supreme Being felt the necessity of creating this universe, His potentiality took the form of an 'atom'—a combination of three Guṇas. This is in reality an inexhaustible stock of energy. The unconscious part (inertia) is known to be बीजम् (seed), the part representing a mixture of both inertia and consciousness is called Nāda (sound), and the intelligent element goes by the name of Vindu. This Nāda, regarded as the ultimate source of all forms of Vāk (Parā, Paśyantī, Madhymā, and Vaikharī), is what is known as 'Śabda-Brahma.' The 'Tāntrika conceptions, as we find in the Sāradātilaka, have striking concurrence with this view.

¹ आह्नितपपरिपाकाया ब्रह्मी शब्दोऽवधार्यते.—Vāk. 1. 85; and शब्दः प्राणाधिष्ठानो ब्रह्माधिष्ठानश्च'.

² अणवः सर्वशक्तित्वात् भेदसंसर्गवृत्तयः—Vāk. 1, III.

³ अरणिस्थं यथा ज्योतिः प्रकाशान्तराकारणम्—Vāk., I, 46.

⁴ ततः परमेश्वरस्य सिद्धचारिमकामायाह्नितर्जायते। ततो विन्दुरूपमव्यक्तं त्रिगुणं जायते। इदमेव शक्तितत्त्वम्। तस्य विन्दोरचिदंशो बीजम्, etc.—Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhānta-manjuhā, p. 171.

The grammarians, it must be borne in mind, have, however, admitted the existence of Sphoṭa,¹ as distinguished from sound whereby it is materialised into word. It is indivisible into parts, formless, and not at all subject to production or destruction. It is pure consciousness that has neither beginning nor end. Of two-fold division of words,² namely, permanent and produced, it is the permanent or eternal that is represented by Sphoṭa. It is called स्फोटः, because the meaning is ultimately expressed by it. The grammarians have ascribed expressiveness to 'Sphoṭa' alone (वाचकता स्फोटैक-निष्ठा) and have unhesitatingly identified it with Brahma.³ The Vākyapadiya begins with this bold assumption and states further that world proceeded from Śabda-Brahma,⁴ just in the same way as meaning follows from word. It will not be out of place to mention here that the doctrine of Sphoṭa, as expounded by the Hindu grammarians, marks one of the novel features of grammar, considered as a system of Philosophy. The identification of words with Brahman, as is established by the Hindu grammarians, is likely to be questioned by modern philologists, since a thin veil of mysticism hangs over the entire speculation. The author of the Śabda-kaustubha⁵ rightly observes that as one is said to have found the much coveted Chintāmaṇi in his search after a missing cow, so the grammarians, while discussing the real origin of Vāk, have found Brahman as Vāk *par excellence*.

¹ Vide Vāk. Kārika, 1. 94. 1. 103.

² इह ही शब्दोऽमानो नित्यः कार्यश्च ।—Mahābhāṣya.

³ इत्थं निष्कृत्यमाणं यच्च शब्दतत्त्वं निरञ्जनम् । ब्रह्मैवेत्येवं प्राङ्मुखोऽप्युपासते मनः ।
Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-Kār, 72 Bom. ed., p. 259; निष्कर्षतु ब्रह्मैव स्फोटः ।

⁴ अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यद्वचरम् । विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगती यतः'—
Vākyapadiya, Kār I; and शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याज्यायविदो विदुः ।—Vāk. 1. 121.

⁵ बराटिकाव्ये षष्ठ्या प्रवृत्तः चिन्तामणिं लब्धवानिति etc.

With a vision so penetrating and far-reaching the Hindu grammarians could not look upon words, as merely phonetic labels arbitrarily assigned to objects but found in Vāk the audible manifestation of all-pervading Brahma. Vāk, taken in its psychological aspect, is not of human invention; it forms the most essential potentiality of men, as it differentiates them from brutal creation. Vāk is held to be eternal, in as much as the internal wind residing in the Mūlādhāra (inexhaustible reservoir of sound) is said to have perpetual existence. Having discussed many points as to the precise nature of words, Patañjali concludes that word is the same as sound (ध्वनिः शब्दः). We should not, however, lose sight of the fact that this applies to 'कार्यशब्दः,' as opposed to 'नित्यशब्दः,' and never confound sound with 'Sphoṭa' or Nāda, that is to say, effect with cause. From what has been said above we are convinced that we can proceed a step further and hold that sound, as a quality of ether (शब्दगुणमाकाशम्), is the product of internal wind which has its origin in subtle word-form—'Nāda.'

It may be asked here as to what we are driving at and what light is really thrown by these references on the origin of language proper. Our answer *prima facie* is that the origin of language is nothing but a vague problem of modern philology, and that it has become almost a fashion with students of philology to deal with this question with much ingenuity. To trace the origin of language is as difficult as to ascertain the dawn of human intellect. And as sound is only an outward garment of thought, the history of language should necessarily be the history of human thought. The psychological origin of language, as already pointed out, may be thus substantiated by facts of common experience. Every material object, when struck, produces sound peculiar to itself. In the same way when mind acts upon internal fire

(मनःकायान्निमाहन्ति) in order to give expression to thought, subtle forms of sound are readily generated in the vibrating sphere of internal region. Now it is almost clear that what has been said in the foregoing pages refers more to the internal or psychological than to the external forms of language. We have, moreover, alluded to the view of Yāska as to why the use of words is preferable to gesture as a means of expressing thought, and have shown the apparent insufficiency of the so-called 'Bow-Wow' theory, as a perfect explanation of the origin of language. We may in a like manner reject the theory of interjection, if it unduly claims to be the only explanation regarding the creation of language, for only a few words like अहो, वत, आ, अहह, etc., might be traced to emotional cries, while the vast majority of words would show no sign of interjectional origin in themselves. We give below, for the sake of clearness, short accounts of the different views that were held by Indian philosophers regarding the origin of language :—

We have at the very outset referred to the Vedic hymns which speak of Vāk as a creation of God. According to this view, language, though spoken by men, does not betray any trace of human invention ; it is a divine gift, and not an achievement of which man has any reason to be proud. It was possibly to distinguish man from brutal creation that the faculty of speech as well as the power of articulating sound had been implanted in him. Manu says that it was the supreme Self-born Being (स्वयम्भुः) who created Vāk. The Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad¹ ascribes the origin of four Vedas to the breath of the 'Eternal Being.' Again, we hear that the primordial sound 'Prajāpata,' involuntarily uttered by Brahma, is the ultimate source of all diversified forms of Vāk.

¹ अरु महती भूतस्य निश्चितमेतद् यद्वचं दः, etc.

The sacred character of the Sanskrit language is, however, due to the belief, current among orthodox scholars, that it is the language of gods.

To the Mīmāṃsakas, language, as an expression of thought, is existing from eternity, its origin being independent of human invention. Man does not practically create language, but only manifests by the operation of vocal organs what lie dormant in some innermost recesses of his body. The question of production and destruction, as suggested by the Naiyāyikas, does not really apply to sound as such ; and consequently it is more proper to use the expressions 'manifestation' and 'absence or cessation of exciting causes' instead of those two terms. The epithet अपौरुषेयः might, therefore, be applied to words which represent the Vedas (सम्ब्रह्मणात्मकशब्दराशिर्वेदः—Sāyana). The necessity of maintaining the eternity of words was almost forced upon the Mīmāṃsakas to establish the eternal character of the Vedas. They were not, however, satisfied with the formulation of this doctrine alone, but tried to establish the relation of word to significance as eternally fixed²—a fact without which the Vedas, looked upon as a store-house of all knowledge concerning 'Dharma' and 'Brahma,' would fall short of orthodox estimation (धर्मब्रह्मणो वेदैकवेद्ये).

In opposition to the views stated above, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy held language to be a creation of men. The operations of vocal organs are the

Conventional or
non-eternal origin.

¹ In his translation of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras and in the Introduction of the 'Slokavārtika,' the learned Prof. Dr. G. N. Jha has in a lucid but learned way discussed this topic with thoroughness, and has shewn the logical method of arguments whereby the discordant views of the Naiyāyikas are to be refuted.

² Mīm. Sūtra, 1. 1. 5.

immediate causes that give rise to sounds which are liable to disappearance just after their utterance. Words, as they exhibit two aspects invariably associated with evanescent objects, namely, production and destruction, are caused and not permanent (अनित्यत्वाय कारणतः Vai. Sū. 2. 2. 28). Having discussed all doubtful points as to whether word is a substance, action or quality, the Vaiśeṣikas sought to discard the theory of eternity of sound by such aphorisms as सतोलिङ्गाभावात्, ¹ नित्यवैधर्मात्, लिङ्गाच्चानित्यः शब्दः etc. Now it needs hardly be said that they took a more practical view of language which has striking coincidence with current opinions. Long before the many-sided development of modern science came to light, the Naiyāyikas, we are proud to say, had arrived at the scientifically accurate conclusion that 'Sound is a quality of ether,' i.e., sound is the resultant of ethereal vibrations (शब्दगुणमाकाशम्), and they might be credited with having founded the so-called 'Wave-theory' (वीचितरङ्गन्यायः).² Though they gave more prominence to the physical aspects of language and tried to free their linguistic views from all mystical conceptions, the Naiyāyikas, it must be remembered, could not entirely exclude the idea of 'Divine interference' in the phenomenon of language. The significance, specially the primary significance, of a word is not, the Naiyāyikas hold, dependent on popular usage or ordinary convention, but fixed by the will of God (ईश्वरिच्छा).³ The characteristic feature of this doctrine is that meanings (शक्तिः) are said to have been assigned to words primarily by God, His volition being expressed in these terms: 'Let this word be denotative of this sense.'

¹ Vai. Sūtra. 2. 2. 26, 27, 32. (Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra's edition) pp. 66-71.

² वीचितरङ्गन्यायिन तदुत्पत्तिस्तु कौत्सिता—Bhāṣāpariccheda, Kār., 166.

³ सामयिकः शब्दादयः प्रत्ययः—Vai. Sūtra, 7. 2. 21.

The grammarians have formulated the doctrine of 'Sphoṭa' as what refers to the real origin of all forms of speech. It is called 'Sphoṭa' because the meaning is ultimately expressed by it. The sound uttered by means of vocal organs should not be confounded with 'Sphoṭa'; it is only suggested by sound (ध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यः), but is not exactly identical with it. We can dissolve the word गौः into three component sounds, namely, ग, औ and विसर्गः, but we cannot do so with regard to 'Sphoṭa' which is incapable of being divided into parts, and is absolutely devoid of any order such as priority and posteriority and so forth (अक्रमः).¹ It is held to be perpetual, i.e., not liable to production and destruction. As a symbol of eternal consciousness, 'Sphoṭa,' though more spiritual than material, is regarded to be the real source of all words. The grammarians divided 'Sphoṭa' into eight different forms (which are ultimately reducible to one—वाक्यस्फोटः), and carried their conception to such a height as to identify it finally with Brahman.

Though there is no distinct reference to the 'Root-theory' as such, the stand-point taken by 'Śākatāyana' as to the reducibility of words to verbal roots and which fully concurred with the basic principle of the 'Nairuktas,' might be put forward as sufficient evidence that this famous grammarian (Śākatāyana) as well as the etymologists in general had considered the entire structure of language to have been evolved from crude elements—roots. The fundamental principle underlying all etymological explanations is that all word-forms, looked at from an analytical point of view, are capable of being reduced to roots which admit of no further analysis. The roots,

¹ नादस्य क्रमजातत्वात् पूर्वो नापश्य सः । अक्रमः क्रमरूपेण भेदवानिव गृह्यते.—Vāk. pad.

like the atoms of the Vaiṣeṣikas, are held to be permanent; they are significant by themselves, and form the germs to which all words may be traced. In combination with formative elements these roots have, however, undergone various modifications. One and the same root has given rise to numerous word-forms, of course, with difference of meanings. These roots, as the last result of linguistic analysis, are equally important to both grammarians and etymologists. They are mostly monosyllabic in form and generally signify 'action' (व्यापारः). We may, however, trace the influence of Onomatopœia to the formation of a certain number of roots, such as गर्द, मर्द, मर्ज, मृ, गद्, पत्, etc., and maintain that the imitation of natural sounds played an important part in the origination of roots. That Yāska made more than one reference to Onomatopœia has already been alluded to.

Before we close this discourse we would like to say a few words more. The view of Śaṅkarāyana and Hindu etymologists, though strongly opposed by Gārgya and some of the grammarians, is also important as showing the possibility, if we are allowed to say so, of our conceiving a crude and infantile stage of language, such as is represented by roots. If the entire stock of words, even without excepting संज्ञाशब्दः, are shown to be reducible to such significant phonetic elements as the Nairuktas have actually done, we are almost emboldened to hold that in the earliest period of the history of mankind there existed what we may now call 'a language of roots.'

Modern philologists, as it is often found, have given language such a wider scope as to include all possible forms of instrumentality whereby thoughts may be conveyed to others. Thus, movements of fingers and face are also included in their conception of language. The Hindu grammarians have, however, made no room for gestures.

Gestures as means
of expressing thoughts.

and the like in their definition of language (Bhāṣā). The Sanskrit word corresponding to 'language' is 'Bhāṣā' which, derived as it is from the root 'bhāṣ' to speak, applies only to articulate sounds or the spoken language as such. It must be, however, admitted that certain ideas are sometimes capable of being communicated to others by the aid of gestures or 'Īṅita' almost in the same way as is usually done by the use of articulate sounds. Yāska seems to have been familiar with the occasional expressiveness of certain physical signs; but he advocates the application of words, as being the most precise and comprehensive way that ensures entire absence of ambiguity and confusion which are always attended with movements of body when considered as means of communicating thoughts. Yāska holds that it is on account of the words being most convincing and involving economy of physical exertions that 'Samjñās' or names are usually given by words, and not by some other means as gestures, etc. The author of the Mahābhāṣya¹ expressly states that good many ideas are capable of being signified even without the use of words, that is to say, by movements of the face and so on. In the 'Śloka-Vārttika'² also we find a reference to gestures as expressive of certain thoughts. It is now evident that gestures, etc., are, to a limited extent, as significant as words. The question then arises as to whether they possess any innate relation to significance like words, or are merely used in substitution of articulate sounds. Panyarāja³ compares gestures with 'Apabhraṁśas,' as both of them are meaningless by themselves, and are found to express the intended sense only by means of inference. The direct expressiveness of

¹ अन्तरिण शब्दप्रयोगं बहवोऽर्था गम्यन्तेऽचिन्तिकोचेः पाणिनिविराजितः.—Mahābhāṣya, Vol I., p. 363.

² हलसंज्ञादयो लोके यदर्थप्रतिपादने । भ्रूयुः कृतसङ्केताः —Sec., 6. 19-20.

³ अचिन्तिकोचादिबदपञ्चशतः—Vāk-pad. Kār. 1. 151.

gestures is therefore contested, and what seems to be more probable is that they, like telegraphic codes, have no significance popularly assigned to them, but they acquire meaning only by reminding one of words which are practically associated with the significance. Gāṅgeśa,¹ the renowned founder of the 'Navya-Nyāya school,' while determining the accurate number of instruments for obtaining valid knowledge, has discussed at length the plausibility of including 'movements of the body' in the categories of Pramāṇas. He has finally rejected gestures and the like as independent sources of knowledge (प्रमाणम्), inasmuch as the supposed expressiveness of gestures depends upon the fact of their reminding those particular words which are in reality capable of expressing the intended senses. He compares gestures with writings, as both of them are meaningless by themselves, and says that it is words alone that are found to have necessary connections with the objects they denote. Thus we see that the direct expressiveness of gestures, as a form of language, is a matter of controversy to the Hindu teachers. The conclusion to which these arguments lead is that the Hindu Philologists did not think it reasonable to recognise movements of the body as an independent means for expressing ideas. The movements of fingers and the like presuppose the existence of certain words or expressions of which they are merely physical signs, the real expressiveness resting with the words alone. True it is that there are, apart from language as such, some other ways as gestures, etc., whereby we can sometimes give expressions to our mental ideas, but it can be hardly maintained that they are as perfect and comprehensive in all cases as the use of articulate sounds. There is,

¹ सङ्केतयङ्गं चेष्टातोऽप्यनुभवसम्भवात् शब्दवत् सापि प्रमाणमन्तर्भवति न प्रमाणाणि इति चेत्, उच्यते, शब्देन चेष्टायां सङ्केतयङ्गात् शब्दस्मृत्युपयोगिनौ चेष्टा लिपिवत् शब्द एव प्रमाणमर्थं क्लृप्तवान्—Tattva-Cintāmaṇi, 'Sabdakhaṇḍa. A. S. B. ed., p. 860.

moreover, scarcely any positive evidence to believe in the existence of such a period in the history of mankind when communications of ideas were absolutely carried on through the medium of gestures or some other forms of physical movements. To hold that the origin and development of articulate speech had been preceded by pure mimesis is nothing but fallacious. Prof. Max Müller's¹ remark on the invention of language does not, therefore, seem to stand on a sound scientific basis.

It is nothing but surprising to find that the Indian speculators on language detected the influence of Onomatopœia in the formation of certain words, specially in the names of birds, long before the 'Cratylus' had come to light. Though we do not fully agree with Plato in assigning the origin of language entirely to the imitation of natural sounds, it is quite true that certain words speak of the same origin. Yāska holds that the word 'Kāka' is formed in imitation of the sound naturally made by this class of birds; and that names of similar origin are to be found largely among the appellations of birds. The word 'Kṛka' (कृक) in the expression कृकवाकु is also explained by Yāska as formed in imitation of sound. In the same way we are allowed to treat the words like 'Kokila,' 'Kukkuṭa,' 'Dundubhi,' and so forth. As we have already pointed out, certain verbal roots, as गर्द्, मर्द्, गर्ज्, गद्, पत्, etc., might be traced to the same origin. It must be, however, borne in mind that the number of such words is very small. We are not, therefore, fully justified in holding that the origin of language is to be traced entirely to Onomatopœia. Many causes, speaking from a practical point of view, were in operation for the origin and

¹ 'Language is the work of man; it was invented by man as a means of communicating his thoughts, when mere looks and gestures proved inefficient.'—Science of Language, Vol. I. p. 31.

development of such a popular and efficient means of communicating thoughts as language; and the imitation of natural sounds might have been one of the conspicuous factors. As most of the names of birds, far from speaking of words denoting objects known to the most primitive man, would remain unintelligible, if we try to find traces of Onomatopœia in them, the teacher 'Aupamanyava' held the opposite view and boldly asserted that no sign of imitation of sound was even traceable in the word 'Kāka.' It is no wonder that the Nairuktas would derive the word 'Kāka' from the root 'Kal' (उपकालयितव्यः), for they have actually shown that even संज्ञाशब्द like 'Pijavana' 'Puṣkara,' etc., are also capable of being derived from verbal roots (सर्वीष्याख्यातजानि नामानि). While writing the aphorism 'अव्यक्तानुकरणस्यात इतो' Paṇ. 6. 1. 98, 'Pāṇini' had undoubtedly in view such expressions as 'Pat-pat,' 'Mar-mar,' etc., which are all formed in imitation of indistinct sounds.

The possession of articulate sounds serves to distinguish man from other animals; it is extremely doubtful whether he could have merited the topmost place in the scale of creation, if he had been wanting in distinct utterance. Man is naturally endowed with the faculty of articulating and modulating his voice, whereas beasts are physically unfit to utter distinctly. It is a fact of experience that beasts, though unable to exercise the power of reasoning, are also gifted with the power of making sounds, and what they really lack are aptitude in varying modulations of voice, as well as the faculty of developing crude speech-germs into articulate and popularly significant utterances. Notwithstanding their utter meaninglessness to us, the sounds they are apt to make have their significance, though it

Articulation
of sound.

is not in the power of man to follow them rightly. The author of the 'Yoga-Sūtra' (3. 17) strongly believes that a 'Yogin' 'having spiritual vision to distinguish word, meaning and cognition from one another' is alone permitted to understand the sounds made by all creatures (सर्वभूतरुतज्ञानम् Yoga. 3. 17). Pāṇini denotes man by the expression व्यक्तवाक्, that is, 'one possessing distinct speech.' While commenting on the rule व्यक्तवाचं समुच्चारणे Pāṇ. 1. 3. 48, Patañjali observes that the epithet व्यक्तवाक्¹ might be applied to all animals, and that the difference with regard to distinctness is one of degree. He, therefore, explains the expression 'व्यक्तवाक्' as meaning possibly 'one gifted with such a speech wherein the letters are distinctly audible.' The reference to the imitation of indistinct sound, as it occurs in the aphorism of Pāṇini, makes it clear that by indistinct or inarticulate sounds are meant those that are not capable of being exactly expressed through letters. There is consequently two-fold² word: word consisting of sound only (ध्वन्यात्मकः), as is produced by the beat of drum; and word made up of sound capable of being represented by letters (वर्णात्मक). Of four different forms of Vāk (Parā, Paśyanti, Madhyamā and Vaikharī), it is 'Vaikharī' alone that is spoken by men, the other forms being too subtle and mystic to be uttered by vocal organs. It is distinctly audible and is usually represented by letters. We have repeatedly stated in these pages that the internal wind is manifested in the form of audible sound, while it passes through vocal organs; it is said to be distinct when it clothes itself with letters. The distinctness of utterance depends, however, on the development of vocal apparatus.

¹ Mahābhāṣya on 1.3.48, Vol. I, p. 283.

² शब्दोद्भवानि च वर्णयन्ति — Bhāṣāpari.-Kār 64.

Before bringing the discussion on Śabda to a close, we consider it necessary to give some accounts as to how the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas strenuously supported the non-eternal view of words in direct opposition to the views held by the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians.

The Naiyāyikas have included Śabda in the category of Pramāṇas¹; but they refuse to agree with the grammarians, who assume the imperceptible Sphoṭa as the ultimate origin of Śabda; and with the Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, who have rather shewn prolixity in supporting the eternity of sound. Gotama² introduces the contention by pointing out dual negations or non-existence with regard to Śabda, that is to say, Śabda does neither exist before it is uttered, nor seems to be existent after the act of utterance is over. Thus having non-existence before and after the utterance, Śabda is a non-eternal entity like an earthen pot. There are, however, doubts as to the exact nature of Śabda. Some hold, continues Vātsāyana,³ Śabda as a quality of ether, pervading the whole space, eternal, and manifested by sound. Undoubtedly this refers to the views of the Mīmāṃsakas. Some again view Śabda as a quality of ether having both production and destruction like intelligence; others take it as an entity produced by the conjunctions of supreme elements (air and sky). These divergent views⁴ have given rise to a doubt as to whether Śabda is eternal or non-eternal. The Naiyāyikas seem to

¹ Nyāya Sūtra, 1. 1. 3.

² प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावोपपत्तेश्च—Nyāya Sūtra. 2. 2. 12.

³ आकाशगुणः शब्दो विभुर्नित्योऽभिव्यक्तिधर्मक इत्येके, आकाशगुणः शब्द उत्पत्तिनिरोधधर्मकः बुद्धिबुद्धिपरि, etc.—Vātsāyana Bhāṣya on 2. 2. 13.

⁴ अतः संशयः किमत्र तत्त्वमिति, अनित्यः शब्द इत्युत्तरम्,—Vāt., Bhāṣya on 2. 2. 13.

have their answer ready. Śabda is said to be non-eternal on the following grounds: Śabda¹ has a cause, as it is directly produced by the operation of vocal apparatus; it is an established fact that anything that is produced by a cause cannot be considered as eternal. These arguments bear comparison with the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात्, and करोतिशब्दात् which are anticipated by Jaimini as Pūrva-pakṣas. Moreover, Śabda is comprehended by the organ of hearing; and it is used, as if it were a product of human effort. As a matter of fact, the attributes such as loudness and mildness which are often applied to Śabda to express intensity, etc., are indications that Śabda is produced and not manifested. These arguments whereby they sought to prove the non-eternity of Śabda are also shown to be untenable, because आदिमत्व, ऐन्द्रियकत्व, and कृतकत्व might even be applied to eternal objects. As, for instance, the non-existence of 'Ghaṭa' (घटाभावः),² though it has a beginning, is said to be eternal by the Naiyāyikas. Again sometimes eternal objects are also treated as if they were non-eternal; for we are accustomed to speak of parts with regard to such eternal entities as sky and soul, viz., 'a part of the sky,' 'a part of the soul' and so on. But these objections are finally set aside. How are we to ascertain that this exists and this does not? It is by means of Pramāṇas, cognition as well as non-cognition that we take something to be either existent or non-existent as the case may be. Judged by this test, Śabda appears to be non-existent, as there is no comprehension of Śabda before it is uttered by means of vocal organs. "Sometimes it happens that objects having existence are not even

¹ Nyāya Sūtra, 2. 2. 14.

² Ibid, 2, 2. 15.

perceived on account of certain 'obstructions.' But this also cannot prove the existence of Śabda, as there is nothing to cover or hide Śabda from our cognition. As a matter of fact, it is the utterance of sound that gives us the cognition of Śabda, and whenever there is no act of utterance, there is necessarily no cognition of Śabda. These arguments are sought to prove the non-existence of Śabda prior to the act of utterance. (This contradicts the Mīmāṃsaka view according to which human efforts cannot produce or create the word but only serve to manifest it.) Then Gotama introduces some other Pūrvaapakṣas in favour of the eternity of Śabda, but they are finally refuted one after another. The anticipation of such Pūrvaapakṣas and their refutations are indicative of the historical relation between the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā systems. The upholders of the eternity of sound advance the following arguments, among others, in support of their own views :—(1) Śabda is eternal like the sky, because it is not tangible (अस्पर्शत्वात्). This ground cannot however stand, because neither tangibility nor intangibility are, strictly speaking, characteristics of eternal entities. As a matter of fact, atoms, though tangible, are said to be eternal, whereas actions (कर्म) are held to be non-eternal (transient) inspite of their intangibility. (2) Śabda is existent and not perishable as soon as it is uttered, inasmuch as it is capable of being given to others (संप्रदानत्वात्), as in the case of a teacher giving words to his pupil. This is also open to objections, as the existence of words between the teacher and the pupil is not comprehensible by any means whatsoever. (3) Śabda is eternal, as there is no cognition of the cause that may

Nyāya Sūtra, 2. 2. 19.

अस्पर्शत्वात्—Nyāya Sūtra, 2. 2. 23.

संप्रदानात्—Ibid, 2. 2. 26.

destroy it. But the attempts of the Mimāṃsakas proved entirely fruitless. The Naiyāyikas put their arguments to severe tests and discarded them one by one. They maintain that words as well as intelligence and action are all momentary. They were, however, not the first to promulgate the non-eternity of sound, since, according to the statement of Yāska, word had already been declared to be impermanent by 'Audumbarāyaṇa.'¹ Yāska had his arguments ready to refute the non-eternal view of words, as maintained by the aforesaid teacher, and found the division of speech into four elements compatible with his own tenet. Patañjali has, however, spoken of two-fold word—'Nitya' and 'Kārya.' By 'Nitya' or permanent word-form, he meant 'Sphoṭa,' as is suggested by sound; and by 'Kārya' or 'caused' words, he understood audible sounds that are produced by vocal organs. He also informs us that these two contradictory views had sufficiently been discussed in the 'Saṃgraha'² as to whether words are eternal or caused, and that the conclusion arrived at there was in favour of the eternity of sound.

As to the manifestation of letters, Vātsāyana³ says that the utterance of sound is caused by the conjunction of internal air with vocal organs (as throat, palate, etc.), whenever there is an effort on the part of the speaker to convey the intended meanings to others. Praśastapāda⁴ takes word as a quality of the sky, comprehended by the

¹ इन्द्रियनिर्णयवचनमौदुम्बरायणः—Nir., 17. 1.

² A treatise on grammar the authorship of which is attributed to Vyāṭi.

³ विवक्षाजनितेन प्रयत्नेन कोटस्य वायोः प्ररितस्य कण्ठताल्लादिप्रतिघातः—Vāt. Bhāṣya on 2. 2. 19.

⁴ शब्दोऽम्बरगुणः श्रोत्रयाज्ञः क्षणिकः.....प्रदेशहन्तिः—Praśastapāda Bhāṣa—Ben. ed., p. 287.

ear, momentary, inconsistent with its cause and effect, produced by conjunction, disjunction and sound, abiding in some portion of Ākāśa, having both homogeneous and heterogeneous causes, that is, one Śabda giving rise to another of the same class, and Śabda produced by conjunction and disjunction. Sound falls under two distinct classes: (1) sound as expressed by letters; (2) indistinct sound as produced by the beat of drum and blowing of conches, etc. Regarding the evolution of sound as expressed by letters, Praśastapāda¹ gives almost the same account as is found in the Śikṣās. It is said that whenever a desire is felt within to communicate one's thoughts to others, there is invariably a conjunction of mind with soul which accounts for the utterance of sound. This utterance, however, presupposes the cognition of similar sounds that are said to have left their impressions already in memory. Desire (इच्छा) is then followed by efforts which bring about a movement in the region of internal air. The air thus stirred goes upwards and strikes the vocal apparatus. Śabda is generated by such conjunction of internal air with 'Sthāna' (as the निमित्तकारण) and finally by the conjunction of 'Sthāna' with sky (as असमवायिकरण). This is, in short, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view on the production of sound.

It is to be carefully noted how one Śabda gives rise to another as the immediate cause of it. The logicians seem to have given here the most scientific explanation so far as the propagation of sound is concerned. Ripples and waves on the surface of water constitute scientific examples as to how sound-waves are transmitted. It is through the medium of air that sound is transmitted. Just as a slight agitation on the surface produces ripples

¹ तत्तत्त्वर्णलक्षणस्थित्तिरात्मनसोऽव्योगात् रस्यत्वेवाहर्णोच्चारणेच्छा, तदनन्तरं प्रयत्नसम-
पेक्षमाणादात्मबाधसंयोगात् वायौ कर्म जायते, स चोर्ध्वं गच्छन् कण्ठादीनभिहन्ति Praśasta-
pāda Bhāṣya, Ben. ed., p. 288.

in water, similarly from the first word a series of words are generated in quick succession in the ether. It is why a word is also heard from a distance. Sound acts on the tympanic membrane of the ear before it is actually heard. This is what is known as the wave-theory or *वैचितरङ्गन्याय* as expounded by the Naiyāyikas. According to another view (popularly known as *कदम्ब-कोरकन्याय*),¹ ten words are simultaneously produced in different quarters which again continue to give rise to numerous sounds. To hold word to be permanent on the ground that the same 'Ka'-sound is heard again and again is fallacious; the Naiyāyikas, on the contrary, maintain that the cognition of the sameness or oneness of 'Ka'-sounds indicates only *साजात्य*, *viz.*, 'Ka'-sounds belonging to the same class (*कत्व*) are only comprehended. It is therefore a question of similarity and not of identity. The scientific and elaborate way in which the doctrine of word (*शब्दतत्त्व*) has been discussed by the Naiyāyikas is really admirable. Śrīdhara² frankly admits that it is useless on his part to enter into the question more thoroughly and adduce further arguments on the origin of words, as the problem has already been solved by the Naiyāyikas with utmost lucidness and ingenuity.

We have already pointed out that on account of its manifold importance Vāk won the most laudatory verses from the ancient seers.

The 'Śruti' eulogises Vāk as the source out of which the entire universe had sprung up. The Brāhmaṇas quoted by Puṇyārāja³ speak of the various purposes that are served by Vāk : By Vāk is expressed the sense ; ideas are conveyed to others by means of Vāk ; the

¹ 'कदम्बकोरकन्यायादुत्पत्तिः कस्यचिन्मते'—Bhāṣāpariccheda.

² अतीवार्थं मार्गसार्थिके चक्षुस्तेनास्माभिरिह भाष्यतावर्थ्यभावं व्याख्यातम्.—Prāśasta. Bhāṣya, Ben. ed., p. 289.

वर्गिवाचं पश्यति, etc.—Under the Vākypadiya, Kār. 1. 119, p. 11.

world with all its diversities is represented by Vāk. The Aitareya Āraṇyaka uses a well-conceived metaphor¹ when it speaks of Vāk as string and names as knots, whereby the world is entirely bound up. In a dialogue² between 'Sanatkumāra' and 'Nārada' in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, we find that the former persuaded the latter to worship Vāk, for the Vedas are represented by Vāk, and no cognition of either virtue or vice, truth or falsehood and so on would have been possible at all, if there had been no such means of expressing thought as Vāk. The exalted eminence accorded to Vāk is quite clear from the fact that Vāk, of course with a deeper spiritual insight, has been identified with Brahman. In Vāk, as we have already stated, the Hindu teachers found the audible manifestation of All-pervading Brahman. Bhartrihari³ is strongly of opinion that no knowledge whatsoever is possible without Vāk; it is through the instrumentality of Vāk that internal consciousness assumes audible form and ideas are communicated to others. What we really learn from it is that the author of the Vākya-pādiya almost believed in the impossibility of thinking without language—a fact which reminds us of the paradox of Humboldt: 'Man is man by speech.' He continues further that Vāk represents all different branches of science⁴ and arts, and that names or distinguishing stamps are given to objects by it, otherwise the world would have ever remained an unnameable and indiscernible complexity. Definition

¹ "वाक्कृत्स्नित्वा नामानि दामानि" तस्येदं वाचा तन्वा नामानिर्दामभिः सर्वं सितम्—again, वाचा व वेदाः सन्धीयन्ते, वाचा कृत्वांसि वाचा मित्राणि सन्दधति—Ait. Ār., 1. 6. Bib. Ind., p. 63—वाचा सर्वाणि भूतानि, etc.—3. 1. 6. (13), p. 328.

² वागवाच नाम्नी भूयसी वाग्वा ऋग्वेदं विज्ञापयति, etc.—Chān. Up., 7. 2., Nir. Ed., pp. 63-64.

³ न लोकोति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते । अनुविहसि च ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्दे न भासते—Vāk, Kār., 1, 124.

⁴ Vākya-pād. Kār., 1, 126-128.

and classification, as two scientific methods of distinguishing objects from one another, are dependent on names. The popular 'Śruti'—**नामरूपे व्याकरोत्**—means that God not only manifested Himself through diversified forms but gave phonetic labels (names) to each.

The origination of the universe is in itself a mysterious problem ; and it appears to be still more a mystical phenomenon when we are told (in opposition to the more scientific and popular theories which acknowledged either atom, water or air as the most primordial substance), that the whole cosmic world owes its origin to Vāk. To ascribe to word or more properly, to 'Śabdabrahma,' the potentiality of producing the world has, however, a deep significance. We may approach this strange position from various standpoints. First, in view of the inseparable association of sound with sense (which is also explained in term of 'cause and effect),' we may be allowed to suggest that they might have the same relation, as manifestor and manifested (**अभिधायकः** and **अभिधेयः**), when definite objects with particular names and forms had come into existence in obdience to some unerring principles (**नामरूपे व्याकरोत्**). The author of the 'Bhāṣya' on the 'Yoga-Sūtra' 1.17 states that words do not lose their respective expressiveness even after utter annihilation (**प्रलयः**), that is to say, the same word would continue to express the same meaning in the following creations.¹ We may add further that as 'Pralaya' means submersion or dissolution of all finite objects into the infinite cause, and the creation simply indicates the passage of unmanifest to the manifestation, so words, to which all objects of thought

¹ **समीक्षित्वापि वाच्यवाचक शब्दपेक्षस्यैव सङ्केतः क्रियते**—under the aphorism ' **तत्त्ववाचकः पदः** : ”

are finally reduced on the destruction of their forms, are to be regarded as the ultimate 'World-stuffs' whereto the cosmic world owed its origin. Secondly, as the evolution of Vāk involves the operations of internal fire ("तेजसा पाकमागतः" and "तेजसैव विवर्त्तते" Vāk. 1.113-1.115), sounds may be said to have likeness with "Fire," which was declared by Heracleitus "as the essence of all things." The "Parā" form of Vāk is immutable, and symbolises the active energy of "Soul-fire." In the opening verse of the Vākya-padīya Bhāṭṭarīhari has made reference to the popular doctrine of "Vivarta" in connection with the evolution of universe from "Śabda-Brahma." This shows the extent to which Vāk was exalted by the native grammarians. To the Hindus words are not dead mechanism invented for the purpose of naming objects, but they represent the mystic embodiment of divine power that is said to have preceded the creation of material world. Philo's conception of world-producing Logos is, therefore, a nearest approximation of Vāk which was conceived by the Hindus as a potential factor of creation. The Vedas enjoin that Supreme Being had created the earth after pronouncing the word 'Bhū.'² Similarly the evolution of all cosmic matters might be traced to their corresponding 'Vāchaka-Śabdas.' As meaning necessarily follows from word, so did the world from names. In his commentary on the aphorism "शब्द इति चेन्नातः प्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्" Brahmasūtra 1. 3. 28, Śāṅkarā-ācārjya has clearly shown how the utterance of significant words on the part of Brahman was immediately materialised by the creation of the world. It is explicitly stated that words first flashed in His mind before God could attempt to create the world. The same

¹ विवर्त्ततेऽर्थ भावेन प्रक्रिया जगती यतः 'and शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याश्नायविदोविदुः । कन्दोभ्य एव प्रथममेतद्विद्य' व्यवर्त्तत—Vāk-pad. Kār., 1. 121, p. 45.

² सभूरिति व्याहरणं भूमिसुदृजत्—Tait. Brāhmaṇa, 2.2.4.2.

truth is, however, illustrated by the Christian dogma, as is incorporated in the Biblical passage—‘Let there be light and there was light.’ The fact underlying this phenomenon is that the creative volition (सिद्धान्तिकाप्रवृत्तिः) of God (to get into diversity from unity) was, so to speak, the efficient (though not material) cause that brought the material world into existence. Bhartrihari strongly believes in the evolution of universe from Logos and has alluded to it more than once.¹ As a pot, holds Puṇyarāja, is said to be earthen since it possesses all the properties of earth, so the world having inseparable connection with ‘Śabdamātrā’ is called ‘Śabda-vivarta’ (transformation of Logos) in the holy scriptures. In support of his view the illustrious commentator has quoted a ‘Rik’² which speaks of the ‘world-building’ power of Vāk; he has also made mention of a scriptural passage that gives the idea of a ‘वाङ्मयपुरुषः’³ as the creator of the universe.

Having shown the nature and importance of Vāk after the manner in which they have been
 Classifications of Vāk. dealt with by the Hindu teachers, we proceed to consider the question regarding the classifications of Vāk. One Rik speaks of four different forms of speech, possibly, ‘Parā,’ ‘Paśyanti,’ ‘Madhyamā,’ and ‘Vaikhari,’ and distinctly lays down that it is the last form (Vaikhari) which is spoken by men, other forms being too subtle to be pronounced by vocal organs. The Yogins alone are supposed to be competent to understand these mystic forms of Vāk. The ‘Vaikhari’ is, however, distinguished from the rest by being perfectly audible and

¹ शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्यान्वायविदो विदुः। कन्दौभ्य एव प्रथममेतत्सिद्ध्यवर्तत—Vākya-paddiya, Kār., 1, 121.

² वागेव विश्वं भूवनानि जज्ञे वाच इत सर्वमसत् यश्च सत्—Under Vāk-pad., Kār., 1, 121, p. 45.

³ ऋद्धमथो यजुर्मयः मानसमथो वैराजः पुरुषः, etc., under the Vāk., Kār., 1, 121, p. 45.

capable of being expressed through letters. We find the detailed accounts of these forms of speech in various treatises. These classifications¹ are based upon the conviction that 'Nāda' (the first manifestation of eternal consciousness) which, as we have already stated, has its origin in 'Vindu,' receives materialisation by the operations of internal air residing in 'Mulādhāra.' The four forms of speech correspond, however, to four different stages through which 'Nāda' passes till it becomes audible.² Thus we may start with 'Vindu' as the ultimate germ of speech and proceed from 'Mulādhāra' to mouth to show how 'Śabda-Brahma' or 'Parā' Vāk reveals itself into popular speech. The nature of 'Parā Vāk,' as described in the Mahābhārata, shows that it is luminiferous conscious-

Parā Vāk.

ness residing in 'Mulādhāra,' and is virtually indestructible. It is what is known as 'Para-Brahma' or the essence of Logos. Nāgeśa holds it as the potential factor of creation. When this 'Nāda' or

Paśyantī Vāk.

'Śabda-Brahma' gets more and more manifested and the internal air that serves to reveal it comes up to the nasal region from 'Mulādhāra,' we have 'Paśyantī' form of Vāk which is indivisible into parts and has intelligence for its ingredient. Next in order comes 'Madhyamā'

Madhyamā.

which is revealed by the same air when passing through heart. It must be remembered here that these three kinds of Vāk, amplifications as they are of the same "Nāda," represent, so to speak, the minutest, minuter, and minute forms of "Pranava." The Vaikhari form of Vāk is, as stated above, spoken by men; it is generated when that internal air which

¹ चत्वारिवाक्परिमितापदानि—Rigveda, 2.3.22.25.

² See Mañjūshā, pp. 175-179, and Vāk., padīya, 1, 144. "वय्यावावः

has its rise in "Mulādhāra" passes through throats and finally finds audible expression in the mouth. This is in short what we know of the classifications of Vak. No such classifications, we are sure, are to be found in any other linguistic speculations of the world; what had really formed the subject of linguistic inquiries of Western scholars from Heracleitus to Bopp was the outward aspect of speech, that is, sound as is produced by the exercise of vocal organs. They did not, however, see deeper and think over the minute internal or psychological operations that take place in the vocalisation of thoughts.

Expression of thought is the sole purpose that is served by the use of language; ideas are, again, completely and best expressed through the medium of sentences as such and not by means of individual words. Jagadīśa¹ holds that the so-called verbal cognition (शब्दबोधः) is obtained only from a sentence, that is, when a number of words having proximity, expectancy and competency with one another are related to one another in such a way as to constitute a significant sentence which is alone sufficient to express the sense or communicate ideas to others. It is true that in some cases a single word is found to be as perfectly expressive of ideas as a sentence would be. The obvious answer is that in such cases the individual word retains in itself the entire force of the sentence the import of which is to be derived by means of usual inference or context. Each individual word, expressive as we call it, is thus an epitome of the sentence of which it forms an integral part. In his commentary on the Yoga Sūtra III.17 Vyāsa rightly observes that a word when used individually is intended to express

¹ वाक्यभावसंवाहस्य सार्थकस्यावबोधतः ; सम्ययते शब्दबोधो नतन्मात्रस्यबोधतः—Śabda-śaktiprakāśikā-Kār, 12.

the import of a sentence. As, for instance, when the word “**वृक्षः**”¹ is uttered, some such word as “**āsti**” (exist) is necessarily to be supplied to make the sense complete. A word, according to this view, is not expressive by itself (the real expressiveness being associated with the sentence), but appears to be significant from the consideration that it represents a sentence in a condensed form. Both Patanjali and Vyāsa seem to have been conscious of the fact that certain words retain in their very formations the entire significance of sentences. That a word sometimes stands as an abbreviation of a sentence or as one that comprehends in itself the entire meaning of a sentence is best illustrated by such word as “**श्रोत्रियः**” which is only a condensed form of the sentence “**ऋन्दोऽधीते**” (one who reads the Vedas) and so on. Language, viewed as significant utterances, started with sentences and not with individual words. The example² set by the Hindu teachers as to how children learn language suggests that children first acquaint themselves with sentences they hear from others and then determine by analysis the significance of each element composing the sentence. Though there are eight different forms of “**Sphoṭa**,” says the author of the ‘**Śabdakaustubha**,’ it is **वाक्यस्फोटः**³ alone that is really significant. Bhartrihari⁴ holds that sentence, as a significant expression of thought, is not divisible into parts, the grammatical analysis of a sentence being only an artificial

¹ सर्वपदेषु चास्ति वाक्यार्थः, वृक्ष इत्यत्रे ऋन्दोऽधीते गम्यते... इष्टं च वाक्यार्थे पदरचनं श्रोत्रियं ऋन्दोऽधीते—Joga-Vyāsa. विभूतिपदः Compare Mahābhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 389.

² “संकेतस्य हः पूर्वं वृद्धस्य व्यवहारतः”—गामानयितेन चित्रपुणेन नियुक्तः कथनं व्युत्पन्नं सहाकृतोऽर्थं प्रतीत्य गवानयनं करोति, तच्चोपलभमानो बालः इदं गवानयनं भवगोचरप्रवृत्तिजन्यम्... युतं वृद्धवाक्यमेव तदभाधारणत्वेनावधारयति, etc.,—Śabdaśakti, Kār., 20 (Ben. ed.), p. 116.

³ यद्यपौहाटौ पक्षा उक्तास्तथापि वाक्यस्फोटपक्षे तात्पर्यमन्यकृताम्,—On Sphoṭa.

⁴ पदे नवर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णोऽप्यत्रयवा इव। वाक्यात् पदानामन्यत्वं प्रविवेकी न कथन—Vāk., 3, 73.

device. As an adherent to the theory of 'Sphoṭa', the author of the 'Vākya-padīya' continues that as letters like 'क,' etc., do not admit of further decomposition, so there are no parts or letters in a word, and words again have no separate existence apart from the sentence. In the Taittiriya¹ Saṃhitā there is a definite indication that in the original state of language there had been no systems of grammar so as to divide the elements of speech into so many parts (noun, verb, preposition, etc). Speech is an indivisible² compact; the significant unit is only represented by sentences that do not really admit of any division into component parts. It is stated further that the sense conveyed by a sentence is also indivisible (अखण्डः).

A sentence³ generally means a collection of words having mutual proximity, expectancy and competency. But Bhartrihari⁴ has carefully shown the diversities of views as to the exact nature of a sentence. We give below only short accounts of these different views:—

(1) Sometimes a verbal form is sufficient to constitute a significant sentence, or, in other words, action (धातुर्थ) or 'Kriyā' represents the meaning of a sentence. The verbal form वर्षति, for instance, may be used with the same significance, as is usually expressed by the sentence 'वर्षति देवोजलम्,' both subject and object being readily understood from the very idea of propriety.

(2) A sentence is a combination of words. As to the meaning of a sentence, some hold that it is the sumtotal of meanings that are usually denoted by words forming the sentence; others suggest that the meaning of a sentence

¹ वाग्वैपराख्यव्याकृतौ, etc.,—Tait. Sam., Vol. 4.7.

² अपोद्धृत्यववाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिवत्—Vāk., 3.1.

³ मिथः साकाङ्क्षशब्दस्यैवोवाक्यम्—Śabdaśakti, Kār., 1.3.

⁴ Vākya-padīya, 2, 1-2, and that follows—com.—“पकतिङ्”—पकतिङ्-वाक्यं भवतीति Mahābhāṣya, Vol. 1, p. 367.

is not exactly the same as are expressed by words, that constitute the sentence, but a sentence acquires some special significance that does not really follow from any word or component parts.

(3) The indivisible 'Sphoṭa,' both as a class and individual, is what is a sentence. 'Sphoṭa' has two aspects, namely, external and internal; the external 'Sphoṭa' is again said to be of two kinds, *i.e.*, class and individual. The internal 'Sphoṭa' is manifested by 'Nāda.' It is called 'Sphoṭa' because meanings are virtually expressed by it. The reason why 'Sphoṭa' is identified with the significant sentence is that the Hindu grammarians ascribe expressiveness to 'Sphoṭa.' The author of the Vārttika¹ defines sentence as an aggregate consisting of a verbal form in combination with indeclinables, cases and attributes. In showing the way how consistent meanings follow from a sentence, the Naiyāyikas hold that the significances of words are first determined in accordance with 'sanketa' or established usage, and then meanings thus ascertained are consistently related to one another so as to form an agreeable combination of concepts. It is from such correlations of meanings that 'Śābdabodha' or verbal cognition is produced.

In consideration of the objects that are usually denoted by words, the author of the 'Mahābhāṣya'² has classified words into four groups, namely, words denotative of class, quality, action, and 'Sanjnās' or names. Dandī³ also made the same classifications with inconsiderable difference, as he added 'substance' in the place of 'यदृच्छाशब्दः.' This was, however, adversely criticised by

¹ आख्यातं साव्ययकारकविशेषं वाक्यम् — Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 367.

² चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः, जातिशब्दाः, गुणशब्दाः, क्रियाशब्दाः, यदृच्छाशब्दाश्चतुर्धा — Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 19.

³ See Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, Kār., 18.

the Naiyāyikas on the ground that the division of words, as shown by Dandî, did not take notice of such words as जडः, मूकः, etc., which do not fall under any group shown above. Before we can arrive at any conclusion as to the exact denotations of words, we are confronted with a controversial point whether words are expressive of class or individual. The 'Mīmāṃsā' ¹ Sūtras of Jaimini record such a controversy. Having discarded all arguments brought forward in support of the individualistic theory of words, the Mīmāṃsakas have shown the plausibility of the view that all words without exception are denotative of class. According to Vājapyāyana, ² as is also held by the Mīmāṃsakas, words denote class, the idea of individuals (व्यक्तिः) being expressed by the interdependence or invariable correlation of a class with individuals. Vyādi, ³ on the other hand, holds that as an active agent directly concerned with action, individual is what is really meant by a word. 'Mammata' ⁴ observes that the Individualistic theory, as referred to above, is exposed to the faults of 'endlessness and vagueness.' The view of Pāṇini, ⁵ as is shewn by Patanjali, with regard to the denotation of words, is that both class and individual are meant by words. Patanjali has also selected two aphorisms from the Astādhyāyî to show that Pāṇini has combined the two opposite views held by Vyādi and Vājapyāyana. The Naiyāyikas have, however, brought about a reconciliation between these contradictory theories by holding that

¹ आकृतिस्तु क्रियायुक्तान्—Mīm. Sūtra, 1.3.33. See also Vāk. pad. comm. on, 3.2.

² आकृत्यभिधानात्, etc.,—Māhābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 242.

³ "द्रव्याभिधानं व्याडिः"—M. Bhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 244.

⁴ "आनन्यादाभिचाराच्च"—Kāṣya-Prakāśa-Com.-Kār., 2. 10, Bom. ed., p. 34.

⁵ किं पुनराकृतिः पदार्थः...द्रव्यं वा । उभयमित्याह । उभयथाह्वाचार्येण सूत्राणि पठितानि—1., p. 34. M. Bhāṣya Vol. I, p. 6. Puṇyārāja पाणिनिद्वये ज्ञातिद्रव्ये शब्देनाभिधायिते—Vāk. pad., 3, p. 6.

it is neither class nor individual alone that is denoted by words, but व्यक्ति; or "individual" conditioned or qualified by genus represents the real significance of words.¹ Thus we see that the Naiyāyikas brought the controversy to a close in an admirable way. The author of the Vākyapadīya has finally dealt with the question from the standpoint of non-dualism (Advaitavāda).² The real and unreal elements, he says, existing in all phenomenal entities indicate respectively genus and individual. He continues further that the transcendental existence (परमार्थसत्ता)³ permeating the entire universe appears in different forms in various substrata or individuals; it is to be regarded as the *summmum genus* which is ultimately denoted by all words ; it is essentially what is meant by all Prātipadikas or crude word-forms, verbal roots, and suffixes like 'tra' and 'tal.' It is this all pervading existence which reveals itself through six different stages, namely, existence, production, growth, transformation, decay and destruction.

It will not be out of place to mention here that the Buddhist philosophers held a peculiar view regarding the denotation of words. They contend that neither class nor individual is actually denoted by words, as the very conception of their realities is a matter of controversy. The 'class-theory' is untenable, because there is much doubt as to the very existence of a genus : the opposite view is similarly refuted on account of the momentary character of individuals. According to the doctrine of

¹ "जातिमान् शब्दार्थः" । शक्तिर्जात्याकृतिविशिष्टव्यक्तौ विश्राम्यति " — Bhāṣhāparīkṣheda, p. 148. (K. Tarkatīrtha ed.)

"व्यक्ताकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः"—Nyāya Sūtra, 2.2.69. Com.—जात्यवच्छिन्नसङ्गो तवती नैमित्तिकीमता—Śabdaśakti.

² Vāk-padī Kār.—3. 32. 4, pp. 28-29.

³ सत्त्वस्मिन्नेदात् सत्तेव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु । जातिरित्युच्यते तस्मां सर्वे शब्दाः व्यवस्थिताः । तां प्रातिपदिकांश्च धात्वर्थं च प्रचक्षते । सा जित्या सा महानात्मा तामाहुस्त्वतलादयः—Vākyapadīya.

“Apoha,” as is held by the Buddhist philosophers, the word “gauh” when uttered, implies “the differentiation of cow-individuals from non-cows.”

There is, however, another way of classifying words from the standpoint of the rhetoricians. In rhetorics we find three kinds of words,¹ namely, (1) Vāchaka or denotative words, which denote exactly the same meaning as is fixed by the volition of God (Saṅketa) or popular usage; (2) Lākṣhaṇika or words with secondary significance; and (3) Vyañjaka, *i.e.*, words that express the suggested sense. We should be particular to notice here that this threefold division pertains more to the designation or attributes than to the object designated. Consequently there is no definite group of words either as denotative, indicative, or suggestive, but what we find actually is that the same word, as “Gaṅgā,” in the expression “गङ्गायां घोषः,” might be used as denotative, indicative and suggestive according to the context and sense of propriety. It is also to be noted that the third form, *i.e.*, Vyañjaka is to be found only in poetry. In the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems we do not hear of such suggestive words and suggestion which, according to them, come under the category of Lakṣhaṇā taken in a wider sense.

According to Gotama,² class, form and individual are all that are meant by a word, whereas the followers of the new school of Logic hold that individual (व्यक्तिः) qualified or conditioned by class is what is really denoted by all words. The Naiyāyikas have classified words into four groups:³ (1) words having conventional meanings assigned to them (रूढः); (2) words with secondary

Classifications of words from the logical standpoints.

¹ सादृशको लाघविकः शब्दोऽयं व्यञ्जकस्त्रिधा”—Kāvyaaprakāśa. kār. 5.

² व्यञ्जानतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः—Nyāya Sūtra, 2.2.65.

³ Śabdaśakti. kār. 16, p. 81 (Ben. ed.).

significance (लक्षकः); (3) words having both primary and derivative meanings (योगरूढः); (4) words having only derivative significance (यौगिकः). To the first group belong words like “gauh,” etc., which have their respective meanings fixed by “Sāṅketa” or popular usage. The peculiar characteristics of words coming under this class are that the meanings derived by analysing such words into stems and suffixes are not exactly the same as their popular or innate significance. The word “gauh,” for instance, derived as it is from the root “gam” to go, would radically mean a “moving being,” and not necessarily one furnished with dewlap, hoofs, horns, etc., if derivative significance were of any importance in the case of such “रूढशब्दः.” Words of this description are popularly called “संज्ञा.”¹ The word “Gangā,” as in the expression “गङ्गायां घोषः,” would be inconsistent² if taken in its primary significance (भगीरथखातावच्छिन्नजलप्रवाहः); it is, therefore, said to be used in its secondary sense when it is taken to indicate “bank” instead of its natural signification “current of water,” in order to render the context consistent. The योगरूढ class of words comprises such words as “Paṅkaja,” etc., which combine in themselves twofold significance—derivative as well as conventional. The word “Paṅkaja” means “lotus” by the force of convention (Sāṅketa), and also implies analytically or derivatively “mud,” “production,” and “agent” (पङ्क-जनि-कर्तृत्वम्), that is, “a substance that grows in mud.” To the यौगिक class belong words like “Pāchaka,” “Pāṭhaka,” “Kāraka,” etc., which denote the same meanings as are signified by the component parts in which they might be grammatically analysed.

Before bringing this topic to a close, we have a few more words to say in regard to primary and secondary

¹ रूढ संकेतवचनानि सेवसंज्ञंति कौत्स्यते—Śabdasakti.

² लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्धात्पदान्पपत्तिः—Bhāṣhāparichheda.

significance. We have already noticed that words may have both primary or innate and secondary or indirect meanings; the primary significance is precisely the same as the conventional meaning assigned to a word from time immemorial (शक्ति:); it is to this original sense that we look for the real denotations of words (शक्ति:). The secondary significance is so called because there is no such direct or necessary association between a word and its secondary sense which is entirely dependent on popular fashion. In a sentence like “manchāḥ krośanti,” “chairs are making noise” (*cf.* the English idiom “an address or voice from the chair, *i.e.*, president), as the idea of “making noise” is found to be inconsistent or incompatible with that of a chair, we are necessarily forced to suggest in the fitness of things that the word “manchāḥ” should be understood as indicating “people sitting on chairs.” We should not, however, fail to notice here that in doing so the word “mancha” had to give up its primary significance and came to indicate a meaning which could only be obtained either from the context or from an idea of compatibility. It is nothing but interesting to point out here that there are some words which have almost entirely lost their original sense and are now used always in their secondary significance. We may take, for instance, words like “kuśalaḥ” and “pravīṇaḥ” that are no longer used respectively in the sense of “cutter of kuśa-grass” and “expert in playing on lyre,”¹ but have obtained currency and popular approval with regard to their secondary meanings, *viz.*, “expert” or “skilful.” It is what is known in Semantics as an instance of “widening of meaning.” The secondary meaning is not, however, totally unconnected with the direct or primary one in such cases, for none but a skilful person can cut sharp kuśa-grass and play on lyre.

¹ प्रज्ञेयौ वीणायां प्रवीणौ गान्धर्वे च सत्यं मुख्या उच्यते:—Durgāchārjya, Nirukta, p. 156.

We have already referred to the passage of the “Taitti. Samhitā” where speech is said to have been originally undivided into parts.

Parts of Speech.

The analytical method adopted in the divisions of Vāk is purely a grammatical device which is at best nothing but artificial. Bhartrihari has emphatically stated that the grammatical way of analysing speech is only an imaginary means that helps us evidently to understand the meaning of an “indivisible sentence” more particularly. Language, with all its diversified forms, appears to be such a complex phenomenon that the first duty of a grammarian has always been to divide a particular language into a number of constituents, his aim in doing so being obviously to facilitate the study of that language.

There are, according to Yāska,¹ four parts of speech—Noun, Verb, Preposition, and Indeclinable. It is not, however, certain if Yāska was the first to make such a classification, because already in the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa² we meet with such grammatical terms as “dhātu,” “ākhyāta,” nāman (noun), vibhakti (case-ending), vachana (number), līṅga (gender) and so on. What is probable is that Yāska found such well-marked classifications already in existence either amongst the grammarians or etymologists who had preceded him. Yāska has cleverly put noun and verb under one group, and made afterwards a separate compound comprising preposition and particle, the priority of order being obviously due to the relative importance of noun and verb so far as linguistic studies are concerned. The importance of noun and verb, as significant elements of speech, lies in the fact that they possess innate significance which they do not lose even when they are

¹ Nirukṭā. 1.1. “चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्याते औपसर्गेनिपाताश्च”

² ओङ्कारं पृच्छामः, कीधातुः, किं प्रातिपदिकम्, किं नामाख्यातम्, etc., R. L. Mitra ed., p. 12 (प्रथमप्रपाठकः) ।

used independently of preposition and particle, whereas preposition and particle have no meanings when they are detached from nouns and verbs. It must be admitted that Yāska's classifications of speech are scientifically accurate. The omission of pronoun in the list does not make any serious defect, for the evolution of pronoun is of comparatively modern origin in the development of language. Moreover, pronoun is only a special form of noun. A word is only needed to explain why adverb is lost sight of by Yāska in the classifications of parts of speech. True it is that the conception of adverb is almost as old as that of verb and consequently adverb ought to have been mentioned along with verb as a separate part of speech ; but it is none the less true that prepositions, if they have any significance, are frequently used as qualifying attributes of verbs to which they are added. In explaining the aphorism “**क्रियाविशेषक उपसर्गः**” (M. bhāshya, Vol. I, p. 256), Patañjali clearly states that the preposition “**pra**” in “**prapachati**” qualifies the action denoted by “**pach.**” What we really learn from this attributive character of prepositions is that they have adverbial sense, and consequently Yāska's classifications are virtually correct as well as complete. Yāska¹ defines verb as a word which denotes action (**भावः**) and noun as what involves the idea of substance ; and holds on the authority of “**Vārshyāyaṇi**”² that “**bhāva**” reveals itself in six different aspects, namely, existence, production, transformation, growth, decay and destruction. Aristotle's definition of verb gives undue prominence to the idea of time, but does not take notice of the fundamental conception associated with verbs in general, that is, action (**व्यापारः**). We may reject

¹ भावप्रधानमाख्यातं सत्वप्रधानानि नामानि—Nir. 1.1, p. 37.

² षड् भावविकारा भवन्तीति वाच्यंयदि जायते, अस्ति, विपरिणमते, वर्धते, अपच्यते, विनश्यतीति.—Nir. 1.1.2, p. 44.

Aristotle's definition of noun as being negative. A careful comparison will undoubtedly show that Yāska's definitions of noun and verb are more comprehensive and accurate than those suggested by the great Greek philosopher. As regards prepositions, Yāska¹ says that prepositions, according to Śakatāyana, have no significance apart from nouns and verbs, *i.e.*, when separated from verbs, they do not seem to have any independent meanings of their own, like letters taken separately from a composite word. This view was, however, contradicted by Gārgya² who held, on the contrary, that prepositions, even when they were taken separately from verbs, were found to have various meanings. Yāska probably expresses his own view consistently with the grammarians when he maintains that prepositions serve only to specialise the meanings of nouns and verbs, or, in other words, prepositions are rather indicative (द्योतकः) than denotative (वाचकः). As regards particles, Yāska holds that they have various meanings. The particles like इव, चित्, न, तु are used to imply "comparison," as in the expression "अग्निरिवेन्द्रः" and so on; some particles like च, वा, etc., denote "conjunctions of meanings" (कर्मेपसंग्रहः); and some again, as कम्, इम्, इत् and उ are only used for the sake of completing a numbered or metrical verse. In his classifications of "सार्थकः," Jagadīśa³ has included particle as one which denotes its meanings only when it comes in conjunction with some other words but cannot do so independently. We shall thoroughly deal later on with the grammatical side of the question as to whether prepositions and particles are

¹ न निर्बन्धा उपसर्गा अर्थान्निराहुरिति शाकटायनो नामाख्यातयोस्तु कर्मेपसंग्रहोद्योतकाः—Nir. 1.3., p. 57.

² उच्चावचाः पदार्था भवन्तीति गार्ग्यः—Nir. 1.3., p. 57.

³ शब्दान्तरमपेक्ष्यैव सार्थकः स्वार्थोपपन्नत्वं प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययश्चैव निपातश्चेति स विधा—Śabda-śākti. Kār. 6.

significant by themselves or they merely play insignificant parts in qualifying the meanings of verbs and nouns.

Having shown the artificial character of grammatical analysis of sentences, Bhartrihari¹ points out that some grammarians speak of only two parts of speech, namely, noun and verb; some have recognised two more elements, *i.e.*, preposition and particle; some again make a fivefold division by adding “कर्मप्रवचनीय” to the list. Panyarāja draws our attention to the fact that these five parts of speech are, on a closer examination, reducible to two, *i.e.*, noun and verb, since particles with certain limitations are capable of being included within the category of nouns; and prepositions and “Karmapravachaniya,” as they are adjuncts to actions, are fundamentally the same as verbs. The indeclinables like “हिरूक्”² and “दृयक्,” which denote actions, may be treated as a particular kind of verbs.³

The grammarians or analysers of speech were not satisfied only with the divisions of speech, but proceeded further to analyse such parts of speech into their final constituent elements, *viz.*, stems and formative elements. Such a division which is often designated as “संस्कारः” forms the fundamental principle of Sanskrit grammar. The expression “शब्दानुशासनम्,” as used by Patañjali instead of ‘Vyākaraṇa,’ suggests that the first and foremost duty of a Hindu grammarian has always been to draw a distinct line of demarcation between Sanskrit and Apabhramṣas by showing that only words of Sanskrit origin (recognised by the “Śishtas”) are capable of being

¹ Vākyapadīya, 3.1., p. 1 (Ben. ed.)—हिधाकैचित्पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पञ्चधापि वा ।
etc.

² हिरूक्प्रथमिति क्रियाप्रधानम् Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 95.

³ See Vāk. pad. 3.1. com., p. 2.

regularly analysed into the so-called bases and suffixes, while corrupted or distorted forms (as in Prākṛita) do not come under the cognisance of their rules of derivation. The two primary parts of speech, *i.e.*, nouns and verbs, are accordingly divided into “Prakṛiti” and “Pratyaya,” which are said to have permanent relation with each other.¹ And in consequence of such innate relationship, neither the stem nor the formative element is allowed to have independent application; and though their separate meanings have been shown by the grammarians, it is actually the whole composite word and not its parts that is popularly used to express the intended significance.² Jagadīśa explains the relation that exists between a base and its suffix as one of inter-dependence, inasmuch as “Prakṛiti” requires to be conjoined with “Pratyaya” before it is said to have full significance and *vice versa*. It may be asked here, how words are broken up into their significant parts, namely, stems and suffixes, and how their respective meanings are determined. The philosopher-grammarian Patañjali takes recourse to a strictly scientific procedure when he concludes that it is by the “method of agreement and difference” (सिद्धत्वव्यतिरेकाभ्याम्) that radical and formative parts of words are separated along with their respective meanings. The following is the way in which bases are distinguished from suffixes:³ When the word “वृक्षः” is uttered, we hear a sound, *i.e.*, “वृक्षः” that ends in “क्ष” and to which विसर्ग has been added. The meanings that are expressed by them are respectively (1) a substance having roots, stem, branches and fruits; and (2) singular number. When the dual form “वृक्षौ” is uttered, we find by comparing the two forms that the original sound

¹ “नित्यसम्बन्धावेतावर्थौ प्रकृतिः प्रत्यय इति,” Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I p. 219.

² समुदायस्याथ प्रयोगादवयवानामप्रसिद्धिरिति—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 219.

³ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 219.

“सः,” as in “वृक्षः” has disappeared in the latter and a new sound, *i.e.*, औ has come in its place. But the sound “वृक्ष” remains unchanged. Similarly, there are also absence and appearance of something so far as meanings are concerned. In the form ‘वृक्षौ’ the notion of the singular number is absent and that of duality is present : the idea of a tree remains the same. What we have particularly observed in these two forms (वृक्षः and वृक्षौ) is that there are practically two parts—one permanent or unmodified and the other that undergoes change both in form and significance. The changing elements, that is, “सः” and “औ” with their respective meanings ‘unity’ and ‘duality’ are called “Pratyayas” or terminations, while the unmodified elements “वृक्ष” is called ‘Prakriti’ in Sanskrit grammar. The inflexional parts with the exception of ‘बहुच्’ and ‘अकच्’ are, according to the general rule of Sanskrit grammar, always used after bases. The author of the Mahābhāṣya has, however, unconditionally asserted that ‘Pratyayas,’ as is implied by the very term, are significant (अर्थं प्रत्याययतीति), and has shown, though provisionally, that certain suffixes like ‘माचच्,’ ह्यसज्, तिथच्,’ etc., are found to have independent uses as well (without being added to bases). On the strength of such instances, though few in number, we are inclined to believe that what are now called ‘Pratyayas’ and have their positions fixed, might have been current as independent words in some remote period of linguistic development.

We have repeatedly stated in these pages that the grammatical method of analysing words into stems and suffixes is considered to be artificial from the standpoint of ‘Sphoṭa.’ A word, according to the doctrine of ‘Sphoṭa,’ is an ‘indivisible compact.’ As a staunch

adherent of the aforesaid doctrine, Bhartrihari says that the so-called division of words into stems and suffixes, though inconsistent with the essential aspect of words, is important as enabling students of grammar to understand the meanings of words with less difficulty.

As in the Sāṅkhya system 'Prakriti' is said to be the primordial element out of which the entire universe

has sprung up, so in grammar 'Dhātu'

Root—the ultimate
germ of Speech—its
Nature and Signi-
ficance.

represents the ultimate element where-
from all words have evolved. The roots

are the last result of grammatical

analysis and form the real foundation of all words.

Roots, like elements of the chemist, do not admit of further division; it is to them that the Nairuktas or

etymologists look for the starting point in their process of deriving words. The analytical method of the

grammarians whereby sentences were broken up into significant parts, further proceeded to analyse such

parts into finer elements, *i.e.*, radical and inflexional, and finally found roots as the nicest elements that

rendered further analysis totally impossible. The author of the 'Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā' has divided Prakriti or

stems into two kinds, namely, nouns and roots.¹ But on a closer examination of facts it will be found that

nouns too have roots as their ultimate bases. The roots are significant sounds, as they are always associated

with the idea of action (व्यापार). There is, however, some divergence of views as to the exact significance

of roots. According to Maṇḍana Miśra (a Mīmāṃsaka) 'result' alone is the meaning of roots, action (व्यापार)

being denoted by terminations like 'तिङ्,' etc. The root 'gam' means accordingly 'conjunction,' and not

movements of feet. Some again hold, on the contrary,

¹ Śabdaśakti, Kār., 14, p. 77.—“निवृत्ता प्रकृतिर्विधा नामधातुप्रसिद्धतः” ।

that action alone is denoted by roots, and that the idea of 'result' follows necessarily from suffixes. Of these two contradictory views, the former, namely that 'result alone is denoted by roots,' is adversely criticised by Gaṅgeśa, the renowned founder of the 'Navya-Nyāya school.' As 'result' is invariably preceded by action, and as the relation between them is one of cause and effect, he defines the significance of roots as 'action favourable or leading to the result' (फलानुकूलो व्यापार एव धात्वर्थः).¹ Gadādhara, however, objects to the other views on the ground that if roots are held to be expressive of actions alone, then verbal forms like 'pachati' and 'gachhati' would have no special significance apart from those of 'cooking' and 'going.'² It must be, however, remembered here that with the Naiyāyikas the form 'gachhati,' as it means 'substratum of actions that lead to conjunction,' is sufficient to constitute a significant sentence by itself, and that the meaning of a sentence (शब्दबोध) is something more than what is usually expressed by words forming such a combination. Some³ again hold that the root 'gam' means 'movements qualified by such result as conjunction.' As to the views of the grammarians, Patañjali defines roots as 'words expressive of actions' (क्रियावचनो धातुः); and elsewhere we find that both 'result' and 'action' are said to be what is actually meant by roots. 'Vyāpāra' or action is immaterial, formless, invisible and is cognised only by inference. How is it, then, known that roots like 'pach' (to cook) are denotative of action? Patañjali answers that all verbal forms have co-inherence

¹ Tattva-chintāmaṇi—Śabdakhaṇḍa—A.S.B., p. 849.

² धातोर्व्यापारमाववाचिरे.....अविलक्षणबोधप्रसङ्गः.—Vyutpattivāda, p. 37.

³ न यस्यास्तु संयोगादिरूपफलविशेषावच्छिन्नसामान्दोषम्याद्यर्थः.—Vyutpattivāda, p. 38.

⁴ क्रियानामियमव्यक्तपरिदृष्टा। अथवा क्रिया पिण्डोभूता निदर्शयितुं यथागर्भो निर्मुक्तितः। साक्षादनुमानगम्या.—M. Bhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 254.

(सामानाधिकरणम्) with 'karoti' (doing), that is to say, the idea of 'doing' is to be found in all forms of verbs. Patañjali has suggested another definition, according to which a root is denotative of 'becoming' (भाववचनो धातुः). The Mīmāṃsakas define verbs as words the utterance of which does not produce any cognition of forms or material body; and speak of two kinds of action (धात्वर्थः)—primary and secondary. In a treatise on Mīmāṃsā (Jaim. Nyāyanālā) we find a two-fold action—accomplished and unaccomplished. To the 'accomplished' class (सिद्धस्वभावः) belong such verbal nouns as 'pāka,' 'pakti' 'pacnah,' etc., which have gender, case and number; the 'unaccomplished' (साध्यस्वभावः) actions are, on the other hand, denoted by such verbal forms as 'karoti,' etc., which have no gender. Bhartrihari¹ says that 'Kriyā' seems to have many parts and represents a combination of successive actions. To revert to the main point at issue, the author of the Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣhaṇa² reconciles the two opposite views when he holds that a root denotes both result and action, and that 'substratum' (आश्रयः) is signified by terminations (तिङ्). That action is denoted by all roots is also clear from the fact that the denotations of formative elements may vary but the significance of radical parts remains unchanged. Now, it may be asked if there is any logical principle to distinguish the radical from the formative elements and determine their respective meanings. The answer given by Patañjali³ is the same as we have already stated (*i.e.*, the method of agreement and difference) in connection with the analysis of nouns into 'Prakṛiti' and 'Pratyaya.'

¹ गुणभूतेरवयवैः समूहः क्रमजन्यनाम् । बुद्ध्याप्रकल्पिताभिदः साक्रियैश्चभिधीयते ।—Vākya-paṭi a.

² फलव्यापारयोर्धातुराश्रयेतु तिङः श्रुताः—Kār. 2.

³ Māhābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 255.

In the Sanskrit language roots are mostly monosyllabic in form and a large number of words is found to have been evolved out of a single root. It is only rarely that we meet with such trilateral roots as चक्वास् and the like. There are, as enumerated in the list of roots (धातुपाठ), about two thousand roots in Sanskrit. It must be, however, admitted that all these roots are not traceable in our extant literature; the number of roots authenticated by use is roughly calculated to be slightly more than one thousand. Jagadīśa has divided roots into three groups; (i) Simple or primary roots, as are to be found in the list (Gaṇapāṭha); (ii) 'Sautra' as suggested by the rules of grammar; and (iii) 'Pratyayānta' or secondary roots ending in some suffixes. The Denominative, Frequentative and Desiderative roots come under the category of the last group. The number of 'Sautra' roots is very small. Though there is no separate class of roots recognised by the native grammarians as reduplicated, the roots दरिद्रा, जाग्र, दीधो, वेवी and the like might be linguistically, though not grammatically, treated as such. Certain roots, as we have already pointed out, such as गद्, गर्ज्, कर्द्, कल्, भर्ज्, etc., may be supposed to have their origin in the imitation of sounds. The Hindu grammarians speak nothing about the so-called compound roots and they never tried to show that the root 'yudh' was a combination of two simple roots 'yu' (to join) and 'dhā' (to place). Nor do we find any reason to accept Prof. Pott's theory as to the amalgamation of roots with prepositions. True it is that certain roots like 'इङ्' and 'अन्' are in most cases found to be preceded by such prepositions as 'अधि' and 'प्र' respectively, but it is a fact that they have not lost their independent uses altogether, inasmuch as the forms 'इते' and 'अनिति' are also to be found. In the Saṃhitās we rather find laxity

of relation between prepositions and verbal forms, words being allowed to intervene between them. The prepositions are kept separate from being amalgamated with verbs, as the grammatical operations like the augment 'अट्' and reduplications do not affect the prepositions at all. The prepositions have, however, some influence upon the verbal forms to which they are prefixed. The presence of certain prepositions serves to change dental nasal and dental sibilants to their corresponding lingual forms; the roots चि, नी, भू are allowed to have the suffix चञ् when they are not preceded by any prepositions.

From the grammatical analysis of words into stems and suffixes we come finally to the question, whether nouns of every description are ultimately reducible to roots in course of decomposition. Yāska records a controversy which had once issued between Śākaṭāyana and etymologists on the one hand, and Gārgya and grammarians on the other, with regard to the derivability of words from roots. Śākaṭāyana¹ took a very extreme view agreeably, of course, with the Nairuktas that all noun-forms even without exceptions of 'संज्ञाशब्द' are capable of being derived from roots. Gārgya² could not give his consent to the doctrine as expounded by Śākaṭāyana, but raised a voice of opposition by holding that all words as a rule were not actually derivable from roots. He based his arguments on the fact³ that if all nouns were derivable from roots, then whatever performed the same action might have received the same designation ;

Reducibility of words
to roots.

¹ See Nirukta, I. 12, p. 99.

² न सर्वानौति गार्ग्यो देहाकरणानाञ्चैके—Nirukta, 1.12, p. 99.

³ अथचेत सर्वान्प्राख्यातानि नामानि स्युर्ध्वः कश्च तत्कर्मकृत्यान् सर्वे तत्सर्वं तथा चचिरन्—Nirukta, 1.12, p. 99,

for instance, any one passing on the street might be called 'गण्ड'. 'But this is contrary to popular use. He continues further that if the theory of Śākaṭāyana holds good in the case of all words, that is, if names are really suggested by actions, then an individual may have as many designations as there are actions associated with it. But this is also far from being the actual case, as we usually find in Semantics that objects receive their respective names from one action or outstanding feature. A man of Yāska's calibre was not, however, wanting in counter-arguments, and we are astonished to see how cleverly Yāska refuted those objections and finally supported the view of Śākaṭāyana to every syllable by laying particular stress on the psychological side of language. The fundamental principle underlying the etymological explanations of Yāska is that in deriving a word where accent, root and grammatical operations are not readily understood, one should take recourse to analogy, both in form and meaning, and then derive it in the light of similar forms. The principle of Etymology, as formulated by Yāska, has a scientific character, and it really reflects great credit upon so ancient a teacher who made such a comprehensive study of language and Semantics long before the Christian era. Yāska carried the view of Śākaṭāyana to such an extent as to render some of his etymological explanations simply fanciful to the modern philologists. Moreover, in deriving a word when he has failed to determine its proper analysis and meaning, the course usually taken by Yāska has been to suggest a number of roots that might furnish some definite clue as to the proper exposition of the word. Thus, while deriving the word 'Nighaṇṭu,' Yāska has pointed to गम्, इ, and 'ह' as the possible roots out of which the form might have been evolved. When we follow the way in which Śākaṭāyana

has derived the word 'सत्यम्'¹ from two simple roots **भस्** (to be) and **इष्** (to go), we are naturally inclined to say that such a method of derivation is nothing but fanciful. Durga,² however, corroborates the view of Śākāṭyāna when he shows that the etymological explanations of 'रुद्रशब्द' are also to be found in the Mantras, and that the derivations of a single word from more than one root are illustrated by the Brāhmaṇas, as, for instance, the three letters representing the word 'हृदय',³ are said to have their origin in three different roots 'हृ,' 'दा' and 'इष्.' What is still more strange is that Yāska even tried to suggest etymological explanations of proper names as 'शन्तनु'⁴ पित्रवन, अवन, कम्बोज and the like. Consequently we see that to the Nairuktas no word whatsoever is incapable of being traced to its primary element, i.e., root. As the idea of 'Kriyā' (action) seems to be predominant in the significance of most of the words, Durga has divided words into three distinct classes:—(i) 'प्रत्यक्षक्रिय'—words like 'Kāraka,' 'Hāraka' etc., where actions are readily perceived; (ii) 'प्रकल्पक्रिय'—words as 'gau,' 'purusha,' etc., which do not signify actions at once but require a good deal of straining to find out the radical elements; and (iii) 'अविद्यमानक्रिय'—words like 'dittha,' 'arvāṇ,' 'chandra,' etc., where the very idea of action is absent. It is, in fact, only the last two classes of words that have been taken up by the etymologists for derivation; and it is mainly in the etymological explanation of words belonging to the last group that they found

¹ पदेभ्यः पदेतराङ्गान् संचस्कार शकटाद्यनः—एतेः कारितं च यकारादिं चान्तराण्यसौः शुद्धं च सकारादिं च—Nirukta, p. 103.

² Nirukta, Bom. ed., 1-14, p. 114.

³ एवं हृरतेर्ददातेरितेहृदयशब्दस्यदर्थफलोपदेशनार्थं ब्राह्मणेनैवं निरुक्तः—Nirukta, p. 114.

⁴ शन्तनुः शंतनोस्त्विति वा शमकैतत्त्वा अस्त्वितिवा—Nirukta, p. 200.

⁵ पित्रवनः पुनः स्वर्धनोयजवो भवति—Nirukta, p. 231. आवयिता सोमानाम्. Nir., p. 311.

immense field for the free play of their fancy. The grammarians, it must be remembered, were not wholly unanimous with Śākatāyana and the etymologists so far as the reducibility of words to roots was concerned. Śākatāyana, as is evident from the rules of Pāṇini and the references in the Mahābhāṣya, was undoubtedly a grammarian to whom is popularly attributed the authorship of the entire chapter on 'Uṇādi.' The view¹ of Pāṇini, as explained by Patañjali, is that words belonging to the so-called 'Uṇādi' class are not regularly capable of being analysed into stems and suffixes recognised by the grammarians. Here we find the reason why the author of so vast and comprehensive a system of grammar as the "Ashtādhyāyī," did not think it worth while to multiply the number of his grammatical aphorisms by bringing those words formed by 'Uṇādi' suffixes under the cognisance of his highly scientific treatment. The word 'बहुलम्' in the rule 'उणादयो बहुलम्' (Pāṇ. 3. 3. 1) is explained by Patañjali as indicative of the comparatively small number of bases to which the formative elements like 'Uṇa' are added; but Kaiyaṭa interprets it in a different way, as he takes the word बहुलम् as indicating the correctness of the so-called 'Uṇādi' forms. We should be careful to notice here that though the extent of his aphorisms was not extended to 'रुद्ध' or संज्ञाशब्द, as are usually included within the 'Uṇādi' class, Pāṇini never questioned their authenticity and acceptability, but unhesitatingly took them to be correct. We find elsewhere that the forms like 'पृषोदर,'² in spite of their ungrammatical character, are also taken to be correct by Pāṇini on the ground of their being used by Śiṣṭas who, with or without any knowledge of grammar,

¹ उणादयो बहुलम्—Pāṇ., 3. 3. 1. See Bhāṣya under this aphorism प्रकृतेस्तनुदष्टेः and नेगमरुदिभवं हि स्यात्.—M., Bhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 138.

² Pāṇ. 6.3. 109.

were competent to use those forms of words that are accepted by the grammarians without a word of objection. Patañjali rightly observes that the rules of grammar, however comprehensive they seem to be, are practically far from being exhaustive, as a good many words lie outside the range of grammar. This reminds us of a couplet,¹ probably composed by the renowned grammarian Durga Simha, which testifies to the fact that even grammarians of the stamp of Patañjali and Durga with their broadest vision and keenest intellect failed to make an exhaustive study of words. Patañjali² holds that 'Naigama' (words occurring in the Vedas) and 'Rūrha' words ending in suffixes like 'Uṇa,' etc., should be regarded as correct, and that in the derivations of words belonging to this class, sometimes bases and sometimes formative elements are to be determined on the analogy of grammatically recognised stems and suffixes.

We have already pointed out in the foregoing pages that language, as audible expression of thought, is held to be current from time immemorial (प्रवाहनित्य) by the native grammarians. It is doubtful whether man could have been what he is now, if there had been no such comprehensive medium of communicating thoughts as language. It has not only vocalised our thoughts, but has practically systematised the process of reasoning. Moreover, the world would have ever remained a complicated phenomenon,³ if it were

Some general observations on the Sanskrit language and literature.

¹ 'अहं' च भाष्यकारस्य कुशायकविद्यावृत्तौ । नैवशब्दाः बुद्धेः पारं किमन्ये जडबुद्धयः ।

² "नैगमवृद्धिर्भवति हि सुसाधु" and यन्न विशेषपदार्थसमुच्चयं प्रत्ययतः प्रकृतेष्वतद्व्यञ्जनम्—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 138.

³ इदमन्यं तमः कृत्स्नं जायते भुवनत्रयम् ।

यदि शब्दाद्वयं ज्योतिराऽसारं न दीप्यते ॥—Kāvya-darśa, 1. 4.

incapable of being simplified by different names and forms (नामरूपे व्याकरोत्).

Judging from the number of literary productions, both ancient and comparatively modern, the Sanskrit language is decidedly the richest of all members of the so-called 'Indo-European' family. Similarly, when we consider the number of roots and inflexions, Sanskrit seems to have no parallel in the world of languages. Sanskrit was, at least to the Hindus, the most original of all tongues. The Hindu grammarians have tried to show that the 'Prākṛita' dialects are not descended from a different source but have Sanskrit as their common origin.¹ It is not for us to make here a bold attempt to prove that Sanskrit is the mother of all languages, nor to explain the structural resemblances of Sanskrit with Greek and Latin. The part played by Sanskrit in the history of Comparative Philology has already been pointed out. Transmitted orally from generation to generation, the ancient Hindu literature has suffered much, a good many literary works being irrecoverably lost for ever. Notwithstanding such losses and mutilations, Sanskrit literature, as it has come down to us, does not fail to show a continuous line of development in thought-process as well as in language. It must be stated at the very outset that the Sanskrit language falls under two well-marked divisions—'Vedic' (Chhāndas) and 'Classical' (Laukika). The former differs from the latter in many respects. The earliest specimen of the Sanskrit language is preserved in the Vedas, specially in the Rig Veda, where we meet with a beautiful language of lyric poetry in which the sacred invocations of our ancient forefathers found expression. In these natural and simple songs are recorded the

¹ शब्दप्रकृतिरप्यंश इति संश्लेषकारोत्तरपक्षशोनास न स्वतन्त्र कथनं विद्यते —Punyarāja, under the Vākyapādiya, Kār. I, 149.

history of Aryan civilisation in its primitive character and the history of Indian thought in its pristine glory. This rhythmical language of the Samhitās was followed by the extensive prose style of the Brāhmaṇas. A point that is specially significant in our linguistic investigation is that in the transitional period between lyrical poetry and artificial prose, many words had undergone changes both in their formal and logical aspects, and a number of new words and expressions were coming into existence. The Vedic language in its last phase is represented by the 'Upanishads' and the ancient 'Sūtras.' The learned professor Sir R. G. Bhandarkar¹ has found three distinct periods in the development of the Sanskrit language. The period beginning with the Brāhmaṇas and closing with Pāṇini is called by him 'the period of middle Sanskrit.' Yāska stands midway between the Vedic and Classical periods; his work represents, so to speak, the classical Sanskrit in the making. When the elaborate and verbose prose style of the Brāhmaṇas had come to a close, there arose a more artificial style (known as 'Sūtra') characterised by extreme brevity and conciseness, which evidently found much favour with the grammarians and philosophers. The extent to which brevity was favoured by the native grammarians is best shown by the 'Paribhāṣā' अर्थमात्रासाधनेन पुत्रोत्सवं मन्यन्ते वैयाकरणाः".

The typical language preserved by the Vedas is literary, as distinguished from spoken, and, as some differences are usually observed between the two, we are necessarily led to suppose that the poetical language of the Samhitās was in certain respects different from the language generally spoken by men in those primitive days. In the absence of any positive evidence, it is almost impossible to say anything definitely as to the

¹ Wilson, Philological Lectures, p. 30.

nature of such a tongue, and the extent to which this popular language had influenced the metrical language of the Vedas. This spoken language which was either older than or co-eval with the Vedic language is supposed by some to have been the oldest form of Prākṛita. They hold that 'Prākṛita' is not an offshoot of Sanskrit, *i.e.*, the relation in which Sanskrit stands to Prākṛita is not one of mother to daughter, but Prākṛita seems to have practically an independent existence of its own, and is consequently as old as the language of the Vedas. According to this view, however discordant with the orthodox opinions, what we call Sanskrit (a purified tongue) might be supposed to have been developed from Prākṛita.

The Vedas, specially the Rig Veda, stands in point of time at the head of Sanskrit literature, and may be viewed as the oldest literary record of the Aryan culture. The Vedas, according to the orthodox interpretation, are regarded as existing from eternity, and not of human origin. But as far as our linguistic vision is permitted to proceed, the language represented by the Vedic hymns, as beautiful as poetical in form, does not seem to have embodied the first articulate utterance of mankind. From both evolutionary and linguistic points of view, it is difficult to assume that the first intellectual unfolding of our remotest forefathers could have found expression in so beautiful and rhythmical a language as that of the Vedas. What is nearer the truth is that in the Vedas we meet with a language that seems to have left its infant stage of cruder forms far behind and received refinement and poetical embellishment to a considerable degree—a fact that naturally strengthens the view that the Vedic language is the result of not an inconsiderable period of linguistic development; in

Pre-Vedic language.

other words, the ancient language had undoubtedly made some progress before it could produce such a literary monument as the Vedas. From the point of view of evolution, the hymns of the Vedas are far from being the first and the most original of their kind, for the artistic descriptions, occurring in the Vedas, tell a different tale, namely, that they had developed from some older and cruder forms. The hymns presuppose a long history of development, but no positive data are available to form any definite idea of it. Judged by the standard of civilisation revealed in the Vedas, the hymns seem to be the history of a people highly religious, who made considerable progress in certain departments of culture and were familiar with some social and political institutions. The hymns, it must be borne in mind, represent the polished literary language which was, as a matter of fact, somewhat different from the current or spoken tongue, the former being more artistic and artificial than the latter. In order to form an idea of this imaginary 'Pre-Vedic' language, we have only to picture before our mind the existence of a tongue—cruder in form, simpler in style, wanting in metaphor—which had ultimately developed into the poetical language of the Vedas. The structural resemblances observed in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin and *Āvestā* have led most of the modern philologists to derive their origin from one common source to which the name "parent-tongue" has been given. By comparing a number of forms, as for instance, Sk. "pañca," Gk. "πέντε," Lat. "quinque," Goth. "fimf," "Lith. Penkī," the philologists have postulated a form like "*penqwe" as the oldest and most original one. Now, this original tongue, whether identical with the Pre-Vedic language as referred to above, or other imaginary form of language that has left no trace behind, is supposed to be the-

mother of all languages. In the opinion of Vākpati¹ it is Prākṛita that deserves such a glorious designation. It is, to speak the truth, very difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion as to the identification of such a "mother tongue."

The Sanskrit term corresponding to language is <sup>Two-fold speech—
Vedic and popular.</sup> "Bhāshā," derived from the root "bhāsh" to speak. The term "bhāshā" was, however, as we shall see later on, restricted to the current or popular tongue, as distinguished from the sacred language of the Vedas. There is ample evidence both in Yāska's² Nirukta and Pāṇini's Ashtādhyāyī³ that a distinction was early made between the sacred literary (metrical) language of the Vedas and the spoken tongue, the former being known as "Chhandas" or "Naigama" and the latter as "bhāshā" or "laukika." We have already said that "Chhandas" represents the literary language, as opposed to the spoken tongue called "bhāshā." Patañjali rightly uses the word "laukika"⁴ to denote this popular speech and declares that the Vedic words are to be learnt from the Vedas,⁵ and "laukika" words from the current usages. Yāska seems to have been fully conscious of the difference as well as the intimate relation between the "Chhandas" and "Laukika" Sanskrit. He observes that the particle "इव," as indicative of comparison, is used both in "Chhāndas" and current speech; the indeclinable "न" is used in "bhāshā" as a negative

¹ सयलाची इमं वायाविसनि एसीयणेनि वायाची। एनि ससुहं चियणेनि सायराचीचियजलाइ, Gaudabadha, 93.

² भाषिकेभ्यो घातुभ्यो नै गमाकृतो भाषन्ते ... नै गमेभ्यो भाषिकाः—Nir. II. 2, p. 161. इवेति भाषायां, again नेतिप्रतिषेधार्थोऽयंभाषायाम्.—Nir. 1.4, p. 64.61.

³ "भाषायां सदवसशुवः"—Pāṇ. 3.1. 108.

⁴ लौकिकानां वेदिकानां च (शब्दानाम्)—Mahābhāshya 1.1.1. P. I (Vol. I).

⁵ वेदानो वेदिकाः सिद्धा लौकाश्च लौकिकाः.—Mahābhāshya, 11.1, P. 5.

particle only, whereas in the Vedic Sanskrit it has a double significance—that of comparison¹ and negation. He states further that in deriving words he has sometimes derived certain Vedic forms from roots taken from “bhāshā” and vice versa.² Moreover, Yāska takes notice of some dialectical varieties or provincialisms in Sanskrit (which was undoubtedly a spoken language in his time), as he observes that in some parts of the country the verbal forms were used, while in others the noun-forms of the same root were only used. Thus, the Kambojas³ used the verbal form “शवति” in the sense of “movement,” while the substantive form “शव,” meaning a “dead body,” was current among the Aryans. In the Ashtādhyāyī we hear of some Sanskrit dialects having certain grammatical peculiarities that prevailed in the eastern, northern, and southern parts of the country. Patañjali states expressly that the people of the Deccan were fond of “तद्धितान्त”⁴ words, as they used “laukike” and “Vaidike” instead of “loke” and “Vede.” The grammatical system of Pāṇini, as it takes notice of both “Chhāndas” and “laukika” words, has merited the glorious designation of “Vedāṅga.”

The “Chhāndas” differs from the ‘laukika’ or current Sanskrit in general tone, vocabularies, and, to a certain extent, in its psychological aspects also. In the Vedic language greater attention was paid to the phonological side; Samāśas were determined by the accents, and this was specially observed in the recitations of the Vedic hymns. The extent to which importance was attached

Some distinctive features of the Vedic language.

¹ As in “सुगो न मोमः.” “दुर्मदासो न सुराग्राम्”—Rig Veda VIII. 2.12.

² Nir. II.2, p. 161.

³ शवतिर्गैतिकर्मा कश्चो ज्ञेयश्च भाष्यते ... विकारमस्यार्थेषु शव इति. Nir. II. 2, p. 161.

⁴ “प्रियतद्धिता दक्षिणाया यथाश्लोके वेदे वेति प्रयोक्तव्ये लौकिकवैदिकेऽपि प्रयुज्यते”—Mahābhāṣya, I.1.1. p 8.

to proper accentuation is illustrated by a legend which tells us that the expression "Indraśatru"¹ turned fatal to the sacrificer himself on account of some error in the accent. In the Vedas we meet with a large number of words and peculiar grammatical terminations which have entirely disappeared making room for new ones in the later phase of the Sanskrit language.

In Vedic Sanskrit we have both the forms "goṇām" and "gavām," while the former has become obsolete in classical Sanskrit. Similarly, we have both "asuk"² as in "janāsaḥ," and "as" as in the classical form "devāḥ" as substitutes of the nominative plural termination "jas." Again, in the accusative singular of words like "tanu" and "prabhu" we find two forms as, तन्वम्, तनुवम्, "प्रभवम्" and "प्रभुवम्"³. The instrumental singular is often formed by the addition of "आ, या," as in "मध्वा" etc., in contrast with the affixes "स्वेन्" and "ना" as in later Sanskrit. The locative singular suffix is sometimes dropped, and we have "व्योमन्" instead of the classical "व्योम्नि," and it is sometimes changed to "ā," as in "नाभा" (for नाभौ)⁴. The nominative plural of words in neuter gender and ending in "अ" is frequently changed to "आ" as we find "विश्वाधनानि" for विश्वानि धनानि". The instrumental plural form of words ending in "अ" often retains भिः as in रुद्रेभिः and sometimes changes to ऐ as in रुद्रेः. For the Vedic grammatical forms like अतारिषत्, पत्नयः, पीत्वी, स्नात्वी, इष्टीनम्, पृत्सुषु⁵ we have now तारयत्, पत्नयः, पीत्वा, स्नात्वा, इष्ट्वा, पृत्सु. It is particularly to be remembered that the Vedic subjunctive mood called "लेट्" in the Aṣṭādhyāyī is not traceable in later

¹ मन्त्रहीनः स्वरतो वर्णतो वा ... यथेन्द्रशब्दः स्वरतोऽपराधात्. Pāṇ. Śikshā, 52.

² Pāṇ. 7. 1. 50.

³ Pāṇ. 6. 4. 86.

⁴ Pāṇ. 7. 1. 39.

⁵ Pāṇ. 7. 1. 48.

Sanskrit. Most of these peculiarities have been shown by Pāṇini in his comprehensive system of grām̐mar which, as we have already said, has treated of both the Vedic and classical forms. The infinitive is usually formed in later Sanskrit by the suffix तुम्, but in the Vedas we meet with a number of peculiar infinitives' (often with the sense of dative singular) as "जोवसे, हन्तवे, दातवे, पिबध्वै" etc., Pāṇini observes that the compound of two words, namely, "माह" and "पिह" yielded such form as "पितरामातरा"² in the Chāṇdas; the root "सह्" (to bear) with "क्ता" gave two forms साह्यै³ and साद्वा instead of the classical form सोद्वा, and that the augment य is sometimes found after क्ता as दत्त्वाय for "दत्त्वा." The Nighaṇṭu enumerates such verbal forms as गमति and इषति which have probably changed to गच्छति and इच्छति respectively in later Sanskrit. (See "Wilson Philological Lectures," pp. 16-20).

With regard to meaning-change, we notice that certain Vedic words have changed their meaning in classical Sanskrit. The word "कवि," as explained by Yāska and Sāyana, was originally used in a general sense to denote "one possessing keen intellectual vision" (क्वाप्तदर्शी, मेधावी), but it has now come to be used in a restricted sense, *viz.*, "the writer of metrical and rhythmical verses." The word "व्रत" originally meant "कर्म," *i.e.*, action in general, but in classical Sanskrit it denotes particular religious rites and ceremonies. Patañjali takes the term "व्रत" as meaning what is taken for food. The word "मृग"⁴ was a general name for animals, and not strictly restricted to a species as "deer." In the same way the word

¹ Pāṇ. 3. 4. 9.

² Pāṇ. 6. 3. 33.

³ Pāṇ. 6. 3. 113.

⁴ "मृगो न भौमः कुचरो गिरिष्ठा"—Rig Veda.

“वसु,” denoting originally “necessaries of life,” is now frequently used to signify “wealth.” Even in Yāska’s Nirukta we find a good many archaic words and expressions which have grown obsolete in later Sanskrit. The words “कर्मन्” and “उपेक्षा” are respectively used by Yāska in the sense of “meaning” and “observation” or “examination;” and the words “प्रदेश” and “वर्णोपजन” are used as significant of “action” (क्रिया) and “augment of letter” respectively. Thus we see that in the course of linguistic transition the meanings of certain Vedic words have been widened, while those of others have been narrowed or restricted to some extent. Durga¹ particularly takes notice of such words as प्रवीण, उदार and निस्त्रिंश etc., which have lost their original significance; as, for instance, the word प्रवीण is no longer used in its particular sense to denote “one skilful in playing on lyre,” but means, generally, “expert.” There are, again, some Vedic forms which are no longer used in classical Sanskrit. The verbal forms उष, तैर, चक्र, पेय, etc., seem to have been obsolete even at the time of Kātyāyana. Patañjali observes that these words have lost their applications and are replaced by such classical forms as उषित, तोष, कृतवान् and पकृतवान् respectively.

It has been the subject of a great controversy whether Sanskrit had ever enjoyed the dignity of a spoken language or had been simply a literary tongue in which the sacred books of the Hindus were composed. The majority of Western scholars, however, deny the possibility of Sanskrit having been ever a spoken language of people in

Sanskrit—a spoken language.*

¹ Durg. Commy. Nirukta. II. 1. 1., p. 156.

* Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar in one of his lectures, as Carmichael Professor of Ancient Indian History and Culture, dealt with this subject (“Was Sanskrit ever a spoken tongue?”) in a learned and critical way.

general. Their arguments are based on the facts that a language possessing such rigid grammatical rules and guided by such phonological niceties is not likely to have been the spoken language of the mass; and what is more possible is that certain forms of Prākṛita might have been the tongue current among people at large who were either uneducated or naturally unfit to pronounce Sanskrit words correctly. In the most fertile period of the Vedic literature, Sanskrit was, we are inclined to believe, undoubtedly a spoken language, though its currency was possibly confined to the area of cultured community of the Brāhṁṇas. There was admittedly a class of people, mainly composed of Brāhmins, that had Sanskrit for its mother-tongue. It is expressly laid down that a Brāhmin should not be allowed to speak in the corrupted dialects of the uneducated mass. This prohibitive injunction (न स्नेच्छितवे नापभाषितवे) is, however, said to have been rigidly observed at the time of performing sacrifice. From what we can infer from the statement of Patañjali, it appears that Brāhmins in their ordinary conversations were probably allowed to use corrupted forms like 'यर्वाण' and 'तर्वाण'¹ instead of "यद्वा" and "तद्वा," but they could not do so while performing sacrificial rites. The demons² are said to have been defeated in consequence of their uttering corrupted words. The utterance of correct Sanskrit words, on the other hand, is said to be attended with religious merits. It is no wonder that the people, whose religious texts, moral laws, spiritual conceptions and ordinances concerning the ten holy sacraments (दशसंस्कार) are all written in Sanskrit, should have Sanskrit as their mother tongue. The term "Bhāshā," as it is derived from the root "bhāsh" to

¹ M. Bhāshya, Vol. I., p. 11.

² तेऽसुरा ह्येतयो ह्येतयो इति कुर्वन्तः परावभूतः—M. Bhāshya, Vol. I., p. 2.

speak, is in itself an indication that Sanskrit was a spoken language. The frequent references to “bhāṣhā,”¹ as they occur in the Nirukta, prove unmistakably that Sanskrit was current as a living language at the time of Yāska. The existence of Sanskrit as a spoken tongue is also made clear by Yāska when he says that in deriving certain Vedic words he has made use of some verbal roots directly taken from the language current at the time. Further, he takes notice of some dialectical varieties of Sanskrit as a spoken tongue. He observes that the verbal form “श्रवति” meaning “motion” is used by the Kambojas, the Aryans using the nominal form “श्रव” denoting “a dead body”; and the people of eastern provinces used the verbal form दाति, while the noun-form दात्र was used by the northern people. The word “laukika” whereby Patañjali denotes the current or spoken tongue is also to be found in the Nirukta.²

There is evidence to believe that Sanskrit continued to be a spoken language at the time of Pāṇini. He had in view both the Vedic and classical forms while he formulated the rules of his Aṣṭādhyāyī. As a good many Vedic forms had already become obsolete, Pāṇini had to make a number of rules exclusively for them. He says that certain suffixes, as क्तु and कानच्, are used equally in the Vedic and “laukika” Sanskrit. He sanctioned the use of some Vedic forms like अनचान्, उपेयिवान् etc., in the current language, and made provisions for such verbal forms as वेदिवान्,³ शुश्रुवान्, उषिवान् on the analogy of Vedic formations. A huge system of grammar, such as that of Pāṇini, could not have practically come into

¹ “नेति प्रतिषेधाधीनो भाषायाम्”; “शब्ददिति विचिकित्साधीनो भाषायाम्”—Nirukta.

² लौकिकेष्वेतदयथासंप्रतीयं ब्राह्मणो न सिद्धो राज्ञेति ।—Nirukta, p. 123. Again, लौकिकेष्वेतदयथा सर्व्वरसा अनुप्राप्ताः पानीयमिति । (*ibid*).

³ भाषायां सदवसश्रुवः.—Pāṇ. 3. 2. 108.—पूर्व्वं तु भाषायाम्. Pāṇ 8. 2. 98.

existence, if Sanskrit would not have been current as a spoken tongue at the time of this renowned grammarian.

The Mahābhāṣya contains some passages which show that Sanskrit had not ceased to be a spoken tongue even at the time of Kātyāyana and Patañjali. While commenting on the Vārttika “यथालौकिकवैदिकेषु,” Patañjali states that the people of the Deccan are naturally fond of using words ending in “Tadāhita” terminations; for instance, they are found to use “laukike” and “Vaidike” instead of “loke” and “Vede.” What is stated here does not refer to a dead language; and we can reasonably assume that Sanskrit was current, though in a limited area, as a spoken tongue in the second century before the Christian era. While advocating the study of grammar for the knowledge of correct words, Kātyāyana holds that, though the meanings of words are usually determined from the current usage, the study of grammar is not rendered entirely useless on the ground that applications of words in conformity with the rules of grammar are alone attended with religious merits.¹ The aphorism “लोकतोऽर्थ-प्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे” etc.,² distinctly refers to a tongue that was nothing but spoken. Patañjali, while ascertaining the subject to be dealt with, states expressly that both Vedic and laukika (current) words constitute the materials of his grammatical speculations; by “laukika” he undoubtedly meant Sanskrit that was a spoken language in his time. Again, in setting forth the purposes that are served by the study of grammar, he has mentioned a verse which emphatically declares that one who does not know how to use “Pluta”³ (a protracted vowel) with regard to a name in responding to a salutation,

¹ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, pp. 8-10.

² Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 8.

³ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 3.

should be treated as a female. Is it possible that such a practice was observed when Sanskrit had been a dead language? All these facts, as we have alluded to, are only explicable if Sanskrit is considered to have been a spoken tongue in those days.

On the strength of such evidence, as referred to above, we are almost justified in holding that there was a time in ancient India when Sanskrit had not been only a literary language, but had been as popular as a spoken tongue. It may be asked here, who were the people with whom Sanskrit was a spoken language or as good as a vernacular. The answer is not far to seek. It was admittedly in the traditionally cultured community of the Brahmins, and, to some extent, of the Kshatriyas, that Sanskrit prevailed as a spoken tongue.¹ Sanskrit was once so popular a language that it could be freely spoken by people belonging to the lower status of society. Patañjali has recorded a discourse between a grammarian and a charioteer.¹ In the "Rāmāyana" a demon named Ilvala² is described as capable of speaking Sanskrit. In the dramatical literature of Sanskrit we find that people belonging to the higher status of society could speak Sanskrit, while uneducated people and females had different forms of Prākṛita as their spoken language. This fact also lends colour to the view that Sanskrit, as a spoken language, was in all probability confined to the area of Brahmanic culture, and that certain forms of "Prākṛita" were, on the other hand, current among the uneducated mass. The Sanskrit-speaking Brahmins were, however, acquainted with the dialects of the neighbouring people, as they had many occasions to come in touch with them. Though with them Sanskrit was evidently a spoken language,

¹ एवं कश्चिद्वैयाकरण आह । कोऽस्यारथस्य प्रवेतेति ? सूत आह । आयुषमन्नं प्राजितेति ।
—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ 2. 4. 56.

² "इल्लवः संज्ञितः वदन् ।"

Kātyāyana and Patañjali seem to have been familiar with such Prākṛita forms as 'आणपयति, वद्धति, वृद्धति, गाम्भी, गोष्ठा, etc. Patañjali gives us another valuable information, namely, that it was not only the educated Brāhmins and the acknowledged teachers who had Sanskrit as their spoken tongue, but there was a class of people known as "शिष्टः"² who, with or without a proper knowledge of grammar, were naturally competent to use correct words almost in the same forms in which they are recognised by the grammarians. They were, so to speak, the authority in the use of words, and their applications, though always contrary to the rules of grammar, are accepted by the grammarians without a word of objection. Just as we can freely speak our mother tongue without knowing a syllable of grammar, even so were these "Śiṣṭas" able to speak Sanskrit without having any knowledge of grammar. Now, with these "Śiṣṭas," Sanskrit was undoubtedly a vernacular. Even irregular forms such as "पृषोदर"³ did not fail to receive the approval of Pāṇini simply on the ground of their being frequently used by the so-called 'Śiṣṭas.' From what we have shown above it will appear that Sanskrit was once current as a spoken tongue among the intellectually superior classes of Indian societies.

It has already been stated that Sanskrit, as a spoken language, was confined to the limited area of the cultured community. The uneducated or ordinary people were either naturally unfit or careless so far as the use and utterance of correct Sanskrit forms were

Possibility of corruptions and the grammatical means of demarcation and detection.

¹ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 259 : "भूवादिपाठः प्रातिपदिकाण्यपयत्यादिनिहृत्त्यर्थः" ।

² See Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 174.

³ पृषोदरादीनि यथोपदिष्टानि. Pāṇ., 6.3.109. "यदितर्हि शिष्टा शब्देषु प्रमाणम्..... नूनमस्य देवानुयुद्धः स्वभावो वा योऽयं न चाष्टाध्यायीमधीते ये चात्र विद्विताः शब्दासाय प्रयुङ्क्ते ।"
—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 174.

concerned. It is to such innate unfitness and careless imitations that the author of the *Vākyapadiya*¹ traces the origin of *Apabhraṃśas* which, according to the definition of Sanskrit grammarians, have Sanskrit as their original source. The uneducated people could either understand Sanskrit, or the learned *Brāhmins* while speaking with them, had to converse in *Prākṛita*. Thus, as the cultured *Brāhmins* had to come often in contact with such untutored people in their ordinary affairs of life, there arose consequently a possibility of Sanskrit being blended, to a considerable extent, with those *Prākṛita* dialects or “*Apabhraṃśas*,” as they are called by the Hindu grammarians. As the Aryans had frequent intercourse with the black-skinned non-Aryans, some of whom were even aryanised for their ready adaptability to the Aryan manners and customs, it is not unlikely that some words and expressions of non-Aryan origin had the possibility of being naturalised into the traditionally sacred tongue of the *Brāhmins*. Dr. Garbe² is of opinion that the words “ghora” and “tambala,” as they occur in the *Śrauta Sūtra* of *Āpastamba*, have had their origin respectively in Hindi and Dravidian languages. The dramatic literature shows that different forms of speech are intended to be spoken by persons belonging to different grades of society. What is really indicated by such practice of the poets is that Sanskrit could not be spoken by people in general and that certain forms of *Prākṛita* (*Apabhraṃśas*) were current as vernacular among ordinary people. Even queens of the royal harem are found in the Hindu dramas to speak *Prākṛita*, although they understand Sanskrit as

¹ *Vākyapadiya*. Kār. 1.149—156 “शब्दप्रकृतिरपभंश” इति संयहकारोक्तेः
Puṇyārāja on Kār. 1.149.

² *Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra*—Ed. by Dr. Garbe.

clearly as educated people. Sanskrit had thus come to have a close touch with Apabhraṃśas; and this intimate relation might have possibly terminated in the Sanskritisations of certain Prākṛita forms. The words रणरणक and दोहद are supposed to have crept into Sanskrit from Prākṛita; words such as होरा, पिक, नेम, तामरस, and so on, are considered to be of foreign origin. With the commercial intercourse of India with the Far West, there were, if we are allowed to assume, both exports and imports of words. In his exposition of the Sūtra तेष्वदर्शनाद्विरोधस्य समा विप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् (Mim. 1, III, 8), Kumārila Bhaṭṭa¹ observes that the words यव, बराह, वेतस, etc., are also to be found current in the Mlechha countries only with difference of meanings, *e.g.*, कङ्गु, वायस, जम्बु respectively. He continues further that as words like पिक and नेम have the same meanings in both Sanskrit and "Mlechha," we are entitled to accept the significance with which these words are used among the Mlechchas, attention being always paid to the fact that these meanings are in no way inconsistent with those of the Vedas. Kūmarila states expressly that the meanings of certain words as "loma" and "kūṭa" are to be learnt from low class people as "butchers" and "makers of coins." It is a fact that the Vedic usage is more authoritative than the Mlechcha usage² so far as the meaning of a word is concerned, but there is hardly any reason why we should ignore the Mlechcha usages altogether, even when they happen to be entirely absent in the Vedas. What is really astonishing here is that Kumārila seems to have a knowledge regarding the introduction of foreign elements into Sanskrit. He lays particular stress on the fact that we should not ignore the words used by the Mlechchas

¹ Tantra-Vārttika—on 1.3.8, pp. 145-157 (Ben. Ed.).

² "शास्त्रास्या वा तन्निमित्तत्वात्—Mim. 1, III, 9.

simply on the ground that they are current among non-Brahmins, since words like पञ्चोर्ण¹ and वारवाण meaning "silken cloth" and "armour" respectively are found to have been borrowed from foreign tongues and yet unhesitatingly accepted by the Aryans. Thus, inspite of all attempts that were made to preserve the purity of Sanskrit, a number of foreign words became ingrained into the sacred language.

Kumārila also observes that the Āryans sometimes favoured the practice of borrowing words from other dialects and transforming them into Sanskrit by necessary grammatical alterations. In doing so they were really actuated by the formal resemblance. He refers to the usual practice of Sanskritising certain Dravidian words as चोर, अतर्, पाप्, माल् and वैर् into their corresponding Sanskrit forms चौरः (thief), अतर् (impassable), पापम् (sin), माला (garland) and वैरिः (enemy). Continuing he says that if the Āryans could exercise their liberty of changing the Dravidian words into Sanskrit in so arbitrary a way, one cannot conceive the grotesqueness they would exhibit in transforming or Sanskritising words taken from Persian, Javana, and Roman languages.²

It was, therefore, necessary to take proper and adequate measures to retain the purity and special aspect of the traditionally sacred language. Restrictions were expressly laid down prohibiting a Brāhmin from using corrupted words; a sacrificial priest is held to be liable to expiatory rites,³ if he is found to use incorrect words. This

¹ "पञ्चोर्णं वारवाणादि यच्च तद्धं शस्यत्वम् ।

तैरिवाकथितं नाम तच्च को वेदितुं शक्नोति" — Tantra-Vārttika, p. 160.

तस्मान्न तेषां व्यवहारप्रसिद्धौ दीर्घत्वम् ॥

² "तद्यदा द्राविडादिभाषायामौदृशी स्वच्छन्दकल्पना, तदा पारसीकवर्ण्यवनरीमकादिभाषासु किं विकल्पा किं प्रतिपद्यन्त इति न विद्मः ।" — Tantra-Vārttika, p. 147.

³ "आहिताग्निप्रपश्यन् प्रयुज्य प्रायश्चित्तीयं सारस्वतौनिदिं निर्बपेत्" — Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 8.

necessitated the usherance of grammar. A good many systems of grammar and etymology had thus their origin in an attempt to effect a demarcation between correct and corrupted words. The first and foremost business of Sanskrit grammar, as a science, was to lay down such rules as would enable one to distinguish correct words from incorrect ones. By the expression “शब्दानुशासनम्” Patañjali introduces the immediate purpose that is served by the study of grammar, namely, that a careful study of Sanskrit grammar is calculated to help us in distinguishing correct or recognised forms from Apabhraṃśas.¹ Patañjali tells us further that one correct word has given rise to numerous Apabhraṃśas,² and consequently the number of Apabhraṃśas is much larger than that of correct forms. He, therefore, finds it more convenient and scientific to give expositions of these correct words alone, the knowledge of corrupted forms being indirectly implied by the isolation of correct words. Now, it was the paramount task of the Hindu grammarians to single out the true Sanskrit form “gauḥ” from a number of corruptions like गावी, गोणा, गोता, etc., and set forth rules showing the scientific method (अन्वयव्यतिरेकी) of analysing such forms into radical and formative elements.

Having shewn the view of Patañjali as to the origin of manifold Apabhraṃśas from one correct form, we now pass on to discuss how a correct word (साधुशब्द) could be recognised and singled out from an assemblage of Apabhraṃśas that were current among the uneducated people. Grammar, as has already been pointed out, takes notice of the recognised correct words alone, and does never attempt to enumerate the Apabhraṃśas that are

An explanation as to why “संस्कृत” is so called.

¹ लघ्वीयान् शब्दोपदेशः गरीयानपशब्दोपदेशः । एकैकस्य शब्दस्य बहुव्रीहोऽपभ्रंशाः । गौरिखेतिकसुपदिष्टे मय्यने एतद्भाष्यादयोऽपशब्दा इति ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 5.

² “अनुशिष्यन्तेऽसाधुशब्दो विविच्य ज्ञाप्यन्तेनेनेति शब्दानुशासनम्”—Pradīpodyota.

corruptions of them. The exposition and analysis of correct words, holds Patañjali, indirectly serve to point out the Apabhramśas. The form “गौ” being supported as grammatically correct, it is necessarily implied that forms like “gāvī,” “gonā” and “gotā,” etc., are nothing but corrupted or distorted forms originating from the former under circumstances already alluded to (natural inaptitude to utter the correct Sanskrit words and wrong imitations). The Apabhramśas, as is held by the grammarians, have no independent origin of their own, but have grown from Sanskrit as their common source. The existence of such verbal corruptions presupposes inability to pronounce the correct Sanskrit forms on the part of low class people with whom “Apabhramśas” was as good as their mother-tongue. While Sanskrit was confined as a spoken language to the narrow area of cultured community, the Apabhramśa-Prākṛita became more and more popular and obtained currency among larger number of people. By frequent associations with these popular dialects, the pristine purity of the “Divine tongue” was about to be vitiated. The rapid growth and widespread popularity of the Apabhramśa-Prākṛita were thus threatening to strike at the very root of the Sanskrit language. It was consequently felt extremely necessary (for the sake of keeping the traditionally sacred tongue intact) to devise certain means so as to retain its original character untainted by any mixture with the Apabhramśa elements.

The Nairuktas and Vaiyākaraṇas¹ came forward to analyse the entire structure of language then ‘current, and laid down the principles of both etymology and analytical grammar in accordance with the facts observable in their language. The scientific character

¹ साधुलज्जानविषया शेषा व्याकरणश्रुतिः—Vak. Kār., 1.143.

of the rules formulated by them lies in the fact that they almost made an entire survey of the whole field of language, so that a greater bulk of words in popular usage might come under the cognisance of their principles. While showing the nature of grammatical aphorisms, Patañjali¹ says that in framing rules of grammar the grammarians had had in view both the principles of generalisation and particularisation so that the rules so constructed might apply to the greatest number of words. And as the number of correct words was virtually smaller than that of Apabhraṃśas, the grammarians thought it more rational and convenient to treat of the former; and entirely lost sight of the Apabhraṃśas that grew out of the tongue in which they used to speak. To maintain the special and conspicuous features of their language the etymologists and grammarians had divided their speech into four parts, namely, noun, verb, preposition and particle (नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताः) and suggested, on the scientific method of agreement and difference (अन्वय्यतिरेकौ),² a number of bases and terminations known as “प्रकृतिः” and “प्रत्ययः.” This gave, however, a distinct stamp to their language, because the Apabhraṃśa-Prākṛita, on the ground of their not yielding to such analysis as suggested by the Sanskrit grammarians, were practically excluded from the range of words which were divisible into stems and suffixes as recognised by the grammarians. Such an analytical method, though artificial and fanciful, as Bhartrihari often tells us, practically served a very

¹ किञ्चित् सामान्यविशेषवङ्गवर्णं प्रबन्धं येनाख्येन यत्ने न महती महतः शब्दौघान् प्रतिपद्येरन्, किं पुनस्तत् ? उत्सर्गापवादी—M. bhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6.

² ये शब्दाः नित्यसम्बन्धा विवेकी ज्ञातशक्तयः । अन्वय्यतिरेकाभ्यां तेषामर्थो विभज्यते.—Vāk. Kār, 2.168.

Puṇyārāja has—“विभागो नाम परप्रत्ययनाय कल्पितः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिभेदः” under Kār. 1.145.

important purpose ; for by it was drawn a hard and fast line of demarcation between the current language of the educated community and Apabhram̐śas. Since then by “Apabhram̐śas” are generally meant those forms of words which do not admit of regular division into stems and suffixes recognised by the Sanskrit grammarians, but represent, as we have already pointed out, corruptions, for the origin of which we must look back to correct words (साधुशब्द). By the expression “शास्त्रकृतो योगः”¹ Yāska undoubtedly refers to the grammatical way of forming words by the addition of terminations to radical elements and the conjunction of prepositions with roots and so on. Thus, the grammarians distinguished “साधुशब्द” from “अपशब्द” or “अपभ्रंश” showing the former as capable of being analysed into bases and formative elements. In doing so they made, as it were, a sort of “verbal purification” (शब्दसंस्कार) by which they succeeded in obviating the introduction and amalgamation of Apabhram̐śas with their sacred tongue. The language which had thus received “संस्कार” or regular grammatical analysis at the hands of the “analysers of speech” (Vaiyākaraṇa) came to be known as “संस्कृत” (purified tongue) in later times. Yāska² seems to have been conscious of such “संस्कार” as he uses the word “संस्कारः” in connection with the grammatical analysis of words into stems and terminations. As no such “संस्कारः” or purification of words had possibly been made in the earliest period of the Vedic literature, we fail to notice there such a qualitative term as “संस्कृत”. In the Vedic literature we meet with the general term “Vāk”³ denoting

¹ शास्त्रकृतोयोगः शास्त्रदृष्टः शब्दस्य शब्दान्तरेणयोगः । तदयथा—उपसर्गस्य धातुना, धातोः प्रत्ययेन, प्रत्ययस्य लोपागमवर्णविकारैः ॥—Durga. Nirukta, p. 45.

² यत्र स्वरसंस्कारौ समर्थौ प्रादेशिकेनावृत्तौ स्याताम्—etc., Nirukta, 1.14. p. 108. स्थितानामिव शब्दानामन्वाख्यानं हि संस्क्रिय—quoted by Śripati in his Kāntanta Parīṣiṣṭa.

speech which is sometimes spoken of as a divine creation “दैवीवाक्.” That such grammatical analysis of sentences and words is not of much earlier date is borne out by the “Taittiriya Samhitā” (VI. 4. 7), where it is explicitly stated that speech was not originally divided into parts and that it was Indra who in response to the appeal of the gods first attempted to analyse or break up speech into its significant parts. Thus, we can somehow account for the absence in early literature of the term “संस्कृत” in this particular sense. The terms व्याकरोत्, व्याकृत and व्याकरवनि are to be understood as referring to the grammatical process of analysing speech. Among ancient works, it is in the Rāmāyaṇa¹ that we meet with the term “संस्कृत” exactly in the same sense. In Pāṇini also we miss it and find such word as “भाषा” which is only a general name whereby “spoken language” was denoted. Patañjali uses the word “laukika” instead of संस्कृत. The author of the Vākyapadīya has clearly referred to such “संस्कार” (शब्दसंस्कारहीनो यः,² etc.) and defines Apabhraṃśas as those corrupted forms which have no such verbal refinement (संस्कार). In Daṇḍin we find the term “संस्कृत” as applied to a language (संस्कृतं नाम दैवीवाक्).

The rise of Buddhism, as it was attended with growing popularity of Prākṛita dialects, urged the Hindu grammarians to the analysis of sentences and words in order to save their sacred tongue from being polluted by frequent intercourse with Prākṛit. Thanks to their fruitful labours, the sacred tongue has been preserved intact. But we have only one word to say, namely, that while we speak so highly of the parts played by the Hindu grammarians, we cannot shut our eyes to the undesirable consequence that resulted from such rigidity

¹ Vākyapadīya Kār. 1.149, p. 59.

² धारयन् द्राक्ष्यते कः इत्यस्य संस्कारं वदन् ।

of grammatical systems. Bound by strict rules of grammar, Sanskrit had its further development forcibly checked, and it finally shared the fate of a dead language.

Apabhramśa-Prākri-
ta—their origin as con-
ceived by the Hindu
grammarians—their
expressiveness.

We have already pointed out that the sacred character of the Sanskrit language won for it the glorious designation of “Divine tongue”; and it was truly or falsely believed to be the most original of all tongues. The structural similarity of Sanskrit with other members of the so-called Indo-European family may be explained as accidental, but it must be admitted that the popular dialects of India generally known as the Prākritis had been organically and generically related to Sanskrit. From the numerous definitions that have been suggested of the word “Prākrita” it is quite clear that these dialects, as they were spoken by the uncultured mass, had Sanskrit as their source of origin. The rise of Buddhism gave prominence as well as dignity to such Prākritis, specially to Pāli (the ancient Māgadhi dialect). In contradiction to the orthodox view, Prākrita was held by some as a popular language of independent origin and not necessarily a direct offspring of Sanskrit. The supposition is now gaining ground that the oldest form of Prākrita is not even posterior to the Vedic Sanskrit, but had been current as the spoken language of the mass existing side by side with the Vedic Sanskrit. It is almost a truism that as a spoken language Sanskrit could not transcend the boundary of educated community and evidently a different form of language, say Prākrita, prevailed among people at large. This popular tongue is now identified by some with the oldest form of

¹ प्रकृतिः संस्कृतं तत् आगतम्—Hem Chandra. 8.1.1.

प्रकृतिः संस्कृतं तत्प्रकृतिः ।

प्रकृत्या स्वभावेन सिद्धमिति प्राकृतम् ।

प्राकृतजनानां भाषा प्राकृतम् ।

Prākṛita. What is still more striking is that Sanskrit is held, in opposition to the views of the Hindu grāmmarians, to be a development out of the crude materials supplied by Prākṛita in its oldest forms. Further, Prākṛita continued to be a spoken tongue, even when Sanskrit had ceased to be so; it has behind it a history of its origin and diffusion and does not stand to Sanskrit in the relation of daughter and mother. The short compass of this thesis will not, however, permit us to give here a detailed history of the Prākṛit language and its philological importance. Moreover, the object kept in view in writing these pages has been not so much to deal with comparative philology in its manifold aspects as to point out in brief outline the views of Sanskrit grammarians regarding the problems of Hindu philology. A perusal of the Prākṛita grammars, such as those of Vararuchi, Hem Chandra and others, will convince one beyond any shadow of doubt that Prākṛita in its diversified forms was directly descended from Sanskrit. It was only Vākpati,¹ the author of a well known Prākṛita epic (Gauḍabadhā), who looked upon Prākṛita from a different standpoint. The word 'तद्भव' (evolved from Sanskrit), as applied to a variety of Prākṛita, corroborates the view that Prākṛita has directly originated from Sanskrit. The general term used by the grammarians to denote this class of corrupted dialects is 'अपभ्रंश' or 'अपभ्रंश,' because the characteristic feature of these dialects is that they represent only the perverted or distorted forms of Sanskrit. We have sometimes used in these pages the term "Prākṛita" as equivalent of the so-called Apabhraṃśa on the assumption that in the opinion of Sanskrit grammarians, Prākṛita is only a language of such Apabhraṃśa or corrupted words. We summarise below the views of

¹ Gauḍabadhā, verse 93.

Sanskrit grammarians regarding the origin and expressiveness of such Apabhramśa-Prākṛita. The author of the "Saṁgraha"¹ (a huge grammar in verse, the authorship of which is ascribed to Vyāḍi) holds that the origin of Apabhramśas is to be traced to Sanskrit; they do not form a separate language having independent growth but represent the refined tongue "संस्कृत" in a corrupted form. These mutilations and corruptions of Sanskrit words were given rise to either by natural unfitness or wrong imitations on the part of low class people in pronouncing the correct Sanskrit forms. Imitation, as is well known to all students of comparative philology, played an important part in the formation of language. The untutored people having close intercourse with the cultured community in which Sanskrit was a spoken language, tried to imitate Sanskrit words which they often heard, but could not do so successfully for reasons already mentioned; the inevitable result was that a dialect of perverted forms having their origin in false imitations of Sanskrit had gradually grown up and ultimately obtained widespread popularity among the mass. The expression "अशक्तिजानुकूलम्,"² as it occurs in the Vārttika, is explained by Patañjali as referring to the natural incompetence for exact imitations which is generally displayed by females and low class people. He observes that a female uses the form "लृतक" on account of her physical inability to pronounce the correct form "ऋतक".² We have already pointed out that Patañjali strongly believes that forms like "gāvi, goṇā, gotā," etc., have all grown as corruptions from the Sanskrit form "gauh"; he also takes notice of such Prākṛita verbal forms

¹ "शब्दप्रकृतिरपभ्रंशः" इति संग्रहकारोक्तिः अपभ्रंशो नाम न कश्चित् स्वतन्त्रो विद्यते । सर्वस्य ह्यपभ्रंशस्य साधुरेव प्रकृतिः—Punyarāja under Kār. 7. 149 (Vākyapadīya).

² अशक्त्या कथाचिद्वाङ्मया ऋतक इति प्रयोक्तव्ये लृतक इति प्रयुक्तम्—M. Bhāṣhya, Vol. I, p. 19.

as आणपयति, वद्धति, वद्धति, which have possibly evolved from such corresponding Sanskrit forms as आआपयति, वर्तते, and वर्द्धते. Kātyāyāna¹ says that the enumeration of roots like “भू,” etc., serves to render such Prākṛita verbal forms as आणपयति, etc., incorrect. Many causes were, however, in operation to bring about such corruptions of speech. We have already referred to physical defect, idleness, carelessness, and economisation of labour, as causes that were at work in transforming a language to such a degraded form. Some Sanskrit words which might have been easily pronounced and properly imitated are to be found in Prākṛita without any formal distortions. These are instances of so-called “तत्सम” class of Prākṛita. Some again, on the other hand, have undergone such a high degree of corruption that they baffle all attempts to find out the original Sanskrit forms of which they are wrong imitations. These belong to the “देशी” class of Prākṛita.

As regards the expressiveness of these Apabhraṁśas, Patañjali² says that though meanings are equally expressed by correct and incorrect words (Apabhraṁśas), it is the use of correct words alone that is attended with religious merits. In the opinion of Bhartrihari³ Apabhraṁśas are not significant by themselves, but their apparent expressiveness depends on the inference of correct forms. What he likes to impress is, that to a learned Brahmin who has Sanskrit as his mother tongue, an Apabhraṁśa word may convey the intended sense only by reminding him of the correct Sanskrit form of which it is a corruption. He continues further that if the Apabhraṁśas were as directly significant as ‘साधुशब्द’⁴s, they might have been used as synonyms of correct words by lexicographers. But this is far from being the actual state of

¹ भूवादिपाठः प्रातिपदिकाणपयत्यादिनिवृत्त्यर्थः 12. M. Bhāṣhy., Vol. I, p. 259.

² समानायामर्थावगतौ शब्देनापशब्दं न, etc., M. Bhāṣhya, Vol. I, p. 8.

³ ते साधुशब्दगुणानेन प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतवः—Vākyapadīya. Kar., 1. 151, p. 59.

things. It is to be, however, taken into account that words like *gāvi*, *goṇā*, etc., are not absolutely incorrect in form, since they are found to be correct when used in a sense other than that of "cow." Having shown the importance and indispensability of the principles of grammar for the purpose of discriminating correct words from incorrect words, the *Mīmāṃsakas* have at last taken up the question as to how meanings are denoted by corrupted forms. Consistently with the grammarians, they¹ attribute the origin of verbal corruptions to the natural inability of pronouncing the correct Sanskrit forms, and hold that correct words are alone directly expressive of sense. The denotations that are found to be associated with corrupted words are essentially indirect and not at all innate as in the case of correct Sanskrit words. The corrupted forms or *Apabhraṃśas* acquire their denotative potency only by their similarity with corresponding Sanskrit words. Gaṅgeśa² has discussed this point with more thoroughness. In conformity with the usual method of the Hindu philosophers, he first puts the arguments in support of the direct expressiveness of the *Apabhraṃśas*. The corrupted words have expressiveness (*शक्ति*), as meanings are regularly denoted by them. There is no justification for holding them to be indicative, as opposed to denotative, since there is no inconsistency with their primary significance. It is not plausible that they (*Apabhraṃśas*) appear to be significant only by recalling the correct forms which are alone denotative, because uneducated people, thoroughly unacquainted with Sanskrit, are also found to derive meanings from such *Apabhraṃśas*. As there is no logical ground, we are not

¹ तदशक्तितदनुपपत्तात्, *Mīm. Sūtra*. 1.3.28.

² See *Tattva Chintāmaṇi*, *Śabda Klapā*, p. 627. Com. 'ते साधुष्वनुमानेन प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतवः'—*Vākyapadiya*. Kār. 1. 151, and 'असाधुष्वनुमानेन वाचकः कश्चिदिच्छते', —*Vāk.*, 3.30, p. 110.

allowed to assume that their significance is due to their imposed expressiveness. In this way Gaṅgeśa puts forward a series of arguments which are finally rejected by him. In conclusion he says that though in ordinary usage both correct and corrupted words seem to be equally expressive of sense, it is more logical to impose expressiveness upon correct words alone, which are, according to the Naiyāyikas, related to meanings by "Sāṅketa" (volition of God, as expressed in these terms—"Let this word be denotative of this sense"). As it involves nothing but redundancy to hold both correct and corrupted forms equally expressive of sense, Gaṅgeśa takes 'साधुशब्द' to be expressive (शक्त), and says that the apparent expressiveness or denotative potency of corrupted words is only imposed or falsely attributed ("अपस्व'शे शक्तत्वभ्रमः।").

PART II.

SEMANTICS.

In this part of my thesis I propose to deal with the science of meaning, as understood by the Hindu philosophers and grammarians. The studies in the science of meaning are now receiving more and more encouragement from students of comparative philology, and attempts have already been made to systematise the materials furnished by an accurate observation of the psychological aspects of language in such a way as to constitute a scientific branch of knowledge essentially connected with philology as such. We have at the very beginning pointed out that studies in the science of meaning or Semasiology, as it is often called, did not fail to receive recognition at the hands of Indian etymologists and grammarians, and that their intellectual labours in this particular line have been attended with conspicuous success.

As an organism, language has both physical and psychological aspects. It has sound for its body, and thought for its soul, or, in other words, the relation between the body and the soul is the same as between sound and concept. Thoughts that rise in our mind find audible expression through sounds produced by vocal organs. All sounds do not, however, constitute words, but sounds expressive of sense¹ are what are popularly known as words. Pātañjali rightly observes that the expression of thought is the sole purpose that is served by the use of word;² and if there is no idea to be communicated to

¹ प्रतीतपदार्थं लोके ध्वनिःशब्द इत्युच्यते ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I., p. i.

² अर्थगत्यर्थः शब्दप्रयोगः । अर्थं संप्रत्याययिष्यामीति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते—M. Bhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 15.

others, no necessity is felt within to exercise the vocal apparatus. There is, therefore, an undercurrent of thoughts running throughout the entire structure of language. Semantics or the science of meaning deals with this logical or psychological aspect (as opposed to the formal or phonological aspect) of language, and shows, among other things, how particular meanings are denoted by particular words, or, how things are named, and how meanings are widened and specialised in the course of diffusion of language. The etymologists in their process of derivation have given much prominence to the logical side of language. Yāska states expressly that in deriving words, *i.e.*, in determining their accent, and analysing them into stems and suffixes, particular attention should be given to their meanings and not to their forms alone. Grammar, as it is based on the physical analysis of words, is more concerned with the formal side, whereas etymology, as it dissolves words in accordance with their meanings, is particularly concerned with the psychological background of language. Though it is often regarded as a complement of grammar, the science of etymology has an independent character as well. A distinction is, however, made by Durga¹ when he says that grammar lays down principles which apply only to the external side, while etymology attempts to bring out the internal aspect, *i.e.*, the meaning of words.

Speech has already been said to be an embodiment of internal consciousness. Thoughts clothe themselves with significant sounds before they are communicated to others. There is, therefore, a constant association of sense with word. What Bhartrihari² really means by the expression 'शब्दानां यतश्चित्तित्वम्' is that words by their very nature have

¹ तच्चात् स्वतन्त्रमेवेदं विद्यास्थानमर्थनिर्वचनम्, व्याकरणं तु लक्षणप्रधानमिति विशेषः—
Nirukta. 15, p. 117.

² Vākyapadiya, Kār. 1.6, p. 4.

the potency of denoting ideas which is never exhausted, but remains almost inherent in them. The meaning of a word is, says Bhartrihari,¹ what is denoted whenever that word is uttered. The utterance of the sound "gauḥ" at once produces the cognition of a being having dewlap, hump, hoofs and horns. It may be asked if there is anything in the sound so uttered which gives rise to the idea of such an individual, and, if so, what is the relation in which sound stands to the sense conveyed by it. Phonology which treats of sound and its physical production fails to suggest any adequate answer, which, then, must be sought elsewhere. Some² hold that sound and sense are essentially the same. We like to add here a note of warning against a possible misconception so far as this particular view is concerned. One may argue that, if word and the object denoted by it were identical, then the utterance of the sound "Agni" would have been practically attended with burning sensation. We have our answer ready. It is evidently from the standpoint of non-dualism that sound and concept, viewed as two aspects of one and the same thing, *i.e.*, supreme soul,³ are to be taken as identical. Some school of philosophy explains this relationship as innate or natural. Some, again, are of opinion that the relation between sound and concept is the same as exists between "cause and effect,"⁴ "manifestor and manifested" and so on. Thus, there are various standpoints from which this relation might be viewed. We proceed, however, to show them in a systematic way.

¹ यस्मिंस्तुञ्जरिते शब्दे यदा बोध्यः प्रतीयते । तमाहुरयं तद्वत्वा नान्यदर्थं स्यात्त्वन्नम् ।

² अर्थो नाप्रविभक्ततत्त्वम् and एकस्यैवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावग्रथकस्थितौ—Vākyapadiya, 2, 329.

³ औपचितिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सत्त्वम् --Mim. Sūtra. 1.1.5, and "नित्यो सत्यवतामर्थो रमि-सत्त्वम्."—Mahābhāṣya, 1, p. 7.

⁴ शब्दः कारणमर्थं स्यात् सङ्घितेनोपजन्यते । तथा च बुद्धिविषयादर्थोऽशब्दः प्रतीयते ॥ Vākyapadiya, 3, 32, and अनादिरर्थः शब्दानां सत्त्वस्यो योग्यता तथा । 3, 29.

It was, however, a great problem to the Hindu philosophers to ascertain the exact relation between the sign and the object signified. We know that this fundamental problem of linguistic science also presented itself to the ancient Greek thinkers. The "Śruti," to begin with, speaks of this relation as inseparable, that is to say, words are associated with their sense by inseparable connections. Thus, whenever a particular word is uttered, a particular idea is immediately and invariably conveyed by it; we cannot think of any object without being reminded of the denotative word. It must be, however, taken into consideration that 'ग', 'औ', and 'विसर्ग' by which the sound "gauḥ" ¹ is usually represented, cannot, when pronounced separately or at intervals, give rise to the idea of a "cow," because it is the entire composite word and not its constituents that is only capable of expressing the intended sense. But to hold this relation to be inseparable does not satisfactorily solve the problem as to why some other words instead of "gauḥ" are not found to have inseparable connection with the intended sense. A few words are only needed to explain the antecedence of ideas to words. Words, as we have already said, are used with the intention of expressing sense; and if there is no idea beforehand, no necessity is felt to exercise the vocal organs. The sole object of using words is to give audible expression to mental ideas, and consequently the utterance of sound presupposes the existence of thoughts. In short, thinking is followed by speaking. The psychophysiological process, already referred to in connection with the manifestation of internal wind in the audible

Antecedence of ideas
to words.

ज्ञानं प्रयोक्तुर्वाङ्मोऽर्थः स्वरूपं च प्रतीयते ॥

शब्देरुच्चरितेनैषां सम्बन्धः समवस्थितः ॥"—Vākyapadiya, 3. 1, p. 96.

"प्रयोगिणाभिज्वलितैः शब्दैस्त्रितयमुपगम्यते ।

आत्मीयं रूपमयं फलसाधनः प्रयोक्तुरभिप्रायश्च"—Helārāja.

form of Vāk, is calculated to lend support to the view that meanings are ascertained by mind before they find expression in language. As to how meanings are associated with sounds, we must say that it is by reason of natural relation (that exists between a particular word and its significance), as opposed to the conventional one, that a word denotes a particular object. Bhartrihari finds in such relation the real cause why objects are invariably denoted by their corresponding words. In showing the existence and nature of such natural or innate relationship, he¹ says that three things are to be taken into consideration, *viz.*, the word, the object to be denoted, and the intention of the speaker; and continues further that words may be said to have hardly any association with the sense unless some such reciprocal but natural (स्वाभाविक) relation is comprehended among these three factors of verbal cognition. He uses the expression 'सम्बन्धः समवस्थितः' with the import that this connection exists by nature, and is not at all fixed by human convention. Thus, we see that Bhartrihari has agreement with Heracleitus so far as the relation between sound and concept is concerned. The Naiyāyikas are of opinion that this relation represents the volition of God (सङ्केत), while Jaimini and Patañjali explain it as permanent or eternal.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣhika views on the relation between words and concepts.—The doctrine of divine convention.

An attempt will now be made to explain the association between the symbol and the object symbolised from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣhika standpoints. We say "association" and not particularly "relation," because the Naiyāyikas do not recognise, as we shall see later on, any relation, whether conjunction' (संयोग)¹ or inherence (समवाय), existing between a word and its significance. It is argued by the Vaiśeṣhikas that Śabda,

¹ "गुणत्वात्"—Vaiśeṣhika Sūtra, 7.2.14.

as it is a quality of ether, cannot logically be supposed to have conjunction (संयोग) with the object denoted, since it is universally admitted that a quality cannot form the substratum of another quality, *i.e.*, a quality cannot possess another quality (गुणैर्गुणाः—Vai. 7.1.15). It is substance alone where qualities inhere, but qualities themselves are totally devoid of qualities. Again, as no action takes place in the way in which meanings are denoted by words, they cannot be said to have conjunction between them; nor can there be any such relation as conjunction between a term and its significance, as we often say “It is no more in existence” and “It will not be.”¹ The obvious reason is that in a sentence like “There is no pot,” we cannot conceive of any conjunction between the word and its meaning which is non-existent. It is further argued that the relation, namely, inherence (समवाय) cannot possibly exist between them. From these arguments advanced by the Vaiśeṣhikas it is almost established that there is neither conjunction nor inherence between a word and its significance. As there is no possibility of having either of the two forms of relations (संयोग and समवाय), we are almost forced to admit that words and the objects denoted are not related to each other (शब्दार्थावसम्बन्धौ, Vai., 7.2.19). But it is against common experience.² If there was entire absence of relation whatsoever between the sign and the object signified, the word ‘घटः’ for instance, might have denoted some other object than ‘pot.’ The sense, as we have repeatedly stated, is always found to be connected with word. Patañjali says that words are used for the obvious purpose of denoting objects and communicating one’s

¹ “असतिनास्तीति च प्रयोगात्”—Vaiśeṣhika Sūtra, 7.2.17.

² “‘अस्यायं’ वाचको वाच्य इति षष्ठ्या प्रतीयते । योगः शब्दार्थयोस्तत्त्वमयतो व्यपदिश्यते ।”—Vākya, 3. 3, p. 99, and “सति प्रत्ययहेतुत्वे सम्बन्ध उपपद्यते । शब्दस्यार्थं यतस्तत्र सम्बन्धोऽस्तीति गम्यते,—Vākya, 3. 37, and “शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानादप्रतिषेधः—Nyāya Sūtra, 2.1.54.

ideas to others. It is therefore asked,¹ if there is entire absence of relation, how, then, is it possible for words to be, as a rule, denotative of sense? The author now sets forth his conclusion in the aphorism “सामयिकः शब्दादर्थप्रत्ययः” (Vai., 7.2.21), which maintains that the cognition of sense from a word is due to ‘Sañketa’ or convention. The authority of such conventions is attributed to God. A word virtually expresses that sense alone which was assigned to it by divine convention. This ‘Sañketa’ or ‘will of God’ is the connection that exists between a word and the object denoted by it. Thus, when both conjunction and inherence were found inconsistent, the Vaiśeṣikas had no other alternative than to look upon the ‘will of God’ as the potential factor that connects words with their respective meanings. This ‘volition on the part of God’ is what represents the relation as such and is the real denotating potency of words (शक्ति). Gotama has also arrived at the same conclusion.² He holds that the connection between sound and concept is purely conventional, and not innate or natural; and argues that if it were natural (as maintained by the grammarians), then the same sound might have been used by different races of mankind in the same sense³, and, consequently, there would have been no difference of languages at all. The word “gauḥ,” according to this view, is so fashioned or made potential by the volition of God (Sañketa) as to denote a being having dewlap, hump, hoofs and horns. The reason why some other words, as “ghaṭa,” are not found to be denotative of an individual as “cow” is that there is no

¹ ननु यदि न संयोगो न वा समवायः शब्दार्थयोस्तर्हि केन सम्बन्धेन शब्दो नियतमर्थं प्रतिपादयतीत्यत आह (सामयिकः शब्दादर्थप्रत्ययः).—Vai. Upaskāra.

² “न सामयिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसंप्रत्ययस्य”—Nyāya Sūtra, 2. 2. 55.

³ “जातिविशेषे चानियमात्”—Nyāya Sūtra, 2. 2. 56. “सामयिकः शब्दादर्थसंप्रत्ययो न स्वाभाविकः । कृष्यादिके च्छानां यथाकामं शब्दविनियोगोऽर्थप्रत्यायनाय प्रवर्तते ।—Vātsāyana Bhāṣya.

such convention (शक्ति) in the word “ghaṭa” whereby it can necessarily produce the cognition of a cow. It is to be particularly remembered here that the convention (Sāṅketa), as conceived by the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, is not exactly the same as what was understood by Demokritus and Aristotle, because it (Sāṅketa) does not depend on popular usage or human will, but represents the volition of God. The greater bulk of words seems to have retained their original significance, only a few of them having undergone partial changes in meaning. The original meanings have either been widened or narrowed, but have nowhere been entirely lost. If man is supposed to have been the author of such conventional relations, then we will necessarily have to admit that words, meaningless by themselves, are only rendered significant by popular usages, and that the meanings whimsically assigned to them by an imaginary body of men in the most primitive state of human society have been still current among us. To the Hindu philosophers such a view is not at all plausible and carries almost no weight. That is why the Vaiśeṣikas had not conceived of any human potency so far as the relation of sound with concept is concerned, but they had unhesitatingly spoken of divine interference as what regulates the phenomenon. This convention (Sāṅketa), they believe, was expressed by God in the following terms: “Let this word be denotative of this sense.” The convention or “Sāṅketa” may be divided into two distinct classes,¹ namely, “Ājānika,” *i.e.*, not of human origin, *viz.*, current from eternity, and “Ādhunika,” *i.e.*, conventions adopted by modern authors. The primary significance of word (known as “Śakti”) comes under the category of “Ājānika” while technical terms with their

¹ “आजानिकसाधुनिकः सङ्गो लो द्विविधो भवतः ।

नित्य आजानिकस्तत्र या शक्तिरिति गीयते ॥

कदाचित्कस्वादुनिकः शास्त्रकारादिभिः कृतः” ॥—Vākyapadīya.

specialised sense such as "guṇa," "vṛddhi," etc. (as in grammar), are examples of "Ādhunika Saṅketa." It is almost needless to mention that the Naiyāyikas held almost the same view with the Vaiśeṣikas so far as the origin of language and the relation of words to their meanings were concerned. Judged from the standpoint of linguistic science, and particularly Semantics, the fundamental point of difference between these two allied schools of philosophy is that the Naiyāyikas made room for "word" in their category of Pramāṇas (instruments of valid knowledge), while the Vaiśeṣikas¹ included it (śabda) within that of inference ("एतेन शब्दं व्याख्यातम्," Vai. 10. 2. 3).

Mīmāṃsā doctrine—
eternity of both sound
and its relation with
sense.

Having taken a brief survey of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views regarding the conventional nature of relationship existing between words and their meanings, we now pass to the Mīmāṃsā doctrine as expounded by Jaimini. Reference has already been made to the Mīmāṃsā theory which holds sound to be eternal. According to this tenet, sound is not really produced by vocal organs and is not liable to disappearance just after the utterance. But what actually takes place is that the operations of vocal organs only serve to manifest (as opposed to production) the sound that is ever existent. It was quite in keeping with the reverence and indisputable authority which were attributed to the Vedas, whereupon stands the entire fabric of 'Dharma' and 'Brahma,' that an orthodox philosopher like Jaimini would try to establish the relation between words and their meanings as eternally fixed. It was evidently to maintain the unquestionable trustworthiness of Vedic injunctions, as Kumārila has expressly stated, that the Mīmāṃsakas were compelled

¹ "शब्दोपमानयोर्नैव पृथक् प्रामाण्यमिच्छते ।

अनुमानगतार्थत्वादिति वैशेषिकं मतम् ॥ Bhāṣāpariccheda.

to ascribe eternality to both words and their relations to meanings. The view of the author of 'Saṅgraha,' as quoted by Puṇyārāja,¹ is that there is no author of the relation that exists between words (both Vedic and popular) and the objects denoted by them.

The grammarians went a step further and tried to establish that words, their meanings, and the relation between them are not conventional or caused, but permanently fixed, *i.e.*, eternal (सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे).

Views of the grammarians—words, their meanings and the relation are all held to be eternal.

Patañjali has shown the eternity or permanent character of word by means of a well chosen example. A man² who stands in need of a pot usually goes to the house of a potter and asks him to make one for his use. But a person who likes to use certain words does not necessarily approach a grammarian and request him to create words for his application. It is intended to imply that words are not caused or created like ordinary material entities, but appear to be self-existent. He also states clearly that the relation of words with the objects denoted by them is permanently fixed and not at all conventional (नित्यो ह्यर्थवतामर्थैरभिसम्बन्धः). Kālidāsa also speaks of this relation as permanent in the opening verse of his Raghuvamśam (वागर्थविवसंपृक्तौ). The author of the Vākya-padīya³ says that the relation of a word with its significance is as without beginning and permanent as the operations of sense-organs in their respective spheres. This relation has been explained in various terms: 'denotative and denoted' (वाच्यवाचकः); manifestor and manifested (प्रकाश

¹ सम्बन्धस्य न कर्तास्ति शब्दानां लोकवेदयोः—

² Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 7.—नतद्वच्छब्दान् प्रयोक्त्यभाषो वैयाकरणकुलं गत्वाहकुरु-
शब्दान् प्रयोचे इति ।

³ इन्द्रियाणां स्वविषयेष्वनादिर्योग्यता यथा ।

अनादिरहः शब्दानां सम्बन्धो योग्यता तथा—Vāk. 3. Kār. 21.

प्रकाशकः); 'expressive and expressed'; 'Cause and effect' (कार्यकारण) and so on. Bhartrihari goes so far as to assert that the relation in which proper names (as 'Dittha'¹) and technical terms (as 'Vṛddhi') stand to their restricted or specialised sense is also permanently fixed. Thus, we see that the existence of relation between words and their meanings is almost unquestionable. What is suggested by saying "this is the meaning of this word" is that sound and concept are related to each other as denotative and denoted. This constant and invariable association of sense with sound points to the possibility of their being connected by some intimate relationship; this connection, whether conventional or permanent, appears to be so close and innate that we are apt to identify words with their meanings and hold them as if they were mutually convertible ('योऽयं शब्दः सोऽयमर्थः'). It is finally stated that words and their meanings, as they represent only external and internal aspects of one and the same thing (चैतन्यम्), are essentially inseparable from one another.² It will undoubtedly be a strange thing for modern philologists to follow how the linguistic and grammatical speculations of the Indian thinkers are brought into close touch with the subtle questions of metaphysics.

Before bringing this topic to a close we like to recapitulate what we said in connection with the origin of words and their relation to meanings. The Naiyāyikas realised the momentary character of words, as they are subject to both production and disappearance, and consequently they declared them to be caused or created (कार्य), as opposed to natural or permanent. The association of sense with the sign is explained as a matter of divine convention (Saṅketa). Almost the same view seems to have been held

¹ नित्य एव तु सम्बन्धोऽडित्यादिषु गवादिवत्—Vāk. 2. 369.

² पक्षेवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावयवकस्मिन्तौ—Vāk., 2. Kār., 32, p. 82.

by Aristotle with this distinction that he made this convention entirely dependent on popular usage, while the Naiyāyikas showed the nicety and extravagant character of their reasoning capacity by introducing the will of God as what determines the real expressiveness of words. Moreover, Aristotle unfortunately failed to distinguish concept from word and held them to be mutually convertible. The Mīmāṃsā doctrine regarding the eternity of sound and its connection with sense, though exposed to criticisms was, as we know, almost a necessity for the sake of maintaining the unquestionable trustworthiness of the Vedas. In formulating the doctrine of 'Sphoṭa' the grammarians have evidently given a distinct stamp to their psychological conception of Vāk. They decided in favour of the natural origin of speech, and tried to show, like Heracleitus, the permanent relationship between word and thought. They were not satisfied with the realisation of so subtle a phenomenon as 'Sphoṭa,' but ascribed expressiveness entirely to it.

In considering sound and concept, the theory of 'Nāma-Rūpa' naturally presents itself before us. In the Vedic literature we meet with such expressions as 'नामरूपे व्याकरोत्,' which undoubtedly refers to the division of complex world into names and forms. Koṇḍabhaṭṭa¹ also explains it from the standpoint of cosmogony and speaks of two-fold creation : creation of names and creation of forms or objects. For every object or conception there is a corresponding name. We have already alluded to the Vedic hymn which informs us that the extent or range of speech is as extensive as the manifestations of all-pervading Brahman. Nāman is the body of which Rūpa is the soul. Sound and sense represent the very same relation in which body stands to

¹ " नामरूपे व्याकरोति " इति श्रुतिप्रसिद्धादधीष्टः—on Sphoṭa. under Kār. 72.

soul, or, in other words, Nāman (name) and Rūpa (object) are exactly the same as word and concept. The formal and psychological aspects of language are thus represented by Nāman and Rūpa. How intimately they are related to each other is clearly shown by the cosmogonic hymn which tells us that God created the earth after pronouncing the corresponding denotative term 'Bhū.' According to the Śruti¹ quoted by Punyarāja, 'Nāman' and 'Rūpa' were held by some to be inseparably connected, while others had early made a distinction between them. In the opinion of the Buddhist philosophers 'Sadda-paññatti' (names) and 'Attha-paññatti' (ideas) are relative, the latter being generally made known by the former. The relativity of these two forms of 'Paññatti' reminds a grammarian of the Vāchya-Vāchaka' (denotative and denoted) relation that exists between word and concept.

Having shown the constant association of sense with sound we now proceed to deal briefly with the question as to how meanings are usually comprehended from word. The cognition of the denotating power of words

Various means of comprehending the denotating power of words.

(शक्ति) is generally dependent on popular usage, but there are other means also which help us in determining the significance of words. They are enumerated as follows²:—
 (1) Grammar (the meanings of roots, stems and terminations are usually determined by grammatical analysis);
 (2) comparison (as the meaning of such term as 'gavaya,' gayal, is understood from the knowledge of its similarity with 'gau'); (3) lexicon; (4) testimony (as the meaning of the word 'Pika' is grasped from the statement of

¹ नामिदं रूपत्वेन च ह्यनुरूपं रूपं चेदं नाममावेनतस्य । एकतदेकसविभक्तं विभेजुः प्राग्वान्ये-
 नेदरूपं वदन्ति —quoted under Kār., 1. 12, p. 7.

² शब्दबोधं व्याकरणोपमानशब्दात् कोषावकाशाद् व्यवहारतश्च ।

वाक्यस्य शेषाद् विवृतेर्बदन्ति सामान्यतः सिद्धपदसंज्ञाः ॥—quoted by Jagadīśa.

trustworthy persons); (5) common usage (as it refers to the way in which children first acquaint themselves with the meanings of words they hear round them); (6) context; (7) explication of a word by its synonyms); (8) association with words of known significance. It happens very frequently that the meaning of a word, though unknown, might be well understood either from the context or its association with words of known import. Bhartrihari¹ states emphatically that meanings are not only known from words alone, but there are other instruments also whereby they may be ascertained. These are as follows: (1) sentence (sometimes meanings are understood from the import तात्पर्य of a sentence); (2) context (if one at the time of dinner asks for 'Saindhaba,' which means both salt and horse, we can readily understand that he wants salt and not a horse); (3) sense; (4) propriety; (5) place; (6) time. When a word having several meanings is used in a sentence, there arises some doubt as to what particular significance is to be taken. In such cases, Bhartrihari² tells us, we should be particularly careful of the following conditions: connection, separation, association, hostility, sense, context, mark, and proximity with other words, etc. The Naiyāyikas have met with a peculiar difficulty in finding out the real conventional meaning of a word when it expresses more than one meaning. To them, as we have already shown, a word has its denotation fixed by convention (Saṅketa) and consequently there arises difficulty as to single out from a multiplicity of meanings one that is really conventional. There are two courses open to us; we may either take one meaning as primary or conventional (शक्ति) and consider the rest as of secondary importance, or look upon all meanings as equally conventional. The Naiyāyikas accepted the second

Vāṅpad, 2. Kār., 316, p. 212.—वाक्यात् प्रकरणादर्थोदीचिव्याद्देशकालतः

Vākyapadīya, 2 Kār., 317, p. 214.—संयोगो विप्रयोगश्च, etc.,

alternative and were consequently compelled to recognise multitude of conventions (शक्ति) in a word like 'हरि,' which has got more than a dozen meanings.¹ Mammāṭa seems to have decided in favour of the first view, for he holds that a word, though it has several meanings, becomes really expressive (वाचक) of one significance alone by means of connection, separation, etc., as shown by Bhartrihari, and the other meanings, apart from the conventional one, are known by suggestion (व्यञ्जना). Thus, according to Mammāṭa, the denotation (शक्ति) of the word 'Hari,' in an expression like 'Hari with conch and disc,' is restricted to 'Vishṇu' on account of his natural association with conch and disc, and other meanings such as air, moon, lion, snake, etc., are not directly expressed but suggested. This is an instance of verbal suggestion or suggestion implied by denotation. It must be, however, remembered that the denotative sense (वाच्यार्थ) is the same to one and all, but the suggestive one (व्यङ्ग्य) varies in accordance with the desire of the speaker, the person spoken to, time, place, etc.; as, for instance, the suggested meanings of the expression 'The sun is setting' are different, according as the speaker is a king, thief, lover, and labourer, etc. We have only a word to say with regard to the multiplicity of meanings. What is really implied by a word having manifold meanings is the laxity of conventional restrictions. Convention in connecting an object with a particular name indirectly serves to distinguish it from other objects that have different designations. But this exclusive relation is relaxed to some extent, the moment a word begins to acquire new meanings. Again, a word does not acquire manifold meanings all at a time; the multiplicity of meanings represent different stages of intellectual development. Many causes, such as analogy, metaphor

¹ यमानिनेन्द्रचन्द्राकविशुद्धिंशंशुबाजिषु । शुकादिकपिमेकेषु हारेर्नाकपिलेविषु

and expansion of knowledge, were in operations to assign new meanings to a word. Sanskrit language is replete with words of manifold significance.

‘Pramā’ means correct or true knowledge, and the instruments whereby such knowledge is usually attained are known as ‘Pramāṇas.’ There are therefore, as many ‘Pramāṇas,’ as there are means of obtaining trustworthy or consistent knowledge. Know-

Word as an independent source of valid knowledge—and the method of deriving verbal cognition (वाचबोध):—

ledge is broadly divided into two kinds—as resulting from memory and experience. But the Mīmāṃsakas define ‘Pramāṇas,’ as the means of acquiring truth previously unknown (अनधिगतार्थगन्तृत्वम्), and, if it is exactly so, memory, as dependent on previous experience, has no claim to be included within the categories of Pramāṇa. There is, therefore, diversity of views regarding the independent character of memory as an instrument of attaining truth. There arose a great controversy among the Hindu philosophers as to the exact number of Pramāṇas; and the result has been that each system of Indian philosophy has got its particular number of Pramāṇas.

The experiential knowledge, however, admits of four varieties, namely, perception, inference, analogy and verbal, the rest being reducible to one of these four groups. We shall now attempt to show how consistent knowledge is generally derived from these different sources and how verbal cognition differs in essential features from both perception and inference. When we find a flower, or to use the philosophical expression, when a real entity as flower comes in contact with our visual organs, an idea of the object is at once presented before our mind (इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्) and we are said to have certain knowledge of the flower thus seen. The knowledge thus derived is popularly

known as perceptive (प्रत्यक्षज्ञानम्). The Vedāntists¹ hold that in the production of perceptive knowledge 'Antakarana' (internal sensation) passes through the doors of sense-organs to the object itself and assumes, though intellectually, the particular form of the object perceived. Again, on the observation of smoke in some part of a hill, the cognition as to the existence of fire, though practically unseen, is produced from previous cognition of the constant accompaniment or invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) of smoke with fire. It should be stated here that the knowledge of such 'Vyāpti' is the result of previous experience. This cognition about the existence of fire is called inferential knowledge as opposed to perception. In the same way, when we hear one uttering the expression 'Lotus is blue,' we at once understand, no matter whether the object (lotus) is present before us or not, the speaker's idea as embodied in his utterance (non-difference or identity of the lotus from something that is blue), that is, the quality of being blue is attributed to the lotus, or lotus forms the substratum wherein the quality of blueness inheres. Now, this cognition with regard to the blueness of lotus, as directly obtained from the words 'blue' and 'lotus' having mutual expectancy, proximity and capability, etc., is different from both perceptive and inferential knowledge² as shown above. This knowledge, as it follows from words and their logical relations with one another, is known to be verbal (शब्दज्ञानम्). As an independent source of knowledge, word is thus included by the Naiyāyikas in

¹ तेजसमस्तःकरणमपि चक्षुरादिद्वारा निर्गम्य घटादिविषयदेशंगलाघटादिविषयाकारेण परिणमते—Vedānta-Paribhāṣhā, 1, p. 21.

² साक्षाद्दर्शवोधस्तदर्थान्वयगोचरः ।

सोऽयं नियन्त्रिताश्लेषप्रत्यक्षं न चानुमा ॥—Śabdasaktiprakāśikā, Kār 2.

their classification of Pramāṇas. The renowned founder of the 'Navya-Nyāya,' who has devoted a special chapter to establish the authoritativeness¹ of verbal knowledge, holds that words are to be regarded as instruments of obtaining valid knowledge on the ground that meanings are derived from them, or more properly, from their correlations. The Buddhist philosophers have, however, denied to word such an authoritative character. The Vaiśeṣhika school, though allied to the Nyāya system of thought in many respects, did not make any room for 'Śabda' in its conception of Pramāṇas, but decided in favour of its inclusion within the scope of inference (एतेन शब्दं व्याख्यातम्—Vai. Sūtra, 9.2.3). But Gaṅgeśa had his arguments ready to repudiate these adverse views and finally established the authoritativeness of word (शब्दप्रामाण्यम्).

Having shown 'Śabda' as constituting an independent source of knowledge by itself, we now proceed to see how the so-called 'verbal cognition' is actually obtained. At the very outset it should be remembered that verbal knowledge or 'Śābdabodha' does not really follow from a single word. Jagadīśa² draws our attention to the fact that verbal knowledge is produced by words only when they are related to one another in such a way as to constitute a completely significant sentence. The reason why Jagadīśa so urges is that the sentence alone, and not its constituent parts, is the logically significant unit of speech. According to the theory of 'Sphoṭa' as already explained, a word has no independent existence apart from the sentence which is an indivisible whole (अखण्ड). But Patañjali observes that a word is sometimes found to be

¹ "प्रयोगहेतुभूतार्थतत्त्वज्ञानजन्यः शब्दः प्रामाण्यम्"—Tattva Chintāmaṇi, Śabda Khaṇḍa, p. 1.

² वाक्यभावनवाक्यस्य सार्थकसंज्ञावबोधतः । सम्यग्यते शब्दबोधो न तन्मात्रस्य बोधतः—Śabda-śakti. Kār., 12, p. 70.

used with the force and import of a sentence, as, for instance, the word 'ओद्विष्य' contains in itself the entire import of the sentence 'हृन्दोऽवैते.' The philologists have consequently come to the conclusion that the linguistic investigations should logically start with sentences and not with isolated words. In a significant sentence like 'Gauh asti' (there is a cow), the constituent parts 'gauh' and 'asti' are said to be mutually expectant, for the conception of a cow is not logically complete unless it is associated with that of existence and the like. Viewed from an epistemological standpoint, our knowledge seems to be everywhere relative; we cannot practically think of one thing but we think of two. Vyāsa¹ says that existence, as a common attribute of all that exists, may be ascribed to all objects of thought. Thus, we are allowed to speak of a thing as existent, even though we happen to know nothing about its other inherent properties. It should be noted here that words wanting in such correlations cannot properly constitute a significant sentence. We may put together a number of unconnected words, and make a huge combination, but they would not form a sentence in the logical sense of the term. This is the reason why Jagadīśa adversely criticised the definition of sentence as proposed by the lexicographer 'Amara Singha.'² His ground for contention is that neither a combination of verbal forms such as 'पचति' and 'गच्छति' nor a combination of nominal forms such as 'घटः' and 'पटः' is sufficient to give a consistent idea, but it is practically a systematic arrangement of words, both 'सुबन्त' and 'तिङन्त' that constitutes a sentence. A sentence, speaking from the standpoint of Semantics, is a consistent thought, and

¹ "न सत्त्वं पदार्थव्यभिचरति । वक्ष्यन्ते चक्षोति" गम्यते—On the aphorism. शब्दार्थप्रत्ययानामितरैतराध्यासात्, etc., Yoga Sūtra, Bibhūtipāda. 17; again, "यवान्यत् क्रियापदं नास्ति तच्चानिर्भवलोपः प्रयुज्यते ।"

² "सुमित्कलाचयो नेवमतिव्याप्तादिदोषतः"—Śabdaśakti.

consequently an arbitrary collocation of words without having any correlation among them naturally fails to produce any coherent idea. There are certain intellectual principles which the mind follows while connecting one concept with another. A regular and significant combination of words (sentence) represents the way in which human mind proceeds to establish some sort of relation, whether agreement or difference, between two concepts. The reason why 'pachati' and 'gacchati' fail to constitute a consistent sentence by themselves is that we cannot intellectually connect the idea of 'cooking' consistently with that of 'going.' To turn to the point at issue. Each of these correlated words ('gauḥ' and 'asti') would then express its own meaning (cow—individual and existence) by the force of convention; and when the two meanings are found to be consistently correlated, that is, when existence as a qualifying attribute, is predicated of the cow, a distinct cognition (विलक्षणबोध) as that of a 'cow having existence' is obtained from the interconnection of these two meanings. The sense that is thus derived from the correlation of meanings is not exactly the sumtotal of the meanings as are separately expressed by each word. This cognition, as it is different from both perceptual and inferential knowledge, is called 'शाब्दबोध,' because it is derived from words, and also 'अन्वयबोध,' as it actually follows from the correlation of meanings. In deriving verbal cognition we should carefully take notice of the following:¹ (1) words having mutual expectancy, capability, etc., (2) the knowledge as to the meaning of each word, and (3) the correlation of meanings. The instruments whereby 'शाब्दबोध' is produced are held to be four in number, namely, proximity (आसत्ति), expectancy (आकाङ्क्षा), compatibility (योग्यता) and import (तात्पर्य). By

¹ पदज्ञानं तु करणं द्वान् तत्र पदार्थयोः । शाब्दबोधः फलं तत्र शक्तियोः सहकारिणौ ।
Āpariccheda, Kār. 91.

proximity (आसत्ति) is meant that the reciprocally expectant words should have proximity in a sentence, no other irrelevant words being allowed to intervene between them. From a combination of words like 'गिरिर्भुक्तमग्निमान् देवदत्तेन' no verbal cognition can possibly be obtained as to 'the hill being fiery' or as to 'Devadatta taking his meal,' inasmuch as the words 'bhuktam' and 'agnimān' have by their intervention done away with the proximity in this couple of sentences. Expectancy implies that words constituting a sentence must be reciprocally expectant; for instance, the accusative form 'ghaṭam' cannot give rise to what it called 'शब्दबोध' unless it is associated with such verbal forms as 'Karoti.' Compatibility means the consistency between the meanings of two words. The expression 'वज्रिना सिञ्चति' seems to be almost meaningless, as the idea of sprinkling is inconsistent with that of fire. By 'import' is meant the purport as signified by a sentence with reference to the context. When one says 'सैन्धवमानय' we fail to understand readily what is actually intended by the speaker, since the word 'सैन्धव' has got a double meaning, namely, salt and horse. But this ambiguity of ideas will cease to exist the moment we would consider both the time and the occasion when the above sentence was uttered. If one happens to say 'सैन्धवमानय' at the time of taking his meal, we understand at once that the speaker wants salt and not a horse. The Bhāṭṭa school of Mimāṃsā philosophy takes such purport (तात्पर्यार्थ) as a special kind of significance indicated by the sentence as a whole and not by any of its component parts. This is popularly known as 'Abhihitānvaya,' because the import (तात्पर्यार्थ) is based on the correlation of meanings. Opposed to it is the theory of 'Annvitābhidhāna,' as held by Prabhākara and others, according to which the import of a sentence is the same as

‘वाच्यार्थे’ or the meaning as denoted by words forming a sentence.

We have already said that words may have both primary or innate and secondary or indirect significance; and we have shown that the primary significance is the same as the conventional meaning assigned to a word from time immemorial (शक्तिः; or अाजानिकसंकेतः),¹ and that it is only to this original sense that we have to look for the real denotation of a word (शक्ति). The secondary significance is so called, because there is no such conventional or necessary connection between a word and its secondary meaning, which is entirely dependent on popular usage.

As we have already referred to the logical classifications of words such as ‘रूढ, योगरूढ, यौगिक, and लक्षक,’ etc., and have shown the rhetorician’s way of classifying words into expressive, indicative and suggestive, we need not repeat them here. But we like to make here a few more observations on the direct and indirect meanings of words. Patañjali² in his usual ingenious way has shown how the secondary meaning indicated by a word is related to the primary or conventional. The secondary sense may be connected with the direct significance either by relation of place, properties, proximity or association. Thus, we see that the secondary meaning is not entirely unconnected with the primary significance, but has intimate relation with it. Some hold that the word ‘mañcha’ meaning ‘chair’ by its primary significance, is essentially different from the word ‘mañcha,’ as in the sentence ‘मञ्चाक्रीशन्ति’ where it implies ‘people sitting on the chair’ by means of indication (लक्षणा). But according to those who hold, on the contrary, that one

¹ ‘ईदरेच्छेवशक्तिः’ and शक्तिश्च पदेन सह पदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः Muktāvalī on Kār. 91.

² चतुर्भिः प्रकारैरतस्मिन् स, इत्येतद्वति । ताख्यात, तावच्छीयान्, तस्मान्नीय्यात्, तस्माच्चर्यात् इति । Mahābhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 218.

and the same word may have more than one meaning, the direct and indirect are to be distinguished as the meanings that are either popular or more or less unfamiliar. Some say that the indirect meaning is one that is understood from context, propriety, association, etc. But this view is open to objection on the ground that in the case of a word like 'आरात्,'¹ which has two contradictory meanings, namely, distance and proximity, the context, etc., do not, however, enable us here to make any such distinction as direct and indirect. We are really confronted with some difficulties in distinguishing the direct from the indirect meaning. In the first place, the science of etymology and grammar does not often prove a helping guide in the determination of the primary significance. An analysis of the word 'gau' (from the root 'gam' to go) will show us that it etymologically means 'one that moves,' and does not exclusively and invariably denote a 'cow.' Are we then justified in saying that the use of the word 'gau' in the sense of a cow furnishes an instance of indication (लक्षणा)? Moreover, if the word 'Kṣāla' meaning 'expert' is taken to be indicative (as opposed to denotative), as Mammata has actually done, we find absolutely no reason why the word 'gau,' as it usually means a cow, should not be regarded similarly. It is, however, popular usage that often prevents us from applying logic to the science of language in general and science of grammar in particular. The word 'gau,' according to the Naiyāyikas,² falls under the category of 'Rurha-śabda' which have their meanings fixed by convention (Saṅketa); consequently the etymological meanings in such cases are practically of no sufficient importance. Secondly, we find that in the development of a language the original

¹ पुरादिभिर्निर्दिष्टं यौवनेति विरोधिनि—Vāk. pad. 2. 270. p. 194.

² वृद्धं संकेतवद्भास्ये संकेति कौत्साति—Śabdaśakti. Kār., 17, p. 87.

meanings of certain words become obscure and new meanings are sometimes assigned to them. These new meanings (secondary or indirect) sometimes obtain so much popularity that we are at last inclined to take them, as if they were primary significance.

Both the material and intellectual advancement of a nation is partly, though not wholly, visible in the growth and development of its language. The progress and diffusion of a language is almost commensurate with those of the people who speak and think in it. Words are not, therefore, merely phonetic types created by men to serve their pressing purposes, but in them are incorporated their intellectual life and activity. Truth to tell, the glorious days of Vedic India have long merged into oblivion leaving behind only a few literary remnants that still speak of the material, social and spiritual progress of that primitive age, and it is through them that we can peep into the dead past. The word 'देवर,'¹ as explained by Yāska, stands as a witness to the social custom that once prevailed in ancient India. The word 'आत्मन्,' which has inspired so many thoughtful verses of the Vedic seers serves to show the extent to which ancient India had developed its spiritual vision. As true symbols of ideas, words may be looked upon as fabrics of history that represent mankind in its intellectual aspect.

Compared metaphorically to an organism, a language has birth, continuance and death. Viewed from a psychological standpoint, every word has within it a history of its origin. The most ancient words are those that signify objects with which men in primitive society were first made familiar. With the progress of civilisation and expansion of knowledge the number of words began

¹ देवरः कस्मात् ? तिस्रो वर उच्यन्ते—Nirukta, III, 15, p. 297. Cf. कीवां शयुक्ता विधवेव देवरम्, etc. Rig. Veda, 10. 40, 2.

to multiply. In a highly developed form of language like Sanskrit we find that certain words have acquired manifold meanings. But it is a fact that a language with its rapidity of development and tendency to coining new words with the growth of new ideas is hardly capable of keeping pace with the progress of thought. Thoughts are so innumerable and varied in character that no language is practically sufficient to represent all the ideas with which people are more or less familiar. A language records many instances as to how words are born, obtain currency among people, and at last die out, making room for some other words. There was a time in ancient India when Sanskrit had enjoyed the dignity and popularity of a living language. But Sanskrit has long ceased to be a spoken language, and has now practically become a dead tongue. Similar fate has been, however, shared by many other languages the existence of which is to be surmised from a few literary fragments that we come across here and there in literature. From a comparison between Vedic and classical Sanskrit we find that a good many words have undergone changes in their physical and psychological aspects. Yāska¹ has already taken notice of such words as 'वराहः,' 'पुष्करः' which are explained by him as distorted forms of 'वराह्वारः' and 'वपुष्करः' respectively. Similarly, with regard to change of significance, Yāska tells us that the word 'पवित्र,'² as found in the Vedic hymns, was originally used to mean mantra (sacred incantation), the rays of the sun, water and gods. But this word means "pure" in later Sanskrit, probably from the idea of sanctity that was usually associated with those objects. This may be cited as an instance of abstraction of concrete meaning. Many

¹ वराहो भेषोभवति वरमाहारमाहार्योः" इतिच ब्राह्मणम्,—Nirukta. V. 3-4, p. 477
पुष्करं वपुष्करं वा, Nir. V. 14, p. 525.

² मन्त्रपवित्रमुच्यते, रश्मयः पवित्रमुच्यन्ते,—Nirukta V. 5, p. 494.

causes were at work to bring about such alteration in both the formal and material aspects of words. Phonetic decay has played an important part with regard to the process by which Sanskrit words were corrupted into Apabhraṃśas. When we compare a number of Sanskrit word as चन्द्र, मध्व, दधि, प्रस्तर, शृगाल, etc., with their corresponding Prākṛita forms such as चन्द्र, मज्झ, दहि, पत्थर, श्रियाल, etc., we see that these transformations were mainly due to phonological changes (on account of the inability to pronounce the correct forms and wrong imitations). The word 'प्रतिसूर्यक',¹ as used by Bhavabhūti in the place of the more regular form 'प्रतिसूर्यशयानकः'² illustrates the principle of idleness or economisation of effort.

The psychological processes that are involved in the transformation of significance of words are so subtle and intricate that we fail to bring them under general principles. The causes that gave rise to such changes in meaning are numerous. A comparison drawn between the Vedic and classical Sanskrit shows us not only the extent to which the metrical language of the hymns changed in its different stages of transition, but also gives us an idea of the manner in which old words became obsolete and consequently dropped out of use, making room for new words. Patañjali³ has taken notice of such old forms as ऊष, तेर, चक्र, and पेच, which were already obsolete and we can see how their places are taken by such forms as उषितः, तीर्णः, कृतवान् and पक्तवान्. The Nighaṇṭu enumerates such old verbal forms as गमति, इषति, etc., in the list of roots denoting 'motion' (गतिकर्मा), but classical Sanskrit

Mental laws and
meaning-change.

¹ "दृष्यद्भिः प्रतिसूर्यकेरजगरखेदद्रवः पीयते ।—Uttara-charita, 2,

² "सुरटः ककला सस्यात् प्रतिसूर्यशयानकः"—Amara.

³ सन्ति शब्दाश्चप्रयुक्ताः 'Mahābhāṣya,' Vol. 1, p. 8.

has not retained those words and has गच्छति and इच्छति in their stead.

Below are given short references to certain intellectual processes by which words usually change their meanings.¹ As Sanskrit is no longer a spoken language, we have no other alternative than to confine our attention to the Vedic and classical Sanskrit in order to show the changes of meaning undergone by some Sanskrit words. Prominent among these are—

(1) Specialisation, by which is meant the narrowing of sense which is, in most of the cases, due to the prominence given to one aspect of the object denoted by a word. The name denoting a class is sometimes narrowly applied to a species that belongs to it. A minute study of facts as to how names are given to things will convince us that a name in its symbolical form cannot signify at once all the properties that are naturally associated with the object to be named. A name in itself is only suggestive of one quality of the thing named. Now, a word is said to be used in a specialised sense when it brings out prominently one aspect of a thing denoted by it. It should be, however, remembered that in this process whereby general terms are restricted to particular sense, the original meanings are not altogether lost or absent. The word कविः,² for instance, as used in the Vedas, meant originally 'a man of keen intellect' (कान्तदर्शी), but when we turn to later Sanskrit the word is found to be used in a special sense, viz., 'poet,' the original sense being retained to this extent that bards in those days were undoubtedly men of high literary

¹ In his book on Semantics, Prof. Bréal has dealt with such intellectual processes in connection with the change of meanings.

² Cf. दुर्गेष्यस्तत् कव्योवदन्ति (Katha-upanishad). Patañjali also uses the word in the sense of learned man. Com. तांजाति कवयो विदुः, Mahābhāṣya. Vol. II, p. 225.

attainments. The word 'मृगः' in its classical sense affords another instance of specialisation of a general term. In the Vedas the word 'मृगः' occurs as a general term denoting 'beast,' but in later Sanskrit it does not mean a class but only a species, *i.e.*, 'deer.' Similarly, the word 'वस्तु,' which originally meant 'necessaries of life,' is now more or less restricted to 'wealth.' If we turn to certain grammatical forms, we shall find that the principle of restriction was not less active there. The roots 'भू, कृ and अस्,' though they have retained their independent uses as well, got themselves restricted to some extent when they came to be used in later Sanskrit as auxiliaries to certain verbal forms such as 'एधामास, एधास्वभूव, एधांचक्रे. The way in which certain, if not all, adverbs have turned to be Upasargas or prepositions and have lost their independent uses altogether, suggests another instance of the law of specialisation. The specialisation of sense found undue favour at the hands of the philosophers and grammarians. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas used the word समयः in the sense of 'convention.' The word 'योगः' means generally 'union,' but it really acquired a specialised sense when it came to mean only 'conjunction of soul with God' or simply 'concentration of mind' (योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः). The meanings which the Hindu grammarians have assigned to the terms प्रकृतिः, प्रत्ययः, गुणः, वृद्धिः, etc., give us a clear idea as to the extent to which specialisation of sense may descend.

(2) Generalisation, or the widening of sense. The

Generalisation. meaning of certain words sometimes embraces a wider scope. What had been

really applicable to particular individuals and particular sets of things were sometimes used with greater magnitude of signification. We have already taken notice of the word 'Kusāla' which has almost given up its original and restricted sense, namely, 'gatherer of Kuśa,' and is

now used as a general term denoting 'skilful.' Durga¹ seems to have been conscious of such widening of meaning, as he accurately observes that words like 'Praviṇa,' 'Udāra' and 'Nistrimsa' have become general terms. The word 'Praviṇa,' meaning, as he holds, one expert in playing on lyre,' was originally used to indicate the 'Gandharvas' who are proverbially efficient in the musical art. But we see that this word, like 'Kusāla,' is now used as a general attributive word denoting a person who is 'expert' in all spheres of activity. In the same way the words 'Udāra,' and 'Nistrimsa' are not frequently used in the sense of 'horse' and 'sword' respectively, but have acquired a general meaning, namely, 'highminded' and 'cruel.'

(3) There are some words which have either partly or wholly lost their original signification.

Loss and deterioration of signification.

The negative particle 'न' is no longer used in the sense of comparison, while in the Vedas it is found to have a double meaning—negation and similarity. The particles in Sanskrit are illustrations of words that have suffered loss of signification. Yāska has recognised some particles, though not all, like कम्, इम्, इत्, ड, etc., which are entirely meaningless. But there was evidently a period in the history of language when most of these particles were as good as significant words and were consequently capable of independent use. While dealing with the deviation and loss of the original meaning of words, we cannot afford to ignore how a number of words has suffered deterioration in later Sanskrit with regard to their 'significations. The word 'आत्मन्', as is evident from the Vedic literature, was originally used as expressive of the 'Supreme Soul' (Brahman). If we turn to the pages of a Sanskrit dictionary,² we find that this word is

¹ Nirukta,—II. I, p. 156—प्रकृष्टो बोधायां प्रवीणो गान्धर्वो अविष्यस्यस्यारतिः, etc.

² "आत्मा ईदृशं धृतीं ज्ञाते स्वभावे परमात्मनि"—Amara.

mentioned as synonymous with देह (body), स्वभाव (character), etc., and the expression 'जघन्यात्मा' is used to mean 'a person of contemptible character.' The word 'धर्मः,' as now used to mean 'properties' of matter, seems to have been deprived to some extent of its original signification. The modern use of the words 'भूत' and 'प्रेत' in the contemptuous sense of 'ghosts' is a remarkable instance of the degradation of meaning.

(4) Analogy and metaphor have played a considerable part in the transference of signification.

Analogy and metaphor-transference of names and epithets.

It is a fact of frequent occurrence that a name properly applicable to one object is sometimes transferred to another having resemblance with it in some aspects. In the primitive stage of language people had to represent, in the absence of adequate terms, abstract ideas by names expressive of material entities. As regards the transference of meanings, poetical fancy may be regarded as an important factor. By the expression 'नेत्रैः पपुः' Kālidāsa has figuratively transferred the function of drinking to visual organs. The expressions like 'कटु वचनम्, मधुरा वाक्, etc., are to be understood as purely metaphorical. It was almost a fashion (poetic license) with the Sanskrit poets to speak of the sky and sin as black, fame as white, and anger as red (मालिन्यं व्योम्नि, पापे यशसि धवलता, etc., Sāhitya Darpaṇa). The expressions 'अन्धं तमः, अन्धकूपः, etc., afford instances as to how epithets properly applicable to sentient beings are figuratively transferred to inanimate objects. Similarly, with regard to the transference of names, the use of the word 'दर्शन' in the sense of 'philosophy' had its origin in the analogy which the so-called philosophical system bear to the 'eyes,' by allowing men to have an insight into the metaphysical truths; and the common word for enquiry or research into abstract questions, गवेषणा, is really "search for the lost cow." The author of the 'Gītā' has in all

probability made use of a metaphor when he applied the term क्षेप to body (इदं शरीरं कौन्तेय क्षेपमित्यभिधीयते). Water is not only called अमृतम् or nectar in a figurative sense, but is also denoted by such word as जौवनम् because of its analogy with life as sustaining the body. In the Vedas words as पर्दतः, अद्भिः, गोत्रः, गिरिः, यावा, etc., are often used in the sense of 'clouds' and the author of the Nighaṇṭu has also treated them as synonyms of cloud. Now, if we have to seek for any justification for these Vedic uses and the inclusion of these words in the list of terms denoting clouds, we must say that it was probably the resemblance of clouds with the mountain-peaks in point of loftiness that induced the Vedic seers to identify clouds with mountains.

The world presents itself to human intelligence as a phenomenon of bewildering complexity that sets at defiance all attempts at differentiation. The Śruti declares that it was the first duty on the part of God to reduce such complexity to simplicity by giving each object a distinct form and name (नामरूपे व्याकरोत्). The question that naturally suggests itself is how names were given to objects and in so doing what facts were actually taken into consideration. Yāska holds that 'संज्ञा' or names are given by words, as they represent the easiest possible means for securing comprehension and accuracy. Bhartrihari¹ tells us that unless there had been such distinguishing signs as words, the world would have ever remained an unnameable and indiscernible mass.

Objects, speaking generally, acquired their respective names either by virtue of their inherent properties or actions. An object may be a substratum of innumerable qualities ; it may serve more than one purpose and may

¹ Vāk. Pad. 1, 124-128 (Kārikās),—"तदुत्क्रान्ती विचिन्नीयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुण्डलम् ।"

be viewed from various standpoints. But the name of a thing can hardly be so framed as to express all that we know of that particular thing. How insufficient is the name 'हिमांशु,' meaning etymologically 'one having cold rays,' to connote all that are suggested by the moon? A name, so to speak, suggests only one aspect of the thing named. Similarly, the name सूर्य, as given to the Sun-god, implies only the idea of shining and does not bring forth other qualities that are also found to be associated with or possessed by the sun. This conspicuous aspect of shining won for the sun in later times a good many names as प्रभाकर, विभावसु, विभाकर, अंशुमान्, etc., etc. It is not necessarily the most conspicuous feature of a thing that is always taken into account in giving names to it, but a careful study of several names makes it clear that what determines the designation of an object is usually the feature which first strikes human attention. If we trace the history of certain names, we find that it is very often the most general aspect of a thing that was made the basis of naming. The name वृक्ष, for instance, which appears to be the oldest one among its synonyms, originated with the idea of 'cutting,' probably from the fact that trees were cut down for fuel even in the most primitive stage of human society. But names as 'पादप,' 'महीरुह,' etc., which betray some knowledge of Botany are comparatively of modern growth. It is now almost clear that the principles of naming objects are far from being perfect and exhaustive. When a thing is entitled to a name on account of its particular function or quality, the name so given depends for its currency and popularity on the unanimous acceptance of the whole society. And if it is once generally accepted, it becomes almost impossible to transfer this designation to other objects, even if they are found to exhibit the same feature. It is for this reason that all that move are not called 'जी'; all that

shine and excite pleasurable sensations are not designated by the term 'चन्द्र'; and all that grow in mud are not known as 'पद्मज.'

The controversy that ensued between Śakatayana and Gārgya, as we have already alluded to, seems to be so important with regard to our present topic that we cannot help repeating it here. Gārgya held in opposition to the theory of Śakatayana and etymologists that all words without exception of even संज्ञाशब्द were not really capable of being derived from roots. His arguments may be summarised as follows :¹—(1) If all words are held to be derivable from verbal roots which denote action, then whoever would perform the same action might have received the same designation; as, for instance, every one that passes on the road might be called 'गच्छ.' (2) A thing will be entitled to as many names as there are actions associated with it. (3) If names are really derivable from roots, then we may be allowed to use the regular grammatical forms 'पुरिश्य' and 'अष्टा' instead of 'पुरुष' and 'अश्व' to make the sense more clear and free from confusion. (4) If actions are what precede and determine names, how could the earth get such a designation as 'पृथिवी' before she was actually extended? Now it is interesting to see how these arguments were ingeniously set aside by Yāska who was evidently a great etymologist of his time. It is to be borne in mind that the Nairuktas had adhered to the theory of derivability of words from

¹ अथ चेत् सर्वाध्याख्यातजानि नामानि स्यु र्यः कश्च तत्कर्म कुर्यात् तत्सर्वं तथाचक्षीरन् य कश्चाध्वानमद्रु नीताश्वः स वचनीयः स्यात्—Nirukta, 1. 12, p. 99.

Again, "अथापि य एषां न्यायवान् कार्मनामिकः संस्कारो

यथा चापि प्रतीतार्थानि स्युस्तथेनान्याचक्षीरन् पुरुषं पुरिश्य

इत्याचक्षीरन्नष्टेत्यश्वम्—Nirukta, 1. 13, p. 103.

and "अथापि निष्पन्नेऽभिव्याहारिऽभिविचारयन्ति । प्रथमान

पृथिवीत्याहुः क एनाश्वप्रथयिष्यत् किमाधारश्च" ॥—Nirukta, 1. 13, p. 103.

roots. Yāska's¹ counter-arguments are briefly as follows. Though the same action is found to be performed by a good many people or objects, it does not necessarily follow that all of them should be called by the same name, *e.g.* all who cut wood are not called 'तृणा', but it is the carpenter alone who receives this particular designation. It is quite manifest that Yāska has here indirectly referred to the Law of Specialisation, as we have already explained. That etymological explanations do not often prove to be infallible in the finding out of the real cause as to why an indefinite name is given to a thing, and that popular usage counts much for the process of naming are made sufficiently clear by the statements of Yāska. He is perfectly correct when he says that all who wander about are not called 'परिव्राजक,' the designation being restricted to an ascetic only ; it is only the juice of the sugarcane that is called 'जीवन,' and not everything that serves to enliven ; and all that grows from the earth does not merit the name 'भूमिज', but it is the planet 'Mars' alone which is invariably denoted by the word. Yāska now comes to the most vital point in connection with the principle of naming. He says that an object, though associated with more than one action, usually receives its designation by virtue of one action only. As to the objection that names more intelligible and grammatically accurate should be used, it will suffice to say that the acceptance of a particular name for a particular object is dependent on popular usage, and it is for this reason that the word 'पुरिग्रय', though grammatically correct and expressive of the same sense, is not popularly used in the place of 'पुरुष'. Durga says that the etymologists do not pretend to be the creator of words,

¹ Nirukta, 1. 14, p. 108, (Bom. ed.)—समानकर्मणां नामधेयप्रतिलक्ष'मिकैषां भेदेषां यथा तत्रा परिव्राजको जीवनी भूमिज इत्यनेनैवोत्तरः प्रत्युक्तः.....etc.

but the task undertaken by them is only to explain the meanings in accordance with popular usage. •

A minute observation of linguistic phenomena shows that every name, as given to a thing, has a history behind it so far as its origin is concerned, though it is not always possible to trace the actual psychological operations and properties of things that secured for objects their respective names. Grammatical analysis as well as etymological explanations serve as the most scientific instruments whereby we can get some clue as to the real origin and signification of words. Nevertheless we are sometimes disappointed and deluded too, when looking upon such etymological expositions as the only means of getting into the real history of names. It is a fact that when a thing gets many names, there is a chronological succession among them. The names शशधर and चञ्ज, as given to the moon, and पादप and महीरुह, as applied to trees, do not chronologically belong to the same period in which 'चन्द्र' and वृक्ष were probably the names whereby the moon and trees were respectively designated. As men advanced in civilisation and became more and more familiar with the properties and characters of material entities, new names suggestive of more accurate knowledge of nature were given to objects. In fact, looking at the pages of a Sanskrit dictionary we find that a single object has got good many names, and also that a good many objects are known by a single name.

Mythology and superstition have played an important part in multiplying the names of objects. The names 'मृगाङ्क,' 'शशधर,' 'शशलाञ्छन,' as assigned to the moon, have their origin in a superstitious belief that the black spots, faintly observable in the moon, are nothing but the figures of fawns lying on the lap. From the popular legend which speaks of the chariot of the sun being drawn by seven horses, the sun probably got the name of 'सप्तारवाहन'. For

the history of such names as **यज्ञ** and **क्षोराधितनया**, we must look back to the ancient legend of 'sea-churning' which narrates the origin of the moon and the goddess of wealth from the primordial sea. The words '**मकरध्वज**' (god of the dolphin-banner) and **पुष्पधन्वा** (god of the flowery bow), as names of cupid (**कामदेव**), might be traced to similar myths or folk-lore. It is, therefore, very difficult to trace the history of proper names, for they do not often admit of that regular etymological analysis which serves as our guide in getting into the meanings of most of the common names, and, moreover, their origin is more or less dependent on mythology and popular fashion. The etymological meanings, though derivable from certain proper names, are not found to be such as would necessarily suggest any precise and accurate idea of the individual so named. But such is not exactly the case with some Paurāṇika or legendary names which seem to be rather really significant. Proper names such as "**शूर्पणखा**" (she with finger-nails as big as the winnowing fan), "**कुम्भकर्ण**" (he with ears as large as jars), "**शत्रुघ्न**" (destroyer of enemies), "**भीम**" (the dreadful), "**परशुराम**" (he who is amused with the axe) etc., etc., have regular meanings and are recognised to be grammatically correct. There are certain proper names that are to be explained with reference to lineage, e.g. "**कौरव**," "**यादव**," "**काकुत्स्थ**," "**राघव**" etc. In ancient India people were sometimes called by their patronymic and sometimes by their metronymic names. The names such as **ऐतरेय**, **राघेय**, **गाङ्गेय**, **वैनतेय**, **पार्थ**, **मादेय**, etc., are to be regarded as metronymic, while **दाशरथि**, **जामदग्न्य**, and **धार्तराष्ट्र**, etc., as patronymic.

Though the science of grammar is, as we have already said, more concerned with the formal than with the logical side of language, there are certain principles of grammar which

are evidently based on or intimately related to psychological operations. The process whereby "Samāsa" are formed in Sanskrit show how mind unites two coherent concepts together; and the systematic precedence of the attributive to the substantive suggests how mind often distinguishes or characterises an individual belonging to a class by some special features or qualities. We propose to give below only a few instances where the principles of grammar are supposed to have a close touch with mental laws:—

(1) Syntax: A certain fixed order in the arrangement of words is generally observed in a sentence for the sake of rendering the sense clear. Almost every language has its syntactical rules peculiar to itself. The position of words in a sentence has much to do with its import; in fact, there are some languages in which the sense is so much dependent on the position of the words that we cannot alter the position without altering the import. The popular grammatical method of placing the subject before the predicate represents a similar mental process in which two concepts, one principal and the other subordinate, are related to each other. Again, the way in which words are generally arranged in a sentence (*e. g.*, subject, predicate, object) is almost similar to the process in which we usually think of objects and their relations to one another. Another instance of logical order is shown by the position of the substantive and the attributive, the qualifying words always preceding the words that are qualified. The Naiyāyikas,¹ therefore, rightly observe that in the course of verbal cognition (शब्दबोध) it is the attributive that is first comprehended. There are, however, no hard and fast rules in Sanskrit as to the order of words in a sentence. In Sanskrit one is allowed to say both

¹ "शब्दबोधे प्राक्प्रतीयमानत्वं विशेषणत्वम् ॥"

असौ पुरुषः and “पुरुषोऽसौ” as well as “रामो गच्छति” and “गच्छति रामः.” Herein we have a laxity of the principles regarding the precedence of the adjective and the position of the subject. The verbal form is sometimes used just at the beginning of a sentence for the sake of emphasis. The principle of correlation (succession) that is almost uniformly and invariable shown by the use of two relative pronouns “यत्” and “तत्” is not even strictly observed in Sanskrit, since the pronominal form “सः” is sometimes allowed to be used independently, that is, without being preceded by the correlative term “यः” (cf. तेहिनी दिवसा गताः—Uttaracharita) There is a rule, more honoured in its breach than in its observance, that the predicate (विधेय) should not be stated unless the subject is stated beforehand.¹ It must be, however, remembered that to place the predicate before the subject gives rise to a rhetorical defect² known as “अविमृष्टविधेयांशः.” In Sanskrit one is thus allowed much liberty to change the order of words, provided in doing so he does not alter the import. In Sanskrit the speaker and listener do not depend so much on the construction of the sentence they hear or read as on the import that is conveyed by the sentence. This indifference to any fixed order is not absolutely without its advantage, inasmuch as it at once becomes easier to speak and write Sanskrit in the absence of such rigid principles of syntax.

(2) Samāsa :—It is not really words alone that combine with each other in a compound, but their meanings too are so related to each other as to give rise to one qualified idea. Every word retains its own meaning so long as it does not enter into combination with another, but the moment it is consistently compounded with another, it ceases to be an independent word with its particular signification.

¹ अनुवायमनुक्तै व न विधेयमुदीरयेत् ।

² प्रकान्तप्रसिद्धानुभूताग्रविषयसच्छब्दो यच्छब्दोपादाननापेक्षते इति न्यायात् ।

What we practically find is that a 'Samāsa', though made up of two or more terms, generally produces only one idea in the mind. In 'Samāsas' we can trace the process by which mind combines two concepts that are mutually expectant and capable (समर्थ) of being united together to make a harmonious whole. 'Samāsas' have thus a psychological background which is none the less important than their external aspect. The primary condition of 'Samāsas' in general is that the words to be compounded must have reciprocal competency (सामर्थ्य) for consistent unification in their psychological aspect before they are allowed to form a compound by the correlation of their meanings. This is why an arbitrary juxtaposition of words fails to make a compound in the grammatical sense of the term. Though in a 'Samāsa' there are sometimes euphonic combinations of letters, as are generally found in 'Sandhi', the former is essentially different from the latter. 'Sandhi' or extreme proximity of letters ("परः सन्निकर्षः संज्ञिता) is based on the principle of phonology, while 'Samāsas' are fundamentally concerned with the meaning. Moreover, in a case of 'Sandhi', it is letters only that are effected by transformations, but words retain their respective significations separately and have nothing to do with correlations so far as their meanings are concerned. There are both formal as well as psychological basis of classifying 'Samāsas'. In the first place, the ancient grammarians divided the 'Samāsas' into five classes¹ according to the prominence of the significations of the members that go to constitute a compound. Thus, the compound in which the signification of the first member seems

¹ 'पूर्वमध्यान्यसर्वाण्यपदप्राधान्यतः पुनः । प्रोक्तः पञ्चविधः प्रोक्तः समासोवाभटादिभिः"—*Śabdaśakti*, Kār. 33. (Samāsa) p. 5. (Ben. ed).

(a) Patañjali recognises four classes—इह कश्चित् समासः पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानः, कश्चिदुत्तरपदार्थप्रधानः, कश्चिद्व्यपदार्थप्रधानः, कश्चिदुभयपदार्थप्रधानः ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 379.

to be more prominent than that of the other is styled “पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानः” (अव्ययीभावः) and so on. In a “बहुव्रीहिः” compound, however, the sense of none of the constituent appears prominently, since in such cases it is usually the import of the object not directly denoted by the terms that is really implied. According to Jayāditya,¹ on the other hand, the five divisions of the grammarians may be logically reduced to two, i.e., ‘नित्य’ (permanent) and ‘अनित्य’ (optional). A permanent or constantly fixed compound is one (as ‘कृष्णसर्पः’) where mere additions of case-endings to the words are not sufficient to express the intended sense ; as, for instance, the compound ‘कृष्णसर्पः’, if split up, in the regular grammatical way, as “कृष्णस्यासौ सर्पश्चेति” means a ‘black serpent’ and not necessarily ‘a cobra’. What strikes our attention here is that certain compounds are so formed as we cannot dissolve them into their constituents without altering the import. It may be further held that the form ‘कृष्णसर्पः’ is in reality one word and not a compound at all, and consequently we are not justified in disjoining it into parts on the principle of agreement and difference (अन्वयव्यतिरेकी). The ‘anitya’ Samāsa is one where the import of the compound is the same as those of its component parts. It must be, however, remembered that ‘Samāsas’ are nowhere obligatory (excepting those instances of permanent compounds), because it depends upon one’s option to say ‘नीलम्’ ‘उत्पलम्’ or ‘नीलोत्पलम्’. There is, however, some difference between a compound form and the sentence which shows its formation. Patañjali² says that a compound is distinguished from the विग्रह into which it “may be

¹ विभक्तिमात्रप्रधानं पाद्विज्ञानार्थतनामसु । स्वार्थस्यावोधवोधार्थां नित्यानित्यौ समासकौ ।

² सुबलोपीत्यवधानं यथेष्टमन्यतराभिसम्बन्धः स्वरः रंख्यादिशेषः etc., Mahābhāṣya, Vol. 1. p. 362.

(a) सविशेषणानां हतितं—but such forms are allowed as देवदत्तस्य गुरुकुलम्, चैत्रस्य दासभार्या on account of गमकत्वं ‘expressiveness.’

dissolved by the following features:—(1) elision of case-endings; (2) extreme proximity; (3) certain fixity of construction; (4) singularity of accent; (5) non-specification of number etc. The words forming a compound are so related to each other as to make the whole look like one indivisible word, and it is for this reason that a compound is recognised as a form of 'प्रातिपादिक' to which, as to common crude forms, terminations are added (एकपदत्व). It should, however, be pointed out that a word, when it has entered into combination with another in a compound, is not generally allowed to have grammatical connection with an attributive outside the compound and so on¹.

Now we come to the important point as to what is precisely implied by a compound which represents a consistent combination of two or more words. There is some diversity of views with regard to the exact nature of the import that is brought out by a Samāsa. In his long but critical expositions of the rule 'समर्थः पदविधिः' (Pāṇ. 2. 1. 1.), Patañjali mainly sets forth two views, namely, 'पकार्यभावा' and 'व्यपेक्षा,' as possible explanations of the term 'समर्थ' occurring in the aphorism. We do not like here to enter elaborately into the grammatical side of the question, but propose to state it briefly from the standpoint of Semantics. According to the first view² (पकार्यभाव—जहत्स्वार्थावृत्ति), words with their different meanings express but one undifferentiated signification when they constitute a compound; and in bringing out such "oneness of sense" they give up their respective denotations to some extent; as, for instance, a person engaged in the work of another man

¹ प्रतियोगिपदादन्यत् यदन्यत् कारकादपि । इतिशब्देकदेशस्य सम्बन्धेननेष्यते—Kātantra. Pariśista.

² समासे खलुभिन्नैव शक्तिः पदजशब्दवत् बहूनां वृत्तिधर्माणां वचनैरेव साधने । स्यान्महोदयं तस्मादेकार्थ्यभाव आश्रितः Vyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa 30-31 page 157.

is naturally compelled to leave off his own work.¹ The grammarians seem to have given more preference to this view, as they hold that "Samāsa" by virtue of the combination of words and the correlation of their meanings practically acquire a qualified or special expressiveness which is not implied by any member of a compound when taken separately. This is what is known in grammar as "जहत्स्वार्थवृत्तिः."² According to the second view (almost the same as held by the Naiyāyikas), a compound does not seem to have a special or additional import in excess of those that are denoted by its component parts. There is no sufficient reason for the assumption of such additional expressiveness (अतिरिक्तशक्ति). But a peculiar difficulty is presented by the "बहुव्रीहिसमासः" for the special characteristic of this class of compound is that the meanings of the constituent parts are always found to be insufficient to express the intended sense. The Naiyāyikas were consequently compelled to resort to "Lakṣaṇā"³ in such cases. Samāsa, as is implied by the very term, is a grammatical device to secure brevity of speech. In the Vedas we generally meet with two-membered compounds which were mostly determined by the variations of accents. Of all the compounds it is specially "बहुव्रीहि" that has got much linguistic advantage, as it enables us to shorten a big expression.

(3) Gender: The determination of grammatical gender constitutes a branch of grammar where we are more controlled by popular usages than by reasoning. No doubt the idea of gender had its origin in the distinction of sexes such as male and female, but when

¹ पुरुषोऽयं परकर्मणिप्रवर्त्तमानः स्व कर्म जहाति । तद्वयथा, तच्चा राजकर्मणिप्रवर्त्तमानः स्व कर्म जहाति ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 364.

² पृथगर्थानामेकार्थोभावः समर्थवचनम्. Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 361.

³ बहुव्रीही न वाक्ये लक्षणा किन्तु पदे.....अतस्तन्निर्वाहिका पदद्वये शक्तिः.....समुदायशक्तौ मानाभावात्. Tattva-chintāmaṇi. Śabdakhaṇḍa, p. 746.

we turn to words and discuss the propriety of their respective genders, we find them too obstinate to yield to any logical generalisation so far as the popular conception of sex is concerned. Grammar has been so much dependent on popular usages with regard to the ascertainment of gender that it utterly failed to give any scientific explanation. No grammar is complete and free from confusion so far as the discourse on gender is concerned. The reason as to why the grammarians,¹ inspite of their accurate observations on all aspects of linguistic phenomena, failed to make a logical and exhaustive treatment of this particular topic, is that the subjective element appears to be so predominant in the formation of genders and that popular usages sometimes betray such rigidity and wanton absence of logic that it is nothing but idle to suggest any justification for the so-called grammatical genders. If we are to explain the question of sex in the words “ज्योत्स्ना” and “नदी,” we must look to certain psychological, or more properly, poetical tendency which represents all that excite pleasurable sensations, as if they were female beings. To regard the “Moon” as feminine on the astronomical ground of its being dependent on the sun for luminosity has but very little to do with the proper conception of sex. There is little that is acceptable in the view that words denoting objects that exhibit female virtues, such as, tenderness, loveliness, submissiveness etc., belong to the feminine gender ; and that words expressive of manly qualities, such as strength, courage, ambition etc., are regarded to be of masculine gender. To turn our attention to Sanskrit grammar, we find just the reverse of this popular view. A flower, though tender and graceful to our sensations, has its denotative term “कुसुम” treated

¹ तस्मान्न देवाकरणेः शक्यं नार्किकं लिङ्गमाख्यातुम्” Mahābhshāya, Vol. II, p. 197.

of in Sanskrit grammar as one of neuter gender and so on. There is so much laxity of the idea of sex in the use of genders that it would be a veritable mistake to suppose that grammatical genders give in reality accurate indications of sex. The Hindu grammarians¹ sought to show the rigidity of popular uses with regard to genders by referring to such forms as “दाराः” and “कलत्रम्” which, though expressive of “wife,” are so sanctioned by popular usage as to be always used in masculine and neuter genders respectively. The conclusion that forces itself upon us in the face of such irregular instances is that in respect of our knowledge of “Laukika.linga” or popular use of genders we are guided more by current usages than by conceptions of sex.

The word “Linga” in its literal sense means a mark or sign by which something may be distinguished, but in popular usage it is rather used in a restricted sense to denote the characteristic marks of males, females, and eunuchs. The popular conception of sex,² according to which beings having long hair and mammary glands are called females, those with hair on the face and breast are known as males, and beings devoid of these features are regarded as eunuch, is not at all harmonious with the grammatical treatment of genders. Patañjali has stated expressly that “Laukika linga” has no application in grammar, as words denoting material bodies such as वृक्ष and खट्वा do not possess any characteristic signs of male and female beings respectively. It is with regard to the entire domain of inanimate world that the question of sex cannot be logically raised. There are two views as to whether “Linga” is to be taken with reference to

¹ “लोकोपचारादयहणमिद्धिः.”—Kalāpa, Sūtra 23.

“हरितक्यः फलान्तीति फलैवपि स्त्रियां वृत्तिः । शब्दानामिकांश्चपि लिङ्गवचनभेदः—यथा आपोऽमलः, दाराः कलत्रं भाव्यति ।—Durga-vritti on the above rule.

² ‘सनकेशवती स्त्रीस्याल्लोमशः पुरुषः श्रुतः’ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. 1, p. 196.

words or objects denoted by them. As neither growth nor decay, whereby males and females are distinguished, is possible so far as words are concerned, it is held by Patañjali that "Linga" is to be understood as pertaining to the object. Some, again, say that "Linga" pertains to the forms of words and has nothing to do with the sense. Though the conception of sex affords much that is anomalous, Patañjali attempted to formulate a scientific principle to explain it. Growth and productivity, he holds, represent two essential characteristics¹ of females and males, *i.e.*, what bears or forms the substratum of embryo is called "स्त्री," and the agent of production is called "पुमान्." Such a criterion, though sound from a physiological standpoint, does not preclude the possibility of confusion. Here too the difficulty arises, as all substances seem to possess growth, development and decay, making it consequently impossible to distinguish males, females, and eunuchs by those qualities. Patañjali comes in close touch with the philosophy of Heraclitus when he observes that everything is in a constant flux of change and as a consequence of such perpetual change nothing can remain in the same state for a moment. There is no growth that is not attended with development and decay, *i.e.*, growth or development and decay is but one and the same thing (there being difference only in manifestation), the latter being only a passage to the former. If the question of absolute growth and decay is thus an impossibility, we have no scientific standard for distinguishing males from females. What course is then to be adopted? When thus scientific

¹ संस्थानप्रसवौ लिङ्गमाश्रयौ..... अधिकरणसाधनालीके स्त्री, स्थायव्यस्यां गर्भः इति । कर्तृ-
साधनश्च पुमान् ।.....नहि कश्चित् स्वास्मिन्नात्मनि मुहूर्तमप्यवतिष्ठते, वडैते वा यावदनेन वर्धितव्य-
मपाद्येनवा युज्यते । तच्चोभयं सर्वतः । यदुभयं सर्वतः कुतोव्यवस्था ? विवक्षातः । संस्थानविवक्षायां
स्त्री, प्रसवविवक्षायां पुमानुभयोरविवक्षायां न पुंसकम् ।आचार्यः—लिङ्गामश्रितं लोकाश्रय-
त्वाङ्गिरस्य etc. Mahābhāṣya (pāṇ. 4.1.1), Vol. II, p. 198.

procedure is proved inefficient for the recognition of sex, Patañjali has no other alternative but to take recourse to “विवक्षा” or particular intention of the speaker. His conclusive remark on this complicated point is that a substance is called “स्त्री” when the idea of growth is intended to be expressed, and “पुमान्” when the idea of productivity is meant. That the determination of grammatical genders baffles all attempts at logic, as the entire question of ‘Līṅga’ depends on popular usages, is quite manifest from the statement of Pāṇini as quoted by Patañjali in support of his own view.

There is no such difficulty with regard to the neuter gender, as it comes between the two well-marked lines. Kaiyaṭa has made here an important observation. He explains ‘नपुंसक’ by ‘स्थितिः’¹ or retention of force which stands midway between the growth and decay. We do not know, if we are allowed to use the scientific expression ‘conservation of energy’ as an exact synonym of ‘स्थिति’ as explained by Kaiyaṭa, but it is almost incontestable that neutrality or a state of equilibrium on the part of ‘Prakṛiti’ or primordial matter represents the preservation of dormant force. It is probably with such lofty thoughts that the word ‘Brahman’ (Supreme Being) was used in the neuter gender by the Vedāntins.

Regarding the philological side of the question, the origin of noun-genders is really obscure. Prof. Brugman could not throw more light on the question than the Indian grammarians who had long ago detected the futility of seeking to find out the rigid sexual associations in the so-called grammatical genders. We may partially account for the two prominent feminine terminations ‘आ’ and ‘ई’ in the following way: The former one *i.e.*, ‘आ’ is probably a shortened form of ‘सा’ or formed in

¹ आभिर्भावितराभावान्नरान्नावस्थास्थितिरुच्यते साच नपुंसकत्वेन व्यवधायते । Kaiyaṭa on the Bhāṣya.

imitation of 'स'—a pronominal word whereby all females are denoted ; and the latter, *i.e.* 'ई' represents similarly the last lengthened vowel in the form 'स्त्री'. The popular custom prevalent among the Hindus¹ also favoured the practice of making all names of females end in lengthened vowels (generally 'ā' and 'ī').

Sanskrit Grammar has its own logic. It has not only taught us the declension and conjugation of some nouns and roots, and how letters undergo transformations in the course of euphonic combinations etc., but has practically shown all throughout strict scientific method in its treatment of linguistic facts. As a system of philosophy based on 'Śabda' in all its aspects, Sanskrit grammar has aimed at scientific principles of generalisation and particularisation. It has its peculiar categories²: action (क्रिया); agent (कर्त्ता); instrument (करण); limit (अवधि); purpose (उद्देश्य); relation (सम्बन्ध); genus (जाति); individual (व्यक्ति) etc. The fundamental method of grammar is an analytical one. Sanskrit grammar, as we have already shown with reference to the Mahābhāṣya, has made use of the scientific method of agreement and difference (अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ) in analysing words into bases and terminations. It has absolute claim to originality so far as the formulation of the doctrine of 'Sphoṭa' is concerned. It was probably for such philosophical characteristics of grammar that the author of the 'Sarvadarśanasamgraha' raised the Pāṇinian system of grammar to the dignity of a regular school of philosophy (पाणिनीयदर्शन). The philosophical aspects of grammar have been shewn by Patañjali and Bhartṛhari in a manner that finds no parallel in the grammatical speculations of the world. The scientific precision, observed in the construction of aphorisms, is an

¹ Manu Saṁhita, 2. 33.

² See Dr. B. N. Seal's "The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus"—P. 294.

indication of the philosophical characteristic of Sanskrit grammar. Grammar has, moreover, made use of certain logical axioms in the course of formulating rules. We give below only a few instances of such grammatical generalisations :

(1) Operations that are mutually dependent are not approved of by grammar (इतरैतराश्रयाणि कार्याणि न प्रकल्पन्ते).

(2) An object does not practically become something else when it has undergone a change with regard to one of its parts (एकदेशविकृतमनन्यवत्).

(3) "The grammarians (the followers of Pāṇini) do not insist on any grammatical operation when its cause is sure to disappear subsequently" (अकृतव्यूहाः पाणिनीयाः).

(4) "A thing should not be inimical or destructive to what it owes its very existence" (सन्निपातलक्षणो विधिरनिमित्तं तद्विघातस्य).

(5) "The conventional signification of a word is more authoritative or stronger than the etymological one" (अवयवप्रसिद्धेः समुदायप्रसिद्धिर्वलौयसी).

(6) A substitute is entitled to all functions of its 'स्थानो', i.e., for which it is substituted (आदेशास्थानिवद्वहन्ति).

(7) That which is actually read or heard is more reliable than what is only inferred or suggested i.e., perception is more authoritative than inference (श्रुतानुमितयो श्रुतसंबन्धोवलवान्).

(8) In the use of synonyms one should not think of their length or shortness (पर्यायशब्दानां लाघवगौरवचर्चा नाद्रोयते). Pāṇini has accordingly used 'वा,' 'विभाषा,' "अन्यतरस्याम्" as indicative of option without considering their relative length or shortness.

(9) The rules of grammar are compared to rainfalls (पर्जन्यवह्नक्षणाप्रवृत्तिः).

(10) When a grammatical operation is applicable to both the predominant and the subordinate, it is the

dominant alone that practically deserves the said operation. (प्रधानाप्रधानयोः प्रधाने कार्यसंप्रत्ययः). This is exactly what we experience in our social affairs. In the presence of a man of high birth and exalted position, people belonging to the lower status of society do not generally command any respect.

The above Paribhāṣhās or fundamental principles of grammar are sufficient to show that the science of grammar is based on logical and popular axioms. Certain Paribhāṣhās (लोकन्यायसिद्ध) seem to have been derived from popular usages, as for instance, 'व्ययदेशिवदेकस्मिन्' (what it means is this:—'A man having only one son may be expected to say in respect of his son, 'he is the eldest', 'he is the youngest' etc.) The rules of grammar have therefore not only a scientific background but have a close touch with the facts of daily experience.

रामार्पणमस्तु

A Historical Study of the Terms Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna and the Origin of Māhāyana Buddhism.

BY R. KIMURA.

PART I

CHAPTER I

I.—The Significance of the terms Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna

From the etymological point of view, 'Mahāyāna' means Great Vehicle, and 'Hīnayāna' means small Vehicle. Now, as you know, 'Yāna' (or Vehicle) implies at least two things; one, the Vehicle itself and secondly, the traveller who uses the Vehicle to go from place to place. From the religious standpoint, 'Yāna' (or Vehicle) itself indicates doctrines, while the figure of the traveller suggests the religious. Again, the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' in relation with one another, have the implication of superiority and inferiority, praise and depreciation; in other words, the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' suggest some rivalry between the two schools, and the word 'Mahā' or Great is used by way of striking a note of superiority and praise of one school over the contending school, Hīnayāna,—as 'Hīna' means small, and implies inferiority and depreciation. So these terms imply naturally superiority and inferiority respectively of the doctrines on the one hand and the religious on the other. If we further particularly amplify these two points, then the 'Doctrines' will resolve themselves into two features, one is the 'Teaching' and another the 'Doctrinal idea'. The former aspect at present stands in the 'Sūtra-form' as record in which doctrinal ideas have

been embodied and the latter is the 'Doctrine' (the dharma) itself; again the 'Religieux' also will resolve itself into two features; one is the 'Religious practices' and the other is 'Salvation.' Therefore, the terms 'Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna' naturally indicate a relation of superiority and inferiority on those four points.

Among Buddhist scholars there is a good deal of divergence of opinion as to the conception of the terms 'Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna'; for example, among our Japanese Buddhist scholars, Dr. Eyun Mayeda, holds that the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' imply a particular relation on the point of 'Religieux' only but definitely not on that of the 'Doctrinal,'¹ while there are others who hold quite a contrary view. But to me the terms indicate both the features; the point of the religieux and the point of the doctrine. And that is precisely why in the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras we find many other terms like 'Ekayāna,' 'Dviyāna,' 'Buddhayāna,' and 'Bodhisattvayāna.' When the necessity has been to show a doctrinal relation, then the terms 'Ekayāna' and 'Dviyāna' have been used in the place of 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna,' and while the religieux is implied, the terms 'Buddhayāna,' or 'Bodhisattvayāna' and 'Arhatyāna,' or 'Śrāvakayāna' have been applied in the place of 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' respectively. All these points will be made clear in course of the subsequent chapters.

*II.—Interrelation underlying between the two terms
Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna as regards subject
matter indicated by them.*

In the previous section, I have already dealt with the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna,' so far as they indicate a mutual relation of two things in the sense of superiority

¹ In his Historical Discourse on Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 117-121. (In Japanese.)

and inferiority, praise and depreciation. At present, our duty is to ascertain the interrelation as regards subject matters indicated by these two terms, and at the same time to try to hit at the right stand-point which can possibly evoke a conception of superiority and inferiority, etc. I should like to say at once that the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' are nothing but expressions of a relation between two aspects of Buddha's perception. This point I had the occasion to explicitly discuss in my paper 'What is Buddhism?'¹ However, for a right understanding of our present subject matter a short-re-statement of the same will be necessary.

When Buddha attained Enlightenment under the Bodhi-tree, he understood the reality of this world in two-fold aspect, *viz.* :—(i) the peaceful real state of the internal world, (ii) the sorrowful apparent state of this world. There he obtained two different perceptions :—(i) The transcendental truth of the world, and (ii) the truth of the apparent world. In other words, when Buddha looked to this world from his enlightened stand point, he at once had a penetration first into the real state of this phenomenal, outward 'Saṃsāra,' the chain of cause and effect; and then an introspection to the reality of the internal world, and the way to realize the same.

From the stand-point of Buddha's perception, the former is 'Phenomenological' and the latter is 'Ontological;' also the former became 'The Doctrine which he preached only according to people's requirements;' while the latter is 'The Doctrine which expressed his own self-introspectional perception;' again the former became 'The Exoteric Doctrine (vyaktopadeśa)' and the latter 'The Esoteric Doctrine (guhyopadeśa).' From the historical point of view again, the former became the

¹ Published in the Journal of Letters, Calcutta University, Vol. IV.

'Original Buddhism,' while the latter, the 'Developed Buddhism.' All these will be clear from the following explanation.

From history of Buddhism in India, we know that, after Buddha obtained perfect Enlightenment, he began to preach for the salvation of all human beings. To carry out his purpose, after due deliberation¹ he preached for the pretty long period of 45 years (530 B.C.—486 B.C.), beginning from the first sermon at the Deer-Park near Benāres, known as Dhammacakka-pavattna-sutta (the sūtra of the Foundation of the Kingdom of Righteousness), and ending with the teaching embodied in the Mahāpari-nibbāna-sutta at Kusinārā. During these years, as far as history records, he preached and explained only his doctrine of Phenomenological perceptions with the 'Four-Noble-Truths' (catvāri-ārya-satyāni) as its basis, namely (1) 'Suffering' (duḥkha) by which he used to explain the question of 'what' of the apparent world, (2) 'Its cause' (duḥkha-samudaya) by which he used to answer the question of 'Why' 'How' of the same 'Saṃsāra,' (3) 'Suppression' (duḥkha-nirodha) and (4) 'The path leading to its final extinction (duḥkha-nirodha-mārga). Besides these, we have two other formulæ embodying Buddha's instruction: (i) The three-fold corner stone of Buddhism, namely 'All is impermanent,' (sarvaṃ-anityaṃ), 'All is suffering' (sarvaṃ-duḥkhaṃ) and 'All is without self' (sarvaṃ-anātmaṃ). (ii) The famous term 'twelve-linked chain of causation' (dvādaśa-pratitya-samutpāda). The former is minute explanation of 'Duḥkha' and the latter is a

¹ The tradition of seven weeks' deliberation after the enlightenment is most satisfactorily explained by the supposition that he was considering carefully the age, the country and the capacity of the ordinary people to whom he would have to minister, and then the best form of presenting the Truth so that all may appreciate. Another reason may be, as has been suggested by others, that he did not find at once the necessary type of disciples who would receive his teachings.

minute statement of 'Duhkha-samudaya.' However, the fact that occurs to us is that all throughout his life the Buddha never preached his Introspectional Ontological Doctrine explicitly. The reason of this, in my opinion, is that he always considered the capacity and the necessity of the people around him, so that he preached whatever were useful and apt to suit the particular condition and environment, religious, philosophical, and social, of that age. We should not forget the most important feature of Buddha's preaching, that he always considered the time, the place, the person, and the totality of these circumstances, whenever, whatever and to whomsoever he was going to preach. That is why it has been said is the Nikāya :—

"Tathāgato araham sammāsambuddho atthaññū, dhammaññū, mattaññū, kālaññū, parisaññū, imehi Pañcāhi dhammehi samannāgato Tathāgato dhammen'eva anuttaram dhamma-cakkaṃ pavatteti"¹

"The noble Tathāgata, the perfectly Awakened one, knows the sense, the dhamma, the proportion, the time, the assembly. Endowed with these five qualities the Tathāgata turns the transcendental Wheel of the Law according to the Dhamma."²

From Brāhmanic, Buddhistic and Jaina sources, we learn that just at the time of the Buddha or a little before him, in India, Vedic Aryan domain (which comprised the countries of Kurus, Matsyas, Pañcālas and Śūrasenas) in the West, as well as Magadha and its surrounding countries in the East among the outlandic or mixed Aryans, differed from one another in social organisation³ and environment, religious and philosophical conditions.

¹ A. N. V., p. 131.

² Translated by my friend Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

³ In the Brāhmanic West, naturally Brāhmanas were most powerful in society among the four castes and Kṣatriyas were subordinate to them, on the other hand

Of these factors, those specially relating to different religious and philosophical systems are very important for our consideration to enable us to understand the history of the period.

As is known, in every country the religious and philosophical movements create and fashion new social ideas and ideals. The most remarkable feature in Indian life at the time of the Buddha was the existence of various order of teachers both Vedic and un-Vedic with different opinions and views on life. This distinctly helped the progress of thought and development of social life. Both the land of the West as well as that of the East were centres of a series of eminent teachers with their separate systems of thought. Again the orders of teachers in both the West and the East, represent different groups or schools of thought. These groups may roughly be divided into either Sramanas and Brāhmanas or Tāpasas and Paribrājakas.¹

In the West, among the Vedic Aryans, there were two different schools of cultures. One is the school of 'Karma' and another the school of 'Jñāna.' The former was propounded and practised only by Brāhmana priests who occupied quite an influential position in the Vedic society at that time and their thought tended only to elaborate sacrificial rituals which, according to them, was the only essential feature of religious life, while the latter on the contrary speculated on religious and philosophical matters. The Kṣatriyas were uppermost in originating and developing this line of thought, though they were busy with military conquests during the early Vedic

in the non-Brāhmanic East, the Kṣatriyas held the first position and Brāhmanas were under them. Herein lies the essential distinction of the two social systems. See 'English translation of Social Organisation in North East India in Buddha's Time' by Richard Fick, published by the Calcutta University, pp. 11-13.

¹ See Dr. B. M. Barua's Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy, p. 191.

period but could make time for such serious thought during the closing period of the Rig-Veda. Problems like these were uppermost in their mind,—the creator of the world, the existence of a ‘Universal entity’ (mahātmā) and ‘Individual entities’ (jivātmā) as well as the idea of essential unity of both. Therefore, their thought tended in contradistinction with that of Brāhmana priest, to encourage the subjective mode of attaining truth and living an ascetic life in the forests, practising penance and pursuing a life of inner culture and meditation. The Upanishadic speculations, as we call them, originated in this period. We should notice here that the Vedic Aryan culture as a whole would appear to be a lay movement; almost all their teachers were married householders. Now let us see what was the cultural condition in the East, the land of the outlandic Aryans or mixed Aryans. It seems that in religious and philosophical speculations and thought-movements the East surpassed the land of the West at this time. It is more proper to say that at the time of the Buddha, the centre of speculative culture in India shifted from the land of the West to that of the East; that is to say, the centre of the culture shifted from Kuru-Pāñcāla to Magadha. In the Magadha proper and territories around it, there were many teachers at the time of the Buddha, and they were not Kṣatriya or Brāhmana householders as in the West but Śramanas and Paribrājakas. In Pāli literature they are called ‘Tittiyaas’ or ‘Tirthaṅkaras.’ Dr. Rhys Davids, for the first time, called them ‘Sophists,’ and said that, they established numerous independent religious orders and several speculative institutions.¹ Again he said in the same book, “Besides the hermits, there was another body of men, greatly respected throughout the country, quite peculiar to

¹ See ‘Buddhist India’ by Dr. Rhys Davids, pp. 141-160.

India, and not known even there much before the rise of Buddhism called the wanderers (*Paribbāyaka*). They were teachers, or sophists, who spent eight or nine months of every year wandering about precisely with the object of engaging in conversational discussions on matters of ethics and philosophy, nature lore and mysticism. Like the sophists among the Greeks, they differed very much in intelligence, in earnestness, and in honesty."

Those teachers whether *Brāhmaṇa* or not by birth, were in general attitude Anti-Vedic and Anti-*Brāhmaṇic*.¹

In the light of the evidence of Buddhist literature one can see that no less than 50 orders² and schools of recluses and wanderers were existing just at the time. Among them the most famous were the so-called six wandering teachers namely :—

1. *Pūrāṇa Kassapa* who held '*Akriyā-Vāda*'³ (*i.e.*, the soul does not act or cause others to act). And at the same time he held '*Ahetu-appaccaya-Vāda*' (*i.e.*,⁴ non-causation).

2. *Kakuda Kātyāyana*, who held also '*Akriyā-Vāda*' as well as '*Satta-Kāya-Vāda*' (*i.e.*, the doctrine of seven categories).⁵

3. *Ajita Keśakambalin*, who held '*Aññamjiv-aññimsarira-Vāda*' (*i.e.*, the doctrine of soul being distinct from the body).⁶ And he was an annihilationist on the one hand and hedonist on the other and at the same time a materialist.⁷

¹ See Dr. B. M. Barua's *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, p. 189.

² Regarding this point, Mr. Bimla Charaz. Law, M.A., has collected the names and schools of the wandering teachers in *J. A. S. B.*, Vol. XIV, 1918, No. 7, pp. 400-406.

³ *Sūtra-Kṛitāṅga*. I.I.I. 13.

⁴ *S. N.* III, p. 69.

⁵ *D.N.* I. 57 and *Sūtra-Kṛitāṅga* I.I.I. 15. 16.

⁶ Dr. B. M. Barua's *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, p. 294.

⁷ *Jacobi's Jaina Sūtras*, Part 2, p. 341.

4. Maskarin Gośāla, who held 'Pariṇāma-vāda' (i.e., a doctrine of natural transformation).¹

5. Sañjaya Belatṭhiputta who held 'Ajñāna-vāda' (i.e., scepticism).²

6. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, who held 'Kriyā-Vāda' (i.e., the law of action).

All these religious and philosophical movements either of the Vedic Aryans in the West or the Outlandic Aryans in the East, either of the school of Śramanas or Brāhmanas, can be included within eight kinds of categories stated in the Brahma-jāla-sutta in Digh-nikāya. —(1) Sassata-vāda, i.e., the doctrine which says that both the external world and individual souls are eternal. (2) Ekacca-sassata-vāda, i.e., the doctrine that a portion of the world and souls are eternal and the other part is not so. (3) Antānantika, some hold that the world is finite and others that is infinite. (4) Amarā-vikkhepika, which does not give any definite answer in any question on any subject. (5) Adhicca-samuppannika, which says that origin of things is without a cause. (6) Uddhamāghatanika, which believes in the future existence of human souls. (7) Uccheda-vāda, the doctrine which says that there is a soul but that it will cease to exist. (8) Diṭṭha-dhammanibbāṇa-vāda which says that there is a soul and that it can attain perfect bliss in the present world.

All the above ideas stood on quite a contrary relation to the Buddha's thought. Most of them were one-sided extremes and quite naturally led ignorant people more and more to the 'Eternalists,' 'Annihilationists,'

¹ According to Jaina Bhagavati sūtra and its commentary, his doctrine is mentioned as 'Puṭṭaparihāra-Vāda, (see Dr. B. M. Barua's Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy, p. 304). In D.N.I., p. 53, his doctrine is mentioned as Niyati-saṅgaṭṭi-bhāva-pariṇata-Vāda.

² In D. N. I., pp. 24-28, his doctrine mentioned as Amarā vikkhepika (or Eel-wriggler.)

³ These eight categories sum up 62 kinds of different opinions which existed in India about the time of Buddha.

'Determinists,' 'Fortuitist,' 'Individualist,' 'Fatalist,' 'Hedonist,' 'Ascetic,' etc., of course, those Śramana and Brāhmaṇa teachers must be ranked in the class of philosophers just because they in their own way had sufficient penetration of thought to recognise the suffering and miserable state of the 'Samsāra' and also they found out ways for men's salvation. That was also just what Gotama Buddha did. It must be recognised, however, that such extreme ideas or one-sided ways could not lead men to real truth.

Buddha with his characteristic insight, understood the particular religious and philosophical condition of the country at that time; therefore, against their ideas he kept his 'Ontological perception' aside from the common mass and preached directly his 'Phenomenological perception.' Besides this he established the 'Middle-path' as the real way to salvation and avoided all kinds of extremes.

It was all useless discussion, he said, to inquire into the origin of all things and existences as the Śramanas and Brāhmaṇas did. He considered that such enquiries were absolutely without any profit and would never lead men to salvation. So when Maluṅka asked Buddha whether the existence of the world is eternal or ephemeral, he made no answer, but simply said :—

"It is necessary to come out at once from fire for those who are in the burning flames and it is necessary to take away the arrow from the body of those who have been struck with the poisonous arrow. They are quite ignorant, who think about the condition when they will be coming out of the fire, while they actually are burning in fire; they are also ignorant who, being struck by the poisonous arrow want to know the construction of the arrow without attempting to remove it from the body."¹

¹ M. N., Vol. I, p. 29.

Thus in accordance with the particular time, social condition and people's inclination and necessity, Buddha permitted himself to preach 'Phenomenological doctrines' in his lifetime. Now we can understand why 'Phenomenological doctrines' had been preached in Buddha's lifetime and at the same time why from the historical point of view, it has been called 'Original Buddhism.'

Here such a question must arise naturally, when and to whom the Buddha preached his 'Introspectional doctrines?' In answer to this, we have at least two explanations to offer. First, Buddha preached his 'Introspectional doctrines' even in his lifetime; secondly, this aspect of his doctrines remained to be manifested or developed by brilliant disciples of Buddha and their followers after the Master's Parinirvāṇa.

Let us now discuss these points one after another. (I) With regard to the first point; Buddha actually preached 'Phenomenological doctrines' in his lifetime according to men's capacity. But from Mahāyānic statements, we come to know that Buddha's final aim was to preach his 'Ontological doctrines,' so that all men could attain salvation equally as he himself did. From the same source we also come to know that as soon as Buddha understood that the common people had not sufficient mental and intellectual strength to grasp 'his Introspectional doctrines,' he hesitated at once to disseminate such high doctrines among them. So it is said in the Upāyakaūśalyaparivarta of Saddharma puṇḍarīka-sūtra :—

“गन्धोर् शारिपुत्र दुर्दृशं दुरनुबोधं बुद्धज्ञानं तथागतैरर्हद्भिः सम्यक्सं-
संबुद्धैः प्रतिबुद्धं दुर्विज्ञेयं सर्वत्रावकप्रत्येकबुद्धैः । तथागत-
एव शारिपुत्र तथागतस्य धर्मं देशयेय्यार्न्धर्मास्तथागतो ज्ञानति ।¹

¹ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, Part I, pp. 29-30.

“The Buddha-knowledge, Śāriputra, is profound, difficult to understand, difficult to comprehend. It is difficult for all disciples and Prottyekabuddhas to fathom the knowledge arrived at by Tathāgatas,..... None but a Tathāgata, Śāriputra, can impart to a Tathāgata alone those laws which the Tathāgata knows.”¹

A similar expression is also to be found even in the Pāli canon :—

“Tassa mayham bhikkhave etad ahoṣi, adhigato kho me ayaṃ dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodho santo paṇito atakkāvacarō nipuṇo paṇḍita-vedanīyo.”²

“Then this thought occurs to me; verily has this Dhamma been realised by me, the Dhamma which is profound, which is difficult to perceive and difficult to understand, which is tranquil, and excellent, which has not its foundation upon argumentation, but which is subtle, and comprehensible only by the wise.”

But nevertheless it was a fact that Buddha preached his ‘Introspectional doctrines’ in an esoteric, mystical garb for the advanced disciples. The following quotation will clearly support this point; in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, it is stated :—

अथ खल्वायुष्माच्चारिपुत्रस्तासां चतसृणां पर्वदं विचिकित्साकथं कथां विदित्वा चेतसेव चेतःपरिवितर्कमात्रायात्मना च धर्मसंययप्राप्तस्तस्यां वेलायां भगवन्तमेतदबोचत् । को भगवन्हेतुः कः प्रत्ययो यद्भगवान् धिमात्रं पुनः पुनस्तथागतानामुपायकौशल्यज्ञानदर्शनधर्मदेशनां संवर्णयति । गम्भीरस्य मे धर्मेऽभिसंबुद्ध इति । दुर्विज्ञेयं च संधाभाष्यमिति पुनः पुनः संवर्णयति । न च मे भगवतोऽस्तिकादेर्वनूपो धर्मपर्यायः श्रुतपूर्वः ।”³

“And the venerable Śāriputra, who apprehended the doubt and uncertainty of the four classes of the audience

¹ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, pp. 30-32.

² Mahāvagga. 1. 5. 2-3. (Vol. I, p. 45). S. N. VI. 1. I. (Vol. I, pp. 136-7) M. N. (Vol. I, pp. 167-168).

³ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, Part I, pp. 33-4.

and guessed their thoughts from what was passing in his own mind, himself being in doubt about the law, then said to the Lord ; what, O Lord, is the cause, what the reason of the Lord so repeatedly and extremely extolling the skilfulness, knowledge, and preaching of the Tathāgata ? Why does he repeatedly extol it by saying, 'Profound is the law by me discovered ; it is difficult to understand the mystery of the Tathāgatas.' Never before have I heard from the Lord such a discourse on the law." ¹

In the same sūtra :—

“बहूनि संवाचनेहि चोक्तं दुर्बोध्यमेतं हि अशिक्षितेहि ॥” ²

“They have spoken in many mysteries ; hence it is difficult to understand (them).” ³

Therefore, Nāgārjuna said in his Prajñāpāramitā-Śāstra :—⁴

“There are two kinds of Buddhism : one is 'esoteric' (guhya) and another is 'exoteric' (vyakta). In the esoteric doctrine which he preached for only Bodhisattvas, it has been said that Bodhisattvas only obtain the reality which is beyond the birth and death. In the exoteric doctrine it has been preached by him that all Arhats are puṇya-kṣetras.” ⁵

Now let us see what light on this point can be had from Mahāyāna sūtras. If we read Amitārtha-sūtra and Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra, which are regarded as the most important of Mahāyāna sūtras, we come to know, that Buddha preached his introspectional doctrine in the last part of his life. The Amithārtha-sūtra runs thus :—

“After meditating six years under the Bodhi-tree, I have arrived at Supreme, Perfect Enlightenment and

¹ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 35.

² Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra, Part I, p. 59.

³ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 59.

⁴ Wang Bundle, Vol. I, p. 29a and Vol. 4, p. 25b of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

⁵ Every individual is a Kṣetra or a field (metaphorically) in which puṇya (virtues or merits) may be produced.

I have penetrated into the secret of the Dharma with the supreme eye of knowledge (buddha-netra), and have come to know that this Dharma cannot be preached at present. Because, I know, that people possess different capacities and different desires. Therefore, since that time, I have been preaching several other doctrines according to their requirements as means or expedient (upāya). Thus during the last forty years, I have not revealed the true doctrine. So people obtained different conceptions of truth but could not get Supreme Enlightenment at once.....

Now I shall preach this Mahāyāna Amithārtha-sūtra (*i.e.*, sūtra on the immeasurable meaning). This is the inconceivable deep doctrine of Buddha. Therefore, this cannot be understood by Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-Buddhas and even the Bodhisattvas of the 'Daśavihārā' or the second stage of Bodhisattva-mārga. But a Tathāgata alone can convey and explain this doctrine to a Tathāgatha, and a Tathāgatha alone can be understood."¹

Again in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra we meet with the following statement:—

“शारिपुत्र तथागतो ऽप्यर्हसम्यक्संबुद्धो न मृषवादो भवति येन पूर्वमुपायकौशलेन त्रिणि यानान्युपदर्शयित्वा पञ्चाङ्गहायानेनैव सत्त्वान्परिनिर्वापयति”²

“Śāriputra, the Tathāgata, the Arhat, &c., tells no falsehood when by an able device he first holds forth three Vehicles and afterwards leads all to complete Nirvāṇa by the one great Vehicle.”³

Again in the same sūtra we have:—

“उपायकौशले प्रकाशयन्ति विविधानि यानान्युपदर्शयन्ति ।
एकं च यानं परिदोषयन्ति बुद्धा इमासुत्तमशान्तभूमिम् ॥”⁴

¹ In Bundle, Vol. I, pp. 3a-4b of Chinese Tripiṭaka (see, also Nanjio's catalogue, p. 43, No. 133.

² Vol. I, p. 82.

³ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 82.

⁴ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, Part I, p. 53.

"Those Buddhas while manifesting skilfulness display various vehicles though, at the same time, indicating the one single vehicle :¹ the supreme place of blessed rest."²

From the above quotations, we get two different statements; one is the 'Periodical division' of Buddha's preaching; another is the 'Characteristic division' of Buddha's doctrines and teachings. First, regarding the 'Periodical division' we come to learn from above statements that Buddha preached his Phenomenological doctrines in the early Part of his life, and Introspectional doctrines or Ontological teachings in the last part of his life. Of course, this statement does not tally with known historical facts. Because, from the historical point of view, there can be no such particular periodical division in the Buddha's preaching except the two-fold forms—'esoteric' and 'exoteric.' But from the above evidence we can easily conclude, that Buddha preached his Introspectional doctrines even in his lifetime. Here, then, a question may arise, if there were no such precise periodical division in the Buddha's preaching, then why such a statement has been made at all in the said Mahāyāna sūtras, that Buddha preached Phenomenological doctrine in early part of his life, while he gave away the Mahāyāna or Ontological doctrines in the last part of his life.

In my opinion, Mahāyana sūtras and the statements embodied therein undoubtedly came into being after Buddha's death, and these were the products of a set of advanced and brilliant disciples of the Buddha. These Mahāyānic ideas were the results of a deep, critical penetration over the Buddha's Introspectional perceptions

¹ In the above quotation words 'Three Vehicles' and 'Various Vehicles' are indications of expedient doctrines which have been indicated in the Amitārtha-sūtra. The words 'Great Vehicle' and 'One Vehicle' are the indications of Buddha's self-introspectional perception.

² S. B. E., Vol. XVI, p. 58.

and his teachings. Thereby they thought, the Buddha's real intention was being fructified. Those Mahāyānic views were really their expositions over the Buddha's Introspectional ideas as rightly grasped by them.

Historically, it must be said that Buddha preached his Phenomenological doctrines in an 'Exoteric form' to the people and his Ontological doctrines in the 'Esoteric form' was reserved only for advanced or brilliant men.

Teachings on both these lines proceeded simultaneously without implying any periodical or chronological division. However, from the doctrinal point of view, the former is the mere expedient (upāya) doctrine, while the latter is the real doctrine. This order equates well with the inherent natural law in the spiritual domain. Here the former or 'exoteric' must come first and the latter or 'esoteric' would come next. All classes of human beings, either wise or ignorant, have to pass through, first, the expedient stage of doctrines for some time as the first step for higher culture, and when they are well-grounded and sufficiently advanced they have to come at last to the real doctrine or final stage. This may have led to the conception of the said 'Periodical division' that we meet with in the Mahāyānic sūtras.

Here we can at once understand that the above statements in Mahāyāna sūtras are not at all different from historical facts on the question of the existence of Buddha's Introspectional doctrines and teachings in his lifetime. Now, at the same time we also understand why Mahāyānists have called Buddha's Phenomenological doctrines by the term 'Exoteric' (or vyaktopadeśa) and his Ontological doctrines under the name 'Esoteric' (or guhyopadeśa).

Next, let us see what is the significance of the above noted 'Characteristic division' of the Buddha's doctrines which we meet with in the above sūtras? This is rather

an important consideration in order to understand aright Mahāyāna doctrines. According to these statements, the doctrine which Buddha preached in the early part of his life has been said 'Expedient doctrine' or (upāyakaauśalya-upadeśa). Sometimes the same has been called 'Two-fold vehicle' or (dviyāna) as well as 'Three-fold vehicle' or (triyāna); while the doctrine which he preached in the latter part of his life has been termed, 'True doctrine' or (satya-upadeśa) or sometimes 'Great vehicle' or (mahāyāna), as well as 'One vehicle' or (ekayāna).

A further elaborate explanation as well as re-iteration of this point is to be met with in the Prajñāpāramitā and other sūtras. In the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra itself Subhāti asks Buddha thus, "What do you say? Is the Bodhisattva stage complete or incomplete?"

Buddha answers, "Bodhisattva stage is itself complete but not incomplete. Another question still. "Which vehicle (yāna) do you think, sir, to be complete?"

He answered, "The Two-fold vehicle (dviyāna) is incomplete, while the Buddha vehicle (buddhayāna) alone is perfectly complete."¹

The above quotation plainly suggests that the doctrine of the Two-fold vehicle (dviyāna) is neither complete nor real. While the Buddha vehicle (buddhayāna) is alone complete. This statement equates well with the general trend of the Amitārtha-sūtra as well as the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra.

Nāgārjuna also speaks in the same clear strain in his Prajñāpāramitā-sāstra :—

"In the Śrāvaka sūtras (hīnayāna) the doctrine of Dharma-tathatā also has been preached, but not clearly enough, while in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras it has been

¹ Pañcaviṃśati-Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, fasciculi 83, i.e., Yuch Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 52a, Chinese Tripiṭaka.

clearly explained. Therefore, in them we easily get a real penetration into the doctrine.”¹

In the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra-upadeśa*² of Vasubandhu we meet with a similar idea. In the said upadeśa, Vasubandhu has given seventeen different names of Mahāyāna³ of which the fourteenth one is “Sūtra in which the doctrine of One Vehicle has been preached” or (*ekayāna-upadeśa-sūtra*).

As a further explanation of the fourteenth name we have the following from Vasubandhu :—

“The name is so, because the doctrine embodied in it fully explains and indicates the reality of Supreme Perfect Enlightenment. But the doctrine of Two-fold vehicle or (*dviyāna*) is not the perfect reality.”¹

The above quotations clearly indicate the two different characteristic doctrines to be met with in the Buddha’s preachings. Next, we understand that the

¹ *Prajñāpāramitā-sāstra*, 68 Fasciculi, i.e., Wang Bundle, Vol. 4, p. 4a, Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² Wang Bundle, Vol. 6, pp. 59b-a, Chinese Tripiṭaka.

³ Seventeen different names of Mahāyāna are :—

- (1) “Sūtra on the immeasurable meanings” or (*Amitārtha-sūtra*).
- (2) “Most excellent sūtra” or (*Uttama-sūtra*).
- (3) *Mahāvaiṣṭhāyika sūtra*.
- (4) “Doctrine which was preached for Bodhisattva.”
- (5) “The doctrine which is being protected by Buddhas.”
- (6) “Esoteric doctrine of Buddha.”
- (7) “The Piṭaka of all Buddhas” or (*Sarva Buddhāṇāṃ Piṭaka*).
- (8) “The Esoteric place of all Buddhas” or (*Sarva Buddhāṇāṃ guhya-sthānaṃ*).
- (9) “The sūtra which relates the birth of All Buddhas.”
- (10) “Sacred place of All Buddhas.”
- (11) “The wheel of the Law which is being turned by All Buddhas.”
- (12) *Sarva Buddhāṇāṃ dhīradhātū*.
- (13) *Sarva Buddhāṇāṃ upāyakaṇḍalya sūtra*.
- (14) *Ekayāna upadeśa sūtra*.
- (15) *Paramārtha sthāpanā*.
- (16) *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*.
- (17) *Uttama dharma*.

The Sanskrit restoration of above names is purely personal.

⁴ Wang Bundle. Vol. 6, p. 59a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

Phenomenological doctrines were being preached according to men's requirements and capabilities, but that was not the real doctrine; while the Introspectional and Ontological doctrines explained in the light of the Buddha's independent self-perception was only real and final.

Thus, from the above we understand clearly, that the Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological doctrines existed even in his lifetime and that was the only real doctrine from his own point of view.

II. Let us, then, consider historically our next point and see how the Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological doctrines had been developed after his parinirvāṇa by a set of brilliant disciples and followers. To discuss this point, it will be necessary to know at first in what Sūtras, the Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological doctrines have been recorded. For this purpose again, it is better to speak here of the classifications and systematic division of Buddhism made by great Chinese Buddhist scholars, during the period from the fifth to ninth centuries A.D., so that we may understand what sort of Sūtras were put under the Mahāyānic division. According to Chinese Buddhist history, during the period from the time of the Sui-dynasty to that of the T'ān-dynasty, *i.e.*, from 581-906 A.D.,¹ Nine Buddhist Schools were established in China. Among them, "the Three sāstra schools," "The Thin-thāi school," "The Avataṃsaka school," and "The Dharma-lakṣaṇa school" came under the Mahāyāna head.² And

¹ In this period Buddhism was in a most flourishing condition in China, so it has been rightly called, "The blossoming age of Buddhism."

² Nine schools were the following: (of which four have already been referred to)

- (1) "The Pure land sect."
- (2) "The Dhyaṇa sect."
- (3) "The Montra sect."
- (4) "The Abhidharma sect."
- (5) "The Vinaya sect."

Of the above, again, the first three were Mahāyānic and the last two Hīnayānic.

Ciā-Siān-tā-sh', C'-cō-tā-sh, Hhien-shen-tā-sh' and Hiuentsang were the respective founders or systematizers of these schools. Be it remembered, however, that they all made classifications of Buddhism according to their own standpoint. However, on the whole, all their classifications agree equally on main points. All of them made both a periodical, as well as a doctrinal, classification of Buddhism.

First, three different periods of the Buddha's preaching are recognised by all:—In the 'First period,' that is to say, just after three weeks of his Enlightenment, the Buddha preached the doctrine embodied in the Avataṃśka-sūtras which he put forth in order to test the people, thereby to understand whether Ontological doctrines will be appropriate for them or not. These sūtras, later on, were eventually regarded as the most important records of the Buddha's Introspectional perception, and necessarily of great value as Mahāyāna sūtras. But Buddha soon found that the people were too ignorant to understand such profound doctrines. Therefore, he changed at once his intention and had recourse to a new method and began to preach 'Four Agamas' (*i.e.*, Four Nikāyas in Pāli) quite in keeping with men's capacity. The doctrines herein embodied were 'Expedient doctrine' (upāya-upadeśa). This is the 'Second period':—In course of time, Buddha came to learn that those people were then more advanced in their mental culture so that it was high time for him to preach his Introspectional and Ontological doctrines. Thus, then, this 'Third period' was reserved and kept aside to preach, when the right time would arrive, his true perception as contained in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, Mahāvaiṣṭya-sūtras, Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra, as well as Mahāyāna-Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtras.

Of the above three periodical divisions, the first was simply a trial stage. So that, really speaking, his actual

preaching was covered by the last two periods. This periodical classification of the said Chinese scholars is quite on a par with the statement in Amitārtha-sūtra alluded to above, as well as Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-sūtra. It is beyond doubt that the classifications of the Chinese scholars were based upon the statements on the Amitārtha and Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-sūtras of Mahāyāna.

Next, let us briefly state the Chinese classification of doctrine of Buddhism. They made a two-fold division on the whole. The doctrines embodied in the so-called 'Four Āgamas' have been variously called 'Triyāna doctrines,' 'Expedient doctrine' 'The Doctrine which was set forth according to peoples on capacity.' Later the generic name 'Hīnayāna' was applied to it. While the doctrines preached in the Third period with that of the Avataṃsaka-sūtras (which Buddha put forth as a test in the First period) were called the 'True doctrine' which later on came to be known as 'Mahāyāna.'

Of the above mentioned two-fold classification, the 'periodical one' is very important for our present purpose. Because, from these statements we come to know clearly that the Mahāyāna sūtras; Avataṃsaka, Prajñāpāramitā Saddharmapūṇḍarīka and Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtras were the records of Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological doctrines. This was our main point of inquiry and here we arrived at the right point.

If Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological doctrines came to be recorded in the Mahāyāna sūtra-form, then, to be quite logical, it should not be said that this doctrine did exist in the Buddha's life-time, because, from the historical point of view, these Mahāyāna sūtras came to exist undoubtedly after Buddha's Parinirvāṇa and so-called 'Four Nikāyas' or 'Āgamas' are only regarded as authentic records in comparison with later Mahāyānic

sūtras. Not only that, it is for the first time that we meet with the names of those Mahāyāna-sūtras in Nāgārjuna's *Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra*;¹ the commentary on *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*. Therefore, it can be said without hesitation, that those Mahāyāna-sūtras came to being at the time of, or some time before Nāgārjuna. We have another inter-related statement on this matter, in Paramārtha's commentary on the *Nikāya-avalambana-śāstra* (Pu-Chih-I-lun) of Vasumitra,² and as its epitome we have the following :—

“During two hundred years after Buddha's Mahāparinirvāṇa, three schools sprang up from the Mahāsaṅghika, namely ; (i) Ekavyavahārika, (ii) Lokottara-vāda, (iii) Kaukkutika. And the cause of this separation was at first, Mahādeva, the leader of the Mahāsaṅghikas who dwelt in Aṅgottara country in the North of Rājagriha. There he preached the doctrine of Avatamsaka, *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, etc. At that time, two parties seceded from the main Mahāsaṅghika school on account of Mahādeva's preaching. Because some of them believed in that doctrine, they together formed one party ; while others did not agree and they made up another party.” If we take this, as an authentic statement, then we can say at once that some of the Mahāyāna sūtras were existing in the time of the Second Council, held a hundred years after the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa at Vaiśālī. But undoubtedly, from the historical point of view or from the point of time, Mahāyāna sūtras came into being definitely not before, but after, Buddha's death. At the same time it cannot also be said that Buddha's Ontological perceptions or

¹ See Appendix.

² This original commentary has been lost, and I culled this statement from a quotation in 'San-ron-gen-gi,' Vol. I, p. 51 (in Chinese).

those Mahāyānic doctrines (in their sūtra-form) were existing in Buddha's lifetime.

Here, we find the definite reason why we have termed Mahāyāna Buddhism as 'Developed form of Buddhism.'

Thus in the course of the above long discussion we have tried to show clearly the validity of two different positions regarding the Buddha's Ontological perceptions or Mahāyāna Buddhism. First, the Ontological doctrines had been existing in the Buddha's lifetime. Second, the said doctrines waited to be developed or manifested only after the Buddha's death. My attempt has been to show that both the statements are correct as they stand by themselves as historical facts. Because from the historical point of view 'Ontological doctrines' (or Mahāyāna Buddhism) are Developed form of Buddhism and 'Phenomenological doctrines' (or Hīnayāna Buddhism) only are Original Buddhism. But from the standpoint of idea or perception we cannot deny the existence of Mahāyānic doctrines or 'Ontological perception' in the Buddha's lifetime. Not only that, we may go a step further, and say that in his lifetime, the Buddha preached such doctrines among his advanced disciples in the esoteric way. This is the reason, I think, why we meet even in the Pāli Nikāya many passages which clearly indicate Buddha's Introspectional perception.

Let us now at the end of this section give a resumé of the whole discussion. We have learnt that the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' in their relation with one another have following senses :—

(1) The terms as expressing the relation between 'Phenomenological perception' and 'Ontological perception.' *This is from the point of Buddha's perception.*

(2) The terms as expressing the relation between 'Expedient doctrines' and 'True doctrines.' *This is from the doctrinal point.*

(3) The terms as expressing the relation between 'Exoteric doctrines' and 'Esoteric doctrines.' *This is from the point of Buddha's way of preaching.*

(4) The terms as expressing the relation between 'Original Buddhism' and 'Developed form of Buddhism.' *This is from historical point of view.*

Now, we have to discuss "By which early Buddhist school the Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological doctrines have been developed and transformed into the Mahāyāna Buddhism as generally called. This question we shall take up in the next section.

CHAPTER II.

I.—Through men of what school and at what time the terms Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna came to be used.

In the last chapter, I have discussed various interpretations on the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna,' and their relation from many points of view. Our duty, now, is to see, how these terms came into use? That is to say, by whom, or through which school and from what time, the terms were made current? In order to clear the question, we have to discuss two problems at least. Firstly, we should deal with the 'Men' or 'School' through whom or which, the said terms were used. Besides these, many other allied questions also will crop up as side issues, but I hope they will be all made clear in the course of our discussion on the two main questions. Incidentally a very important question, *viz.*, "*the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism*" also will be explained.

Now, let us take up the first question. And in doing so, we would draw your attention, at first, to the point already noted that the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' on the very face bear a relative sense, 'Superiority' and 'Inferiority,' as well as 'Praise and Depreciation.' Obviously, as we can all easily imagine, such terms, speaking from an emotional point of view, cannot come from the quarter of the men of Hīnayāna. This is exactly the reason why the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' and other allied ones having the same sense are occurring in Mahāyāna Sūtras and Śāstras innumerable times, but there is even not a single instance of them in the Pāli Nikāya.¹

¹ In certain statements contained in introduction of Ekottarāgama-sūtra, in Chinese we meet with the term 'Mahāyāna.' However, so far as we understand these portions are later additions.

Our next question then is, who was the founder of the Mahāyāna school and whom can we call the first Mahāyānist, if at all? As I have told you in the introductory note, some scholars of Buddhism are of opinion that the founders of Mahāyānism were Aśva-ghoṣa I, Nāgārjuna, as well as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. And among them Nāgārjuna was regarded as the chief one. Their opinion mainly rests on two points. (i) According to the Mahāyāna tradition, Mahāyāna Sūtras like Prajñāpāramitā, Avataṃsaka and Saddharmapuṇḍarīka were kept in the palace of a Nāga king before the time of Nāgārjuna.¹ But Nāgārjuna brought them from there, made their contents public, spread those doctrines and established Mahāyāna Buddhism, as well as its school. Since that time Mahāyānic doctrines came to be known. On this tradition scholars base their view that Nāgārjuna was the founder of Mahāyāna Buddhism. (ii) Next, Buddhism as known to Brāhmaṇical sāstras like Mādhavāchārya's Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtras as well as to Jaina books like Guṇaratna's commentary on Shaddarśana samucchaya, is divided into four schools, namely: Sautrantika, Vaibhāsika, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. Among these the first two belong to Hīnayāna, while the last two came under Mahāyāna. According to them the founder of the Mādhyamika school was Nāgārjuna, and of the Yogācāra school were Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Hence they are apt to hold the view that men like Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were founders of Mahāyāna Buddhism. But from my point of view, the said opinion is entirely wrong. Of course, Nāgārjuna may claim credit as a great systematizer or expounder of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

¹ Wassileiff's Buddhism, p. 188 ff. There are many like traditions in Chinese Buddhist texts. See Appendix.

But distinctly he was not the founder of Mahāyāna Buddhism. There is no question of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu at all. This fact will be clear to us if we critically look at the mighty work: Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra and Daśabhūmi-vibhāsa-śāstra of Nāgārjuna. The former is a commentary on Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra and the latter is a commentary on the Avatamsaka-sūtra. In these Śāstras the author quotes many Mahāyāna sūtras; for example, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Amitāyusha-sūtra and Vimalakīrti-sūtra, etc.¹ This fact convinces us sufficiently that there were undoubtedly many Mahāyāna sūtras before Nāgārjuna. Then, how can we say that Nāgārjuna was the founder of Mahāyāna Buddhism? And this fact itself indicates that there were certain schools which acted as forerunners to Mahāyāna Buddhism before Nāgārjuna (about 250 A. D.—350 A. D.), and these previous schools were gradually manifesting and expounding the Buddha's Ontological perception which in their Sūtra-form were termed Mahāyāna Buddhism. Otherwise, how can we explain the existence of those Pre-Nāgārjuna Sūtras, if Mahāyāna doctrines were not spreading beforehand. Moreover, from Paramārtha's commentary on Nikāyāvalambana-śāstra (Pu-Chih-I-lum) of Vasumitra, as I have stated before, we come to know that Prajñāpāramitā and Avatamsaka-sūtras were existing within two hundred years after Buddha's Parinirvāṇa, and these had been used by the Mahāsaṅghikas. Of course, those Sūtras would not be in the same form then as at present, these were certainly an original nucleus.

If this was the case, then, it is not wrong to observe that men of the Mahāsaṅghika schools were closely connected with Mahāyāna Buddhism. Nay, from this point of view, it was they who manifested Buddha's

¹ See Appendix.

Introspectional and Ontological doctrines which were embedded first in the Mahāyāna sūtras and ultimately came to be known as Mahāyāna Buddhism. Of course, really speaking, there was no actual founder of Mahāyāna Buddhism except the Buddha himself. Because, its ideas were existing in Buddha's perception, and only remained to be manifested into set doctrines or in the Sūtra-form by the Mahāsaṅghika men. However, from the historical point of view, if any one insistently asks me "*Who is the founder of Mahāyāna Buddhism?*" then, I would like to say, that the men of Mahāsaṅghika schools were the founders. Let us discuss now this point a little elaborately. As I have told you many times before, the Mahāyāna doctrines were the exposition of Buddha's self-introspectional and ontological perceptions.

Without a human agency, such introspectional ideas could not be transformed into set doctrines, and these again into Sūtra-forms later on. But such deep and high ideas or doctrines could be understood or penetrated not by common people but by the advanced men, through their inner intuition. Speaking from the point of view of mental culture, the Sthaviravādins belonged to the ultra-conservative party, as we know from Dipavaṁśa and Mahāvamśa as well as other historical records of Indian Buddhists. Therefore, they simply preserved Buddha's Phenomenological doctrine (known as Original Buddhism) very strictly, carefully too, without going into deep ontological ideas. But brilliant thinkers among the Buddha's disciples were naturally progressive. Therefore, such men could not rest satisfied without going further into the bottom and penetrating Buddha's Introspectional perception on his Ontological doctrines. The Mahāsaṅghikas as generally called, as historical fact tell us, were the heralds of progress and they felt not the

least hesitation to plunge deep into the matter and sift out the truth whatever it might be. The chief leaders of this party, it seems to me, were the Vajjians of Vaiśālī. They were exactly in every respect men of the said mettle among all the Outlandic Aryans. Therefore, predominantly Vajjian Mahāsaṅghikas having such deep wisdom penetrated into the Buddha's Introspectional perception and thoroughly understood his Ontological doctrines, and they tried to manifest them into Sūtra-form. This is the reason why they had Prajñāpāramitā and Avataṃsaka-sūtras, during the two hundred years after Buddha's Parinirvāṇa, as Paramārtha informs us. So, it will not be wrong to say that *Mahāsaṅghikas were the forefathers of Mahāyāna Buddhists and their schools.*

But, unfortunately for us, we have no external evidence for this. Therefore, we would state here our internal consideration to prove this matter. In order to do this, we have to compare the doctrine of Mahāsaṅghikas with that of Mahāyāna sūtras on the one hand and on the other with that of Buddha's Introspectional perception, so that it will be clear to us that those three sets of doctrines are not only mutually interconnected with each other but in a sense all identical. Ultimately we will see that Buddha's Introspectional doctrines were transformed into Mahāyāna sūtra setting through the men of the Mahasaṅghika schools. We reserve the next section for a full discussion of this. Here I draw your attention to one point. The doctrine of every school of Buddhism, really speaking, is mainly concerned with three points at least: One—the doctrines which deal with Cosmic Existence; Second—that which deals with Buddhology; and Lastly, those that deal with conception on Human Life. Therefore, our discussion on the inter-relation between the Buddha's Ontological perception,

the doctrine of Mahāsaṅghika and those of Mahāyāna sūtras will proceed on the above three lines.

II.—(a) The relation between the doctrines of Mahāsaṅghikas and those of Mahāyāna sūtras on Cosmic existence.

Buddha's Phenomenological teachings as well as Theravāda's doctrines are, generally speaking, Original Buddhism. So both the conceptions on the Cosmic existence have actually no difference. They equally hold that 'All is impermanent,' and 'All is without Ego.' That is to say, according to them, all phenomenon is nothing but the aggregate productions of elements and these aggregates have been always formed by Cause (hetu) and Conditions (pratyaya). All such composite things are always subject to an invariable law of change and law of cause and effect. Therefore, there is no existence of an eternal Universal Entity or a person who may be regarded as the Creator and Controller of this world.

There was a branch school of Theravāda which has been known under the name of Sarvāstivāda. The latter separated from the main Theravādins about three-hundred years after Buddha's Parinirvāṇa, and established its centres in Kashmira and Gandhāra. This school differed a little from the main Theravādins in doctrine,¹ and their doctrine is generally known to us as 'Anātmā-sarvāstivāda.'² According to them, all cosmic existences are aggregate productions. Therefore, they are always subject to an invariable law of change as well

¹ Here we should remember that main point of difference between the Theravādins of Northern school and the Sarvāstivādins, is that the former maintained the superiority of Sūtra among the three piṭakas while the latter maintained the superiority of Abhidharma.

² This name has been restored by me from Japanese book.

as subject to a law of cause and effect. So there is no existence of an eternal Universal Entity or individual Entities. Thus far their opinion tallies with that of the main Theravādins. But this school held a characteristic opinion quite peculiar to itself. According to these Sarvāstivādins, though composite things are impermanent, however, the elements or substances composing them are themselves permanent. In view of this, this school has been called 'Sarvāstivāda.' But the so-called Mahāsaṅghikas, on the contrary, held quite different opinions from both the main Theravāda as well as its offshoot—Sarvāstivāda. This school is known to us under the name 'Anātmā-adharmavāda.'¹ According to their view on the cosmic existence, an Universal Entity or individual Entities as well as cosmic existences—as taken composite thing or in their elements—are all non-existents. Hence this school has been called 'Anātmā-adharmavāda.' Of course, originally the Mahāsaṅghika school did not go so far as these subtle ideas. But in their branch schools such ideas had been brought out fully. Vasumitra's Nikāya-bheda-dharmamati-chakra Śāstra (I-pu-tun-lun-lun) informs us that the original Mahāsaṅghika school was of opinion that "There is no existence of cosmic elements in the past and future, but they exist in the present only."² However, according to Paramārtha's commentary on Nikāya-avalambana Śāstra (pu-chih-i-lun), Ekavyavahārika; the first branch school of the original Mahāsaṅghika party held that "All existences of this loka (world) and uttaraloka (higher world) are simply provisional names. Therefore there is no real existence."³

¹ This name has been restored by me from Japanese book.

² I-pu-tsun-lun-lun, p. 92, Toyo-Daigaku edition of Tokyo.

³ I have quoted this from San-ron-gen-gi. Vol. I. p. 51.

Dr. Eun Mayeda, a great Japanese Buddhist scholar, has clearly pointed out the doctrine of this school :—

“This school holds such conception that all things in the Universe exist in the three period of time—past, present and future—are simply provisional. And there are no noumenon existences. Therefore, this school is more advanced in doctrine than that of the original Mahāsaṅghika school.”¹ Thus in this Ekavyavahārika school, the idea of ‘Anātmā-adharmavāda of Mahāsaṅghikas as a whole, has found a full expression. Again, this idea has a similar bearing like the ‘Śūnyatā’ doctrine. Paramārtha in his commentary on Nikāya-avalambana-śāstra characterizes doctrines of Lokottaravāda, the third branch school of the Mahāsaṅghikas as ‘Śūnyātmā-śūnyadharma-vāda.’² Consequently, we are justified to say that the Mahāsaṅghika school as a whole, upholds a similar doctrine like that of ‘Sarva-śūnyatā of Mahāyāna-sūtras.

Next, let us turn our eyes to the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, one of the most important set of Mahāyāna sūtras regarding as a record of the Buddha’s Ontological perception, specially conception on Cosmic existence. There we will find exactly the same idea as among the Mahāsaṅghikas on the same subject, but rather in a much more definite and concrete form.

The essential idea of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras can be summed up in the words “Nirākāra-sarva-śūnyatā”³ (all is formless, Śūnyatā) or “Sarvadharmānām śūnyatā na sā śakyābhilāpitūm”⁴ (All existence is Śūnyatā and it cannot be explained). This is exactly the idea of the Mahāsaṅghikas. In a sense it can be said that the

¹ In his Historical Discourse of Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 72 (In Japanese).

² This is found in San-ron-gen-gi, Vol. I, p. 52.

³ Such passages are found everywhere in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras.

⁴ Aṣṭasahasrika Prajñāpāramitā, p. 348, Bibliotheca Indica series

Mahāsaṅghika doctrine of 'Anātmā-adharma' has been elaborately expressed in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras under the term 'Śūnyatā' or 'Śūnyapuruṣa-śūnyadharma.'¹ Here we have an important matter to draw your attention to. Many Buddhist scholars are apt to explain the term 'Śūnyatā' in Mahāyāna Buddhism as 'emptiness.' But it is a quite wrong explanation. Because, the meaning of 'Śūnyatā' as explained in Prajñāpāramitā as well as other Mahāyāna sūtras may be translated as 'absolute unrestrictedness.' Among the Mahāsaṅghikas we do not find a full explanation of this and this is the reason why I called the idea of Prajñāpāramitā to be more concrete than that of the Mahāsaṅghikas. Nāgārjuna supplies us with a very interesting statement on this point in his Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra :—

"In Śrāvaka doctrines (Hīnayāna) we have the idea of Puruṣa-Śūnyatā while in the Buddha vehicle (Mahāyāna) both the teachings of Puruṣa-śūnyatā as well as Dharma-śūnyatā."²

Again :—

"There is a two-fold Śūnyatā; namely 'Puruṣa-śūnyatā' and 'Dharma-śūnyatā.' 'Puruṣa-śūnyatā' has been preached in the Hīnayāna while 'Dharma-śūnyatā' has been preached in Mahāyāna."³

On the basis of Nāgārjuna's statement we came to understand that the doctrine which simultaneously dealt with the two-fold Śūnyatās belonged to Mahāyānism : while that which only dealt with one Śūnyatā should be classed as Hīnayāna. On the other hand, from a statement in Paramārtha, we also come to learn that the Mahāsaṅghikas, on their part too, upheld both the doctrines of 'Anātmā-adharma' and 'Śūnyapuruṣa-śūnyadharma.'

¹ In the Suvikrāntavikrami-paripricchā of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Yüeh Bundle Vol. 8, p. 89B of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra, Wang Bundle, Vol. I, p. 29a, Chinese tripiṭaka.

³ Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra, Wang Bundle, Vol. II, p. 58a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

On the basis of this, we cannot but identify Mahāsaṅghika doctrines with those in Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras. Not only that, we can say so far, that the doctrines of Prajñāpāramitā are actually developments of Mahāsaṅghika idea.

In the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras this two-fold Śūnyatā is again explained under the following heads :—

1. Asaṅskṛta-śūnyatā (this principle to be applied in case of the noumenal world).
2. Saṅskṛta-śūnyatā (to be applied in the case of the phenomenal world).
3. Atyanta-śūnyatā (or absolute unrestrictedness in the case of both).

We should remember that according to these Sūtras, all existence in the Universe, either noumenal or phenomenal, is Śūnyatā; therefore, it is absolute Śūnyatā. Sometimes this three-fold Śūnyatā is explained more elaborately under eighteen heads¹ :—

1. Adhyātmaśūnyatā or Internal śūnyatā, *i.e.*, internal existence is śūnyatā.
2. Bahirdhāśūnyatā, or External śūnyatā, *i.e.*, external existence is śūnyatā.
3. Adhyātmabahirdhāśūnyatā, or Both the Internal and External śūnyatā, *i.e.*, both the internal and external existence are śūnyatā.
4. Śūnyatāśūnyatā, *i.e.*, The knowledge on the śūnyatā is also śūnyatā.
5. Mahāśūnyatā, or Universal śūnyatā, *i.e.*, the Universal existence is śūnyatā.
6. Paramārthaśūnyatā or Transcendental śūnyatā, *i.e.*, transcendental wisdom on the Śūnyatā of every existence is śūnyatā.
7. Saṅskṛtaśūnyatā, or Phenomenal śūnyatā, *i.e.*, the existence of the phenomenal world is śūnyatā.

¹ In the Mahāprajñāpāramitā sūtra, Jih Bundle, Vol. I, p. 7B, Chinese Tripitaka.

8. Asanskṛtaśūnyatā, or Noumenal śūnyatā, *i.e.*, the existence of the noumenal world is śūnyatā.

9. Atyantaśūnyatā, or Absolute śūnyatā.

10. Anavarāgraśūnyatā, or Limitless śūnyatā, *i.e.*, śūnyatā having no beginning and no end.

11. Anavakāraśūnyatā, or Ceaseless śūnyatā.

12. Prakṛtiśūnyatā or Sabhāva śūnyatā. In an elaborate way it is called 'Buddha-sabhāva-śūnyatā,' *i.e.*, the nature of Buddha, existing inherently in men, is also śūnyatā.

13. Sarvadharmasūnyatā, or All doctrinal śūnyatā, *i.e.*, all doctrines of the Buddhas are śūnyatā.

14. Svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā, or Characteristic śūnyatā, *i.e.*, 32 kinds of characteristics (Lakṣaṇa) and 80 kinds of superior marks are śūnyatā.

15. Anupalambhaśūnyatā, or Non-acquisitional śūnyatā, *i.e.*, it is difficult to acquire result: so it is śūnyatā.

16. Abhāvaśūnyatā, or Non-existent śūnyatā, *i.e.*, there is no such truth as 'Anātmā-adharma' doctrine to cut off men's delusion; so it is śūnyatā.

17. Svabhāvaśūnyatā, or Existent śūnyatā, *i.e.*, 'Anātmā-adharma' doctrine can cut off men's delusion so it is śūnyatā.

18. Abhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatā, or Non-existent and Existent śūnyatā.¹

Nāgārjuna explained the idea of Śūnyatā of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras under two heads; namely,

¹ In the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Jih Bundle, Vol. 1, p. 7B, Chinese Tripiṭaka.

Without elaborate explanation on these 18 kinds of Śūnyatā, it is difficult to give a clear idea of the subject; but through fear of confusion and digressions that might arise, as being inconsistent with the main subject-matter at our disposal, I leave this point to be discussed elsewhere. We have in Chinese elaborate explanation on this subject in Aṣṭādaśa-śūnyatā-śāstra of Nāgārjuna. Translated by Paramārtha, A.D. 557-56 of the Chan dynasty A.D. 557-589. See Nanjio's Catalogue, p. 262, No. 1187.

'Samvṛiti-satya' and 'Paramārtha-satya,'¹ that is to say, from the Samvṛiti or conventional point of view, all things are existing provisionally. But from the Paramārthīc or transcendental point of view, all things are not existing, it is 'Atyanta-sūnyatā' or 'absolute unrestrictedness.'²

I have thus far shown the close connection between the doctrines of Mahāsaṅghikas and those of Mahāyāna from a 'negative point of view.'

Let us see next, how far we are able to show the relation between doctrines of the said two schools (Mahāsaṅghikas and Mahāyāna) on the same subject from a 'Positive point of view?'

According to Paramārtha's commentary on Nikāya-avalambana-śāstra (Pu-chih-l-lum), the Lokottaravāda the third branch of the original Mahāsaṅghikas held:—
 "Worldly existence (laukika dharma) sprang from an overturned or opposite idea (viparītā mūḍam). This produces suffering (kleśa); this again produces conformation³ (saṃskāra) and this again produces the effect (kārya). And all productions from the overturned idea are false. Therefore, they are all untruths. But the super-world existence (uttara-laukika dharma) is the only reality."⁴

This statement suggests clearly that this school explained all cosmic existence from two points of view

¹ These two divisions of Nāgārjuna are very important, in order to express the idea of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras. So he said in the Mādhyamika-śāstra:—

इसत्ये समुपनित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदीक्षणा ।

लोकसंहतिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥"

"The teaching of Buddha is based on the two-fold truths: the conventional and the transcendental." (The Mādhyamika-śāstra, Chap. 24, Kārika 8).

² Exactly the same sense is met with many times in the Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra; Wang Bundle, Vol. I, p. 12B; Vol. II, p. 98B; Vol. III, p. 37a.

³ In Buddhist philosophy, it is capable of meaning impressions, ideas, notions, conceptions, effect of work, merit of action, etc. Mrs. Rhys Davids translates it as action of the mind." somewhere else.

⁴ I have quoted this from San-ron-gen-gi, Vol. I, p. 52 (in Chinese).

in two distinct terms: one is 'worldly' (laukika) and another is 'super-world' (uttara-laukika). The former is exactly the same as 'Saṃvṛti-satya' and the latter 'Paramārtha-satya' used by Nāgārjuna, as explanatory terms of cosmic existence.

From the former point of view the Lokottaravādins of the Mahāsaṅghika school denied all existence as false or merely provisional; but from the latter point of view, they affirmed ontologically all noumenal existence as real. The latter point of view clearly indicates that the Mahāsaṅghika schools, as a whole, held nearly the same idea contained in the Prajñāpāramitā and other Mahāyāna sūtras, viz.,—'Dharma-svabhāva-nityaṃ' ¹ (i.e., the original condition of existence is permanent). This is the positive side of 'Sarva-sūnyatā' of Prajñāpāramitā and other Mahāyānic sūtras.

Now, our next question is how possibly could the Lokottaravādins of the Mahāsaṅghika school bring out this positive aspect of their view on noumenal existence.

In answer to this, I dare say at once that the doctrine of 'Vimala-citta-svabhāva' of original Mahāsaṅghika school was its source. The original Mahāsaṅghikas held that the original nature of the human mind is naturally pure. So it is that Vasumitra said in his Nikāyabheda-dharmamati-chakra-śāstra (or I-pu-tsun-lun-lun):—

"The nature of mind (of beings) originally is pure,² but it has been encumbered by suffering which did not exist originally; therefore, the mind became impure."³ At first sight, the above statement seems to indicate of

¹ The two main Mahāsaṅghika schools similarly bring out almost exactly both sides of the doctrine when explaining cosmic existence. The Ekavyavahārika school expresses the negative sense of 'Sarva-sūnyatā,' while the Lokottara school harps on the positive aspect contained in 'Dharma-svabhāva-nityaṃ.'

² The 'pure mind' and 'suffering' of this doctrine, may be favourable compared with 'Purṣa' 'Prakṛiti' of Sāṅkhya philosophy.

³ Toyo daigaku Edition of Tokyo, p. 91.

eternal and endless purity of the original mind of individual beings only. But a deep consideration would reveal that it is applicable not only in the case of an individual mind, but also the same holds true in the case of the universal mind (noumenal existence). The Lokottaravādins of the Mahāsaṅghika school well understood the inner idea of 'Vimala-citta-svabhāva,' and through it they sought to establish the idea of reality of 'Uttara-laukika-dharma' or 'Dharma-svabhāva-nityam.' In other words, from the Pāramārthic point of view, they held that all existence in the universe is a reality without beginning, without end.

Let us, next, draw our attention to Mahāyāna doctrines. In the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras we find, on the one hand, the idea of 'Sarva-sūnyatā' as the negative explanation on the cosmic existence, while, on the other hand, we find there also the idea of 'Dharma-svabhāva-nityam' which is a positive explanation on cosmic existence. Therefore, Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras stated thus : —

"Every existence (sarva-dharma) is all Sūnyatā. Therefore, there is nothing to recognize (asaṃjñā), nothing to entreat (apraṇihitam), nothing to produce (aunpāda), nothing to decay (aniroda). Therefore, all existence is originally calm (svabhāva-nirvāṇa). Whether the Buddha come to this world or not, such a character of all existences (Dharma-lakṣaṇa) is permanent."¹

The sense of 'Svabhāva-nirvāṇa' some times has been put in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras as 'Dharma tathatā' or 'The real characteristic of existence,' which has been termed by us as the positive side of the explanation. Be it noted, here, that the same has been fully brought out in the Upāyakaūśalya-parivarta chapter of Siddharmapūṇḍarika-sūtra which is rightly regarded as

¹ Chinese translation of Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra : Hoang Bundle, X, p. 60a.

the record of a complete exposition of Buddha's Introspectional perception. There it is said :—

“विदित्व बुद्धा द्विपदानमुत्तमा प्रकाशयिष्यान्ति समेकयानम्
धर्मस्थितां धर्मनियामतां च नित्यस्थितां लोकि इमामकम्प्याम्”¹

“Knowing this, the Buddhas, the highest of men, shall reveal this single vehicle. They shall reveal the stability of the Dharma (existence), its being subjected to fixed rules, its unshakable perpetuity in the world.”²

Hence Nāgārjuna: the great expounder of Māhāyāna Buddhism has touched these two aspects of the doctrine—negative and positive—in his system. By the same term ‘Sarva-sūnyatā’ he sometimes gives the negative aspect of his Ontological explanation, and in other place he brings out the positive side.

In the beginning of Mādhyamika-sāstra³ as well as in Prajñāpāramitā-sāstra⁴ he said :—

“अनिरोधमनुत्पादमनुच्छेदमशाश्वतं ।
अनेकार्थमनानार्थमनागममनिर्गमम् ॥”⁵

“No annihilation, no production, no destruction, no persistence, no unity, no plurality, no coming in, no going out.”

In this Kārika he has explained Ontological ideas from a negative point of view. But in his ‘Dharma-dhātu-sāstra’ he has said :—

“Dharma-dhātu (universe) is originally pure and permanent.”⁶ We also find the same expression in his Prajñāpāramitā-sāstra :—

¹ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, Part I, p. 53.

² S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 53. Dr. Kern's translation of ‘Dharma’ here, as ‘Law’ is a mistake.

³ Mādhyamika Vṛtti, Chap. I, Kārika, I.

⁴ Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sāstra, Wang Bundle, Vol. I, p. 38a.

⁵ These eight kinds of negations originally occurred in ‘The sūtra of the garland of the Bodhisattva’ (Yā Bundle, Vol. IV, p. 33b, Chinese Tripiṭaka). But Nāgārjuna has used these in his Mādhyamika-sāstra as well as in his Prajñāpāramitā-sāstra.

⁶ Chang Bundle, Vol. XX, p. 67b (see Nanjio's catalogue, No. 1070).

“*Sarva dharmā* (all existence) is originally pure.”¹ These are expressions of the positive point of view. I think, such positive idea of Nāgārjuna undoubtedly originated from ‘*Vimala-citta-svabhāva*,’ of the Mahāsaṅghika school and ‘*Dharma-nirvāṇa*’ or ‘*Dharma-tathatā*,’ or ‘*Dharma-svabhāva-nityam*’ of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras and “*Dharma sthitiṃ dharma niyāmatām nitya stithām*” of Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra.

If we go a little further and examine Mahāyāna-śraddhotpāda-śāstra² of Aśvaghōṣa II, one of the most famous expounders of Mahāyāna doctrines flourishing in 5th century A.D., we shall find that the ideas of ‘*Vimala-citta-svabhāva*’ of Mahāsaṅghikas and ‘*Svabhāva-nityam*’ of Prajñāpāramitā have been clearly explained in a much more concrete form than that of Nāgārjuna. He has established the existence of a universal mind from the existence of individual sentient minds. And that universal mind is the root or foundation of all existences in the world, either phenomenon or super-phenomenon, and it is also pure and permanent. We should remember, here, that this universal mind has been called by him as ‘*Bhūtatahatā*.’ So he said:—

“What is Mahāyāna? It is the soul of all sentient beings (*sarva-sattva*), that constitutes all things in the world, phenomenal and super-phenomenal; and through this soul we can disclose what the Mahāyāna signifies.”³ Again,

“What is meant by the soul as suchness (*bhūtatahatā*), is the oneness of the totality of things (*dharma-dhātu*),

¹ This passage has been quoted from Prof. G. Unada's History of Indian Buddhism, p. 256 (in Japanese).

² The original Sanskrit text has been lost. But we have two Chinese versions; one is translated by Paramārtha (553 A.D.) of the Liñ dynasty (502—557 A.D.). Another is by Sikṣānanda (695—700 A.D.) of the T'ang dynasty (618—907 A.D.). We have also two English translations of this work one by T. Suzuki, another by Rev. T. Richaud.

³ Mr. T. Suzuki's Awakening of Faith, p. 53.

the great all-including whole, the quintessence of the Doctrine. For the essential nature of the soul is uncreate and eternal.

“All things, simply on account of our confused subjectivity (*smṛti*), appear under the forms of individuation. If we could overcome our confused subjectivity, the signs of individuation would disappear, and there would be no trace of a world of [individual and isolated] objects.

“Therefore, all things in their fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. They are without the range of apperception. [They are universals.] They [things in their fundamental nature] have no signs of destination. [They are not particulars.] They possess absolute sameness (*samatā*). [They are universals.] They are subject neither to transformation, nor to destruction. They are nothing but the one soul, for which suchness is another designation.”¹

Again,

There is another statement which exactly identified with ‘*Vimala-citta*’ doctrine of Mahāsaṅghika school as following:—

“While the essence of mind is eternally clean and pure, the influence of ignorance makes possible the existence of a defiled mind. But in spite of the defiled mind, the mind [itself] is eternal, clear, pure, and not subject to transformation.”²

From the above quotation, it would not probably be wrong that Aśvaghōṣa II’s doctrine of ‘*Bhūtatathatā*’ was also based upon the idea of ‘*Vimala-citta-svabhāva*’ of Mahāsaṅghikas as well as ‘*Svabhāva-nityaṃ*’ of Prajñāpāramitā and Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-sūtras, just in

¹ Mr. T. Suzuki’s *Awakening of Faith*, p. 55-57.

² Mr. T. Suzuki’s *Awakening of Faith*, p. 79.

the same way as Nāgārjuna did. Thus, we see that the positive side of the Ontological ideas of Mahāyānism had been developed in a complete form from the time of Aśvaghōṣa II.

From the above discussion, we understand clearly how the doctrines of the Mahāsaṅghikas were connected with those of Mahāyāna sūtras in both 'negative' and 'positive' aspects. But here we should not forget one thing. In the above, I have quoted some typical passages from Prajñāpāramitā and Saddharmapundarīka-sūtras among innumerable other Mahāyāna sūtras. This is because, these two Sūtras are very important and representative among others, to present the Ontological perception of the Buddha on cosmic existences. Of these two, the latter one may be regarded as touching the vital and essential chord of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

(b) *The relation between the doctrine of Mahāsaṅghikas and that of Mahāyāna sūtras regarding the Buddha-kāya conception.*

First of all, let us see, what is the Buddhology of Mahāsaṅghikas? If we look at the Nikāya-bheda-dharmamati-chakra-śāstra (or I-pu-tsun-lun-lun) of Vasumitra, we come across the following passages:—

“The fundamental and common doctrines of the Mahāsaṅghika, the Ekavyavahārika, the Lokottaravāda and the Kaukkutika schools:—The four schools unanimously maintained that (1) The Blessed Buddhas are all superhuman (lokottara). (2) all Tathāgatas have no worldly attributes (sāsrava-dharmās). (3) The words of Tathāgatas are all (about) the ‘Turning of the Wheel of Law’ (Dharma-chakrapravartana). (4) Buddha preaches all doctrines (dharmas) with one utterance. (5) In the teachings of Bhagavān (Buddha) there is nothing that is not in accordance with the truth.

(6) The physical body (rūpa-kāya) of Tathāgata is limitless. (7) The majestic powers of Tathāgata also are limitless. (8) Lives of Buddhas, too are limitless. (9) Buddha is never tired of enlightening living beings and awakening pure faith in them, etc.”¹

The above quotation shows clearly that the conception of Mahāsaṅghikas regarding the Buddha-kāya is quite different from that of Sthaviravādins, upholders of Original form of Buddhism, as well as of its offshoots Sarvāstivādins who, we know, hold only Buddhology of Rūpa-kāya (or historical Buddha). But, from Vasu-mitra's statements quoted above, we easily observed that the idea of 'Dharma-kāya Buddha' and 'Saṃbhoga-kāya Buddha' have already been manifested in the Mahāsaṅghika schools. Besides Vasu-mitra's work, the Mahāvastu, a book of Vinaya of Lokottaravādin school of Mahāsaṅghika, also embodies the same conception of Buddha-kāya. Professor L. De la Vallée Pouesin said in his learned article thus :—

“The 'Buddhology' of Mahāvastu marks a stage between the conception of Buddha as a simple mortal (Little vehicle) and that of Buddha as a quasi-eternal god sending illusory images down to this world (Great-vehicle). The Buddha of the Mahāvastu is a superman. He feels neither hunger nor thirst ; he lives in ignorance of carnal desires ; his wife remains a virgin. It is from consideration for humanity, in order to conform to the customs of the world (lokānuvartanā), that he behaves as a man, or that he gives to men the false impression that he is behaving as a man. In technical terms, he is lokottara, 'superior to the world.' ”²

Next, let us look at the Avataṃsaka-sūtras, regarded as one of the most important Mahāyāna sūtras, and these

¹ See Journal of Letters of Calcutta University, Vol. I, pp. 7-8.

² E. R. E., Vol. 8, p. 329.

originated, from my point of view, as early as the time of *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*. These *Sūtras*, as a whole, deal with Buddha's Ontological perceptions just in the same light as other *Mahāyāna sūtras* do. But the special features of these are to indicate Buddha's Introspectional perception on the Buddha-kāya and Human life more definitely than that of the cosmic existence. There we find the following passages regarding the Buddha-kāya :—

“Tathāgata is all-prevailing in the Universe (Dharma Dhātu).”¹

Again,

“Buddha-kāya is visible everywhere in ten directions.”²

Again,

“The Dharma-kāya of the Tathāgata is extensive.”³

Again,

“Even single utterance of Tathāgata is immeasurable.”⁴

Again,

“Even single utterance of the Tathāgata is without measure.”⁵

Again,

Buddha-kāya pervades all through the Dharma-dhātu and it manifests itself before all human beings.”⁶

Again,

“One body of Buddha (Buddha-kāya) reveals numberless bodies.”⁷

¹ *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* : Tien Bundle, Vol. I, p. 6a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² *Ibid* : Tien Bundle, Vol. I, p. 6a.

³ *Ibid* : Tien Bundle, Vol. I, p. 7b.

⁴ *Ibid* : Tien Bundle, Vol. I, pp. 8a and 15a.

⁵ *Ibid* : Tien Bundle, Vol. I, p. 22a.

⁶ *Ibid* : Tien Bundle, Vol. I, p. 25b.

⁷ *Ibid* : Tien Bundle, Vol. I, pp. 76a and 82a.

Again,

“The magnificent body of Tathāgata prevails everywhere in the Dharma-dhātu, therefore, without changing the seat he prevails in all places.”¹

Again,

“The Tathāgata, the Supreme Perfect Enlightenment, is always staying in calm and immovable condition, yet he reveals himself everywhere in the world of ten directions.”²

Again,

“Any one willing to admire the limitless and wonderful body of the Tathāgata, would not be able to do so even in the unlimited Kalpa.”³

Again,

“By one utterance (Buddha) preaches, innumerable teachings and at the same time by innumerable utterances (Buddha) preaches simple teaching.”⁴

Such conception of Buddhology is found everywhere throughout the whole Avatamsaka-sūtra, and this Mahāyānic conception of Buddhology fully developed as a last stage in the Tathāgatāyusapramāṇa-parivarta of the Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-sūtra. Throughout the whole chapter Buddha tries to explain to men that he has not newly been a Buddha but was such through eternity; so he said :—

अचिन्तित्वा कल्पसहस्रकोट्ये यासां प्रमाणं न कदाचि विद्यते ।
 प्राप्ता मया एष तदायबोधिर्घर्मं च देशेभ्यहु नित्यकालम् ॥
 समादपेमा बहुबोधिसत्त्वान्बोधिस्मि ज्ञानस्मि स्थपेमि चैव ।
 सत्त्वान् कीटीनयुताननेकापरिपाचयामी बहुकल्पकोट्यः ॥
 निर्वाणंभूमिं चुपदशयमि विनयार्थं सत्त्वान् वदाम्युपायम् ।
 न चापि निर्वाम्यहु तस्मि काले इहैव चो घर्मु प्रकाशयामि ॥”⁵

¹ Tien Bundle, Vol. I, p. 83a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² Tien Bundle, Vol. II, p. 10b.

³ Ibid, Vol. I, p. 84b.

⁴ Ibid, Vol. XI, p. 14a.

⁵ Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-sūtra, Part IV, p. 323, No. 1.2.3

“1. An inconceivable number of thousands of koṭis of æons, never to be measured, is it since I reached superior (or first) enlightenment and never ceased to teach the law.

“2. I roused many Bodhisattvas and established them in Buddha-knowledge. I brought myriads of koṭis of beings, endless, to full ripeness in many koṭis of æons.

“3. I show the place of extinction, I reveal to (all) beings a device to educate them, ableit I do not become extinct at the time, and in this very place continue preaching the law.”¹

From a perusal of what is stated above we are surprised at the striking tone of identification between the Mahāsaṅghika school and Mahāyānism regarding the conception of Buddhalogy.

The so-called Three-kāya doctrine of Nāgārjuna, Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and Āśvaghoṣa II is mainly based upon the Avataṃsaka-sūtras and said chapter of Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra.

Here, one thing we should bear in mind that among the Mahāyāna sūtras, specially Avataṃsaka sūtras and said chapter of Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra were the only statements in which Buddha's Introspectional perception regarding his 'own personality' as well as 'human life' are fully expressed. That is to say, there Buddha has explained his perception on the reality of human life (or the solution of the question 'What is man?') through his own Buddha-like personality which has no beginning, no end.

To sum up: the doctrines of the Mahāsaṅghika schools regarding the cosmic existence and Buddhalogy have been identified with that of Mahāyānism on the same conceptions. In other words, the doctrine of the Mahāsaṅghikas on the cosmic existence has been identified with

¹ S. B. E., XXI, p. 307.

that of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras and the Upāyakaauśalya-parivarta of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra. And at the same time, the doctrine of the Mahāsaṅghikas on the Buddha-kāya has been identified with that of Avatamsaka-sūtra and the Tathāgatāyusaḥpramāṇa-parivarta of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra.

Thus, from the internal investigation, it has been clearly shown that both the Mahāsaṅghika doctrines and the doctrines of Mahāyānism are identical. It can also be proved that Mahāyāna Buddhism is nothing but simply a developed form of the Mahāsaṅghika doctrines. From my point of view, the Mahāyāna doctrines which have been manifested in Mahāyāna sūtra forms, *have been coined by the men of the Mahāsaṅghika school*. Because, those Mahāyāna sūtras are, it can be said, the records of Buddha's Introspectional perceptions. However, such perceptions could not assume form except through human agency, *viz.*, advanced disciples or men like those of the Mahāsaṅghika schools. Here a flood of light is thrown on the most important question. '*The origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism,*' because we have already seen that, from historical point of view, Mahāyāna Buddhism originated in the Mahāsaṅghika doctrines, but from the doctrinal point of view, Mahāyāna doctrine originated in the Buddha's perceptions.

III.—(a) *The relation between the idea of Buddha's Introspectional perception and the doctrine of Mahāyāna sūtras regarding the cosmic existence.*

Now, let us see what relation can be found between the idea of Buddha's Ontological perception and the doctrines of Mahāyāna sūtras regarding the cosmic existence, in order to make clear the point, that the doctrines of Mahāyāna sūtras are nothing but only manifestation of Buddha's Introspectional perception

regarding Ontology. And at the same time we shall understand also that the Mahāyāna doctrines, as ideas, existed originally in Buddha's Introspectional perceptions since the time of his Enlightenment.

The moment when Buddha attained the Enlightenment he obtained absolute truth. That very moment he understood also the external aspect of the world—the condition of this External world or 'Samsāra'—as well as the real condition of Internal world or real state of the world. From that very moment, the man Siddhārtha, the son of Suddhodana, became the Buddha. He was no more an ordinary man but the 'Jina of all' (Sabbābhū), the 'Knower of all' (Sabbavidū).¹ He was no more the son of Suddhodana but the father of the whole world.²

The absolute truth which he obtained, was the truth of the 'cosmic existence.' Because, without the cosmic existence no truth can exist. Of it there are naturally two aspects: one is the truth on the 'external,' another is 'internal.' So, there must be two aspects also in that absolute truth itself: one is the 'truth on the external world,' another is the 'truth on the internal world.' As soon as Buddha obtained that absolute truth, two kinds of perceptions on the two aspects of the said truth dawned upon him—the one the 'external aspect' according to me is Buddha's Phenomenological perception, while the other the 'internal aspect' is Buddha's Ontological perception.

But, as a matter of fact, the time and the social circumstances in India at that time, allowed him to

¹ 'Sabbābhū sabbavidū', *hamasmi*, M. N., Vol. I, pp. 171, 227 and A. N. IV, p. 23.

² "Eko, mhi sammāsambuddho," M. N., Vol. I, p. 171; again, "वेधातुकं च समिदं परियहो ये ह्यद दहन्ति मनौति पुत्राः" (*Saddharmapugṇḍarika-sūtra*, Part I, p. 90).

"This triple world is my domain and those who in it are suffering from burning heat are my sons." (S. B. E., XXI, p. 88.)

preach the doctrine only by his Phenomenological perception. Therefore, as I have already stated, he hesitated to reveal his Ontological perception to the mass. We know this also, that his Phenomenology had been preached in his lifetime through 'Four noble truths', and among them he has dealt chiefly and minutely with 'Suffering' (duḥkha) and 'Its-cause' (duḥkha-samudaya). Again, in order to make clear the former, he laid special stress upon what we call 'Threefold-doctrine,' namely: 'All is impermanent' (sarvaṃ-anityaṃ), 'All is suffering' (sarvaṃ-duḥkhaṃ), and 'All is without ego' (sarvaṃ-anātmaṃ). And as regards the latter he dwelt upon what is called 'Twelve-linked chain of causation' (dvādaśa-pratitya-samutpāda). The 'path leading to its extinction' (Duḥkha-nirodha-mārga) has also been pointed out by the enumeration of the 'Eightfold noble-path' but he did not try to explain 'Its suppression' (duḥkha-nirodha) or in other word 'Nirvāna' fully and well.

Because, though it bears a negative sense, yet it suggests an Ontological idea. And if he tried to deal minutely with this point, just in the same way as he did with the other three points, he would have to explain fully his Introspectional perception on Ontology which, however, was not favourable to the time and social condition then existing. This is the reason, I think, why his explanation on the 'Nirvāna' was very scanty. In a word, Buddha, in his lifetime, has only shown to people the 'way to salvation' but not the real stage of salvation itself which he realised through his Introspectional perception. Of course, as a matter of fact, this 'way to salvation' is the most important matter from religious standpoint. Because, without this, men can never realize themselves. And again, without such realization, they cannot obtain true perception and real salvation.

This is the very reason why Buddha's movement is regarded as the most important one and the most excellent religious revolution India has ever seen. From my point of view, Buddha's movement gave a new life and new light to India's religious thought. Therefore, it is not wrong to hold that his movement was the real centre in the history of India's religious and philosophical thought. However, from the point of Buddha's Introspectional perception, this Phenomenological doctrine was only a means or expedient doctrine (*upāya-dharma*) but not the reality itself. Here, a difficult question may arise: if Buddha's original teachings or doctrines mainly dealt with the Phenomenological perception, how then can we understand his Introspectional and Ontological doctrine upon the cosmic existence, etc. Of course, there is no positive and external statements regarding this point except a ratiocination. Therefore, if cosmic existences, from the point of view of Buddha's Phenomenological perception, are 'Impermanent,' and 'Suffering,' and 'Without ego,' then from the Ontological point of view which is quite opposite of the former, they should be 'Permanent,' 'Happy,' and 'With a great ego,'—indicated throughout the *Mahāyāna-mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*.¹ And the following statement of *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra* is the exact indication of Buddha's Ontological perception on cosmic existence:

“धर्मस्थितिं धर्मनियामतां च नित्यस्थितां लोकि ह्यममकस्याम् ।”²

¹ There are two kinds of *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtras* in the Chinese translation of the *tripiṭaka*; one deals with Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*, this may be called *Hīnayānic Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* corresponding with the *Mahāparinibbana-sutta* in *Dīgha-Nikāya* of the Pāli canon (see Nanjio's catalogue, p. 136, No. 545 and p. 139, No. 552). The other belongs to the *Mahāyāna sūtra*. Though its title is the same with that of the Pāli D. N. and its manner of writing is also about the same, that is to say, the teachings have been imparted by Buddha just before his *parinirvāṇa* for future's sake, yet the idea contained in the *Sūtra* is quite different from that of the Pāli D. N. because, it deals with Buddha's Ontological perception on the cosmic existence as well as human life. (See Nanjio's catalogue, p. 39, No. 114, etc.)

² *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka sūtra* Part I, p. 53.

“They shall reveal the stability of the Dharma, its being subjected to fixed rules, its unshakeable perpetuity in the world.”¹

In the Original form of Buddhism, there is no positive statement on such Ontological idea on cosmic existence as I have told before. However, we find references to such ideas in negative sense scattered throughout the Pāli Nikāyas which are regarded as embodying statements much akin to the Original Buddhism.

In the Saṃyutta-Nikāya it has been stated :—

“Yattha kho āvuso na jāyati na jīyati na mīyati na cavati na uppajjati, nāham taṃ gamanena lokassa antaṃ ñāteyyaṃ dattheyyaṃ patteyyaṃ-ti vadāmi.”²

“Where, friend, one does not get born, nor grow old, nor die, nor leave one sphere for another, nor get reborn :—that end of the world, I say, thou art not able by walking to come to know, nor to see, nor to arrive at.”³

In the Aṅguttara-Nikāya also we find the same statement as above.⁴

Again, in the Saṃyutta-Nikāya :—

“Yattha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati, ato sarā nivattanti. ettha vaṭṭam na vaṭṭati, ettha nāmañca rūpañca, asesam uparujjhatī.”⁵

“Where the four elements that cleave, and stretch,
And burn, and move no further footing find.
Hence ebb the flooding tides : here whirls no more.
The whirlpool ; here to utter ending comes
This compound thing of body and of mind.”

¹ S. B. E., Vol. XVI, p. 53.

² S. N., Part I, p. 61 (S. N. 23.6).

³ The Book of the Kindred Sayings by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Part I, p. 85.

⁴ A. N., Part, II, p. 48 (A. N. IV, 45).

⁵ S. N., Part, I, p. 15 (13.7).

⁶ The Book of the Kindred Sayings, Part I, p. 23.

This passage, according to me, may be rendered thus :—As water, earth, fire and air have no firm footing, so do the tides ebb and flow (i.e., have no firm footing), etc.

Again, in the Udāna :—

“*Atthi bhikkhave tad āyatanam, yattha n’eva paṭhavī na āpo na tejo na vāyo na ākāśānañcāyatanam ... n’āyam loko na paralokō ubho candimasūriyā, tad aham bhikkhave n’eva āgatiṃ vadāmi na gatiṃ na tṭitiṃ na cutiṃ na upapattiṃ, appatitṭham appavattam anārammaṇam eva tam, es’ ev’ anto dukkhassā’ti.*”¹

“There is, O monks, a sphere where there is neither earth, nor water, nor heat, nor air, nor the endless atmosphere neither this world, nor another world, none of the sun and the moon; therefore, O monks, do I say that it is neither coming nor going, nor staying, nor sleeping, nor arising, but that it is unstable, unchanging, without any support. This, verily, is the end of suffering.”²

Again, in the same Udāna :—

“*Yattha āpo ca paṭhavī vāyo na gādhati, na tattha sukkā jṇanti, ādieco nappakāsati, na tattha candimā bhāti, tamo tattha na vijjati, yadāca attanāvedī muni monena brāhmaṇo, atha rūpā arupā ca sukha dukkhā pamuccatīti.*”³

“Where water, earth, heat or air enters not, the stars do not gleam there, nor does the sun shine, nor the moon and darkness exists not. When the Brahmana becomes a sage by silent meditation and realises his own self, he becomes quit of form and formless-ness, of happiness and suffering.”²

Again, in the Digha-Nikāya :—

“*Viññānam anidassanam anantam sabhatopaham, Ettha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati.*

¹ Udāna, VIII. 1.

² Translated by my colleague Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

³ Udāna, I, p. 9.

Ettha dīghañña rassañña anuṃ thulāṃ subhāsubham,
Ettha uāmañña rūpañña asesāṃ uparūjjhati,
Viññāṇassa nirodheno etth'etaṃ uparūjjhatīti."¹

"The intellect of Arāhātship, the invisible, the endless accessible from every side : - -

'There is it that earth, water, fire and wind,
And long and short, and fine and coarse,
Pure and impure, no footing find
Die out, leaving no trace behind.
When intellection ceases they all also cease.'²

Therefore, the sense of 'Nirvāṇa' in the Original form of Buddhism is 'incomposite' (asaṅkhata), 'unweakened' (ajajjara), 'stable' (dhuva), 'eternal' (amata). So, it should be 'peaceful' (khemā) as well as 'calm' (santa); then it must be 'final' (parāyaṇa) and 'true' (sacca).³ So, we should not think that 'Nirvāṇa' is extinction of something, but eternal reality of cosmic existence, which is really difficult for human language to express in the positive sense. Moreover, in the Phenomenological

¹ D. N., Vol. I., p. 223 (D. N. II. Kevaddha).

² Dialogues of the Buddha by Rhys Davids, Part I., pp. 413-484.

It is very interesting to state here that the idea of Buddha's Ontological perception in negative aspects on Nirvāṇa, as stated above, corresponds exactly with that of some Upanishadas. In the Kāṭha V, 16, Muṇḍaka II, 2, 10, and Śvetāśvatara, VI, 14, the following passage is recorded :

“ न तव सूर्यो भाति, न चन्द्र तारकं.
तेन विद्युतो भान्ति, कुतोऽयमग्निः ?
तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं,
तस्य भान्ता सर्वभित्तिं विभान्ति । ”

The idea as well as the mode of expression are exactly the same as noted above. In the Upanishadas this mode of expression indicates the stage of 'absolute Brahman' while in Buddha's point of view, it indicates the state of Nirvāṇa. From a perusal of such identical expressions as we come across in both, we may hold that in a certain sense Buddha's Ontological perception on the 'cosmic existence' as well as on 'human life' does not surpass the ideas of the Upanishads. But the difference between them is the different way of realization; that is to say, the way of realization of Upanishadas is philosophical, while Buddha's way is a religious one.

³ S. N., Part IV, pp. 369-373 (Asaṅkhataṃ).

doctrine of Buddha (original form of Buddhism), it was not his aim to deal with the positive aspect of Nirvāṇa. This is why Buddha used simply the term Nirvāṇa from the negative point of view. So it is said in the Udāna :—

“No ce taṃ bhikkhave abhavissa ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅkhatāṃ nayidha jātaṃ bhūtaṃ kattaṃ saṅkhatassa nissaraṇaṃ paññāyetha ? ”¹

“If, O monks, that were not unborn, non-existent, not made, not compounded, would not the dissolution of the existent, the made, the compounded be comprehensible ? ”²

Again, in the Kathāvatthu : —

“Sabba-dhammānaṃ tathatā asaṅkhatā, nibbānaṃ tāṇaṃ, lepaṃ, saraṇaṃ, parāyaṇaṃ, accutaṃ, amataṃ nibbānaṃ, asaṅkhatāṃ.”³

“Nibbāna is the deliverance, the safety, the refuge, the highest path, the stability, the eternal cessation, the unfathomable.”

So, it can, unmistakably, be held that the sense of ‘Nirvāṇa’ is consistent with the negative aspect of Buddha’s Ontological perception. Here we should bear in mind one thing which is of vital importance in understanding Buddha’s doctrines as well as Developed form of Buddhism—that whenever Ontological ideas are expressed in the negative way, it is always done by the denial of all phenomenological existence; the case of ‘Nirvāṇa’ here is also the same. Such expression is found not only in the Buddhism but also in Vedantism, wherein ‘Nirguṇa Brāhmaṇa’ has been expressed always in the negative by the term ‘neti neti neti.’ Thus the Ontological aspect in the Original form of Buddhism is

¹ Udāna VIII, 3; and Jī-vuttaka, 43.

² Translated by my colleague, Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

³ Kathāvatthu, Vol. II, p. 583.

found always in the state of denying or annihilating phenomenological existence. So it is said in the Suttanta :—

“ Ye te suttantā Tathāgata bhāsita gambhīrā gambhīratthā lokuttarā suññattapaṭisaṃyuttā, tesu bhaññamānesu na sussesanti, na sotam odabhisanti, na aññācittam upatthāpessanti, na ca te dhammam aggahetabbam pariyāpuṇitabbam maññissanti.”¹

“ Those suttantas uttered by the Tathāgata, deep, deep in meaning, not of the world, dealing with the void, to these when uttered, they will not listen, they will not lend a ready ear, they will not bring to them an understanding heart, they will not deem those doctrines that which should be learnt by heart, that which should be mastered.”²

So, it is not strange that in the time of Buddha, Nigrodha paribbājaka used to designate Buddha's doctrine by the term ‘Suññagara-hata-pūña’ or ‘the perception in the wisdom of emptiness.’³

Now we find that in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, such negative aspect of Buddha's Ontological perception is clearly expressed. The idea of ‘Sanskrit-sūnyatā,’ ‘Asanskrita-sūnyatā’ and ‘Atyanta-sūnyatā,’ embodied therein, is nothing but concrete explanation of Buddha's Ontological perception in the negative. This point has been clearly pointed out in the Mādhyamika-śāstra by Nāgārjuna who was the systemizer of the sūtra thus :—

“ निवृत्तमभिधातव्यं निवृत्ते चित्तगोचरे ।

अनुत्पन्नानिरुद्धं निर्वर्णमिव धर्मेत ॥ ”⁴

“ The real state of dharma is like Nirvāṇa, indescribable, incomprehensible, without birth or death, it is

¹ S N Part II, p 267

The Book of the Kindred Sayings, II, p. 179

² D N, Vol. III p 38 Ucumbarika Sīhonada suttanta.

³ Mādhyamika-śāstra, chap XVIII, karika 7.

beyond the reach of thought or language for it is absolute."

The Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras themselves, as we know, deal with Buddha's Ontological perception. This can be understood even from the meaning of the term 'Prajñāpāramitā.' Etymologically, 'Prajñāpāramitā' means the highest or the absolute wisdom of Buddha (which he obtained under the Bodhi-tree). Of course Buddha's perception has bearing on two aspects—negative and positive— as has been referred to, many times, in the previous discussion. The 'Śūnyatā' idea of the Prajñāpāramitā is its negative aspect while the 'Dharma-tathatā' idea of it is the positive one.¹ However, the main treatment of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras was concerned with the exposition of the negative aspect of Buddha's Ontological perception. And the Mādhyamika doctrine of Nāgārjuna is the systematized doctrine of this negative idea.

Now, it is clear enough from the above statements, that Buddha's Ontological perception on the cosmic existence can be identified with the Mahāyāna doctrine or the Developed form of Buddhism in the negative aspect. Nay, we venture to go a step further and say that both the said ideas are not only identical but originally they were one and the same in the Buddha's perception.

Our next enquiry, then, is to find out the relation between Buddha's Ontological perception and the doctrine of the Mahāyāna sūtras so far as their positive aspect is concerned.

¹ The positive aspect of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras or Buddha's Ontological perception has been clearly and fully expressed in concrete form in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra. The Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras themselves attempt to make us understand the existence of the positive aspect of Buddha's Ontological perception. While the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra attempts not only to make us understand its existence but at the same time realize it in our life.

As we know from the above discussion, in the Original form of Buddhism, speaking generally, Buddha expressed his Ontological ideas in the negative. But occasionally, we came across even certain positive aspect of his Ontological idea in the Pāli Nikāyas. For example, in the Saṃyutta Nikāya :—

*Ekāyano ayam maggo sattānam visuddhiyā, sokapari-devānam samatikkamāya dukkhadomanassānam atthaṅga-māya ñāyassādhigamāya nibbānassa sacchikiriyaṃ.....”*¹

“There is the one way to this path which exists for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of grief and lamentation, for doing away with sorrow and dejection, for the attainment of the knowable and the realisation of Nibbāna.”²

Again, in the same Nikāya :—

*“Jātipaccayā bhikkhave jarāmaraṇam,uppādā vā Tathāgatānam anuppādā vā Tathāgatānam, tṭhitā vā sā dhātu dhammatṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idapaccayatā, tam Tathāgato abhisambujjhati, abhisameti, abhisambujjhitvā abhisametvā ācikkhati, deseti paññāpeti, paṭṭhapeti vivarati vibhajati uttānikaroti passatāti cāha.”*³

“Conditioned by rebirth is decay and death..... whether, Brethren, there be an arising of Tathāgatas, or whether there be no such arising, in each this nature of things just stands, this casual status, this casual orderliness, the relatedness of this to that. Concerning that the Tathāgata is fully Enlightened, that he fully understands. Fully Enlightened, fully understanding he declares it, teaches it, reveals it, sets it forth, manifests, explains, makes it plain, saying ; Buddha ! Conditioned by this, that comes to be.”⁴

¹ S. N., Part V, pp. 167, 185, and A. N., III, p. 814.

² Translated by my colleague, Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

³ S. N., Part II, p. 25.

⁴ The Books of the Kindred Sayings, II, p. 21.

This idea is exactly the same with that of 'Dharma-tathatā' as expressed throughout the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, which reveals the expression of the positive aspect of the doctrine. We find, moreover, in one of the same sūtras the following passage :—

“Every existence (sarva-dharma) is 'all sūnyatā.' Therefore, there is nothing to recognize (asaṃjñā), nothing to entreat (apramahitaṃ), nothing to produce (anuppādo), nothing to decay (anirodha). Therefore, all existence is originally calm (svabhāva-nirvāṇa). Whether the Buddha come to this world or not, such a character of all existences (Dharma-lakṣaṇa) is permanent.”¹

At the very sight of the above passage, we can understand how exactly the idea expressed in it corresponds to that of the above quoted Nikāya passages? However, the positive idea of the Ontological perception has been fully manifested in the Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra. So the Upāyakaṣāya-parivarta of the same sūtra states :—

“धर्मस्थितिं धर्मनियामतां च नित्यस्थितं लोकि इमामकम्याम् ।”²

“The stability of the Dharma, its being subjected to fixed rule, its unshakable perpetuity in the world.”³

The idea expressed here is exactly the same as that of Saṃyutta-Nikāya and the Prajñāpāramitā passages, quoted above. But more complete expression of it is found in the Tathāgatāyuspramāṇa-parivarta in the Saddharma-puṇḍarika-sūtra :—

“यदापि सत्त्वा इमं लोकधातुं पश्यन्ति कल्पेन्ति च दृश्यमानम् ।
तदापि चेदं मम बुद्धक्षेत्रं परिपूर्णं भोती मरुमानुषाधाम् ॥
क्रीडा रतो तेय विचित्रं भोति उद्यानप्रासादविमानकोट्यः ।
प्रतिमण्डितं रत्नमयैश्च पर्वतैः इमेस्तथा पुष्पैरुपलेखितैः ॥

¹ Chinese translation of Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Hoang Bundle, Vol. X. p. 60, of Chinese Tripitaka.

² Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra, Part I, p. 53.

³ S. B. E., Vol. XVI, p. 53.

उपरि च देवा ऽभिहनन्ति तूर्यान् मन्दारवर्षं च विर्सजयन्ति ।
 ममैव अभ्योकिरि आवकांश्च ये चान्य बोधाविह प्रस्थिता विदू ॥
 एवं च मे क्षेत्रमिदं सदा स्थितं अन्ये च कल्येन्तिम दह्यमानम् ।”¹

“When creatures behold this world and imagine that it is burning, even then my Buddha-field is teeming with gods and men.

“They dispose of manifold amusements, kotīs of pleasure gardens, palaces, and aerial cars; (this field) is embellished by hills of gems and by trees abounding with blossoms and fruits.

“And aloft gods are striking musical instruments and pouring a rain of Mandāras by which they are covering me, the disciples and other sages who are striving after enlightenment.

“So in my field here, everlasting; but others fancy that it is burning.”²

Again, in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtras which are regarded as belonging to a later composition in consideration of the Saddharmapūṇḍarika-sūtra and Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, this positive Ontological perception of Buddha assumes concrete form in the terms ‘Nitya’ or permanent, ‘sukha’ or happy and ‘Ātma’ or Ego, as opposed to the terms ‘Anitya’ ‘Duhkha’ and ‘Anātma’ of the Original form of Buddhism.

Thus, the Buddha’s Ontological perception on cosmic existence has been proved clearly to bear a close identity with the doctrine of Mahāyāna sūtras so far as positive sense is concerned.

(b) *The relation between the Buddha’s Ontological perception upon his own personality and Mahāyāna Buddhology.*

The Buddha’s Ontological perception on the cosmic existence and its relation with the doctrine of Mahāyāna

¹ Saddharmapūṇḍarika-sūtra, pp. 324-5.

² S. B. E., Vol. XXI, pp. 308-9.

sūtras have been discussed above. Our duty now will be to see what relation can be found between Buddha's Ontological perception on his 'own personality' and Mahāyāna 'Buddhalogy.' Before proceeding with the discussion, we should bear in mind, that from the Buddha's standpoint, there is no Buddhalogy. For, so-called Buddhalogy pertains to Buddha's personality itself. And his perception on his own personality turned out later on to be 'Buddhalogy' among his disciples.

As we know from the scriptures, the culminating moment of his meditation is the moment of the solution of questions regarding the truth of reality and at the same time the moment of the attainment of the said truth is the moment of Buddha's Enlightenment. At that very moment he obtained not only ontological perception upon cosmic existence, but at the same time he understood the real characteristic of his own personality. Thereupon, the man Siddhārtha, the son of Suddhodana discovered himself no more as such, but as father of all no more as such ordinary human being but the 'Jina of all' (sabbābbibhū), the 'Knower of all' (sabbavidū). So it is said in the Suttanta:—

“Sabbābbibhū sabbavidū'ham asmi.
 Sabbesu dhammesu anupalitto.
 Sabbañjaho taṇhakkhaye vimutte.
 Sayanabhiññāya kam uddiseyyam.”¹

“I am the all-conqueror, the all-knower, I am free from all conditions, I have left all, and am emancipated through the destruction of desire. Having attained to supreme wisdom by my own self, whom shall I point out (as my teacher).”

This is because, at that very moment he himself found the truth, so it is said in the Nikāya :—

“Dhammaṃ hi so bhikkhu passati.

Dhammaṃ passanto maṃ passati.”¹

“One who understands the dhamma, also understands me and one who understands me, also understands dhamma.”

The said absolute truth is eternal. Therefore, from the above quotation it is clear that as soon as Buddha discovered himself harmonized with Dharma or absolute truth, that very moment, through his Introspectional perception he realised for the first time, his own personality also to be eternal, having no beginning and no end (anādi-ananta). Over and above that perception he also, at that very moment, penetrated into the truth that he was originally possessed of Buddha-hood. The idea of the oneness of both Buddha and Dharma is the basis of the conception of ‘Dharma-kāya Buddha’ and the historical Buddha, thereby, becomes the ‘Nirmāṇa-kāya Buddha’ and finally these two combined together from what is called the ‘Sambhoga-kāya Buddha.’

Regarding the Buddhology of Mahāyānism we have already entered into a discussion where the relation between the Mahāsaṅghika and Mahāyāna sūtra* conception upon the Buddha-kāya has been dealt with. So it is needless to re-state it fully here again. However, in order to make clear the point in issue a slight touch should be made.

As we know, in the Mahāsaṅghika Buddhology the ‘Tri-kāya’ conception already existed in the bud and it began to bloom in the Avataṃsaka-sūtras and fully blossomed into flower in the Tathāgatāyuspramāṇa

¹ Itivuttaka, 92 (p. 91).

parivarta of Saddharmapundarika-sūtra. So it has been said here :—

“कुलपुत्रास्तथागतं कर्तव्यं तत्तथागतः करोति । तावच्चिराभिसंबुद्धो
ऽपरिमितायुष्मन् तथागतः सदा स्थितः । अपरिनिर्वृतस्तथागतः
परिनिर्वाणमादर्शयति वैनैयवशेन ।”¹

“The Tathāgata then, young men of good family, does what he has to do. The Tathāgata who so long ago was perfectly Enlightened is unlimited in the duration of his life, he is everlasting. Without being extinct, the Tathāgata makes a show of extinction, on behalf of those who have to be educated.”²

Thus, we arrive at a clear identification between the Buddha's perception on his own personality and Mahāyāna Buddhalogy.

IV.—Inter-relation among the Buddha's Ontological perception and doctrines of the Mahāsaṅghikas as well as of Mahāyāna sūtras regarding human life and their points of agreement.

In the previous sections II and III, we have dealt with the relation subsisting between the Buddha's Ontological perception and the conception of Mahāsaṅghika schools as well as that of Mahāyāna sūtras regarding cosmic existence and Buddhalogy. And there we have also pointed out their agreement.

In this section, we shall have to discuss the conception of the ‘human life’ as they exist in the Buddha's Ontological perception, doctrines of Mahāsaṅghika school as well as that of Mahāyāna sūtras.

The conception of ‘human life’ might have been explained in connection with the discussion of cosmic existence and Buddhalogy as noticed above. Because

¹ Saddharmapundarika-sūtra. Part IV, pp. 318-319.

² S. B. E., XVI, p. 302.

the 'human life' is one of cosmic existences and conception of the same had already been revealed in the Buddha's Ontological perception through his personality as well as in Mahāyāna Buddhology.

However, I kept silence on this point in cause of my previous discussions through fear of digressions. Therefore, I denote this special section in order to make the point clear.

First of all, we should bear in mind that the conception of 'human life' is one of the most important problems in Buddhism. This is because every religion and philosophy owes their origin in the question of 'What is man'? Though there are many other ultimate questions as such --What is the world? What connection has the man with the world? Why man is born in the world? What is the instinct of man? What is the destiny of man? Yet the question 'What is man?' is the most important one, for all other questions have a principal bearing upon it; because had there been no men on earth, why then other question would arise? So this question must be solved first, and with its solution, all other questions may be solved automatically. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that all the sages of India and other countries had been engaged in solving this question. Such was the case with Buddha also and his disciples. This is the reason why we attach much importance to this point. Moreover, the three problems regarding 'cosmic existence,' 'Buddhology' and 'human life' are of vital importance among the early eighteen schools of Buddhism and those of Mahāyāna schools. And difference of opinions regarding these problems was the main cause of their separation.

Let us see, first, what was Buddha's Ontological perception on the 'human life.' As we know, at the moment of Buddha's Enlightenment, he himself discovered

that he was no more an ordinary man but the Enlightened Buddha, not only that, but at the same time he found his personality having no beginning, no end and even that he was originally Buddha. Such perception he obtained through the absolute truth. And again through this truth along with his Introspectional perception he also realised that all human lives too originally possessed Buddha-hood. If all human beings had not the germ of Buddha-hood, then it would have been quite impossible for human Siddhārtha to attain Buddha-hood and there would also have been no way by which men could attain that Buddha-hood. The idea is like that of potatoes which can never produce rice and of rice which can never become potato.

So, it has been stated in the *Dīgha-Nikāya* :—

“ Buddho so Bhagavā bodhāya dhammam deseti,					
Danto	„	„	damathāya	„	„
Santo	„	„	samathāya	„	„
Tiṇṇo	„	„	taraṇāya	„	„
Parinibbuto	„	„	parinibbānāya	„	„ ¹

“ Enlightened is the Exalted One ; he teaches the religion of Enlightenment. Self-mastered is the Exalted One ; he teaches the religion of Self-mastery. Calm is the Enlightened One ; he teaches the religion of Calm. Saved is the Enlightened One ; he teaches the religion of Salvation. At peace is the Enlightened One ; he teaches the religion of Peace.”²

If human beings had not possessed the germ of the Enlightenment, then what was the necessity of Buddha to preach Enlightenment for them. Therefore, from the above statement, it can be held beyond doubt that the conception on the ‘human life’ in the Buddha’s

¹ D. N., Vol. 55 (udumbarika).

² Dialogues of the Buddha, Part 3, pp. 49-50.

Ontological perception was that of human beings possessing originally Buddha-hood. More concrete form of the same idea can be found in the Saṃyutta-Nikāya:—
 “Yec’ abbhatitā sambuddhā ye ca Buddhā anāgatā, yo c’ etarahi sambuddho bahunnaṃ sokaṇāsano.

Sabbe saddhammagaruno vihaṃsu viharanti ca.
 Atho pi viharissanti, esā Buddhāna dhammatā.”¹

“Those perfectly Awakened Ones that are past, the Enlightened Ones that have not been, and he that has become perfectly Awakened now, the dispeller of the misery of the many, all these preceptors of the Good Law existed, do exist and will exist—this is the nature of the Buddhas.”²

This statement indicates clearly that through the absolute truth, some realized their Buddha-hood in the past, some realize it in the present, while others will realize it in future, thus showing that they were originally possessed of the germ of Buddha-hood. From the standpoint of the absolute truth, every one can be Buddha.

Next, let us see what is the conception of the Mahāsaṅghika school on the ‘human life.’ In the Nikāya-bheda-dharmamati-chakra-śāstra (or I-pu-tsum-lun-lun) by Vasumitra.³ It is stated :—

“The nature of mind (of being) originally was pure (vimala), but it has been encumbered by suffering which did not exist originally, therefore, the mind became impure.”⁴

This statement shows clearly that the original Mahāsaṅghikas, the Ekavyavahārika, the Lokottaravāda

¹ S. N. 56. 24 (Part V, p. 403). The same expression we find in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, p. 396, Bibliotheca Indica Edition.

² Translated by my colleague Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

³ He is Vasumitra II and contemporary of King Kanishka II (about 140 A.D.).

⁴ Toyo Daigaku Edition. Tokyo, p. 91.

and the Kaukkautika schools held that all individual beings originally were possessed of 'pure mind.' The 'pure mind' here signifies what is called 'Buddha-sabhāva' of the Mahāyāna Buddhism; that is to say all human lives originally possessed the 'nature of Buddha.' This idea is clearly expressed in the Mahāyāna-avatamsaka-sūtra where it is said :—

“The mind (universal mind), Buddha and human life are one and the same.”¹

Therefore, this Mahāsaṅghika conception, more or less, indicates Buddha's Ontological perception on the 'human life': and speaking generally, the conception of Mahāsaṅghika can be identified with that of Buddha's perception regarding the problem at hand.

Lastly, let us see what is the conception of Mahāyāna sūtra on the same point. Regarding this, the Mahāyāna sūtras, the Avatamsaka and Saddharmapundarika-sūtras, are specially important.

The very statement “the mind (universal mind) Buddha and the human life are one and the same,” is the very expression of Avatamsaka-sūtra on the idea. Again, throughout the same Sūtras, we find such conception that all human lives unite with 'Dharma-kāya,' that is to say, human lives exist within the 'Dharma-kāya-Buddha.' Therefore, it is not wrong to hold that in these Sūtras Buddha's Ontological perception on human lives has been manifested more clearly than the doctrines of Mahāsaṅghika schools. But concrete form of this conception can be found only in Saddharmapundarika-sūtra. It has been said there :—

“कतमच्च शारिपुत्र तथागतस्यैककृत्यमेककरणोयं महाकृत्यं महाकरणोयं येन कृत्येन तथागतो ऽर्हन्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते । यदिदं तथागतज्ञानदर्शनसमादापनहेतुनिमित्तं सत्त्वानां तथागतो ऽर्हन्सम्यक्संबुद्धो

¹ Tien Bundle. Vol. 7, p. 57 B, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

लोक उत्पद्यते । तथागतज्ञानदर्शनसंदर्शनहेतुनिमित्तं सत्त्वानां तथागतो ऽर्हत्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते । तथागतज्ञानदर्शनावतारणहेतुनिमित्तं सत्त्वानां तथागतो ऽर्हत्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते । तथागतज्ञानप्रतिबोधनहेतुनिमित्तं सत्त्वानां तथागतो ऽर्हत्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते । तथागतज्ञानदर्शनमार्गावतारणहेतुनिमित्तं सत्त्वानां तथागतो ऽर्हत्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते ।”¹

“This, O Sāriputra, is the sole object, the sole aim, the sole purpose of his appearance in the world. Such then, Sāriputra, is the sole object, the sole aim, the lofty object, the lofty aim of the Tathāgata. And it is achieved by the Tathāgata. For, Sāriputra, I do show all creatures the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge; I do open the eyes of creatures for the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge, Sāriputra; I do firmly establish the teaching of Tathāgata-knowledge, Sāriputra; I do lead the teaching of Tathāgata-knowledge on the right part.”²

In the above statement, the conception of Mahāyāna Buddhism on the ‘human life’ reached its highest zenith and here again Buddha’s Ontological perception on the same point has been fully revealed. If all human lives had not possessed ‘the nature of Buddha’ as well as ‘Buddha-hood’ originally, then how could the Buddha, as stated in the Sūtra, show, open, establish, and lead to the ‘Buddha-knowledge.’ Through the expression of this statement we therefore, come to know definitely that all human lives originally possessed ‘Buddha’s nature’ as well as the germ of ‘Buddha-hood.’ Thus, Buddha’s conception, the conception of Mahāsaṅghika school and the conception of Mahāyāna sūtras on the ‘human life’ has been shown to be nearly related.

To sum up: in above three sections (II, III and IV), we have, after lengthy discussion, shown clearly a close

¹ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, Part I, p. 40.

² S. B. E., XXI, p. 40.


relation among the Buddha's Ontological perception and the doctrines of Mahāsaṅghika school as well as that of Mahāyāna sūtras on the three points (*i.e.*, on cosmic existence, Buddhology, and human life). And at the same time we have found out their doctrinal identification also. That is to say, Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception on the said three points, showing a close relation with the conception of Mahāsaṅghika school and the doctrine of Mahāyāna sūtras on the same points.

We can now arrive at a conclusion by holding that Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception transformed into the form of Mahāyāna sūtras and it manifested in the Mahāyāna doctrines by the men of Mahāsaṅghika school and their lineage. And at the same time we understand this also that such Mahāyāna sūtras as existed before the time of Nāgārjuna were compiled by Mahāsaṅghikas. Hence it will not be going far away from historical truth to hold that, man of Mahāsaṅghika schools were '*forefather of the Mahāyānist.*'

At the end of this section, I would like to remind you one important feature in the Mahāyāna sūtras. Among the many Mahāyāna sūtras, Prajñāpāramitā, Avataṃsaka and Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the like are the most important as well as representative in character. Among them Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras mainly reveal Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception on the cosmic existence, while Avataṃsaka-sūtras mainly dwell upon Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception upon Buddha's own personality as well as human life. And lastly, both the conception of cosmic existences and Buddha's own personality as well as human lives has been again manifested fully and in concrete form, in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra. This is the reason, I think, why this Sūtra has been regarded as the heart of whole

Mahāyāna Sūtras by the founders of various sects of the Buddhism in China and Japan from the ancient time.

In Charts.



CHAPTER III.

Why did the men of the Mahāsaṅghika schools coin and use the terms Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

Let us now turn our attention to the main discussion. The terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna,' as I have told you, in the previous section, could not be of Hīnayāna origin, but were undoubtedly coined and used by the Mahāyānists. In the previous section, I have also discussed that the men of Mahāsaṅghika schools, were forefathers of the Mahāyānists, and Mahāyāna doctrines were made manifested and their Sūtras were formed by them. This being so, we may hold that the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' were for the first time coined and used by the Mahāsaṅghikas. Hence the question necessarily arises, for what reason the men of Mahāsaṅghika school coined and used those terms? The reason is not far to seek. I may at once point out, that the conflict between the Sthaviravādins and the Mahāsaṅghikas as regarding the superiority of their doctrines led to the coinage of these terms.

According to the Southern as well as Northern records of Buddhism, it was the historical event, that even in the Buddha's lifetime, disciples of the Buddha held different opinions on Buddha's doctrine and in consequence a great conflict arose among themselves.¹ But at that time the conflict was limited to individuals only. It was for the first time, in the history of Indian Buddhism, that different opinions of different parties and different schools were afloat at the Vaiśālī Council, known in the

¹ About this point, I have fully discussed in my 'History of early Buddhist Schools' in the Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes, Vol. III, Part II.

Buddhist history of India as the Second Council. And why these different parties and different schools came to the arena of Buddhism, will be all clear to us, if we understand the characteristics of both the schools. That is to say, the Mahāsaṅghika party was liberal and advanced, while the Sthavira party was conservative, who loyally stuck to the Original Buddhism preached by Buddha in general. Hence, their doctrines on the 'cosmic existence' and 'Buddhalogy,' etc., must naturally be different. Consequently, they had always a conflict of opinion. The Mahāsaṅghikas did not rest satisfied with the Phenomenological aspect of Buddha's doctrine preached in general, but wanted to rightly manifest Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception upon the 'cosmic existence,' 'Buddhalogy,' as well as 'human life.' Such being the case, the conflict of the parties went on and at last, just one hundred years after Buddha's Parinirvāṇa, actual separation was made at the Council of Vaiśālī on the questions (i) 'The ten different points' of Vinaya and (ii) 'Bhadra's five points' of doctrine.¹

Owing to their conflict in Vaiśālī, the Sthaviras excommunicated the Mahāsaṅghikas, on the ground of their introducing heretical views into the Buddha's

¹ According to the statements of the Southern school of Buddhism, 'the ten points' of the Vinaya were only the cause of that separation between the Sthaviras and Mahāsaṅghikas. But Northern records maintain that 'the five points of Bhadra' were only the cause of that separation (Chinese records on the other hand state 'Mahādeva's five points' instead of 'Bhadra's five points' but to me this is an error). I hold both to be real causes, because, their opinions must be differentiated on the 'Vinaya' as well as on the 'doctrine.' However, different schools state the cause according to their point of view. As to the reason of this, I would like to say that Sthaviras of Southern school belong to the lineage of the Vinaya-Bhāṇaka, while the Northern school of the Sthaviras belong to that of Sūtra-Bhāṇaka. Therefore, to the former, the Vinaya is essential, so far as the teachings of Buddha are concerned so they maintained the 'ten points' of Vinaya as the only cause. While to the latter, the Sūtra is essential, so they maintained the 'five points' of Bhadra as its only cause. About this point I have discussed fully in my 'History of Early Buddhist Schools.'

doctrine. Not only that much, but Sthaviras even called them by the bad epithet 'Adharma-vādin' (holder of the heretical doctrine) and 'Pāpa-bhikṣu' (sinful monk).¹ After the time of Vaiśālī, Mahāsaṅghika school was getting into power and popularity among the Buddhist communities. But it pained them much to have had such epithets like 'Adharma-vādin' and 'Pāpa-bhikṣu.' Henceforward, they harboured much rage upon Sthaviras, and began to search for such a term as could display the superiority of their own doctrine, on the one hand, and disparage the doctrine of their opponent, on the other. Many terms were invented by them, but none suited their purpose. After great exertion, they at last coined the terms 'Hīnayāna' and 'Mahāyāna,' the former, they thought to be the fit epithet for their opponents Sthaviras, as serving their purpose, while the latter, conveying a sense of superiority, they reserved for themselves.

Thus, the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' came into being.

¹ Dipavaṃśa, p. 36. Just the same expression we find in the Mahāvibhāṣā-sūtra of Sarvāstivādin (see Shou Bundle, Vol. 4, pp. 96-98, of Chinese Tripiṭaka). Regarding this point we have a very interesting statement in the Mahāyāna Vinaya. We find there, many times, that "If any one call Mahāyānist by the term 'Adharma-vādin,' then it will be the greatest sin." From this, it is evident that Mahāyānists were sometimes called by the term 'Adharma-vādin' by the Hīnayānists.

CHAPTER IV.

How the Mahāsaṅghikas found out or coined the terms Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

The terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' are not met with in the Pāli Nikāyas nor in the Chinese translation of Buddhist Āgamas which are regarded as the most trustworthy of all extant records of the original form of Buddhism. But these terms, on the contrary, have been used several times in Mahāyāna Sūtras as well as Śāstras, as I have already noted in the introduction. And I have also discussed in the previous section that these terms were coined and used by the men of Mahāsaṅghika school. Here one thing, we should bear in mind, that every word has more or less, its history at its back. Therefore, such terms like 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' did not come into use all on a sudden; they must have passed through a series of previous historical stages. As I have already said, the Mahāsaṅghikas, before they could finally coin these terms, had to come across a good deal of similar other terms. So, our first duty is to find out the terms they used before the coinage of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna.' Then we should see how they found out and which one was first used and which was next.

If we look at Mahāyāna Sūtras like Prajñāpāramitā, Avataṃsaka and Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtras which are regarded as the earliest existing ones among Mahāyāna Sūtras before the time of Nāgārjuna, we find several terms like 'Ekayāna,'¹ 'Agrayāna,'² 'Anuttarayāna,'³

¹ See under the explanation of the term 'Ekayāna.'

² Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, Part I, p. 61, Bibliotheca Buddhica Edition, and Ti'en Bundle, Vol. 5, p. 26a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

Ti'en Bundle, Vol. 9, p. 12a, Vol. 10, p. 1a, Vol. 10, p. 48a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka and Karmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, p. 67, (B. T. S. Edition, Calcutta).

‘Uttamayāna,’¹ ‘Paramayāna’ (Prathamayāna or Sreṣṭhāyāna),² ‘Bodhisattvayāna,’³ and ‘Buddhayāna,’ as synonymous with the term ‘Mahāyāna.’ Among the terms ‘Ekayāna,’ ‘Buddhayāna,’⁴ and ‘Bodhisattvayāna’ have been used more frequently than the other terms, and when the term ‘Ekayāna’ was used in the place where Buddha’s Ontological ideas have been expressed or in the place of the term ‘Mahāyāna,’ then the corresponding terms ‘Dviyāna’ or ‘Triyāna’ were used in the place where Buddha’s Phenomenological ideas have been expressed or in the place of the term Hīnayāna. For example, in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra it is stated thus :—

“एकं हि यानं द्वितियं न विद्यति तृतीयं हि नैवास्ति कदाचि लोके ।”⁵

“There is, indeed, but one vehicle ; there is no second, nor a third, anywhere in the world.”⁶

The same statement occurs many times in the same Sūtra.⁷ And the terms ‘Anuttarayāna,’ ‘Prathamayāna,’ ‘Agrayāna,’ ‘Paramayāna’ and ‘Uttamayāna’ are nothing but the synonyms of the term ‘Ekayāna.’ Similarly, when the terms ‘Buddhayāna’ or ‘Bodhisattvayāna’ were used in the place where Buddha’s Ontological ideas have been expressed or in the place of the term Mahāyāna, then the terms ‘Arhatyāna,’ ‘Śrāvakayāna’ were used in the place where Buddha’s Phenomenological ideas have been expressed or in the place of the term ‘Hīnayāna.’ We see also that the term ‘Ekayāna,’

¹ Lalita Vistara, p. 142 (J. R. A. S., p. 34, 1900).

² J. R. A. S., p. 33, 1900.

³ See under the explanation of the term ‘Bodhisattvayāna.’

⁴ See under the explanation of the term ‘Buddhayāna.’

⁵ Part I, p. 46, of Bibliotheca Edition.

⁶ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 46.

⁷ Part I, pp. 48-49, pp. 76, 79, 8a, Part II, pp. 13a, 189.

though sometimes indicates the same idea as expressed by the term 'Buddhayāna,' it mainly occurs where Buddha's Ontological ideas on 'cosmic existence' are dealt with. On the contrary where Buddha's Ontological ideas on the 'human life' are mainly dealt with, the terms 'Buddhayāna' and Bodhisattvayāna are used. But the term 'Mahāyāna' was indicative of Buddha's Ontological perception on both 'cosmic existence' and 'human life'; that is say, this term indicates the sense both of 'Ekayāna' and 'Buddhayāna' or 'Bodhisattvayāna.' Here we should bear in mind that the term 'Mahāyāna' as well as 'Hīnayāna' which occur in early Mahāyāna Sūtras like Prajñāpāramitā and Saddharmapūṇḍarika were not yet used in the sense of comparison as we find them in the later Mahāyāna Sūtras and Śāstras which came to being about the time of Nāgārjuna. For example, in the Saddharmapūṇḍarika-sūtra, we find the term 'Hīnayāna' only twice¹ and in the Chinese translation of Pañcavimsati-sāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra we find the term once only² but there the term was not used to serve the purpose of comparison. But in the Chinese translation of Suvikrāntavikrami-paripricchā of Mahāprajñāpāramitā³ and Mahāyāna-parinirvāṇa-sūtras⁴ which are regarded as later composition, we find several times the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' used in the sense of comparison. Now it is clear that the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' came into existence later than the terms 'Ekayāna' and 'Buddhayāna' or Bodhisattvayāna, etc.

In my opinion, these terms were in vogue in the time of Nāgārjuna.

¹ Part I, p. 60, and Part 2, p. 147.

² Yüeh Bundle, Vol. 5, p. 43a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

³ Yüeh Bundle, Vol. 8, pp. 67b and 68a.

⁴ These sūtras are included in the In Bundle, Vols. 5-9, where these terms have been used many times.

Our next enquiry then, is to find out the priority of these different terms that came into use before the coinage of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna.' The terms 'Ekayāna,' 'Anuttarayāna,' 'Vinayayāna,' 'Brahmayāna' and 'Dhammayāna,' occur both in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese translations of the four Āgamas. For example in the Samyutta Nikāya it has been stated :—

"*Ekayāno'yam maggo sattānam visuddhiyā.*"¹

"This is the only path, the only course, that exists for the purification of the beings.

Again in the same Sutta :—

"Imass' eva kho etaṃ Ānanda ariyass' atthaṅgikassa maggassa adhivacanam *Brahmayānamiti* pi *dhammayānamiti* pi anuttara-saṅgāma vijaya iti pi."²

"O Ānanda, the synonym of this Noble Eightfold Path is Brahmayāna, Dhāmmayāna and Transcendental Victory."

Again, in the same Sutta :—

"Etad attaniyam bhūtam, *Brahmayānam* anuttaram, Niyanti dhīrā lokamahā, aññadatthu jayam jayanti."³

"This is reflected in self, this is transcendental Brahmayāna;⁴ the wise are led out of the world (by means of this yāna); victory is sure and certain.

¹ S. N., Part V, pp. 167-168, 185, and A. N., Vol. III, p. 314.

² S. N., Part V, p. 5.

³ S. N., Part V, p. 6.

⁴ Yassa saddā ca paññāha||dhammā yuttā sadā dhuram||hirīsā mano yottam||
sati ārakkasārathi||.

Ratho silaparikkhāro||Jhānakkho cakkaviriyo||upekkhā dhura-samādhī||anicchā
parivāranam||.

Abyāpādo avihiṃsā||viveko yassa āvudham||tittikkhā dhammasaṁvāso||yogak-
khemāya vattati|| (S. N., Part V, p. 6).

In the Chinese translation of *Saṃyuktāgama-sūtra*, we find the following passage corresponding exactly to the First Pāli passage quoted above thus :—

“ Here is the one Path, the only course that (*Ekayāna mārga*) exists for the purification of all human beings.”¹
Again, in the same Āgama we meet with another passage which corresponds to the aforesaid Third Pāli quotation, thus :—

“ O Ānanda ! *Saddharma Vinayayāna*, *Devayāna*, *Brahmayāna* can conquer of the army of the suffering. Listen to me and think of my words, what I am going to say to you, O Ānanda ! what is that thing which has been called by the terms *Saddharma Vinayayāna*, *Devayāna* and *Brahmayāna* those which can conquer the army of the suffering ? That is nothing but the ‘ Eightfold noble margas.’ ”²

Thus, we find the terms ‘ *Ekayāna* ’ and ‘ *Anuttarayāna*, ’ etc., from the Pāli Nikāyas as well as from the Chinese translation of the four Āgamas. And we should also remember that the terms ‘ *Ekayāna* ’ and ‘ *Anuttarayāna* ’ are met with in the Mahāyāna sūtras. So these terms are common to both the Original form of Buddhism and the Developed form of Buddhism. The connotation of the terms, however, is different in different forms of Buddhism. That is to say, in the Original form of Buddhism, it indicates only the ‘ *Aṭṭhangika-magga* ’ (the Eightfold noble path) or the ‘ *Majjhima—patipadā* ’ (the middle path). While in the Mahāyāna Sūtras it indicates Buddha’s Ontological perception both on ‘ cosmic existence ’ and on ‘ human life. ’ For example, in the

¹ Shen Bundle, Vol. 3, p. 11a, p. 14a, p. 15b of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² Shen Bundle, Vol. 3, p. 64a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

Saddharmapundarika-sūtra it is stated thus :—

“एवं च भाषाम्यहं नित्यनिर्वृता आदि प्रशान्ता इमि सर्वधर्माः ।
चर्या च यो पूरयि बुद्धपुत्रो अनागते ऽध्वानि जिनो भविष्यति ॥”
उपायकौशल्य ममेव नूपं यत्तौणि यानान्युपदर्शयामि ।
एकं तु यानं हि नयस्य एक एका चियं देशन नयकानाम् ॥”¹

And so do I reveal all those laws that are ever holy and correct from the very first. And the son of Buddha who has completed his course shall once be a Jina.

It is but my skilfulness which prompts me to manifest three vehicles; for there is but one vehicle and one track; there is also but one instruction by the leaders.²

Again, in the same Sūtra :—

“स्थितिका हि एषा सद धर्मनेत्रो प्रकृतिश्च धर्माण सदा प्रभास्वरा ।
विदित्व बुद्धा द्विपदानमुत्तमा प्रकाशयिष्यन्ति ममेकयानम् ॥”³

“The line of the law forms an unbroken continuity and the nature of its properties is always manifest. Knowing this, the Buddhas, the highest of men, shall reveal this single vehicle.”⁴

The above quotation shows that the term ‘Ekayāna’ indicates Buddha’s perception on cosmic existence.

Again, in the same Sūtra :—

“एकमेवाहं शारिपुत्र यानमारभ्य सत्त्वानां धर्मं देशयामि यदिदं
बुद्धानं । न किञ्चिच्छारिपुत्र द्वितीयं वा तृतीयं वा यानं संविष्यते ॥”⁵

“Sāriputra, by means of one sole Vehicle, to wit, the Buddha-vehicle, Sāriputra, do I teach creatures the law; there is no second Vehicle nor a third.”⁶

Above quotation shows the term ‘Ekayāna’ points to Buddha’s perception on ‘Human life.’

¹ Saddharmapundarika-sūtra, Part I, p. 48.

² S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 48.

³ Saddharmapundarika-sūtra, Part I, p. 53.

⁴ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 53.

⁵ Saddharmapundarika-sūtra, Part I, pp. 40, 42, 44.

⁶ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, pp. 40, 41, 43.

The same expression we find in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras.¹

This being the case, it became quite evident that the term 'Ekayāna' or 'Anuttarayāna,' etc., were used by Buddha's immediate disciples. Not only that, but it may not be wrong to observe that such terms were used even in the lifetime of Buddha himself.

(1) *The term Ekayāna.*

Our problem here is to discuss how Mahāsaṅghikas appropriated the term 'Ekayāna' for their own use. From what has been discussed above, we can easily imagine and come to the conclusion that as soon as the Mahāsaṅghikas were excommunicated by Sthaviras with such disparaging epithets as 'Adharma-vādin' and 'Pāpa-bhikṣu,' they began to seek for such a term whereby they could display the superiority of their own doctrine and disparage that of their opponents. But they could not find any other suitable term than the term 'Ekayāna.' They found it in the Original teachings of Buddha which were common to all of his disciples and followers at that time. They applied it to their own doctrine; that is to say, they used it particularly for the indication of Buddha's Ontological perception on both 'cosmic existence' and 'human life.' And they thought it to be the most suitable term to distinguish themselves from their opponents so far as doctrinal superiority is concerned. On the other hand they called the Sthaviras by the name of 'Dviyāna'

¹ " एकयानसमाहृदा वक्ष्ये नम बोधिसत्त्वा महासत्त्वा एकमार्गसमाहृदामहासत्त्वाः ।"

(Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, p. 422, of Bibliotheca Indica Edition.

Again in the same Sūtra :—

"यिचखल, पुंनुरिमे चायुष्मन् सुमुते वयो बोधिसत्त्वयानिकाः पुद्गलासथागते नाक्याताः एवं चयाणां व्यवस्थानं न भवति। एकमेव हि यानमभवति यदत बुद्धानं बोधिसत्त्वयानं यथाचायुषतः सुमुते निर्द्देशः ॥" (The same Sūtra, p. 139.)

with a view to indicate their inferiority. But it appears to me that some time afterwards the Mahāsaṅghikas get themselves puzzled over the term 'Ekayāna' as being common to both parties, indicating on one hand Buddha's Ontological perception from their point of view, while expressing the idea of 'Eight-fold noble path' of the Original Buddhism as well as of the ~~Sth~~aviras on the other hand. Therefore, they came to realise that the term was not so suitable as they first thought it to be. Hence, the Mahāsaṅghikas once more began to search for another appropriate one. This time they invented the term 'Buddhayāna' or 'Bodhisattvayāna.'

(2) *The terms Buddhayāna and Bodhisattvayāna.*

In the Pāli Nikāya and the Chinese translation of the Four Āgamas, we find the terms 'Ekayāna,' etc., but no mention has been made therein of the term of 'Buddhayāna' and 'Bodhisattvayāna'; while throughout the Mahayāna Sūtras particularly in the earlier ones, these terms are several times met with. So we can at once hold that as soon as the Mahāsaṅghikas found that the term 'Ekayāna' did not suit their purpose, they, after searching for a more appropriate one coined the terms 'Buddhayāna' and 'Bodhisattvayāna.' It would in this connection not be improper to say that the term 'Ekayāna' was discovered at first and such terms as 'Buddhayāna' and 'Bodhisattvayāna' were invented next, while the 'Mahāyāna' was the last term that they could adopt and apply for themselves. The terms 'Buddhayāna' and 'Bodhisattvayāna' which they preferred to 'Ekayāna' were invented and applied by them to indicate the superiority of their doctrines, or in other words, they applied these terms to indicate Buddha's Ontological perceptions, calling at the same time the

doctrines of the Sthaviras by the terms 'Arhatyāna' 'Śrāvakayāna' indicative of their inferiority. For example, the Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra states thus :—

“ब्रेधातुके श्रेष्ठविशिष्टयानं बुद्धयानं सुगतहि वर्णितम् ।”¹

“The best and the most excellent vehicle in the whole of the threefold world is the Buddha-vehicle magnified by the Sugatas.”²

Again, in the same Sūtra :—

“एकमेवाहं शारिपुत्र यानमारभ्यस्त्वानां धर्मं देशयामि यदिदं बुद्धयानं ।”³

“I do lead the teaching of Tathāgata-knowledge or the right path, Sāriputra. By means of one sole vehicle to wit, the Buddha-vehicle, Sāriputra, do I teach creatures the law.”⁴

The same statements are found about six times in the same chapter in the same Sūtra.⁵ We also come across the same expressions mentioned several times in the Prajñāpāramitā and Avataṃsaka-sūtras. Here we should bear in mind that of the terms 'Buddhayāna' and 'Bodhisattvayāna,' the former has been used more frequently than the latter. The latter again has been used as being synonymous of the former in the Mahāyāna Sūtras. For example, in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā sūtra :—

“एकमेव हि यानमवति यदत बुद्धयानं बोधिसत्त्वयानं यथा प्रायुषतः सुभूतेर्निर्देशः ॥”⁶

“There is only one vehicle viz., Buddhayāna, or Bodhisattvayāna, as has been pointed out by venerable Subhūti.”

¹ Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra, Part I, p. 11.

² S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 11.

³ Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra, Part I, p. 40.

⁴ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 40.

⁵ P. k., Part I, pp. 41, 49, 43, 44, etc.

⁶ P. 319, Bibliotheca Indica Edition.

Again, the identical expressions occur several times in the Chinese translation of *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and in *Avatamsaka-sūtra*, etc.¹ Let us discuss a little further as to the relation of these two terms. The term 'Bodhisattvayāna' indicates a vehicle by which all human beings can attain Bodhisattva-hood, while the term 'Buddhayāna' indicates a vehicle by which all human beings can attain Buddha-hood. We should also know that the Bodhisattva-hood is the previous stage of a Buddha or one who is on the way of attaining perfect knowledge; while the Buddha-hood the highest stage of the former or one who has already attained the Perfect Knowledge. Therefore, properly speaking Bodhisattva and Buddha do not much differ from each other, the only difference being as regards the stage of Perfection. So the terms 'Buddhayāna' and 'Bodhisattvayāna,' though they go by different namings, yet express the same idea as it were. Regarding this we find a nice example in the Chinese translation of the *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*. Where 'Bodhisattvayāna' has been termed 'Bodhisattva-Buddhayāna.'² We also find a nice explanation of Nāgārjuna in his *Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra* :—

"The question is, whether this vehicle (yāna) is the dharma of Buddha or the dharma of Bodhisattva." The answer is:—This is the dharma of Bodhisattva... and this vehicle possessed the great power and can at once obtain Buddha-hood."³ Here our question is how then the Mahāsaṅghikas could invent these terms and why did they rest satisfied with them? In answer, I should like to say that the Mahāsaṅghikas thought that such terms

¹ Yüeh Bundle, Vol. 9, p. 10b, Vol. 3, p. 24b, 42a, 51a, Vol. 4, p. 14a, p. 43a and T'ien Bundle, Vol. 6, p. 45a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² Yüeh Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 10b.

³ Wang Bundle, Vol. 3, p. 52a.

can only be used to indicate an important aspect of Buddha's Introspectional perception. In other words, these terms they thought, were clearly indicative of Buddha's Ontological perception on 'human life,' *i.e.*, the realization of the highest life having no beginning and no end which Siddhārtha discovered himself as soon as he attained to the Buddha-hood. Again, through his experience and perception he understood that all human beings originally possess the 'nature of Buddha' (Buddha-svabhāva) or 'the mind of Buddha' (Buddha-citta). Nay, he understood not only this much but also that all human beings were originally possessed of Bodhisattva-hood and Buddha-hood having no beginning and no end. Therefore, he tried to make men realise the highest life which he himself attained. Why Buddha made such exertion is clearly expressed in the following statement of Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-sūtra :

“कतमञ्च शरिपुत्र तथागतस्यैककृत्यमेककरणीयं महाकृत्यं महाकरणीयं येन कृत्येन तथागतो ऽर्हन्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते । यदिदं तथागतज्ञानदर्शनसमादायनहेतुनिमित्तं सत्त्वानं तथागतो ऽर्हन्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते । तथागतज्ञानदर्शनसंदर्शनहेतुनिमित्तं सत्त्वानं तथागतो ऽर्हन्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते । तथागतज्ञानदर्शनावतारणहेतुनिमित्तं सत्त्वानां तथागतो ऽर्हन्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते । तथागतज्ञानप्रतिबोधनहेतु निमित्तं सत्त्वानां तथागतो ऽर्हन्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते । तथागतज्ञानदर्शनमर्गावतारणहेतुनिमित्तं सत्त्वानां तथागतो ऽर्हन्सम्यक्संबुद्धो लोक उत्पद्यते ।”¹

“ For, Śāriputra, it is for a sole object, a sole aim, verily a lofty object, a lofty aim that the Buddha, the Tathāgata, etc., appears in the world. And what is that sole object, that sole aim, that lofty object, that lofty aim of the Buddha, the Tathāgata, etc., appearing in the world ? To show all creatures the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge

¹ Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-sūtra, Part I, p. 40.

does the Buddha, the Tathāgata, etc., appear in the world; to open the eyes of creatures for the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge does the Buddha, the Tathāgata, etc., appear in the world. This, O Sāriputra, is the sole object, the sole aim, the sole purpose of his appearance in the world. Such then, Sāriputra, is the sole object, the sole aim, the lofty object, the lofty aim of the Tathāgata. And it is achieved by the Tathāgata. For, Sāriputra, I do show all creatures the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge; I do open the eyes of creatures for the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge, Sāriputra; I do firmly establish the teaching of Tathāgata-knowledge, Sāriputra; I do lead the teaching of Tathāgata-knowledge on the right path, Sāriputra.”¹

The men of the Mahāsaṅghika school having realized this profound Ontological perception of Buddha on ‘human life’ established at first the idea of ‘Vimala-citta’ which is one of the important features of their doctrine. Furthermore, through the idea of ‘Vimala-chitta’ along with the primitive Bodhisattva conception they established the idea of Buddhalogy which afterwards became the Tri-kāya doctrine in the Mahāyāna Buddhism. And thereby they invented the terms ‘Buddhayāna’ and ‘Bodhisttvayāna’ which to them, were quite suitable and independent ones.

Here a historical investigation as to the invention of the terms by the Mahāsaṅghika is necessary.

*A historical study of the terms Buddhayāna and
Bodhisttvayāna.*

The idea of Bodhisattva was not entirely absent in the primitive Buddhism. But, in the primitive Buddhism, the Bodhisattva conception dealt mainly with

¹ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 40.

the former life of Sakyamuni Buddha and sometimes with that of a particular Buddha of the past or the future.

The *Cariya-piṭaka*¹ which is acknowledged² as the fifteenth book of the *Khuddhaka-nikāya*, contains thirty-four short *Jātaka* stories in verse, in which a brief account of Buddha's meritorious³ action during his *Bodhisattva cariya* has been given, while the Canonical books of the *Jātakas* consisting only of verses generally give an elaborate account of his meritorious deeds during his *Bodhisattva cariya*.³ This much is certain that *Cariya-piṭaka* is a simplified or reduced form of the canonical *Jātaka* stories. Hence it can possibly be said that the idea of *Bodhisattva* in primitive sense must have existed at a time when those *Jātakas* came into being. Of course, the *Cariya-piṭaka* might have existed at a comparatively later time as has already been pointed out by Dr. Rhys Davids. But in my opinion it must be a Post-Aśokan production. That the said canonical *Jātaka* book in verses which according to Dr. Rhys Davids was at least older than the Council of Vaiśālī, is admissible.

From the discovery of Dr. Rhys Davids, we came to learn that *Suttanta Jātakas*⁴ as he calls them, are

¹ There is one *Sūtra* in the translation of the Chinese *Tripiṭaka* entitled *Ṣaṭpāramitā-sannipāta-sūtra* translated by Kṣāṇ-Saṅ-hwui of the Wu dynasty, 222 A.D. in 8 fasciculi (see Nanjio's catalogue, p. 47, No. 143). This *Sūtra* is exactly of the same type as the *Cariya-piṭaka*. Prof. G. Ono, who possessed vast knowledge of Buddhist arts, said in his '*Buddhist Art*' (in Japanese) that many of the *Jātaka* stories illustrated by bas-reliefs on the Bhārhut Stūpa are identical with the *Jātaka* stories stated in this *Sūtra*. And he has already identified some of them.

² Dr. Rhys Davids's *Buddhist India*, p. 176, and *Buddhist Birth Stories*, p. lvi.

³ The *Jātaka* book containing 550 stories is a quite later production. And it has been said that it was written probably in the fifth century A.D. in Ceylon by an unknown author. And this is a commentary on the said canonical *Jātaka* books. Therefore, its full title should be 'the commentary on the *Jātakas*' (see *Buddhist India* of Dr. Rhys Davids, p. 207).

⁴ Those *Jātakas* based on the *Suttanta* of *Dīgha*, *Majjhima* and *Saṃyutta* as well as *Vinaya* are called *Suttanta Jataka* (see *Buddhist India*, p. 195).

older specimens of the canonical Jātakas. He has also pointed out one of the most important matters as to the historical study of Jātaka cult in his Buddhist India. Regarding this he has said that stories are told in the older documents, and the hero is expressly identified with the Buddha in a previous birth, for instance; Ghatikāra (M. 2.53); Mahā-govinda (D. 2.220); Pacetana's wheelwright (A I, III); and Mahā-vijaya's (D.1. 143), were called Jātakas, even before the Jātaka books grew up, though they were not included in the Jātaka collection.¹

Again,

"There is a very ancient division found already in the Nikāyas,² of Buddhist literature into nine classes. One of these is 'Jātakam' that is to say, Jātakas. And this must refer to such episodes in previously existing books. It cannot refer to Jātaka book now included in the canon, for that was not yet in existence."

The two types of Jātakas pointed out by Dr. Rhys Davids which represent the earlier stages in the development of Jātaka stories, do not contain the Bodhisattva idea embodied in the canonical Jātaka books which are, therefore, of later growth.

Dīpavaṃśa,³ in connection with the separation of the Mahāsaṅghikas from the Sthaviras at Vaiśālī, incidentally refers to 'Jātaka' as one of the existing Buddhist scriptures. The Jātaka here, according to me, refers to nothing but the canonical Jātaka collection containing only the verses. Dīpavaṃśa which cannot be placed prior to the fourth century A.D., seems to bear but a poor evidence of the events of seven centuries before.

¹ Buddhist India, p. 196.

² Majjhima. 133; Anguttara. 2.7, 103, 108, pp. 43, 178; Vinaya, 3.8 (see also Buddhist Birth Stories, p. lxii).

³ V, 35.

But, after all it is the best we have, as it is acknowledged to have been based on earlier sources; and according to Ceylonese tradition, it is at least a reliable evidence that a book called the Jātaka existed at the time of Vaiśālī Council,¹ 386 B.C. There is yet further evidence confirming the Dīpavaṃśa tradition; the Buddhist scriptures are sometimes spoken of as consisting of nine different divisions or sorts of texts (*angānī*) of which the seventh is the Jātaka (or the Jātaka collection). This division of the sacred book is mentioned not only in the Dīpavaṃśa, but in *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī* and *Anguttara-nikāya* (one of the later work included in the Pāli piṭaka),² as well as in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra*.³

Regarding this point, we have the most important and highly interesting evidence in the Archaeological researches. In the carvings on the railings round the relic shrine of Śānchi, Amarāvati and particularly of Bhārhut, many of the Buddhist Jātakas have been illustrated. And almost all of the illustrated Jātakas are indicative of Bodhisattva cariya. Thus from the above statements, it becomes clear that the canonical Jātaka stories, as we call them, existed already in the third century B.C. And the Jātaka cult was prevalent among the common people at the time.

Again, as these Jātakas represent the Bodhisattva idea of the former life of the Sākyamuni Buddha, the presumption, therefore, is that the primitive Bodhisattva idea already existed at the time of Vaiśālī Council, held one hundred years after Buddha's Mahāparinirvāṇa. On this point, *i.e.*, the then existing Bodhisattva idea, I venture to go a little farther from internal point of view.

¹ Buddhist Birth Stories, p. lviii.

² Buddhist Birth Stories, by Dr. Rhys Davids, p. lxii.

³ Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra, Part I, p. 45.

As I have discussed many times in previous chapters, one of the most important causes of separation of the Mahāsaṅghikas from the Sthaviras at the Council of Vaiśālī was the doctrinal differentiation and the conception regarding the Buddha's great personality (or Buddhalogy) became one important aspect of their doctrines at that time. Such doctrines must, therefore, have come into being, after Buddha's Parinirvāṇa. The primitive Bodhisattva-idea was the starting point of their Buddhalogy. The said separation of the parties in the Vaiśālī Council was a real fact. As it is a fundamental truth that the cause must precede the fact, it must be admitted that their separation, was due to some causes which in one way or the other, point to difference of of opinions between the two parties regarding the Buddhalogy. And such conception of the Buddhalogy originated with the deep emotional feeling of the most faithful and devoted followers of Buddha, out of their reverence towards the personality of their great master after his Mahāparinirvāṇa. The primitive idea of Bodhisattva is, as I have said, the first lead of their emotional feeling for the master. No one doubts that almost all of Buddha's disciples and followers had deep regard for or faith upon him. Therefore, the primitive Bodhisattva idea was common to all of them. But different opinions gradually grew up among them to give rise to different Buddhalogies, in consequence whereof they were divided into different parties. Therefore, the primitive idea of Bodhisattva came into being long before the Vaiśālī Council.

In my opinion, during the period covering the Second and the Third Council (*i.e.*, 386-232 B.C.), the original Mahāsaṅghika school, through the primitive Bodhisattva idea, as well as their realisation of Buddha's Introspectional perception on human life, began to

hold such an advanced Buddhology as we get in the statement of Vasumitra's treatise. They, thereby, held, "Every human being is Bodhisattva" and "Every human being possessed Buddhahood." In this way, they gradually transformed themselves into Mahāyānists and their doctrine into Mahāyāna Buddhism. Side by side with such movement, as aforesaid, they coined the terms 'Bodhisattva' and 'Buddha.' The following discussion will make the point more clear.

If we look at the Cariya-piṭaka, as well as the Jātaka proper we will find the 'Ten perfections' (daśapāramitā or daśapāramitā-bhūmi) which Gotama Buddha had to acquire during his previous births as Bodhisattva.

They are :—

(1) Generosity (dāna); (2) Good conduct (sīla); (3) Renunciation (nekkhamma); (4) Wisdom (paññā); (5) Firmness (virīya); (6) Patience (khanti); (7) Truth (sacca); (8) Resolution (adhiṭṭhāna); (9) Kindness (mettā); (10) Equanimity (upekkhā).¹

Without these Ten perfections, past, present and future Buddha, could not, cannot and will not, obtain Buddhahood. Again, if we look at the Mahāyāna Sūtras² we will meet with the 'Ten virtues of perfection' (daśa-pāramitā) which are :—

(1) The Virtue of charity (dāna); (2) the Virtue of good conduct (sīla); (3) the Virtue of patience (kṣānti); (4) the Virtue of firmness (virya); (5) the Virtue of meditation (dhyāna); (6) the Virtue of wisdom (prajñā); (7) the Virtue of skilfulness (upāya); (8) the Virtue of

¹ Buddhist Birth Stories, p. *loc.* See also Pāli Dictionary by Childers, pp. 334-335. See also Nidāna-Katha, VV. 125-126. And this also find in the Vimokṣamārga-sūtra composed by Upaṭiṣya or Śāriputra, translated by Saṅghapāla, A.D. 505 of the Liao Dynasty A.D. 502-557 in 12 fasciculi: 12 chapter. (Ch'ang Bundle, Vol. 3, p. 53a Chinese Tripiṭaka).

² Saviṅśāntavikrami-paripriccha in Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, etc.

determined will (pranidhāna); (9) the Virtue of strength (bala); (10) the Virtue of knowledge (jñāna).

The formation of the above Ten-pāramitās of Mahāyāna Sūtra is almost identical with the Ten-pāramitās of the Cariya-piṭaka of the Original form of Buddhism. And the difference between these two is that the former deals with religious practices, leading to perfection for the self only, while the latter is for the self, as well as for others. This is the essential point of difference between the Original form of Buddhism (or Hīnayāna) and the Developed form of Buddhism (or Mahāyāna).

One chapter in Chinese translation of the Avataṃsaka-sūtras, entitled 'Daśabhūmi-sūtra,'¹ deals with the explanation of 'Daśa-bhumi' or Ten-stages of Bodhisattva's religious practices which are as follow ;—

(1) The delighted stage (pramuditā-bhūmi); (2) The purified stage (vimala-bhūmi); (3) The illuminated stage (prabhākārī); (4) The inflamed stage (arciṣmatī); (5) the invincible stage (sudurjayā); (6) The stage in the direction of (abhimukhī); (7) The far advanced stage (dūrangamā); (8) The immovable stage (acalā); (9) The stage of good intelligence (sādhumatī); (10) The stage of clouds of dharma (dharmameghā).²

These Ten Bodhisattva stages do not represent the stages of religious practices of the former lines of Sakya-muni Buddha, but of all human beings, who exercise

¹ It seems that this chapter of the Avataṃsaka-sūtra has been regarded as very important among the ancient Mahāyānists in India, as well as in China. In India, this has been used independently of the Avataṃsaka-sūtras and for this reason, I think, in Nepal, this has been counted as one of 'Nine dharmas,' see S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. I. It has been said that there were four or five commentaries on this; however, at present we have only two of them, one is the 'Daśabhūmi-vibhāṅgā-śāstra' by Nāgārjuna, while the other is the 'Daśabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra' by Vasubandhu. It is also very interesting to note here, that there was one Buddhist sect in China entitled 'Bhūmi-śāstra sect' before the Sui and the T'ang Dynasty. This sect was established upon the doctrine of this sūtra and those śāstras.

² See Appendix.

Mahāyānic religious practices. Because, from the Mahāyānic point of view, every human being is Bodhisattva. The description of the Ten-stages of Bodhisattva in the Daśabhūmi chapter of the Avataṃsaka-sūtras is much complicated and highly advanced in every respect. And such form came into existence at a much later time. However, if we study a bit carefully the original form of these Ten-stages, we will easily arrive at the conclusion that these stages were originally formed on the basis of the 'Ten perfect virtues' (daśa-pāramitā). Or, to be more precise, it may be said that the Daśa-bhūmis are nothing but the systematized form of the Daśa-pāramitā. This might be the reason, why in the very statement of Daśa-bhūmi chapter of Avataṃsaka-sūtra, Buddha preached these Ten-stages of Bodhisattva along with the Daśa-pāramitās :—

1. In the Joyful stage (pramuditā), Bodhisattva should practise mainly the virtue of charity (dāna-pāramitā).

2. In the Immaculate stage (vimala), Bodhisattvas have to practise mainly the virtue of morality (Śīla-pāramitā).

3. In the Shining stage (prabhākārī), Bodhisattvas have to practise chiefly the virtue of patience (kṣanti-pāramitā).

4. In the Radiant stage (archiṣmatī), Bodhisattvas have to practise chiefly the virtue of energy (vīrya-pāramitā).

5. In the Invincible stage (sudurjayā), Bodhisattvas have to practise chiefly the virtue of trances (dhyāna-pāramitā).

6. In the Turned-towards stage (abhimukhi), Bodhisattvas have to practise mainly the virtue of wisdom (Prajñā-pāramitā).

7. In the Far-going stage (duraṅgamā), Bodhisattvas have to practise mainly the virtue of the means (upāyakaṃśala-pāramitā).

8. In the Immovable stage (*acalā*), Bodhisattvas have to practise chiefly the virtue of resolves (*pranidhāna-pāramitā*).

9. In the Good Knowledge stage (*sādhumatī*), Bodhisattvas chiefly practise the virtue of strength (*bala-pāramitā*).

10. In the stage of cloud of the dharma (*dharma-meghā*), Bodhisattvas have to practise chiefly the virtue of knowledge (*Jñāna-pāramitā*).

Regarding this point, we find a very interesting and important statement in the *Mādhyamikāvatāra* of Chandrakīrti. There Chandrakīrti¹ established an intimate connection between the 'bhūmis' and the 'pāramitās' in following way² :

(1) The joyful stage (*pramuditā*) is the domain of the Virtue of charity (*dāna*).

(2) The Immaculate stage (*vimala*) is the domain of the Virtue of morality (*śīla*).

(3) The shining stage (*prabhākārī*) is the domain of the Virtue of four trances (*dhyāna*).

(4) The Radiant stage (*archiṣmatī*) is the domain of the Virtue of energy (*Virya*).

(5) The Invincible stage (*sudurjayā*) is the domain of the Virtue of patience (*kṣanti*).

(6) The stage of Turned-towards (*abhimukhī*) is the domain of the Virtue of wisdom (*prajñā*).

(7) The Far-going stage (*duraṅgamā*) is the domain of the Virtue of means (*upāyakauśala*).

(8) The Immovable stage (*acalā*) is the domain of the Virtue of resolves (*pranidhāna*).

(9) The stage of good knowledge (*sādhumatī*) is the domain of the Virtue of strength (*bala*).

¹ He is one of the great teachers of Mādhyamika school in 6th century A.D.

² Full statement has been recapitulated by Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin in *E. R. E.*, Vol. 2, p. 748. I have extracted this statement from there.

(10) The stage of 'cloud of law' (dharmameghā) is the domain of the Virtue of knowledge (jñāna).

If we compare this statement with that of the Daśabhūmi chapter of Avataṃsaka-sūtra we shall understand at once that the intimate connection shown by Chandrakīrti is quite proper and is, no doubt, the result of this careful study of the Daśabhūmi chapter of the Avataṃsaka-sūtra. Again, regarding this point, we should not overlook an important account of the Mahāvastu which has been regarded as a Vinaya book of the Lokottaravādin of Mahāsaṅghika schools. There we come across the description of the Ten stages (daśabhūmi), quite independent from those of the Daśabhūmi chapter of the Avataṃsaka-sūtra. Those Ten stages are:— (1) The stage difficult to attain (durārōha); (2) The stage of fastening (baddhamāṇa); (3) The stage adorned with flowers (pushpamaṇḍitā); (4) The attractive stage (rucira); (5) The stage of expansion of heart (cittavistāra); (6) The stage where one possessed lovely body (rupāvati); (7) The stage difficult to conquer (durjaya); (8) The stage of the ascertainment of birth (janmanideśa); (9) The stage of installation as crown-prince (yauvarāja); (10) The stage of coronation (abhisheka).¹

Both the names and characteristics ² of each stage are quite independent of those of Daśabhūmi chapter of Avataṃsaka-sūtra. However, this seems to be the most primitive form of the Ten-stages of Bodhisattva as we

¹ Full description has been given by Senart in his introduction of Le Mahāvastu, p. xxvii, and Mahāvastu itself, Vol. I, p. 75 ff. See also Nepalese Buddhist literature by Dr. R. Mitra, p. 116.

² The Daśabhūmi or the Ten-stages in the career of the Bodhisattva in the Mahāvastu are only for the particular persons who are already predicted by a Buddha as would-be Buddhas. And there, these Ten-stages have been explained by a reference to the history of Śākyamuni Buddha. While those Ten-stages in the Daśabhūmi chapter of Avataṃsaka-sūtra are not only for the particular persons but for every human being carrying Mahāyānic, religious practices.

find in the Buddhist literatures. The Ten-stages (daśa-bhūmi) of Avataṃsaka-sūtras, as I have said before, are the systematized forms of the Ten-perfect virtues (daśapāramitā) viewed with reference to their internal characteristics. However, formation of these Ten-stages, we may believe, depends on the Daśabhūmi of the Mahāvastu. Concerning this point I am very glad to find that the same opinion is expressed by Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin in his learned article on the 'Mahāyāna.'¹

The foregoing discussions enable us to say that there was an inseparable connection between the Daśapāramitā of the Original form of Buddhism and that of the Developed Buddhism, and between the Ten-stages (daśa-bhūmi) of Avataṃsaka-sūtra and the Ten-perfect virtues (daśapāramitā) as well as the Ten-stages (daśabhūmi) of the Mahāvastu. Therefore, from historical point of view the Mahāyānic Daśabhūmi of the Bodhisattva came into being through the Mahāyānic Daśapāramitā as well as the Daśabhūmi of Mahāvastu, and was moreover, connected with the 'Vimala-citta' doctrine of the Mahāsaṃghika school. That is to say, adepts of the Mahāsaṃghika school penetrated into Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perceptions, but not being satisfied with the Daśabhūmi of Mahāvastu, as not being common to all people, at last formed the Daśabhūmi of the Avataṃsaka, accessible to all, having the said threefold foundations, for its bases.

According to the 'I-pu-tsun-lun-lun' of Vasumitra, the doctrine that "all beings are Bodhisattva" was not held by the Mahāsaṃghikas in the original stage of their separation from the Sthaviras, just one hundred years after the Parinirvāṇa of Buddha; but there can be no doubt, that the doctrine came into being within two hundred years after the demise of the master, that is to

¹ E. R. E., Vol. 8, p. 336.

say, about the time when the Ekavyavahārika, Lokattaravādin and Kokkutika—the offshoots of the Mahāsaṅghika school—separated each other from the original school. As to the cause of this separation, according to the statement of Paramārtha, it has been said that original Mahāsaṅghika school incorporated at that time, Prajñāpāramitā and Avataṃsaka-sūtras, etc., into their scriptures. Some thought it right while others were against it, and in consequence separation took place. But according to me, the real fact signified by this tradition was that those Prajñāpāramitā and Avataṃsaka-sūtras were not independently composed by any man or any school other than the Mahāsaṅghikas. That is to say the Mahāsaṅghikas after penetrating into Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception manifested the doctrine, for the first time in Sūtra form under the man of Prajñāpāramitā, Avataṃsaka-sūtras, etc. But as the doctrine itself originally existed in Buddha's perception, so they wanted and at the same time they thought it quite proper to state those Sūtras as Buddha's direct preaching. I think such was the common tendency among the Buddha's disciples and followers.

Now, let us see how the original Mahāsaṅghika school began to hold the idea that "All human beings are Bodhisattvas." As we know, the original Mahāsaṅghikas held the 'Super-human' Buddhology. And this doctrine has been manifested in complete form in the Avataṃsaka-sūtras. Again, also we know that they held the doctrine of 'Anādi-ananta-vimala-citta' which has been manifested fully in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras. Those great thinkers of the Mahāsaṅghika school did not stop their investigation there but gradually pushed themselves forward into more advanced stages and at last they combined together the idea of 'Anādi-ananta-vimala-citta,' with the Buddhology of 'Super-human' and gave out that

this 'Vimala-citta,' possessed by all human beings is the germ of Buddhahood for future. This 'germ,' in other words, is the 'nature of Bodhisattva.' Hence they began to hold the idea "All human beings are Bodhisattvas." Again, carrying on their investigation further they formed the idea that all human beings originally possessed the nature of Buddha—nay, they were originally Buddha. Such ideas of them are clearly manifested in the Mahāyāna Sūtras, specially in the Avataṃsaka and the Saddharmapūṇḍarika-sūtras. So it is said in the Avataṃsaka-sūtra :—

"At that time Tathāgata, penetrating all beings in Universe (dharma-dātu) with the pure eyes of knowledge without any hindrance, said thus:—O wondered! wondered! Those all beings possessed Tathāgata-knowledge, however, being ignorant, they did not know and did not understand what they really were? Therefore, I should teach them the noble right-fold paths in order to destroy their hindrance of ignorance perpetually, and having exercised the noble right-fold paths they would obtain the Tathāgata-knowledge."¹

Again, in the Saddharmapūṇḍarika-sūtra, it has been said :—

"This, O Sāriputra, is the sole object, the sole aim, the sole purpose of his appearance in the world, such then, Sāriputra, is the sole object, the sole aim, the lofty object, the lofty aim of the Tathāgata. And it is achieved by the Tathāgata for, Sāriputra, I do show all creatures the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge; I do open the eyes of creatures for the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge, Sāriputra; I do firmly establish the teaching of Tathāgata-knowledge on the right path."²

¹ Tien Bundle, Vol. III, p. 43, Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 40.

According to me such lofty ideas were investigated and manifested by the Mahāsaṅghikas during the period from their separation to first century A.D. approximately. The Mahāsaṅghikas thus coined the term 'Bodhisattvayāna' or 'Buddhayāna.' They thought it to be a more suitable term to distinguish themselves from the Sthaviras in point of doctrine and at the same time to assert their own superiority. And they called their opponent by the term 'Arahatyāna' or 'Śrāvakayāna,' which indicates that by this vehicle, men could attain only to 'Arhatship' but not 'Bodhisattvahood,' not to speak of Buddhahood.

(3) *The term Mahāyāna.*

In the oldest Mahāyāna Sūtras, such as the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra, some portion of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra and some portion of Avataṁsaka-sūtras, we come across the terms 'Ekayāna,' 'Bodhisattvayāna' and 'Buddhayāna,' more frequently than the term 'Mahāyāna' which is used not in the sense of comparison. While in the later Mahāyāna Sūtras, the term Mahāyāna occurs more frequently than those terms and there this term has been used in the sense of comparison. From such application, it appears to me that the term 'Mahāyāna' came into being in its current sense at a much later time. For, as I have already discussed, when the Mahāsaṅghikas found that the term 'Ekayāna' was common to both the Sthaviras and the Mahāsaṅghikas and that it indicated Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception (which the Mahāsaṅghikas wanted to manifest) and at the same time Buddha's Phenomenological doctrine (which the Sthaviras loyally adhered to), they began to search for another suitable term to serve their purpose and as a result 'Bodhisattvayāna' and 'Buddhayāna' were coined. Again after some time they came to know that

it indicated Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception on his 'own personality' as well as 'human life.' But this is only one aspect of his perception and not the entirety of it. If Buddha's full Introspectional and Ontological perceptions are to be expressed by a single term, it should be necessary to find out such a term as can indicate both the aspects of Buddha's perception on the 'cosmic existence' as well as on 'human life.' Thus again the Mahāsaṅghikas began to seek for a suitable term and at last they coined the term 'Mahāyāna' to be applied to themselves and the term 'Hīnayāna' for their opponents with a view to indicate the superiority of their own doctrine. As a matter of fact, it seems that these terms fulfilled their intentions for both purposes, that is to say, the term, on the one hand, fairly distinguished them so far as doctrine and religious practices were concerned, while, on the other hand, the term 'Mahāyāna' exactly indicated the sense of both the term 'Ekayāna' and 'Buddhayāna.' For example, in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, it has been said :—

“For the men of Mahāyāna, the supreme way has been shown.”¹

Again, in the same Sūtra :—

“Six-pāramitās are the Mahāyāna of the Bodhi-sattva.”²

Again, in the Saddharmapūṇḍarika-sūtra :—

“In like manner, Kāśyapa, is there but one vehicle, viz., Mahāyāna :³ there is no second vehicle, no third.”⁴

¹ Yüch Bundle, Vol. 8, p. 67b of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² Yüch Bundle, Vol. 1, p. 20b.

³ There are six manuscripts in Sanskrit, three among them mentioned the word 'Mahāyāna,' while others mentioned the word 'Buddhayāna' in the place of Mahāyāna.

⁴ See S. B. E., XXI, p. 129.

Again, in the Avataṃsaka-sūtra :—

“ Desire, O monks, all people in the Mahāyāna can accomplish ‘ Sarvajñāna-mārga ’ without any hindrance and also desire, O monks, all people can arrive at the region of bliss by that Sarvajñāna-yāna.”¹

Again, in the Samādhirāja-sūtra :—

“ With the object of attaining a Buddha’s knowledge, I adore the Mahāyāna (great vehicle), which is neither destroyed nor made, which is devoid of stains and which cannot be described by words, I repeatedly bow down to the Mahāyāna, which is devoid of any contingency, non-conditioned, uncreated, and revered by the Buddhists.”²

Again, in the Amitāyurdhyāna-sūtra it has been said :—

“ O my son in the law, thou hast practised the Mahāyāna doctrine ; thou hast understood and believed the highest truth ; therefore I now come to meet and welcome thee.”³

The above quotations show clearly that the term ‘ Mahāyāna ’ has been applied in the sense of ‘ Ekayāna,’ that is to say, it indicates Buddha’s Ontological doctrine. On the other hand, it expresses other sense also, for example, in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra :—

“ The Bodhisattvas put on the armour of Mahāyāna, ornamented themselves with Mahāyāna and lived in the Mahāyāna.”⁴

Again, in the same Sūtra :—

“ The Bodhisattvayāna is the Mahāyāna.”⁵ Such statements are met with several times in the same Sūtras as well as Avataṃsaka-sūtras.⁶

¹ Tien Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 23a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² Samādhirāja-sūtra, p. I. (B. T. S. Edition).

³ S. B. E., Vol. XLIX, Pt. 3, p. 190.

⁴ Yüch Bundle, Vol. 7, p. 4a.

⁵ Yüch Bundle, Vol. I, p. 18a.

⁶ Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra ; Yüch Bundle, Vol. 3, pp. 24b, 25a, 26b. And Avataṃsaka-sūtra, Vol. I, p. 18a. Tien Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 21b, Vol. 9, 6b.

Again, in the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* :—

“Those who are learning *Mahāyāna*, though possessing human eye, yet are said to be endowed with the eye of Buddha. Since the ‘*Mahāyāna*’ has been called ‘*Buddhayāna*,’¹”

The above quotation clearly shows that the term ‘*Mahāyāna*’ has been sometimes used to signify the term ‘*Buddhayāna*,’ that is to say, it sometimes expresses Buddha’s Ontological perception on his ‘own personality’ as well as on ‘human life.’

Our next important discussion is to see how the *Mahāsaṅghikas* found out the term ‘*Mahāyāna*.’

As we already discussed that when the Buddha obtained the absolute wisdom he realized himself as Buddha having no beginning and no end. At the same time, he, through his perception, could realise that all human beings possessed equal personality. The *Mahāsaṅghikas* easily realized this deepest and highest perception and manifested it in their doctrines, and at the same time established : “All human beings possess *Bodhisattvahood* or *Buddhahood*.” Here, the very word ‘All’ is the most important one regarding the origination of the term ‘*Mahāyāna*.’ The term ‘*Mahāyāna*’ means the ‘Great Vehicle.’ Then what does the word ‘Great’ signify here? It is the ‘Vehicle’ which can carry all human beings, and has, therefore, been called ‘Great.’ The word ‘All,’ again, has sometimes been expressed in the *Mahāyāna Sūtras*, by the term ‘*Asaṃkhyā*’ or numberless.

According to the Original form of Buddhism or *Hīnayāna*, the cultured men only attained the Arhatship and *Pratyeka-Buddhahood*, but not all human beings, while, on the contrary, according to Developed or *Mahāyāna Buddhism*, all human beings or numberless

¹ *La Bundle*, Vol. 5, p. 290 of Chinese *Tripitaka*.

beings can equally attain Buddhahood. In other words, through the 'doctrine' or 'yāna,' 'all' or 'numberless,' human beings will understand that they possess the germ of 'Buddha-hood.' And at the same time by the same, 'all' or numberless human beings can realize their Buddhahood. Hence Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological doctrine or Developed Buddhism has been termed as 'Mahāyāna' or 'great vehicle.' This idea is clearly expressed in the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra:—

“एवमुक्ते आयुषान् सुभूतिर्भगवन्तमेतदवोचत् । महायानं महायानमिति भगवन्ब्रुयते । सदेवमानुषसुरलोकमभिभवन्निर्यास्यति आकाशसमतया अतिमहत्तया तस्महायानं ॥ यथाकाशे अप्रमेयाणामसंख्येयानां सत्त्वानां अवकाशः एवमेव भगवन्नस्मिन् याने अप्रमेयाणामसंख्येयानां सत्त्वानामवकाशः ॥ अनेन भगवन् पर्यायेण महायानमिदं बोधिसत्त्वानां महासत्त्वानां । नैवास्मागमो दृश्यते नैवास्मिन् निर्गमो दृश्यते नाप्यस्य स्थाने संविद्यते । एवमस्य भगवन् महायानस्य नैव पूर्वान्त उपलभ्यते नाप्यपरान्त उपलभ्यते नापि मध्य उपलभ्यते । अथ समं मगवंस्तदयानं महायानमित्युच्यते ॥”¹

“After this had been said the long-lived Subhūti spoke thus to the Lord : O Lord ! Mahāyāna is called the Mahā-yāna (great vehicle). It is called Mahāyāna because it will lead gods men and demons, being as spacious as the sky. Just as the sky may be a receptacle for immeasurable and innumerable objects, so also, O Lord, this vehicle (yāna) is a receptacle for immense and innumerable sentient beings (sattvas). In this speech, O Lord, the Mahāyāna is to be understood to be a receptacle for the Bodhisattvas alone. It is not seen whence it comes, whether it goes, and where it stops. Thus O Lord, neither the beginning, nor end, nor middle

of 'the Mahāyāna is perceptible. This vehicle (yāna), O Lord, is of equal dimensions throughout. It is for these reasons that the Mahāyāna is called Mahāyāna. "Great vehicle."

Exactly the same statement is found in the Daśa-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra in Chinese translation.¹

Thus, at last Mahāsaṅghikas coined the term 'Mahāyāna' for themselves in order to show their doctrinal superiority, and at the same time they found out, in the same process, the term 'Hīnayāna' for their opponents to indicate their inferiority. Hence the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' came into use.

Our next question is as to when these terms came into being? As we discussed above, the term 'Ekayāna' came to be used, at first, after the separation of the 'Mahāsaṅghikas' from the Sthaviras. The next term 'Bodhisattvayāna' or 'Buddhayāna' was found out about the time when the first separation took place in the Mahāsaṅghika school within two hundred years after Buddha's Parinirvāṇa.

According to me, the term 'Mahāyāna' was coined just after 'Buddhayāna' or 'Bodhisattvayāna' came to be used. But we should bear in mind that the indication of the term 'Mahāyāna' at that time was different from that of its later use. That is to say, at first it was used in the place of the term 'Ekayāna' as well as the term 'Buddhayāna' and thus we find, for example, in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra stated:—

"In like manner, Kāśyapa, is there but one vehicle, *viz.*, Mahāyāna: there is no second vehicle, and no third."²

Here the term 'Mahāyāna' is used in the place of Ekayāna."

¹ Yüeh Bundle, Vol. 8, p. 11, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 129.

In the same Sūtra :—

“These ones may be said to be those who, coveting the vehicle, fly from the triple world. Therefore, they are called Bodhisattvas, Mahāsattvas.”¹ Here the term ‘Mahāyāna’ is used in the place ‘Bodhisattvayāna.’

Again, in the same Sūtra :—

“The Tathāgata, the Arhat,.....considering that he possesses great wealth of knowledge, power, and absence of hesitation, and that all beings are his children, leads them by no other vehicle than the Buddha-vehicle to full development.”²

Here, the term ‘Buddhayāna’ means ‘Mahāyāna.’ The above quotations show clearly that the term ‘Mahāyāna’ did not signify any comparison. However, in the later Mahāyāna Sūtras, the term ‘Mahāyāna’ has been used in comparison with the term ‘Hīnayāna.’ For example, in the Suvikrāntavikrami-paripricebā of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra which is regarded to be a much later work, it is said :—

“It indicates the supreme way for the men of ‘Mahāyāna’ and does not preach the way of the Śrāvakas as well as Pratyeka Buddhas.

It indicates the way of the Śrāvakas so far as the men who are practising the Hīnayāna are concerned and shows the Great way to men who desire to conduct the Mahāyāna.”³

Again, in the Avataṃsaka-sūtra :—

“Perpetually give up the Hīnayāna and desire earnestly the Mahāyāna.”⁴

¹ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 80.

² *Ibid.*, p. 81.

³ Yüch Bundle, Vol. 8, p. 67b. And the same expression can be found in the same Bundle and the same Vol., p. 68a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

⁴ Tien Bundle, Vol. 9, p. 5b.

Again, in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra:—

“Desire all people to light the light of Mahāyāna and put down the light of Hīnayāna.”¹

Such comparison of the terms ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hīnayāna’ was vigorously pushed forward at the time of Nāgārjuna and later on. I shall make this point clear in the next chapter.

¹ In Bundle, Vol. 5, p. 77a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

PART II

CHAPTER I

The different applications of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' in the two periods of the making of Mahāyāna Buddhism (or Mahāyāna sūtra period) and of Mahāyāna teachers (or Mahāyāna school period).

In the first part, we have made a historical study of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' from various points of view and thereby we have sought to indicate the line of the Original Mahāyāna Buddhism as well as its gradual manifestation.

In this part, we are going to discuss varied applications of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' at different times by the many teachers of manifold Mahāyāna schools. Roughly the period runs from the beginning of the second century A.D. to the seventh century A.D. In other words from the time of Aśva-ghoṣa I, down to the teachers of the Nālandā period.

But before we enter into this question we have at first one thing to discuss here which is of vital importance regarding the subject matter of our present inquiry. We should note here the different implications of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' at the respective time of the Mahāyāna Sūtra and Mahāyāna school periods.

In the Mahāyāna Sūtra period (or as I designate it Mahāyāna manifesting period) we find the term 'Mahāyāna' mainly used in the sense of 'disclosing or unfolding one's own real doctrines,' having not the least indication of 'rejecting the other doctrines.' At the same time the terms 'Mahāyāna' in relation to that of

‘Hīnayāna’ indicates only the relation of Buddha’s Ontological and Phenomenological perceptions respectively. But in the Mahāyāna school period, specially in the time of Nāgārjuna, these terms began to be used more in the sense of ‘rejecting’ other’s doctrines, as a fundamental feature, than merely ‘disclosing one’s own doctrines.’ Again, from the time of Nāgārjuna the above terms began not only to be used as indications of a sense of relationship between the Buddha’s Ontological and Phenomenological perceptions but also they were applied to strike out a comparison of one school with another. So that, in this period, Sthaviravāda on the one hand, the Sarvāstivāda with their allied schools as well as, that of the Mahāsaṅghikas even on the other (which was the fore-runner of Mahāyānism) were included in the scope of ‘Hīnayāna.’ While the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna, Yogācāra school of Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and of Aśvaghōṣa II did alone come under the scope of ‘Mahāyāna.’ This is clear from the following passage of Nāgārjuna’s Prajñāpāramitā-sāstra:—

“The doctrines of Hīnayāna mainly dealt with the idea of impermanence. While those of Mahāyānas chiefly expostulate the idea that ‘all existence is śūnyatā’ (or Dharma śūnyatā). In other words, in Hīnayāna at first, the idea of impermanence has been preached but afterwards, the idea of ‘Dharma-śūnyatā’ also came in. While in Mahāyāna from the very beginning, idea of ‘Dharma-śūnyatā’ has been preached.”¹

We should carefully mark here that the first portion of the statement, *i.e.*, “In Hīnayāna at first, the idea of impermanence has been preached” is evidently alluding to the Sthavira doctrines or the school of Sarvāstivāda, while the latter portion, *i.e.*, “But afterwards the idea

¹ Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sāstra, 60, fasciculi; Wang Bundle, Vol. 4, p. 46a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

of 'Dharma-sūnayata' also came in" is a distinct allusion to the doctrines of the Mahāsaṅghikas.

As we already know, the Sthaviras held that all existence is impermanent. The Sarvāstivādins went a little further and opined that although all existence is impermanent yet the atomic elements are permanent. The Mahāsaṅghikas again held that both cosmic existence as well as atomic elements are impermanent. This latter idea of Mahāsaṅghikas is fairly stated in the commentary of the Nikāya-avalambana-śāstra (Pu-chih-i-lun) by Paramārtha as the doctrine of Ekavyavahārika :—

"Ekavyavahārikas held that all existences in this world (loka = phenomenon) as well as in the super-world (uttaraloka = noumenon) are temporary, so that all existences (dharmas) have no reality."¹

Again, if we look at the Buddha-svabhāva-śāstra² by Vasubandhu, we will come to know that the Mahāsaṅghika school was included within the scope of 'Hīnayāna,' an extract from which runs thus :—

"Every school in Hīnayāna has its distinct opinions and specific interpretations. If we look at the doctrines of the Vibhāṅgyavādins, we see that they preach that 'sūnyatā' is the origin of all human beings—both wise and ignorant. Because, these classes of men all came into being out of the same 'sūnyatā.' This 'sūnyatā' is the 'nature of Buddha' (Buddha-svabhāva), and this Buddha-svabhāva is the Mahānirvāṇa. Again, if we look at the doctrines of Sarvāstivāda schools, we see all these schools preaching that all human beings do not possess originally, the 'nature of Buddha' (Buddha-svabhāva), but it can be obtained by religious practices."³

¹ The original book has been lost. I have quoted these passages from San-ran-gen-gi, Vol. I, p. 51.

² This book was translated by Paramārtha (557-569 A.D.). See Nanjio's Catalogue, p. 268, No. 1220.

³ Shu Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 74b, of Chinese Tripitaka.

In this statement, the term 'Vibhājyavādin' indicates the Mahāsaṅghika school. Etymologically, 'Vibhājyavādin' means 'one who follows the analytic method of enquiry.' From the Pāli Nikāyas we came to know that the expression 'Vibhājyavādin' originally implied Buddha's analytic method of enquiry.

In the Majjhima Nikāya,¹ Buddha declares himself to be a 'Vibhājyavādin' and not an 'Ekāmsavādin' indicating thereby that his method of teaching was analytic and not synthetic. According to Southern and Northern Buddhist sources sthaviras with their allied schools were Vibhājyavādins.² But in Chinese translations of Northern Buddhist Books, we find that the term Vibhājyavādin sometimes implied the Mahāsaṅghikas. The above-quoted passage is a sure evidence of this. Again the same expression is used in Abhidharma-mahāvibhāsa-śāstra³ of the Sarvāstivādins. It has been stated there that :—"some (school) is holding that 'Citta is originally pure' just as the Vibhājyavādins do." But we know, already that the doctrine of 'Anādi-ananta-vimal-acitta,' is a distinct Mahāsaṅghika tenet. Therefore, it is not very difficult to conclude that in the above statement, the term 'Vibhājyavādin' implies Mahāsaṅghikas and also that the Mahāsaṅghika school came under the scope of 'Hīnayāna.' Again, if we look at the record of Fa-Hien who came to India during the fourth century A.D. we find the following :—

"Students of the Mahāyāna present offerings to the Prajñāpāramitā and to Mañjuśrī."

¹ M. N, II, 99, p. 197.

² See Dr. Oldenberg's Introduction to the Vinaya Piṭaka, Vol. I, p. xlii; and Mrs. Rhys Davids's Introduction to the English translation of Katha-vattu.

³ See Nanjio's catalogue, p. 277, No. 1264.

⁴ Shu Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 74, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

⁵ Fa-hien by Legge, p. 46.

This does not supply any direct evidence for our purpose. But we have here an indirect implication that, at Fa-Hien's time, the Mahāsaṅghika school already had been included in the 'Hīnayāna.' Again, I-Tsing who travelled through India in the seventh century A.D. gives us the following:—

"Those who worship the Bodhisattvas and read the Mahāyāna Sūtras are called the Mahāyāna (the great). While those who do not perform those are called Hīnayāna (the small). There are but two kinds of the so-called Mahāyāna, first the Mādhyamika; second the Yoga."¹

This also is not direct evidence. But from this, we understand clearly that, at the time of I-Tsing, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools only were regarded as Mahāyāna. Therefore, it is no wonder that all other Buddhist schools would naturally at that time, come under 'Hīnayāna.' Thus, from the above discussion, it becomes clear that the implication of the term 'Mahāyāna' and its relation with 'Hīnayāna' had changed widely in the interval between the Mahāyāna Sūtra period and Mahāyāna school period.

Now this will naturally lead to such a question as how did the Mahāsaṅghika school come to be included into the scope of 'Hīnayāna' at the Mahāyāna school period? In answer to this, I would like to say that the Mahāsaṅghika and its allied schools just began the task of manifesting Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception into a doctrinal form. They also expressed those doctrines by such terms as 'Ekayāna,' Bodhisattvayāna, 'Buddhayāna' and at last by 'Mahāyāna.' While, on the contrary, at the same time they, with a strong sense of superiority, termed the doctrine of their opponents or

¹ I-Tsing, by Dr. J. Takakusu, p. 15.

Sthaviras by 'Dviyāna,' 'Arhatyāna,' and at last by 'Hīnayāna' in order to perpetuate a well-marked mutual distinction. But when, in course of time, the Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception was revealed, expressed and systematised more and more by brilliant men of the lineage of later Mahāsaṅghikas, a necessity arose to differentiate the earlier and later movements. The later line of the Mahāsaṅghikas was disposed to include the original Mahāsaṅghika school under the head of 'Hīnayāna.'

Let us continue the above discussion a little further in a concrete form.

Pūrṇayaśa a teacher of the later Mahāsaṅghika line the elder contemporary of Aśvaghoṣa I, held a little more advanced ideas than those of the original Mahāsaṅghikas. We come to know of his tenets from his discourses with Aśvaghoṣa I, embodied thus in 'Pu-fa-tsân-yin-yuen-kin' ¹ :—

"There are two standpoints from which to explain the existence. From the Conventional (*samuṛita-satya*) points of view 'existence' is nothing but simply a provisional name. While from the Transcendental (*paramārthā-satya*) point of view every existence is 'sūnya.' " ²

The life of Aśvaghoṣa I, shows that he was influenced by the teacher Pārśva and became a Buddhist. But according to the historical record 'Fu-fa-tsân-yin-yuen-kin' he obtained real perception through the teacher Pūrṇayaśa which reason, I think, led him in the beginning of his *Sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra* to offer a salutation first to Pūrṇayaśa and then to Bhikṣu Pārśva. This is a clear indication to prove that he belonged to the Mahāsaṅghika

¹ Translated by Ci-cia-ye, together with Thán-yáo, 472 A. D. of the Northern Wei dynasty, 386-534 A. D. In 6 fasciculi. This is a very well-known history of the succession of twenty-three patriarchs from Mahākāśyapa to the Bhikṣu Simha (see Nanjio's Catalogue, p. 298, No. 1340).

² Ch'ang Bundle, Vol. 9, p. 105b, of Chinese Tripitaka.

lineage. Āśvaghoṣa I, again lays down his fundamental doctrine in the 'Śāstra on the meaning of Anātmā in Dharma asked by a Nirgrantha,' there too 'he is seen to consider existence in general from two points of view, *i.e.*, from the point of Samvṛitasatya, all things exist in different ways in different positions; again, from the point of Paramārthasatya no such things (of the said descriptions) exist. But beyond these Dharma-tathatā exists which has no birth and no death being originally pure.'¹

Regarding Nāgārjuna, it has been stated in the 'Fu-fā-tsān-yuen-kin,' that he received instruction from Kapimala who was of the same line as Āśvaghoṣa I. From an examination of doctrines we are also convinced that Nāgārjuna undoubtedly was of the Mahāsaṅghika lineage. We know he established 'Sarva-sūnyata' doctrine which was based directly upon Mahāyāna Sūtras, specially, Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras and indirectly was nothing but a fairly systematized and much advanced form of original Mahāsaṅghika tenets.

It is needless to mention that the followers of Mādhyamika school like Āryadeva undoubtedly sided with Nāgārjuna in doctrinal matters. We learn nothing of Maitreyanātha the founder of Yogācāra school from 'Fu-fā-tān-yuen-kin' and other historical records and consequently it is very difficult to trace his previous connections. However, from the doctrinal point of view we clearly understand that his ideas had been much influenced by the 'Vimal-citta' doctrine of the original Mahāsaṅghikas. Maitreyanātha as we know established the Yogācāra school upon the basis of Mahāyāna Sūtras like Avataṃsaka-sūtra, Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Sandhinirmocana-sūtra, etc. And these

¹ Ch'en Bundle, Vol. 9, p. 3a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

Sūtras as I have stated before, were propounded by Mahāsaṅghika school men. Therefore, of him it may be said that indirectly he too belonged to the Mahāsaṅghika line. His doctrine of 'Vijñāpti-mātra' or 'Sarva-vijñāna' from a certain point of view may be called a systematized form of 'Vimala-citta' doctrine of original Mahāsaṅghikas. Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and other followers of the same school may be said in the same light to be indebted to the Mahāsaṅghikas although their doctrines were only a step further than those of Maitreyanātha. Thus, the doctrines of 'Asanskṛita dharma' as well as 'Anādi-ananta-vimala-citta' of original Mahāsaṅghikas as well as their Buddhalogy were gradually amplified by the Lokottaravādins and Ekavyavahārikas of the same line. Again, a further advanced stage was reached by Pūrṇaśāśana and Āśvaghōṣa I. At the time of Nāgārjuna of the Mādhyamika school and of Maitreyanātha of Yogācāra school and their respective followers the above doctrines were developed to a still greater extent. Thus the 'Anātmā-adharma' doctrine of the Mahāsaṅghikas was elaborated by Nāgārjuna under the term of 'Sarva-sūnyatā' doctrine, and that of 'Asanskṛita-dharma' under the name of 'Dharma-tathatā.' While the 'Vimala-citta' doctrine of the Mahāsaṅghikas was fully developed by Maitreyanātha under the name of 'Sarva-vijñāna' as well as 'Vimala-svabhāva-nirvāṇa' doctrines. At last, as the last logical stage Āśvaghōṣa II, one of the greatest Mahāyāna teachers combined together in a perfect whole both the doctrines of Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras under such a title as 'Bhūtatathatā' or 'suchness' doctrine.

In other words, Nāgārjuna's doctrines mainly treat of the problem 'the determination of what constitutes the substance of reality.' While Maitreyanātha's doctrines mainly touch the problem of 'the determination of the relation between reality and cognition.' And both these

points of view have been combined together by Aśva-ghoṣa II.¹

In this way, the doctrines of the Mahāsaṅghika school were formulated, developed and advanced step by step by different teachers of the same lineage and were, at the last stage of the whole Mahāsaṅghika movement, transformed into what is generally known as Mahāyāna Buddhism. The upholders of the latter system finally called themselves Mahāyānist. They went to the extent of including into the scope of 'Hīnayāna' the original Mahāsaṅghikas and their allied schools.

Besides this, there was another reason for this inclusion of the Mahāsaṅghikas within the scope of 'Hīnayāna.' About the time of Nāgārjuna and afterwards, the question of the religious, religious practices, as well as final salvation became all important among the different schools of Buddhism. So that the Mahāyānist naturally were busily engaged to strike out comparisons among different forms of the Buddhist faith on the said points. The terms 'Mahāyāna,' and 'Hīnayāna' were used in this connection. At this time these religious controversies, we should bear in mind, were of more value than philosophical discussion. As we all know, from the theoretical point of view, the consideration of philosophical doctrines is of more importance than the religious aspect. But from the practical point of view, religious, religious practices as well as final salvation are of vital importance in human life. Buddhism as a whole, we should remember, is more a religion than a philosophy. Therefore, its most important question is that which touches salvation and its ways. But when Nāgārjuna and other Mahāyāna teachers found themselves into the vortex of a keen controversy and had to stand against Brahmanical or non-Brāhmanical

¹ For this reason, his only known work 'Mahāyāna Środdhotpāda-śāstra' has been considered as the common scripture for Mahāyāna Buddhists.

philosophers and theorists were compelled to formulate a set of philosophical doctrine and tenets and thus to raise high in men's estimation the fame of the Buddhist faith. However, when the conflict was in their own folk they made comparison among the different Buddhist schools on practical religious points indicated above.

The original Mahāsaṅghika school as we have stated, began to manifest Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological ideas, and at the same time, it became the fore-runner of Mahāyāna Buddhism. But at that time, their ideas on the religious, religious practices and final salvation could not reach the Mahāyanic stage on the same. For example, the original Mahāsaṅghikas though held 'Anādi-ananta-Vimala-citta' doctrines yet practically their idea on religious did not go beyond 'Arhatship.' While the Mahāyānists realized all religious as Bodhisattvas and capable of attaining Buddhahood.

From such a religious or practical consideration, the fully developed, later Mahāyānists counted original Mahāsaṅghikas as one of Hinayāna. While they themselves, *i.e.*, the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna, Yogācāra school of Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu as well as that of Aśvaghōṣa II, were only regarded as 'Mahāyāna.'

CHAPTER II

Application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' among the founders of Mahāyāna schools and their followers.

Different teachers of Mahāyāna school made independent applications of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' according to their individual notions. The investigation on this subject is a very important matter for the students of Buddhist history. So I shall state in this chapter, the different applications of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' of different teachers of Mahāyāna school, and of their immediate followers.

I

Application by Aśvaghoṣa I.

Let us see at first, in what sense the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' have been applied by Aśvaghoṣa I. As we know, he, an inhabitant of Sāketa, was the son of Suvarṇākṣī and lived contemporaneously with king Kaniṣka II, the Great Scythian king (about 140 A. D.).

In Buddhist history, he was known more as a poet than as a philosopher of India. He wrote many works in Sanskrit among them, Buddhacarita, Saundranandakāvya and a drama Śaradvatī-putra-prakarana¹ are regarded as the best specimens of his poetic literature. Of his poetic art, it has been said, it excels even that of Kālidāsa.² While regarding his religious and philosophical ideas, I would like to say that they stand midway between the Hīnayāna on the one hand and Mahāyāna on the other ; they contain in them much of Hīnayānic doctrines

¹ It has been discovered in the second Turfan Expedition and has been edited by H. Lüders, 1911.

² See Preface of Saundranandamikāvyaṃ, P. iv, by MM. H. P. Śastri.

and at the same time, they smack of Mahāyānic ideas none the less. It is then rather proper to say that, his stage is one of transformation of the Hīnayāna school into that of Mahāyāna. But as stated already, he is one of the predecessors of Mahāyāna Buddhism. In his works we come across the term 'Mahāyāna' about four times, but the term is always used singly, without giving rise to any idea of comparison with the term 'Hīnayāna,' which curiously enough, is not mentioned at all. For example, in the 'Sūtra on the meaning of the Anātmā in Dharma asked by a Nirgrantha Jñāti-putra' ¹ stated :—"At that time Nirgrantha went to the man who understands the *Mahāyāna*." ²

Again,

"Man who understands the *Mahāyāna* said to Nirgrantha." ³

Again, in the same Sūtra :—

"At that time, after hearing (Āsvaghoṣa's explanation on the Anātmā) all those heretical people were delighted much and having well understood that explanation, they dissolved their doubt and obtained *Mahāyāna knowledge*." ⁴

Again, in the Buddhacarita Kāvya, once we meet with the term 'Mahāyāna' thus :—

"This, sirs, is the *Mahāyāna*, the instrument of the law of perfect Buddha." ⁵

From the above quotations, it becomes clear that the application of the term, 'Mahāyāna,' by Āsvaghoṣa I, means only the indication of certain ideas of Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception ; but it does not indicate any relationship with the term 'Hīnayāna.'

¹ This book has not been mentioned in Nanjio's Catalogue. But we find it in the Catalogue of Chinese Tripiṭaka of Kō-kio-shō-In Edition.

² Ch'ang Bundle, Vol. 9, p. 2a

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Ch'ang Bundle, Vol. 9, p. 3a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

⁵ Chap. XVI (Cowel's Edition, p. 148) and S. B. E., p. 184.

II

Application in Nāgārjuna.

Nāgārjuna was a native of Southern India. He was a Brahmin by caste and flourished sometime between the later half of 2nd century and the first half of 3rd century A. D. He has been known to Indian Buddhism as the founder of Mādhyamika school. However, in Northern Buddhism (China and Japan), he has been known as the fourteenth patriarch in Buddhism and at the same time he has been regarded not only as the founder of Mādhyamika school but as the founder of all Mahāyāna schools. Of course, though as a matter of fact, he was not the founder of all Mahāyāna schools, but the tradition seems to indicate how much he was honoured by the Northern Buddhists. And a tradition like this, naturally leads us to understand that he was a brilliant teacher of Buddhist philosophy and a great exponent of the faith. Really, he was the man who expounded and systematized Mahāyāna Buddhism. Therefore, we can say definitely that the Mahāyāna movement, in general, arose really in every respect—theoretically and practically—in the time of Nāgārjuna. And from this period, the relation between the schools upholding Buddha's Ontological perception and Phenomenological perception, that is Developed and Original forms of Buddhism, as well as between the different schools, in the sense of superiority and inferiority, became a matter of great controversy and discussion. So the application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' also came into being in the real sense of comparison. This is the reason, I should say, that if we look at his mighty work, the Prajñāpāramitā-sāstra,—the commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra,—which has been regarded as the Encyclopaedia of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, we meet

several times with the comparison of the Developed Buddhism with the Original one or Buddha's Ontological perception with that of view on Phenomenology through the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna,' from various points of view—on the points of 'doctrines,' 'Religious practices,' and 'Religieux' as well as finally on 'salvation.' The following example will make the idea more clear.

In the 4th fasciculi of Prajñāpāramitā-sāstra,¹ we find all these points in a single passage, thus:—"Mahāyāna has been preached for both Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas, while the Sūtra of the Śrāvakas (Hīnayāna) has been preached only for the monks (śrāvakas) but not for Bodhisattvas."—*This shows the relation between the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna forms of the Buddhism on the point of Religieux.*

"Buddhayāna is a great and vast one while Śrāvakayāna is small and narrow one."—*This shows the relation between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Buddhism on the point of salvation.*

"Śrāvakayāna is for the benefit of one's own self while Buddhayāna is for the benefit of all."—*This shows the relation between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Buddhism on the point of religious practices.*

"In the Śrāvakayāna, the sūnyatā of individual entity (or anātmā) has been preached mainly, while in Buddhayāna, the sūnyatā of individual entity as well as cosmic existences (anātmā-adharma) have been preached."—*Here we find the relation between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Buddhism on the points of philosophical doctrine.*

In the following statements of the said Sāstra again, I want to show the relation between the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Buddhism on various points referred to above.

¹ Wang Bundlo, Vol. I, p. 29a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

In the 18th fasciculi of Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra it has been stated¹ :—

“The sūnyatā of all things has been preached in the Śrāvakayāna. While in Mahāyāna, the sūnyatā of all things as well as their inner nature have been preached.”

Again, in the 22nd fasciculi of the same Śāstra occurs² the following :—

“In Śrāvakayāna, suffering (dukkha), impermanence (anitya), non-ego (anātmā) have been preached. While in Mahāyāna the truth of only one reality (dharmatathatā) has been preached.”

Again, in the 69th fasciculi of the same, it is stated³ :—

“The doctrine of Hīnayāna preaches much of impermanence, while the doctrine of Mahāyāna preaches much of sūnyatā of existences. In other words, in the doctrine of Hīnayāna impermanence has been preached first and the sūnyatā of existences after that. But in Mahāyāna, from the very beginning, the idea of ‘Dharma-sūnyatā’ has been preached.”

In all the quotations above, the terms ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hīnayāna’ indicate *doctrinal differences* between the two *i.e.* between Developed and Original Buddhism.

Next, in the 79th fasciculi of the Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra,⁴ it has been stated :—

“The doctrine of Mahāyāna is full of mercy, while that of Hīnayāna is without mercy. Because the doctrine of the Mahāyāna is for all creatures but that of the Hīnayāna is for the benefit of self only.”

¹ Wang Bundle, Vol. I, p. 115a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 7a.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 46a.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 107b.

In the 35th fasciculi of the same Śāstra we find ¹ :—

“The wisdom of Bodhisattva is superior to that of Śrāvaka. The Śrāvaka though he understands the śūnyatā of all existences yet does not know that both this world and Nirvāṇa are one and the same.”

Again, the 24th fasciculi of the same Śāstra stated ² :—

“The Śrāvaka is just like a physician who does not know proper medical treatment, while the Bodhisattva is just like the great physician to whom there is no disease unknown to him and at the same time no medicine, the use of which he does not know.”

In the above quotations, through the two terms a differentiation has been made between the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna *on the point of religion*.

Again, in the same Śāstra, 96th fasciculi, it occurs ³ :—

“In the school of Hīnayāna, Nirvāṇa is regarded as the only reality, while in the school of Mahāyāna every existence is regarded as one and the same with Nirvāṇa, for the teachers of Mahāyāna penetrated those existences with deep and sharp knowledge.”

Again, in the same Śāstra, 100th fasciculi, we find ⁴ :—

“The aim of all Buddhism is only one,—what is called the destruction of suffering and attainment of Nirvāṇa. This salvation is of two kinds ; one is only for the self, another is not only for the self but for all creatures. Therefore, though both are equally claiming Nirvāṇa as their ideal, yet there is the difference that one claims it for the self and the other for all creatures. This makes a differentiation in Buddhism. This is the reason why there are ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hīnayāna’ in the Buddhism.” The above quotations show the relation between different

¹ Wang Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 84a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² *Ibid*, Vol. 2, p. 17a.

³ *Ibid*, Vol. 5, p. 85b.

⁴ *Ibid*, Vol. 5, pp. 105a-b.

aspect of Buddhism on the salvation by the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna.'

Thus, I have shown that at the time of Nāgārjuna the interrelation and comparison of Buddha's Ontological and Phenomenological perceptions, in other words Developed and Original forms of Buddhism, became of vital importance from various points of view. Here one thing we should bear in mind, *viz.*, that Nāgārjuna also used specially the terms 'Buddhayāna' and 'Śrāvakayāna' in place of 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' in order to praise the Mahāyāna doctrines and reject the Hīnayāna ones respectively. For example, in the 77th fasciculi of Prajñāpāramitā-sāstra,¹ it is stated thus :—

"One should be far away from the 'Dviyāna,' *i.e.*, (śrāvakayāna and pratyekabuddhayāna) and one close to 'Buddhayāna.' "

Again, in the 5th and 13th fasciculi of Daśabhūmi-vibhāsa-sāstra,² it is stated that :—

"It has been called the death of a Bodhisattva if (any one) sinks down into the level of a Śrāvaka or a Pratyekabuddhayāna. Because, there he loses all benefit. "It is no fear at all, if (any one) goes down into the hell even. But, on the other hand, it is the greatest fear for him if he sinks down into the level of Dviyāna. Because, if (any one) goes down even into the hell yet he would obtain Buddhahood at last. But if (any one) sinks down into the level of Dviyāna he will thereby cut off all his connections with Bodhisattvahood for ever."

III

The Application in Āryadeva.

Āryadeva, sometimes known under the name of Kānadeva, son of a Brahmin of South India, was an

¹ Wang Bundle, Vol. 4, p. 97b of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² Su Bundle, Vol. 8, p. 19b, and Vol. 8, p. 62b.

eminent disciple of Nāgārjuna and consequently his younger contemporary.

As we know, Nāgārjuna treated Buddhism in a double way, *i.e.*, 'rejecting or disparaging others, doctrines' and 'disclosing or unfolding one's own doctrine.' But Āryadeva, being matchlessly eloquent and possessed of a very strong power to defeat his adversaries, has treated Buddhism during his whole life much more from the outlook of 'rejecting other's doctrines' than 'disclosing one's own doctrines.' This we can see very well in his works.¹ All his works except the 'Mahāpuruṣa-śāstra' deal mainly with the method of the 'rejecting the doctrines of others.'

He too, like Nāgārjuna, has not only rejected Brahmanical and non-Brahmanical doctrines but also proved the futility of the doctrines of the primitive or Hīnayāna schools of Buddhism. An example² of this can be cited from the Śāstra or 'the explanation of the Nirvāṇa by the heretical Hīnayāna teachers mentioned in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.' Whenever he strikes at a relation or comparison among different Buddhist schools, he did it by the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna.' One of his works states thus :—

“हीनयानाभिरुद्धानं मृत्युशङ्का पदेपदे !

संग्रामजयतुक्तेन(सुतेषां) दूर एव व्यदस्थितः ॥

महायानाभिरुद्धस्तु करुणाधर्मवर्धितः ।

क्षपानयधनुर्वाणो जगदुद्धरणाशयः ॥”³

“The people of the small vehicle (Hīnayāna) are afraid of death at every step ; their achievement of victory

¹ There are Śata-śāstra, Śata-śāstra-vaipulya and Śāstra on the refutation of the principles of four heretical Hīnayāna schools mentioned in the Laṅkāvatāra-śāstra, as well as Śāstra on the explanation of the Nirvāṇa of twenty heretical Hīnayāna (teachers) mentioned in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.”

² See Bundle, Vol. 5, p. 586 of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

³ This work did not exist in Chinese Tripiṭaka. However, the original one has been discovered from Nepal by MM. H. P. Śastri and also has been published in B. A. S., Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2, p. 180, 1898.

in war lies indeed very far off ; while the men of the great vehicle (Mahāyāna) are clad with the armour of mercy ; they are intent on saving the world and are fully equipped with the bow and arrows of sympathy and morality.

The application of the terms ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hīnayāna’ in Āryadeva is comparatively simple for our understanding than in Nāgārjuna. From this, I venture to say that Āryadeva was more busily engaged in the task of defeating Brāhmanical and non-Brāhmanical schools than in making a comparative estimate of the different schools of Buddhism. Because, there can be no denial of the fact that it was a period in which Brāhmanical and non-Brāhmanical faiths and Philosophies were in a very flourishing condition.

IV

The Application in Sthiramati.

Sthiramati was one of the great followers of Nāgārjuna. He flourished about a hundred years after Nāgārjuna. Sthiramati’s work entitled Mahāyānāvatāraka-śāstra¹ has been translated into Chinese by T’ao-thai, of the Northern Liān dynasty, 397-439 A. D. From this we may conjecture that his date ran some year between 200-300 A. D. He belonged to the lineage of Nāgārjuna and developed to a great extent the ‘Śarva-sūnyatā’ doctrine. His application of the terms ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hīnayāna’ on the relation or comparison between the primitive and developed Buddhism, was rather of a more concrete form than that of Āryadeva and even than that of Nāgārjuna so to say. In his Mahāyānāvatāraka-śāstra, we read :—

“The slandering of Mahāyāna is the direct cause of falling into evil ways.”²

¹ See Nanjio’s Catalogue, p. 273, No. 1243.

² Su Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 61a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

Again, in the same Śāstra, we find :—

“ If you think that Śrāvakayāna is equal to Mahāyāna it would be very wrong and it cannot be so. Because, the cause (religious practices) and its effect (salvation) are different in the two vehicles (Mahāyāna and Hinayāna). The cause of Śrāvakayāna being the same with that of Mahāyāna, the effects of both must also be the same. But their effects are actually different. Therefore, the same should be the case with their cause too : that is to say, their cause also must be different. Because the Śrāvakas have only cut off all hindrances and penetrated into impermanence. Besides this, the Śrāvakas understand a doctrine only by hearing from others and by being instructed. While the Bodhisattvas have cut off not only all hindrances but also their minute ‘semblances’ and ‘perfumes’ and have at all the same time penetrated into all existence (sarva-dharma) as Dharma-tathatā and, unlike the Śrāvakas, have not to hear others but they by themselves understand any doctrine naturally in their own wisdom. So there is much difference between the Śrāvakayāna and the Mahāyāna.”¹

The above quotation helps us to understand how the relation or comparison between the two aspects of Buddha’s perception, *i.e.*, the primitive and developed Buddhism assumed a more concrete form, through the use of the terms ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hinayāna’ by Sthiramati than it wont to do in the age of his previous teachers.

Besides the above-mentioned teachers, we have many others belonging to the lineage of Nāgārjuna before the University of Nālandā came into being. They are : Rāhulabhadra, the younger contemporary of Āryadeva ; Buddhapālita, the older contemporary of Bhāvaviveka

¹ Su Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 62a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

who flourished about the end of the 5th century A. D. This Buddhapālita held, as we know, the doctrine of 'Prasanga' on the Mādhyamika system. While Bhāvaviveka held the doctrine of 'Svatantra' on the same system.¹

We have nothing to mention in particular regarding the application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' in works of the above teachers besides what has already been pointed out.

We have so far tried to indicate the application of these terms by various teachers of the Mādhyamika school previous to the foundation of the Nālandā University.

Let us now turn our attention to the application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' by the teachers of the Yogācāra school.

V

The Application in Maitreyanātha.

Ārya Maitreyanātha was the founder of the Yogācāra school in India. According to Dr. H. Ui he flourished sometime between 270-350 A. D.² Nāgārjuna established the Mādhyamika school in Southern India while

¹ Both Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka belonged to the lineage of Nāgārjuna and they equally enhanced the doctrine of Mādhyamika system. But their opinions differentiated one from another. The former held the doctrine of 'Prasanga,' that is to say : every existence came into being only by the 'cause' (heta) 'conditions' (pratayas). And such existence has no kind of permanent nature (sabhāva nityatā). Therefore, they are all śūnyatā (emptiness). And he taught; this is the real doctrine of Nāgārjuna. While, the latter held, on the contrary, the doctrine of 'Svatantra,' that is to say : from conventional (saṃhṛti satya), point of view, all existence is production only through 'cause' and 'condition.' But from transcendental (paramārtha-satya) point of view, original nature of all existence is permanent.

² A learned article on this appeared in the Philosophical Journal of Imperial University, Tokyo, No. 411, 1922.

Maitreyanātha founded the Yogācāra school near Ayodhyā.

It will not be out of place to state here something of the historical authenticity of Maitreyanātha. Hitherto, Maitreyanātha, the founder of Yogācāra school, had been regarded as a mythical person, or sometimes as the Maitreya Bodhisattva or the future Buddha. But since MM. H. P. Śāstri pointed out the historicity of Maitreyanātha from the colophon of *Abhisamayā-lamkāra-kārikā* which is a commentary from the Yogācāra point of view, on *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* by Maitreyanātha, I myself have been at pains to see if it can be confirmed from Chinese sources. And I am very glad to say that my learned friend Dr. H. Ui, Professor of Tohoku Imperial University, wrote an article¹ supporting MM. H. P. Śāstri on the point.

Now, let us look to the application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hinayāna' made by Maitreyanātha. From his works we come to understand that his application does not bear the sense of 'rejecting others' doctrines' but definitely points to 'unfolding one's own doctrines.' A few examples will make the point clear. In the 35th fasciculi of *Yogācārya-bhūmi-śāstra* we find :—

"On the whole there are two kinds of purification; one is the purification of 'hinderance' (*kleśāvaraṇa*), another is the purification of 'intellectual hinderance' (*jñānāvaraṇa*). Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas are able to obtain the purification only of 'hinderance' but not of intellectual hinderance. But Bodhisattvas alone can obtain both kinds of purification. Therefore, it has been said that they (Bodhisattvas) in comparison with all, are the highest and supreme. Again, there are four things in which Bodhisattvas are superior to the Śrāvakas and

¹ In the *Philosophical Journal of Imperial University of Tokyo*, No. 411, 1921.

the Pratyekabuddhas. These are—(1) superior nature ; (2) superior conduct ; (3) superior skilfulness ; (4) superior effect.”¹

Again, in the 46th fasciculi of the same Śāstra, we have the following :—

“The Bodhisattvayāna is characterised by seven great features. Therefore, it has been called ‘Mahāyāna.’

What are then these seven ? These are :—

1. The great characteristic in the doctrine *i.e.*, among the twelve different divisions of Buddha’s doctrines (dvādaśāṅga-Buddha-vacanam), the Bodhisattva-pitaka belongs to the extensive teaching (vaipulya).

2. The great characteristic in the aspiration (cittot-pāda), *i.e.*, one kind of people alone can desire to obtain the perfect form of knowledge.

3. The great characteristic of the perfect understanding (adhimukti), *i.e.*, one kind of people have got perfect understanding as well as faith on the extensive doctrine.

4. The great characteristic of excessive pleasure (adhyāśaya), *i.e.*, one kind of people being possessed of adhimukti-caryābhūmi can obtain the perfect pleasure-stage (anutrāśaya-bhūmi).

5. The great characteristic of the way, *i.e.*, perfect religious practices with the virtue and knowledge can secure the most perfect knowledge.

6. The great characteristic of the period (kāla), *i.e.*, after passing through three numberless great kalpas one kind of people can obtain the most perfect knowledge.”²

Of the above mentioned seven great characteristics No. 1 relates to the doctrine ; Nos. 2, 3 and 4 apply to the religious (of different kinds). Nos. 5 and 6 are concerned with religious practices and their duration period. No. 7 points to the kind of salvation.

¹ Lai Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 67a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 26a.

Again, if we look at the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra*, we meet with several passages in which Maitreyanātha in dealing with the terms ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hinayāna’ makes positive references to the Mahāyānic doctrines but the point is more clearly explained by Asaṅga in his commentary on the said Śāstra.

VI

The application in Asaṅga.

I have stated above that Maitreyanātha was the founder of the Yogācāra school and established, for the first time, the doctrine of Alaya-vijñāna which, in general terms, is called Yogācāra doctrines. But it remained for Asaṅga to evolve a complete system out of it.

Asaṅga was the son of a Brāhmin of Gāndhāra (modern Peshwar and Rawalpindi districts) and flourished about 310-390 A.D. He was at first an adherent of the Mahīśāsaka school of Sarvāstivādins, then he became a follower of Vaibhāsika philosophy but could not long remain satisfied with its doctrines. Subsequently he became a follower of the Mahāyāna school and received

¹ *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra* means merely the verse portion which is one of Maitreyanātha's works. Its prose portion is a commentary on it by Asaṅga. Therefore, Asaṅga's work here should be properly called *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra-vṛtti* or *kārikā*. Up to the present, both the verse and prose portions have been thought as a single work by Asaṅga. But it is wrong to say so; because, according to the evidence of Hsuen-Tsiang: “Asaṅga Bodhisattva went up by night to the palace of Maitreya Bodhisattva and there received the Yogācārya Śāstra, the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra.” (Beal's translation here by the word—‘*ṭikā*’ is a mistake, see Beal's Book I, p. 226.) Besides this, in the end of *Mahāyāna-vatāraṅka-śāstra* of Sthiramati it is stated:

“It should be known that Mahāyāna is the original vehicle just as it is explained in the *Sūtrālaṅkāra* of Maitreyanātha.” (See Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 73b.) From these statements we can easily conclude that the verse portion of that Śāstra was the work of Maitreyanātha. This point has been discussed by my learned friend Dr. H. Ui in his article on the “Historical personage of Maitreyanātha and works of Asaṅga.” *Idem* Philosophical Journal of Imperial University of Tokyo, No. 411, 1921.

instructions from Maitreya-nātha somewhere near Ayodhyā. In due course Asaṅga established the Yogācāra school which is a well-known Mahāyāna school of Buddhism as opposed to the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna.

The terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' have been applied by Asaṅga in their two-fold sense, *viz.*, 'Unfolding one's own doctrines' and 'rejecting other's doctrines.' For example, in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra-kārikā it is stated :—

"How are these differentiated? They are so in five points, namely: on (i) the aspiration or faith; (ii) the teaching; (iii) the way; (iv) the livelihood and (v) the period. In the Śrāvakayāna those five—*viz.*, aspiration, teaching, way, livelihood and period—are only for the purpose of obtaining one's own Nirvāṇa. Therefore, the collection of merit as well as of wisdom, the period (of practices and salvation) and the attainment of salvation after three births—are all in a small scale. While in the Mahāyāna these are all entirely the opposite scale. Therefore, in every point the two ways are diametrically¹ opposite so that Hīnayāna cannot become Mahāyāna."

Again, in the Mahāyāna-samparigraha-śāstra, it has been stated thus:—

"Ten superior points are existing in the Mahāyāna but not in the Hīnayāna."²

In other places of his works we find several times such a relation or comparison drawn between the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna.' If we compare his application of the said terms with that of Nāgārjuna we

¹ "कथं विरुद्धं । पञ्चभिविरोधैः । आशयोपदेश प्रयोग उपसम्भवादि विरोधैः । यावकयाने ह्यात्मपरिनिर्वाणायैवाशयस्तदर्थमेवोपदेशस्तदर्थमेव प्रयोगः परौ तत्तत्पुण्यज्ञानं रभारसंगृहीत उपसम्भवादि कालेन चान्येन तदर्थप्राप्त्यर्थवन्निमित्तमपि नान्यमिति । महायानं तु सर्व विपक्षेण । तस्मादन्योन्य-विरोधाद्ययानं ह्येनं ह्येनमेव तत् । न तन्महायानं भवितुमर्हति ।" (Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra-kārikā). Edited by Prof. Sylvain Levi, p. 4, kārikā for the 10th verse.

² Lai Bundle, Vol. 9, p. 47b, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

come to appreciate, as we approach the time of Asaṅga, that a deep sense of rivalry began to grow and that it had evidently a tendency to become more and more sectarian. Therefore, it seems that in Asaṅga's time, the question of a comparative estimate of the Primitive and Developed Buddhism was a burning one so to say.

The following introductory passage from the Mahāyāna sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra-kārikā will clearly indicate such a situation at his time :—

“वैवेदं महायानं बुद्धवचनं कुतस्तस्यायमनुशंसो मविथतोत्यत्र वि-
प्रतिपन्नास्तस्य बुद्धवचनत्व प्रसाधनार्थं कारणविभाज्यमारभ्यश्लोकः ।”¹

“(Some say) the Mahāyāna doctrine is not Buddha's speech. How, then, can it be admired? To meet this doubt the following śloka, by way of a full analysis of the reason, is put forth, in order to carry perfect credence that the Mahāyāna doctrines are really Buddha's true speech though the fact has been doubted.”

This passage shows clearly that at the time of Asaṅga there were many Sthaviras and other men belonging to allied schools in Ayodhyā and its neighbouring countries who very much abused Mahāyānic Buddhism by applying such terms as ‘Adharma-vādin’ in the same way as the original Sthaviras did in course of their disputes with the Mahāsaṅghikas.

This is the reason, I think, why Asaṅga tried his utmost to remove such a false notion and to establish the truth of Mahāyānism by the right application of the terms ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hīnayāna.’

VII

The application in Vasubandhu.

Vasubandhu was a younger brother of Asaṅga and flourished about 390-400 A.D. He was a man of brilliant

¹ Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra-kārikā, p. 3.

parts. At first, he was a member of the Sarvāstivāda school and, as one of its leaders, wrote out the Abhidharmakaśa-sāstra, one of the famous works of the Sarvāstivādins. But sometime after, he tried the doctrines of the Sautrantika school. He, however, could not rest satisfied with the latter. Subsequently, as the result of Asaṅga's teachings, he became a follower of the Yogācāra school and incidentally one of its greatest masters.

The Yogācāra school, as we know, was founded by Maitreya-nātha, systematised by Asaṅga and elaborated by Vasubandhu. The headquarters of the latter was round about Ayodhyā which was the capital of the Gupta Empire at that time. When Bālāditya (Kumāra Gupta I) ascended the Gupta throne, Vasubandhu came to be highly respected and patronised by him and his mother Dhruvā. Hence Ayodhyā, the imperial capital city became a great centre of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism.¹

Regarding the application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna,' he played no less a part than Asaṅga, but was even more positive in his dealing than the latter. Examples will make this point clear. In his Mādhyāntavibhāga-sāstra, it is stated :—

“The Sūtra of Hīnayāna is only for self-benefit, but the Mahāyāna Sūtra is for the benefit of the self as well as others. Therefore, Mahāyāna is the superior one.”²

Again, in the Mahāyāna-samparigraha-sāstra-yākyā, it has been stated :—

“This one Vehicle (ekayāna) only is the highest one. There is no other Vehicle superior to this. Therefore, you should know, that there is only one superior Vehicle

¹ See my 'Shifting of the Centre of Buddhism in India,' Journal of Letters, Calcutta University, Vol. 1, pp. 29-34.

² Lai Bundle, Vol. 9, p. 26a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

which has been called 'Buddhayāna,' besides the 'Śrāvākayāna."¹

Again, in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra-śāstra, we find :—

"The Hīnayāna is like milk, while the Mahāyāna is like the cream of milk."²

Again, if we look at the Buddha-svabhāva-śāstra, in the first fasciculi, we find :—

"Buddha preached (in the Mahāyāna) that all beings possessed the nature of Buddha."³

But in the same fasciculi, we find :—

"Buddha preached, for the men of Hīnayāna, the doctrine that they do not live in the 'Nature' (nature of Buddha) and will not be able to obtain Nirvāṇa."⁴

In these statements, the former indicates the exaltation of Mahāyāna doctrines and the Mahāyānists; while the latter indicates the rejection of the Hīnayāna doctrines and the Hīnayānists.

Besides these eminent teachers of Yogācāra school, there were several other great teachers of the same line, namely, Bandhuśrī, Citrabhāna, Vinasvabhāva, etc.,⁵ and they flourished after the time of Vasubandhu and before the time of the teachers of Nālandā.

Regarding their applications of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna,' there is nothing of special importance.

In connection with the Yogācāra teachers, we should direct our attention to one point which is very important in the history of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Among the Mahāyāna teachers, those of the Yogācāra school mentioned above, tried not only to establish the relation and comparison between the Primitive and

¹ Wang Bundle, Vol. 7, p. 54a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 6, pp. 63a and 70a.

³ Su Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 74b.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See Nanjio's Catalogue, p. 373 (Appendix I, No 12).

Developed Buddhism by the application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna,' but also emphatically asserted to prove that the Mahāyāna Buddhism is Buddha's true doctrine. For example; Dharmapāla,¹ in his *Vijñāptimātrasiddhi-śāstra*, quoted Maitreyanātha's explanation on the said point with the following seven kinds of reasons:—

“The Mahāyāna Buddhism is Buddha's true doctrine.

(i) *Because no mention has been made beforehand, i.e.,* if the Mahāyāna Sūtras (as the Hīnayānists have said) were forgery after Buddha's death and would have destroyed Buddha's true doctrine, why then did not Buddha mention it beforehand and at the same time why did not Buddha refer to the fear of it? Therefore, it must be Buddha's true doctrine.

(ii) *Because both the Sūtras have been equally exercised, i.e.,* both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna Sūtras have been equally exercised from the very beginning, then how can it be said that Mahāyāna doctrine is not Buddha's true doctrine?

(iii) *Because this is not the object of others' understanding, i.e.,* the doctrine of Mahāyāna is vast and deep; therefore, it cannot be understood by men of heretical sect and the Hīnayānists. This is the reason why Buddha did not preach this doctrine in their Sūtras and Śāstras. And if Buddha preached it in their Sūtras, it would not have been understood by them. Therefore, this doctrine did not find access in the Hīnayāna Sūtras. But for that reason, it cannot be said that the Mahāyāna doctrine is not Buddha's true doctrine.

(iv) *Because that can be established certainly, i.e.,* if you say that the Mahāyāna Buddhism is another

¹ This Sūtra is the work of Dharmapāla. But the quotation, as I have mentioned here, is the explanation of Maitreyanātha and has been quoted by Dharmapāla in his work.

Buddha's preaching, not of present Buddha, yet it can be established that the Mahāyāna is Buddha's true doctrine because all Buddhas communicated with one another.

(v) *Because if it be so, then that cannot be so, i.e.,* if any one admit the existence of Mahāyāna Buddhism then it should be believed that the Mahāyāna is Buddha's true doctrine because without Buddha's doctrine Mahāyāna could not come into being. If there be no Mahāyānism, then Hīnayānism also could not come to exist. Because without Mahāyāna idea Buddha-hood cannot exist. If there is no Buddha, then who is to preach the doctrine of Śrāvakayāna? And you say that Śrāvakayāna doctrine is Buddha's true speech, how then can it be possible that Mahāyāna is not Buddha's true doctrine?

(vi) *Because it can well-conquer, i.e.,* if any one practises religious practices according to the Mahāyāna Sūtras he will obtain clear understanding and knowledge and at the same time he will conquer all of those sufferings, therefore, it should be believed that the Mahāyānism is the Buddha's true doctrine.

(vii) *Because the inside-ideas differ from the outside statements, i.e.,* the idea of the Mahāyāna doctrine is so deep that the real idea cannot be got only by following the indication of sentences as they appear. Therefore, if we look at only the surface of sentences, we may find differentiation between the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna doctrines. But if we penetrate deep into the idea, then they are not found to be contradictory to each other. Only with a superficial observation and a biased mind one should not say that Mahāyāna is not the true doctrine of Buddha.”¹

Asaṅga also has spoken on these points in his Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra-kārikā as well as in the

¹ Wang Bundle, Vol. 10, pp. 12b-12a of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

Prakaranāryavaca-śāstra-kārikā¹ and in the Mahāyāna-samparigraha-śāstra,² and he has adduced ten reasons in order to prove that Mahāyāna Buddhism is Buddha's true doctrine. And these ten reasons are almost the same as those stated by him in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-kārikā as well as in Maitreyanātha's statement pointed out above.

Again, Vasubandhu also tried the same question and he too proved more conclusively than his elder brother that the Mahāyāna doctrine is Buddha's true doctrine. So in his Bodhi-cittotpādana-śāstra he has counted the calumny of Mahāyāna Buddhism as one of the four great crimes. And he has said :—

“Thirdly, those people who speak ill of the true and vast doctrine of Mahāyāna commit one of the great crimes.”³

“The faith on the Mahāyāna to be the great cause which can destroy the four kinds of hinderances; and at the same time he stated that the calumny of Mahāyāna is one of the great hinderances.”⁴

From the above several quotations, we come to understand that when Ayodhyā was the centre of the Yogācāra school, the teachers of that school had tried their best to explain that the Mahāyāna Buddhism is Buddha's true doctrine and also proved that the Mahāyāna Sūtras are but the true speech of the Buddha himself. Reason to this is not far to seek. As we know, when the Mahāsaṅghikas, having manifested Buddha's Introspectional and Ontological perception, separated from the Sthaviras, the latter excommunicated the former with such bad epithets as ‘Adharma-Vādins’ and ‘Pāpabhikṣu’ as their nicknames. Hence a great dispute took place between those

¹ Lai Bundle, Vol. 7. p. 86a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² *Ibid*, Vol. 9, p. 47b.

³ *Ibid*, Vol. 10, p. 99a.

⁴ Su Bundle, Vol. 2, p. 82b.

two schools. And when the latter lineage of the Mahasaṅghikas established the Mahāyāna Buddhism or the Mahāyāna schools then the Sthaviras began to calumniate the Mahāyāna Buddhism. And they were called by the Mahāyānist as 'Srāvaka-yāna' or 'Hīnayāna.' Therefore, their hatred upon the Mahāyāna Buddhism. As the Mahāyānist became more and more strong so they began to call the Mahāyāna Buddhism by such terms as 'Naivedaṁ Mahāyānaṁ Buddha Vacanaṁ' (*i.e.*, the Mahāyāna doctrines are not the true doctrine of Buddha). Of course, the struggle between the Mahāyānist and the Hīnayānist existed undoubtedly long before the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, but it became a burning question at the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and downwards.

VIII

The application of the terms in Aśvaghoṣa II.

Many of the Buddhist scholars still hold that Aśvaghoṣa, the author of the Buddhacarita and the Soundarānanda-kāvya, is identical with the author of the Mahāyāna śradhotpāda-śāstra; but I cannot agree with them. According to me the author of the Buddhacarita and the Soundarānanda-kāvya is somebody other than the author of the Mahāyānaśradhotpāda-śāstra. Regarding this point, we have very few external evidences but from internal investigations, it can be shown that they are different persons having the same name. Because Aśvaghoṣa I, was a great poet in India before the time of Kālidāsa but not a great Philosopher, while Aśvaghoṣa II, was not a poet but rather one of the greatest Philosophers of Buddhism in India. He established the doctrine of 'Bhūtatathatā-pratītyasamutpāda' or the doctrine of phenomenon rising from suchness (existence as such). If

we look at the philosophical work referred to above, we shall be struck with the depth of his system of philosophy. We already know that Nāgārjuna's doctrine of the 'Dharma-tathata' mainly dealt with to speak in the terms of European philosophy—The problem 'the determination of constituents of reality,' while the Yogācāra doctrine of 'Alaya-pratītyasamutpāda' or 'Sarva-vijñāna-vāda' mainly deals with the problem of the 'determination of the relation between the reality and cognition.' And the doctrine of Aśvaghoṣa II is a combination of both the above two systems of the doctrine. Hence, we are able to ascertain his date also; the foregoing discussion proves that he must have flourished after the time of Nāgārjuna, Aśaṅga and Vasubandhu and we shall not be far wrong if we place him in or about the 5th century A.D. approximately.

Now, let us see, how the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' had been applied by him. Through his work we come to know that he tried to exalt Mahāyāna doctrine with the help of the term 'Mahāyāna' and without rejecting or disparaging other doctrines. The following quotation will make the point clear.

In the Mahāyāna Śrādhapāda-śāstra, it is stated that :—

“The Mahāyāna can be briefly treated as to its two aspects, namely, what it is, and what it signifies. What is the Mahāyāna? It is the soul of all sentient beings (sarvasattva) that constitutes all things in the world, phenomenal and supra-phenomenal and through this soul we can disclose what the Mahāyāna signifies.

Because the soul in itself involving the quintessence of the Mahāyāna, is suchness (bhūtatathatā), but it becomes (in its relative or transitory aspect, through the law of causation) birth and death (saṃsāra) in which are revealed the quintessence, the attributes and the activity of the Mahāyāna. The Mahāyāna has a triple

significance. The first is the greatness of quintessence. Because the quintessence of the Mahāyāna as suchness exists in all things, remains unchanged in the pure as well as in the defiled, is always one and the same (*samatā*) neither increases nor decreases and is void of distinction.

The second is the greatness of attributes. Here we have the Tathāgata's womb (Tathāgatagarbha) which in exuberance contains immeasurable and innumerable merits (*punya*) as its characteristics.

The third is the greatness of activity, for it (*i.e.*,) Mahāyāna produces all kinds of good works in the world, phenomenal and supra-phenomenal. Hence the name Mahāyāna (great vehicle).

Again this Dharma is called the Mahāyāna: because it is the vehicle (*yāna*) in which all Buddhas from the beginning have been riding and Bodhisattvas when riding in it will enter into the state of Buddhahood."¹

IX.

The application of the terms by Sthiramati.

Sthiramati, sometimes known as Sāramati, is a man of Central India:² and he flourished about the latter part of the 5th century A.D. So he is a later contemporary of Aśvaghōṣa II, and from the doctrinal point of view he undoubtedly belonged to the same lineage with Aśvaghōṣa II. According to Hiuen-Tsang's record³ he wrote the Mahāyāna-dharmadhātu-aviseṣata-śāstra (?) and the Mahāyānottaratantra-śāstra in the Southern India. From this it seems that his influence spread in the Southern India.

¹ Awakening of Faith by I. Suzuki, pp. 52-55.

² The Discourse of History of Mahāyāna Buddhism, by Eun, Mayeda (in Japanese), p. 134.

³ Beal's Records of Western World, p. 268.

Through the above works, we come to know that his application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna,' with respect to the relation or comparison of different aspects of Buddhism, was by the disparaging of Hīnayāna doctrine. And he counted the Hīnayānic faith as one of the great 'sins of abusing religion' (dharmā-pavāda). So in his Mahāyānottaratantra-sāstra, it is stated thus :—

“Those people who have a preference for the doctrine of Hīnayāna have no faith in the Mahāyāna Dharma, so they are abusing all Mahāyāna Dharma.....Therefore, you should be afraid of such slander of Dharma. Because, such sin will lead us to hell where people suffer endless miseries.”¹

CHAPTER III.

The application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' by the teachers of Nālandā University.

Nālandā was the centre of Buddhism during the period that covers the time of Śākṛāditya and Buddhagupta of the later Gupta dynasty, on the one hand and the time of Mahipāla of the Pāla dynasty on the other, that is to say, the period running from the 5th century A.D. to the 11th century A.D.² We know that the Yogācāra school of Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu first arose in Ayodhyā and gradually spread to the South-East. The Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna arose in the Andhra country at first and extended its influence gradually to the North and Central India. It is rather strange that those different Mahāyāna schools came across

¹ Su Bundle, Vol. II, p. 102b of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² I have discussed about the History of Nālandā in my work 'the Shifting of the Centre of Buddhism in India,' published in the Journal of Letters, Calcutta University, Vol. I, p. 35.

each other in the Madhyadeśa. The famous Nālandā monastery was the very place where these two schools met each other during the 5th century A.D. After that time, Nālandā became the most important place as being the centre of Buddhism as well as the seat of Buddhist learning.

There, not only Mahāyānic doctrines, such as 'Mādhyamika' and 'Yogācāra,' but also other systems of it such as 'Bhūtatathatā' doctrine of Asvaghosa II, 'Mantrayāna' doctrine of Nāgābhodhi—nay even the Hinayānic systems—were taught and studied simultaneously.

In this period several famous learned monks of different schools flourished in India and many of them came and lived together in Nālandā. Though they had to contend against each other in course of their discussions as to their doctrinal differences and though their opinions differed from each other yet they were equally at their best in exalting the Mahāyāna Buddhism and disparaging the Hinayāna and other heretical doctrines. For this reason I shall not take their accounts separately but put all of them together under the Nālandā school.

(A) As to Nāgārjuna's lineage the following teachers who flourished during this period might be noticed, they are :—

1. Bhāvaviveka (about 528-560 A.D.)
2. Jñānaprabha (about the end of 6th century A.D.).
3. Candrakīrti (about the end of 6th century A.D.).
4. Simhaprabha (about the beginning of 7th century A.D.).
5. Jinaprabha (about the end of 7th century A.D.).
6. Śāntideva (about the end of 7th century A.D.).

Bhāvaviveka.—One of the lines of Nāgārjuna—held the idea of 'Svatantra' on the Mādhyamika doctrine as opposed to the tenets of 'Prasaṅga' of Buddhapālita on

the same doctrine mentioned above. Of his application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' we find in his Prajñādhīpa-śāstra-vyākhyā. There it has been stated:—

“Saddharma (true law) is pure and it can do away with all sorts of sufferings as well as their semblances (or perfumes) which may leave some impression on one's mind. Therefore, it has been described as pure.....and this Saddharma is what we call Mahāyāna.”¹

Jñāprabha.—No work has as yet been found that can be attributed to his authorship. However, from the Chinese as well as from the Japanese Buddhist source² we come to know that he divided the whole Buddhist system into three categories and ascribed them to three different schools:—

(i) The doctrine which says that 'both subject and object are existing.'

(ii) The doctrine which says that 'subject is existing but object is not existing.'

(iii) The doctrine which says that 'both subject and object are not existing.'

Item No. (i) indicates the Hīnayāna doctrine, *i.e.*, the doctrine of the Sthaviravādins and the Sarvāstivādins and No. (ii) indicates the doctrine of the Yogācāra school, while No. (iii) indicates the Mādhyamika doctrine. With the help of the first item he disparaged the Hīnayāna doctrine and with the second as well as with the third he extolled the Mahāyāna doctrine.

Candrakīrti and Sinhāprabha.—Regarding them we have not as yet come across any statement that can throw light upon the application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna.'

¹ Su Bundle, Vol. I, p. 139b, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² Jin-ni-mon-ron-shin-chi-gi-ki; one of the most important commentaries on the Dvādaśa-nikāya-śāstra of Nāgārjuna, p. 3a.

Śāntideva.—Regarding his application of the terms the following works bear testimony. In the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* it has been stated :—

“If the great vehicle is not admissible, how then your tradition can be admissible?”¹

Again, it has been stated in his *Śikṣā-samuccaya* thus:—

“The Master replied : ‘Even so, Mañjuśrī, whosoever after producing the thought of enlightenment holdeth not fast, neither studieth the Great Vehicle, but hath intercourse with such as follows the “Disciples Vehicle,” and is intimate with them and readeth their doctrine, and maketh his study therein, and proveth it, and informeth him thereof, and reciteth its topics.....’ and so forth down to ‘.....teacheth them, he thereby becometh dull of wit, and is torn away and cast back from the Road of the Highest wisdom.’”²

Again, in the same *Śāstra*, he stated :—

‘*Dissuading from following the Perfections—Preaching the Ideals that lead to the Hīnayāna.*’—“Again the inceptor Bodhisattva may speak thus to some one: You are not capable of practising the six perfections. You cannot become enlightened with the perfect Enlightenment. Speedily produce the thought of the way of the Disciples or the Pratyeka Buddhas: by this means you shall escape from the chain of re-birth...and thus, as aforesaid, this is the second Root Sin of the Inceptor Bodhisattva.”³

Again, in the *Sarvadharmaratnottara-arthasaṅgīti-śāstrā*, he has stated:—

“The true doctrine has been preached in the *Mahāyāna*.”⁴

¹ “*Nanu assidhaṃ Mahāyānaṃ kathaṃ siddhastvadāgamah.*” (Published in *Journal of Buddhist Text Society*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 26, No. 42.

² *Śikṣā-samuccaya*. Translated by W. H. D. Rouse, 1922, p. 7.

³ *Ibid*, p. 63.

⁴ Bundle, Vol. 3, p. 88b, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

Again in the same Śāstra he stated thus:—

“This Mahāyāna is the essence of all Dharma.”¹

(B) As to the lineage of Yogācāra school, we have the following teachers during the Nālandā period, they are:—

1. Guṇamati (about the end of 5th A.D.).
2. Digunaga (about the end of the 5th A.D.).
3. Sthiramati (a contemporary of Digunaga).
4. Sankaraśvāmi (a contemporary of Digunaga).
5. Nanda (about 528-560 A.D.).
6. Vimāla Candrapāla (about 528-560 A.D.).
7. Dharmapāla (about the beginning of the 6th A.D.).
8. Śīlabhadra (636 A.D.).
9. Dharmakīrti (about 698-9 A.D.).
10. Jinaputra.
11. Viśeṣa Mitra.
12. Jñānacandra.
13. Bandhuprabha (Nos. 10-13 are all the younger contemporaries of Dharmapāla).

Guṇamati, Digunaga and Sankaraśvāmi.—Regarding the application of the terms by them we have no statement in particular.

Sthiramati.—Of his application we find in the Mahāyānābhīdharmasamūyukta-saṅgīti-śāstra thus:—

“In the Mahāyāna there are four secrets which include all kinds of truths that Buddha has preached.”

Again, in the same Śāstra it has been stated:—

“The question is: if the Śrāvaka-piṭaka and Bodhisattva-piṭaka, etc., are equally derived from the Dharmakāya, then, why the people offering Bodhisattva-piṭaka with fragrances and wigs, produce great limitless fortune and why it is otherwise in the case of Śrāvakayāna?”

¹ See Bundle, Vol 3, p. 89a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

Answer: Because, the Bodhisattva-piṭaka is the foundation of the divine favour and is the source of pleasure for all people.”¹

Nanda and Vimalacandra.—Regarding their application of the terms, nothing is as yet known.

Dharmapāla.—About his application we find the following statement in his Vijñāptimātrasiddhi-śāstra in connection with what he said about six Pravartana-stage:

“The 5th Pravartana stage is low and inferior; that is to say, the stage of two yāna (Śrāvaka and Pratyeka Buddha-yāna) is meant only for the self-benefit and for this purpose, suffering is depreciated, while search after Nirvāṇa and realisation of the truth of Atma-sūnyatā only are advocated.....

The 6th Pravartana stage is high and superior, that is to say, the stage of Mahāyāna is intended for the attainment of great Bodhi—both for self and others—and at the same time they neither hate birth and death nor do they seek for Nirvāṇa; but they look to the attainment of both the Atma-sūnyatā and Dharma-sūnyatā.”²

Again, in the Vaipulya-sata-śāstra-oyākhya he has said thus:—

“This Śloka indicates two kinds of virtues of one who believes in the Mahāyāna. One is the attainment of high knowledge and the other is the great virtue itself. Therefore, Mahāyāna can easily destroy all heretical sects and it gives great benefit. In other words, through those virtues one can attain the highest Nirvāṇa and at the same time help others to shake off the pangs of birth and death.”³

Śilabhadra.—Regarding his application of the terms, we have no statement in particular. However, from the

¹ Sn Bundle, Vol. 8, p. 78b-a, of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

² Wang Bundle, Vol. 10, p. 44a.

³ Ibid, p. 104a.

Chinese as well as from the Japanese accounts, we come to know that he has made three divisions of the whole Buddhism according to different characters of the doctrine, through three different categories, as has been stated in the Śāndhinirmocana-sūtra. The three divisions are:—

(i) The doctrine of existence (*i.e.*, the doctrine which admits the existence of atomic elements but not the existence of Ego).

(ii) The doctrine of Śūnyatā (*i.e.*, the doctrine which does not admit either the existence of atomic elements or the existence of Ego).

(iii) The doctrine of middle-path (*i.e.*, the doctrine which not only admits the existence, but at the same time does not admit the Śūnyatā also). Among them, First division indicates the Hīnayāna doctrine, Second and Third indicate the Mahāyāna doctrine. With the help of these three kinds of division he depreciated the Hīnayāna Buddhism and extolled the Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Dharmakīrti—is a disciple of Dharmapāla. In the translation of Chinese Tripiṭaka we have two works referring to Dharmakīrti as an author. One is Vajrasūci and another is Śikṣa-samucchaya. Regarding his application of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' we find three places² of reference in his latter work. But these statements are, curiously enough, exactly identical with those of Śāntideva's Śikṣa-samucchaya already pointed out by me. From an examination of both I hold that this Śikṣa-samucchaya is, on the whole, almost the same as that of Śāntideva. Therefore even if it is the translation of the same original, it is quite clear that Dharmakīrti

¹ Jiu-ni-mon-ron-shiu-chi-gi-ki: one of the most important commentary on the Dvādaśa-nikāya-śāstra, Vol. I, p. 36-a.

² Su-Bundle, Vol. 3, p. 24b; p. 28a; p. 33b of Chinese Tripiṭaka.

the Little Vehicle who hampered by contracted views, adhere to a Śāstra which abuses the principles of the Great Vehicle. They speak of the followers of that system as men of a different religion, and they wish to hold a controversy with you on this point. Now I know that in your convent there are eminent and exceedingly gifted priests of different schools of learning who will undoubtedly be able to overthrow them—so now, in answer to their challenge, I beg you to send four men of eminent ability, well acquainted with one and the other school, and also with the Esoteric and Exoteric doctrine, to the country of Orissa.’

“When Śīlabhadra had received the letter, he assembled the congregation, and after inquiry, he selected Sāgarāmati, Prajñārasmi, Sindhārasmi and the master of the Law as the four men in reply to the king’s mandate.....
.....‘And now, the master of the Law being desirous to go to Orissa, inquired about getting the essay of the “Little Vehicle” which proposed to destroy the principles of the “Great Vehicle” in 700 ślokas.....

“Then having grasped the errors of the work, he wrote a refutation of it in 600 ślokas, and called it ‘*The destruction of heresy*,’ taking up the doctrines of the Great Vehicle point by point.

“He presented the work to Śīlabhadra and amongst all the disciples there was not one, on reading the work but was consenting to it, ‘who,’ they said, ‘can overturn such arguments?’”¹ This was the condition that existed between the Mahāyānist and Hīnayānist even at that time.

In the above I have shown only the application of the terms ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hīnayāna’ by the Mahāyāna teachers. Let us then see also what was the conception

¹ Beal’s translation of the life of Huien-Tsiang, pp. 158-165.

vihāra of brass, a work magnificent and admirable. But why did not Your Majesty *construct a Kāpālīka temple* or some other building of that sort ?

"The king answered : 'What mean you by these words of reproach ?'

"In reply, they said : '*The Monastery of Nalanda with its "sky-flower" doctrine is not different from that Kāpālīka sect. This is our meaning.*'

"Before this a consecrated king of South India had a teacher, an old Brāhman, whose name was Prajñāgupta and who was well versed in the doctrine of the Sammatīya school. This man composed a treatise in 700 Ślokas against the Great Vehicle. All the teachers of the Little Vehicle rejoiced thereat, and taking the book showed it to the king and said : 'This represents our doctrine : is there a man of the other school that can upset one single word of it ?'

"The king said : 'I have heard of the fox, accompanied by the meadow rats, boasting that he was able to contend with the lion, but as soon as he saw him, his heart failed him and they were all scattered in a moment. You, sirs, have not yet seen the priests of the great Vehicle, and so you firmly maintain your foolish principles. If you once see them—affrighted, you will, *I fear, then, be the same as that (fox).*'

"Then they answered : 'If there be any doubt on the king's part about the matter, why not assemble a conference and let there be a close investigation as to right and wrong ?'

"The king said : 'And what difficulty is there in this ?'

"So on that very day he sent a messenger with a letter to the Nālandā convent to Śīlabhadra, the master of the Law, surnamed 'the treasure of the true doctrine' (saddharmapiṭaka?), in which he said : 'Your servant, whilst progressing through Orissa, met some priests of

was not the author of the work but Sāntideva is. The Chinese translator, however, has made a mistake.

Jiṇaputra, Viśeṣamitra, Jñānachandra and Bandha-prabha.—Regarding their application of the terms we do not find any statement at present. Thus in the above, we have shown several applications of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' by different teachers belonging to the Nālandā period. This application of the terms point to two ends in view: that is to say, through these terms they disparaged doctrine while extolling Mahāyāna Buddhism on the one hand and they tried to prove that the Mahāyāna doctrine is the true doctrine of Buddha on the other. This being the case, we also come to understand that during the Nālandā period there were still many Hīnayānists who used to look down upon the Mahāyānists and their 'Dharma' as not being true Buddha's doctrine, otherwise, why did these Mahāyāna teachers of that time tried to prove that the Mahāyāna Buddhism is the only true doctrine of Buddha. Moreover, this fact is clear from a statement in the life of Hiuen-Tsiang where it has been stated thus:—

"Before Śimharasmi had departed, Śilāditya-rājā had constructed a vihāra covered with brass plates by the side of the Nālanda monastery about a hundred feet in height. It was renowned through all countries.

"The king after returning from the subjugation of Koṇyodha (Ganjam?) came to Orissa. The priests of this country all study the little vehicle [and do not believe in the great vehicle. *They say it is a system of the 'sky-flower' heretics, and was not delivered by Buddha.*

"When they saw the king after his arrival, they entered into conversation and said: 'We hear that the king has built by the side of the Nālandā convent a

of the terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna,' according to the view of the common people at this time. On this point, I-Tsing's statement will give clear explanation. His statement runs thus :—

“Those who worship the Bodhisattva and read the Mahāyāna Sūtras are called the Mahāyānists while those who do not perform these are called the Hīnayānists. There are two kinds of the so-called Mahāyāna, first the Mādhyamika : second, the Yoga ”¹

It should be borne in mind that this kind of conception among the common people were current even in the time of Fā-Hien who started on his travels in A.D. 399 and returned to China after fifteen years. So he has said :—

“Students of the Mahāyāna present offerings to the Prajñāpāramitā, to Mañjusri and to Avalokiteśvara.”²

¹ Dr. Takakusu's, I-Tsing, p. 15.

² Legge's Fa-Hien, p. 46.

